The management of the Vietnamese refugee crisis, when the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) resettled approximately three million refugees between 1975 and 1997, remains a cornerstone of UNHCR’s self-representation and an oft-cited example of successful intervention to this day. However, the focus on resettlement obscures the fact that UNHCR’s engagement in Vietnam started well before the end of the war, in 1973, in the form of humanitarian aid. This essay argues that UNHCR’s early engagement with Vietnam intended to realize the organization’s international ambitions, namely, to further globalize its reach. After its successful war of decolonization, Vietnam attained a special position in the Global South as well as in the communist bloc that allowed UNHCR to build new relationships beyond the West. The essay makes extensive use of archival material, not only from UNHCR’s archives and Western countries, such as the United States and Great Britain, but also from the Vietnamese National Archives, to show how in these early stages the usage of the word “refugee” became a taboo for UNHCR officials and the communist Vietnamese authorities alike. This reluctance to recognize those leaving Vietnam as refugees impeded their chance at protection, while it allowed UNHCR to intervene in the crisis on behalf of the Vietnamese government. Hence, rather than a saviour of refugees from Vietnam, UNHCR let its own interests prevail, violating its mandate to protect refugees. Examining international crisis management and foreign intervention in Vietnam, this essay demonstrates that UNHCR attempted to exploit the crisis to exponentially expand its own size and globalize its reach to both the post-colonial and the communist worlds. Paradoxically, only when UNHCR changed course, adopting the Orderly Departure Program of 1979, did the Office expand to become one of the leading agencies within the UN system.
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