Arbitral Jurisdiction Research Articles

Does Article 8 of the Model Law Call for Full or Prima Facie Review of the Arbitral Tribunal's Jurisdiction?

COURTS IN Model Law jurisdictions are currently divided on an issue that is of great practical and theoretical importance. It concerns the extent of the review of arbitral jurisdiction to be undertaken by a court seised of a referral application based on Article 8(1). Provided that it has been made in a timely manner, such an application can only be dismissed if the agreement is either inapplicable or ‘null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed’ – in other words if the action does not fall within the ambit of an arbitration agreement which is, from a legal standpoint, fully binding.1 In a nutshell, the debate concerns whether the court can perform a full review of the arbitration agreement's validity and applicability – in which case the claim could only be referred to arbitration upon a finding that the claimant actually acted in breach of an undertaking to arbitrate – or whether the court should rather apply a prima facie standard and refer to arbitration upon finding that there is a reasonable likelihood that the claimant acted in breach of a duty to arbitrate. The text of Article 8(1) provides no clear answer. In practice, this debate matters because the court's role has direct consequences on the cost, duration and complexity of referral, as well as on the likelihood that a court will refuse to assert jurisdiction over a claim that allegedly falls within the ambit of an arbitration agreement. From a theoretical standpoint, the debate is essentially about the true basis of the court's obligation to refer the parties to arbitration and a tension between, on the one hand, ensuring the efficiency of the arbitral process and, on the other hand, dealing promptly and finally with objections to the tribunal's jurisdiction in order to ensure that the …

Reconhecimento e Execução do Laudo Arbitral Internacional no Mercosul

termo1 EXECUÇÃO– termo2 ARBITRAGEM– termo3 MERCOSUL. A globalização se caracteriza hoje pelos processos integracionistas, e é nesse sentido o MERCOSUL um andamento desta realidade, que tem necessidade de responder aos conflitos de dinamismo e abertura do comércio atual em vistas ao desenvolvimento dos Estados. Para facilitar estos processos, surgem alheios ao Estado, mecanismos alternativos de solução de controvérsias, que encontram o seu auge no campo das relações dos sujeitos de Direito Privado, onde prima a “autonomia da vontade”. Destes mecanismos o principal é a arbitragem, que é a possibilidade dos particulares, em uso de sua liberdade, mediante acordo de vontades, someter a um terceiro a solução de uma controvérsia, deixando ao arbítrio deste a sorte de seus direitos. Pela importância da arbitragem como meio de estimulo ao comércio internacional surge a necessidade de assegurar e garantir a eficácia para fins de sua maior e melhor utilização, pelo que, diante do seu descumprimento surge a necessidade de efetivar o seu resultado, coativamente se necessário. Este resultado, o laudo ou sentença arbitral é vinculante e obrigatório, é a fase final e a mais importante da arbitragem, não deve exceder-se ao pactuado, e deve ser fundamentado e ter embasamento legal, assim como seguir os requisitos do Tratado ou regulamento interno que o rege. Goza do império da coisa julgada (fato pelo qual não pode ser revisado pelo judiciário a pedido de parte não satisfeita). Em determinadas legislações ela equivale a uma sentença judicial, pelo que pode executar-se como tal. Devido aos elementos que envolvem esta realidade e a dênsa possibilidade de legislação aplicável, surgem Tratados Internacionais e Normativas Internas com o fim de regulamentar e garantir o reconhecimento e execução dos laudos arbitrais internacionais e principalmente harmonizar o seu tratamento jurídico. No MERCOSUL existiam antes Tratados que visavam à regulamentação de solução de controvérsias entre os Estados e entre estes e os particulares, além de se utilizar na arbitragem internacional de outros Tratados e Convenções. Existe aqui uma omissão a respeito do tratamento de controvérsias entre particulares, pacivel de ser notado a partir do Acordo sobre Arbitragem Comercial Internacional do MERCOSUL, e aquele entre o MERCOSUL, Chile e Bolivia, em Buenos Aires (1998). É assim que os Acordos do MERCOSUL remetem à Convenção de Panama (1975), Protocolo de Las Leñas (1992) e Convenção Interamericana de Montevideu (1989), e para Estados não partes se aplicam as Convenções Interamericanas ou por ultimo o direito do Estado requerido da execução. Desta forma a Convenção de Panamá e a de Nova Iorque remetem à lei do Estado onde se pede o reconhecimento e excução do laudo, ficando as matérias não arbitráveis sometida aos direitos internos dos paises sedes da arbitragem e daqueles requeridos do reconhecimento e execução. A validez do acordo se rege pela lei de escolha das partes e subsidiariamente a lei do Estado sede da arbitragem. Pela convenção de Nova Iorque dever-se-á seguir o procedimento de “exequatur”, pelo qual se dota ao laudo estrengeiro da mesma validez e eficácia de um laudo nacional. Mas, nos paises do MERCOSUL, apesar de suas legislações prever a execução de sentenças arbitrais, esses, de forma original não adotam o “exequatur” como condição à execução, devido a que existe aquí a tendência a equiparar o arbitro ao juiz; constituindo o laudo titulo executivo, condicionado eficacialmente a não descumprir a ordem pública nacional e internacional e os bons costumes. São dois os recursos admitidos contra o laudo: os de rectificação / ampliação e os de petição de nulidade, este possivel quando faltante algum elemento de validez, como regularidade do tribunal, principios do devido processo e ampla defesa, capacidade das partes e do árbitro, etc. A retificação é para erros materiais e a ampliação é para pronunciamento de questões materiais da controvérsia não resolvidas. O laudo não pode ser impugnado com o fundamento de violar a garantia de defesa ou o acesso ao judiciário, nem a garantia do juiz natural, visto que as partes acordaram previamente a jurisdição arbitral. A arbitragem acaba com o ditado do laudo definitivo ou quando o tribunal ordena, pelo acordo de partes, ou pelo fato do procedimento ter-se tornado supérfluo ou impossível. Se o laudo reune condições de apreciação dos fatos e aplicação do direito pelo arbitro, é inapelável, isso sem prejuizo de impugnação judicial por via de exeção, só em caso de inconstitucionalidade, ilegalidade ou irrazoabilidade.

