BOOK REVIEWS 481 Proslogion H and IlL A Third Interpretation of Anselm's Argument. By