The Nature of Arbitral Authority: A Comment on Lesotho Highlands

FOR PURE intellectual challenge, few endeavours match the task of setting principled standards to distinguish an arbitrator's good faith mistakes from an excess of authority. In bargaining for out-of-court dispute resolution, parties to arbitration agreements commit themselves to respect the result regardless of who wins. The award is intended to be final even if one side thinks that the arbitrator got it wrong. Arbitration is a consensual process, however, unfolding within an enclosure created by the contract and applicable arbitration law. The litigants accept the risk of arbitrator mistake only for decisions falling within the borders of arbitral authority. Great practical importance attaches to how lines are drawn between arbitrator mistake and excess of authority. Indeed, the distinction that goes to the heart of what arbitration is all about. A simple error is normally not subject to appeal, since the litigants have asked an arbitrator, not a judge, to decide the legal and factual merits of their disputes. By contrast, no court should recognize an award falling beyond the arbitrator's authority. Thus some measure of judicial scrutiny over arbitral jurisdiction remains a vital safeguard to the integrity of the process, and constitutes an essential corollary to enforcement of legitimate awards. ### (a) Error of Law or Excess of Powers? The House of Lords decision in Lesotho Highlands v. Impreglio 1 serves as a prism through which to separate several of the themes that inhere in the nature of arbitral authority. In rejecting arguments that an error about the currency of an award represented an excess of jurisdiction, their Lordships confirmed a healthy appreciation that arbitrators do not exceed their powers simply by making a mistake. Construction of a dam in the African nation of Lesotho gave rise to a dispute between the builder and the owner. The dispute was submitted to arbitration by a three member tribunal sitting in …

L'arbitre de griefs, instrument efficace de contrôle des abus de pouvoirs de l'employeur ?

In theory, recourse to the grievance arbitration would appear to be an efficient means of controlling the abuse of powers (i.e. violations of the collective agreement) by the employer. Indeed, experience has borne out the truth of this affirmation. Mainly due to the management rights principle however, there still remain several important lacunae in this regard. On the one hand, by invoking the so-called management rights principle as a favorite means for circumscribing the arbitrator's jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of Canada has greatly diminished the efficacy of the arbitration process. This has occured primarily through the quashing of arbitration decisions either on the basis of error of law or else by limiting the arbitrator's discretion in disciplinary cases. On the other hand, it would be just as harmful to the efficiency of the arbitration process if arbitrators themselves were to abuse the management rights principle in interpreting and applying collective agreements. In general, arbitrators have proved to be highly conscious of this problem. By the same token, arbitrators have been faced with the problem of whether or not to discipline acts of insubordination even though employees may have been provoked by an abuse of authority on the part of the employer. All in all, arbitrators, by their attitude, appear to manifest a desire of ensuring the efficient functioning of the arbitration process, without acting to the detriment of management rights. In this regard, the Supreme Court of Canada, with the notable exception of Chief Justice Laskin, would seem to be fighting a rear-guard action by continually emphasizing management rights.

A Thing 'Unknown to Law': the Strange Case of the Admiralty Transport Arbitration Board

Arbitrations are of three kinds … An arbitration may originate: 1. in an agreement between the parties, called a submission; 2. in an order of the Court; 3. in me provisions of an Act of Parliament. … an arbitration arising from a source other than these three is unknown to law. IN CHARACTERISTICALLY forthright terms, Quintin Hogg circumscribed the sources of arbitral jurisdiction in the only edition of his The Law of Arbitration .1 However, an alternative source of arbitral authority had briefly been canvassed in the peculiar conditions of the Great War: an arbitration scheme established by Royal Proclamation to regulate the payment of compensation for the exercise of the Crown's prerogative right to requisition ships. This article reviews the brief history of this body, the Admiralty Transport Arbitration Board, its rules and methods of working, and considers the courts' response to its ambiguous legal status. The Board had been conceived as part of a peacetime act of wartime contingency planning. In the many conflicts of the previous century, the Government had chartered the vessels necessary for military operations on the open market.2 However, it was recognised that the conditions of modern warfare demanded a speedier and more comprehensive mobilisation of tonnage. The Transport Department was asked to consider the means by which an Expeditionary Force might be landed on the Continent, and in December 1912 it commissioned a report from Lionel Fletcher, manager of the White Star Line, and Thomas Royden, Deputy Chairman of the Cunard S.S. Co, to advise on the shipping requirements for this purpose.3 In April 1913, after discussions with the War Office and the Admiralty, the report was produced. In February 1914, an Interdepartmental Committee of the Board of Trade and the Committee for Imperial Defence, under the chairmanship of Admiral Slade, was asked …

Breach of an Arbitration or Exclusive Jurisdiction Clause: The Legal Remedies if it Continues

THIS ARTICLE considers the remedies available to a party1 where an arbitration or exclusive jurisdiction clause has been breached by the commencement of foreign proceedings and, in particular, what the claimant can do where the usual remedies (applying for a stay of the foreign proceedings in the foreign court itself and/or an anti-suit injunction in the English courts against the counterparty continuing in the foreign proceedings) are ineffective. However, before proceeding with this analysis it is important to place the arbitration/jurisdiction clause in context and consider some preventative remedies. In international commercial transactions it has proved increasingly important that all agreements include a dispute resolution provision. Two clauses vital in any dispute resolution provision are the arbitration/jurisdiction and choice of law clauses. These clauses are interrelated: the arbitration/jurisdiction clause cannot competently be drafted until the governing law has been determined because it is that legal system which will generally govern its interpretation. Throughout this article it is assumed that English law2 has been chosen to govern the agreement and that an English arbitral seat or English courts are chosen. In many cases there will be advantages in opting for international arbitration, as opposed to national courts, to resolve an international commercial dispute. Arbitration generates an arbitral award that may be more easily enforceable against a counterparty's transnational assets than a court judgment, or a party (especially a state or sovereign) may refuse to submit to a national court's jurisdiction due to concerns about neutrality or submission to another state's jurisdiction per se . The alternative is a jurisdiction clause which may provide for exclusive or non-exclusive jurisdiction. A party with enough bargaining power will be best served by a clause that provides for exclusive jurisdiction in its home country's court or the courts (if they can be trusted) …

Parallel Actions Pending before an Arbitral Tribunal and a State Court: The Solution under Swiss Law

SWITZERLAND IS undoubtedly known as an arbitration-friendly country. However, since the recent Peruvian case decided by the Federal Tribunal in the matter Compania Minera Condesa SA and Compania de Minas Buenaventura SA v. BRGM-Perou SAS ,1 one may hold a different opinion. True, the motion to set aside the arbitral tribunal's interim award affirming its jurisdiction was rejected by the Federal Tribunal; however, the legal implication of that decision may affect the liberal conception of the Swiss arbitration law, which is one of its characteristic features. Prior to discussing the Federal Tribunal's decision in the Peruvian case, some preliminary considerations should be made. In his introduction, Professor Schlosser gave a brilliant outline of what is meant by the concept of the ‘competence-competence’ of the arbitrators. This concept has a positive effect which empowers the arbitral tribunal to decide on its jurisdiction, and in certain systems of law, such as French law, also a negative effect which obliges a state court to decline its jurisdiction where an arbitration agreement exists. This rule results expressly from Article 1458 of the New Code of Civil Procedure, which applies to both domestic and international arbitration.2 True, under French law, as under most other national laws, the state court will have the last word on the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction, since the decision of the arbitrators in this respect can be reviewed and, as the case may be, set aside by the state jurisdiction. However, the arbitral tribunal has the priority to decide on the issue of its jurisdiction. For the leading trend of the Swiss doctrine, mere is no such negative effect under Swiss law; indeed, according to Article 186 of the Swiss Statute on Private International Law (PIL Statute), the arbitral tribunal is competent to decide on its own jurisdiction. However, this …

International Dispute Resolution - The Regulation of Forum Selection, 14th Sokol Colloquium edited by Jack L. Goldsmith

International Dispute Resolution – The Regulation of Forum Selection, 14th Sokol Colloquium by Jack L. Goldsmith (ed.). Published by Transnational Publishers, Inc., Irvington-on-Hudson (1997, x + 329 pp., incl. Preface, Contributors and Index) . Hardback. Price US$95. ISBN 0-941320-74-X. This book examines how parties can mitigate the effects of concurrent jurisdiction ex ante through the use of forum selection choices, i.e . jurisdiction clauses and arbitration agreements. Furthermore, the role of provisional and protective measures in the regulation of forum selection is discussed. Finally, the book contains a review of judicial doctrines that regulate ‘improper’ forum selections. It is mainly the first part of the book entided ‘Party Control over Forum Selection’ which deals with arbitration. Three of the four contributions contain a comparative study of arbitration agreements and jurisdiction clauses. The one exception is Harold Maier's contribution ‘The U.S. Supreme Court and the “User-Friendly” Forum Selection Clause: the Effect of Carnival Cruise Lines on International Contracts'. As the title suggests, this article contains a review of American case law on forum selection clauses. No clear distinction is made between arbitration agreements and jurisdiction clauses. The author generally concludes that there is a tendency of the courts to become user friendly and enforce the forum selection clauses even where this involves a weaker party who may be forced to go to a difficult forum. William W. Park's contribution is entided ‘The Relative Reliability of Arbitration Agreements and Court Selection Clauses’. Remarkably, he is …

L'Empresa de la Correge et la conquête de la Sicile, le royaume errant de Martin de Montblanc

The empresa of the Correge instituted by Martin, Duke of Montblanc, appears as a motto that attaches, to the Duke, a reduced group of knights, who dedicate their lifes to military exploits, single combats, pilgrimages, armed passage, around the central vow, defense of the ladies. The status, adopted before 1390 and adapted in 1392, after the occupation of Palermo, are the manifestation of a curial and royal order. Composed by twenty-one paragraphs and strongly influenced by French models, the status build up the solid architecture of a power and combat group, who seeks the conquest of Sicily, and guarantee solidarity, mutual payment of ransoms, arbitration jurisdiction, unity and efficiency at the service of the State of conquest whose soul is Martin the Young and that is governed by the Duke. When Martin of Montblanc ascended the throne of Aragon, he did not maintain the motto in his politic function. He attributed it to Catalan barons, but also to the ladies of the aris­tocracy, creating or reactivating on the other hand other pleasures of Society, without, from then on, cultivating a real politic of symbolism, that the Aragonese State did, in fact, not need.

Separability - the Indestructible Arbitration Clause

IN IBM Australia Limited v. National Distribution Services Limited ,1 two members of the New South Wales Court of Appeal suggested that an arbitrator had no jurisdiction to determine whether a contract, pursuant to a provision of which the arbitrator was appointed, was void ab initio . Subsequently, in the Federal Court of Australia, in QH Tours Limited v. Ship Design & Management ( Australia ) Pty Limited ,2 Foster J declined to follow Clarke and Handley JJA in IBM . He favoured a more liberal approach to the scope of an arbitrator's jurisdiction. Recently, Young J in the New South Wales Supreme Court has adopted the more liberal approach, in Ferris v. Plaister .3 It is inimical to the proper working of the arbitral system that there should be doubt on this point. In the writers' opinion, the conclusions arrived at by Foster J and Young J are more consonant with modern principle. First, the statements in IBM are in conflict with the law of Australia with respect to international arbitration to which the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) (‘the Commonwealth Act’) applies. Secondly, the law in other countries and the more recent approach in England suggest that in relation to domestic arbitration also, the statements in IBM are outdated. It is trite to say that an arbitrator's jurisdiction springs from a valid agreement to submit the dispute to arbitration. If the agreement incorporating the provision for arbitration is claimed to be void, does the arbitration clause survive to clothe the arbitrator with jurisdiction to decide the question? The statements in IBM ignore the concept of separability, also known as severability, or autonomy, of the arbitration clause. The arbitration clause is treated as a separate contract. It remains untouched by allegations of invalidity of the principal contract. The …

The Effect of the Place of Arbitration on the Enforcement of the Agreement to Arbitrate

THERE are three stages to any inquiry about the effect of the place of arbitration on the validity or applicability of arbitral agreements. First, it is necessary to determine the contexts in which an attack on the validity of the agreement to arbitrate may occur. Courts will occasionally consider this subject using different rules and deferring to other legal systems depending on the stage reached in the arbitration, the location of the arbitral proceedings and the context in which the issue came to the court's attention. The second stage in the investigation concerns the question of the law to be applied in determining the applicability of the arbitral clause in question. Finally, one has to look at some concrete cases where the choice of a place of arbitration can make a difference. This will identify some of the traps lurking in municipal laws concerning the enforceability of arbitral clauses. Since most of these rules apply to all arbitrations taking place within their territories, they demonstrate the effect that the law of the seat may have on the smooth running of arbitral proceedings. Depending on the place of arbitration, there are a number of ways in which a party can seek to attack the enforceability of an arbitral clause. The extent to which the court is prepared to deal with such challenges prior to the rendering of a final award varies a great deal from country to country. In this context, there is always a risk that a court will either refuse to hear a challenge to the agreement to arbitrate or will only permit it to prevail if it is obviously justified. The Anglo-American tradition, followed by Sweden, and to a lesser extent Germany, is to permit either party to apply to court for a ruling on the arbitrator's jurisdiction …

Competence of Competence: An English View

TYPICALLY in English law, a legal concept gradually develops with each individual case and not as a sudden process of logical reasoning from a set of first principles. So it is not surprising that while relatively few English lawyers and arbitrators, at least until recently, would have used as legal terms of art the actual phrases ‘autonomy of the arbitration clause’1 or ‘competence of competence’, nonetheless English arbitration law has long experience in the practical application of these different legal concepts. This note seeks to demonstrate that the concept of competence of competence is alive and well in English arbitration law2 and that the concept is applied in practice in a flexible manner, despite its absence as an ordinary English legal term of art. It is axiomatic that commercial arbitration depends first on consent. As recently restated by Messrs Redfern & Hunter ‘An arbitration tribunal may only validly determine disputes which the parties have agreed that it should determine. This rule is an inevitable consequence of the voluntary nature of arbitration. In consensual arbitration, the authority or competence of the arbitral tribunal comes from the agreement of the parties; indeed, there is no other source from which it can come. It is the parties who give to what is essentially a private tribunal the authority to decide disputes between them; and the arbitration tribunal must take care to stay within the terms of this authority… an arbitral tribunal must not exceed its jurisdiction…’3 This obvious limitation on the jurisdiction of arbitrators, imposed by the dependence of that jurisdiction on the consent of the parties, gives rise to a logical problem and a practical need. The logical problem is that an examination by an arbitrator of his own jurisdiction in the event of challenge, involves an assumption that …

Jurisdiction of Arbitrators in Case of Assignment of an Arbitration Clause - On a recent decision by the Swiss Supreme Court

Jurisdiction of Arbitrators in Case of Assignment of an Arbitration Clause - On a recent decision by the Swiss Supreme Court

The Importance of Having a Connection

> The Doctrines of ‘Separability’ of the Arbitration Agreement and ‘Competence de la Competence’ in English Law: A Comment on the Judgment of the Court of Appeal in Ashville Investments v. Elmer Contractors (1987) 37 BLR 55. In international arbitration literature a wide range of complex legal issues pertaining to the proper scope of the jurisdiction of arbitrators is often discussed under the headings of the doctrines of separability (or severability) and competence de la competence . Neither concept (and especially not the latter) is widely used in England where however the legal analysis of the actual problems, both by courts and scholars, has been varied and extensive and in many respects more incisive than elsewhere. Writing in 1983, Sir Johan Steyn provided the following brief summary of the position of English law, and its likely future development, on most of the crucial questions of relevance in this context1: ‘The orthodox view in England is that disputes as to 1. whether a contract containing an arbitration clause was ever concluded; 2. whether such a contract was void ab initio; 3. whether such a contract set out the true intention of the parties or should be rectified; fall outside the scope of an arbitration clause in the contract. On the other hand, the English courts have categorised and treated the arbitration clause in a contract as a wholly severable agreement for certain purposes, ie, it survives the termination of the principal contract by fundamental breach, breach of condition or frustration. The concept of the separability of the arbitration clause has not been fully worked out by the English courts, but it is thought that one may be witnessing the gradual evolution of such a concept. It is possible therefore that propositions (ii) and (iii) mentioned above will be re-examined by the courts but …

Multi-party disputes: Consolidation under English law The Vimeira - a Sad Forensic Fable

over Christmas 1980 the vessel Vimeira discharged a cargo of grain at a dock called the Rodenhuizedok in the port of Ghent, having berthed at night stern first with the assistance of pilot and tugs following a turning manoeuvre at the dock entrance. When the vessel left the dock, her rudder was found to have suffered serious damage causing substantial losses to her Owners. Disputes over this incident between the Owners and three other interested parties were referred separately to two arbitrations in London where they became the subject of extensive legal proceedings in the English courts between the Owners, the Time Charterers and the Voyage Charterers of the vessel, and to litigation in Belgium between the Owners and the Ghent Port Authority which was not party to any arbitration agreement. The London arbitrations are a classic lesson in the problems of multi-party disputes arising from the same incident. The case re-affirms the need for some mechanism for ‘consolidation’ of related arbitrations between different parties, both where a claimant claims against multiple respondents and where a respondent claims relief against a third party, which was the case in The Vimeira . These problems exist in every arbitral jurisdiction; and a comprehensive practical solution remains elusive for a number of reasons. In England and other countries enacting the 1958 New York Arbitration Convention, the separate problem exists of related disputes covered by concurrent arbitration and litigation where consolidated court proceedings are thwarted by one party applying for a mandatory stay pursuant to an arbitration agreement with another party, leaving in the litigation other disputants not party to a similar arbitration agreement.1 In The Vimeira this further problem is evident from the separate Belgian proceedings brought by the Owners against the Ghent Port Authority alone; and it has no apparent solution. …

The Court of Appeal of Paris and lack of arbitral jurisdiction A 1980-1986 Digest

in 1980, the French law of arbitration was comprehensively reformed. A year later, a further decree created special rules, characterised by great tolerance for party autonomy, that apply to arbitrations containing an international element (typically a divergence of nationality of the litigants).1 As a result of these reforms, which were incorporated into the New Code of Civil Procedure (or NCPC as it is abbreviated in French), awards rendered ‘in the absence of an arbitration agreement or on the basis of a void or expired agreement’ may be nullified by application to the Court of Appeal at the place of arbitration. (The arbitral tribunal is perceived as functioning in the place of a court of first instance; in consequence, challenges are directly submitted to the appellate jurisdiction). This criterion is identified in the same terms with respect to domestic (NCPC Article 1481(1)) as well as international (1502(1)) awards. It is accordingly of interest to international practitioners to examine the practice of French Courts of Appeal in all cases, domestic or international, involving a challenge to the jurisdiction of arbitrators. Since almost all international arbitrations in France take place in Paris, the most important court from the standpoint of the international lawyer is the Court of Appeal of Paris. An examination of its treatment of challenges to arbitral jurisdiction is especially relevant to International Chamber of Commerce practitioners, since about one-third of ICC awards are rendered in Paris.2 In addition, the highest court (the Cour de cassation ) does not review findings of fact. Jurisdictional issues quite often turn on questions of fact (such as the sufficiency of given types of documents as expressions of an intent to refer to arbitration). Therefore the practitioner will obtain more concrete guidance from the many decisions of the Paris Court – most of which …

The Jurisdiction of an International Commercial Arbitrator

The Jurisdiction of an International Commercial Arbitrator

Book Review: Labor Law: The Question of Arbitrability: Challenges to the Arbitrator's Jurisdiction and Authority

Book Review: Labor Law: The Question of Arbitrability: Challenges to the Arbitrator's Jurisdiction and Authority

The Question of Arbitrability: Challenges to the Arbitrator's Jurisdiction and Authority.

The Question of Arbitrability: Challenges to the Arbitrator's Jurisdiction and Authority.

The Question of Arbitrability—Challenges to the Arbitrator's Jurisdiction and Authorityby GrossmanMark M. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, New York State School of Labor and Industrial Relations, 1984, 122 pages, $9.95 paper.

The article presents a review of the book “The Question of Arbitrability: Challenges to the Arbitrator's Jurisdiction and Authority,” by Mark M. Grossman.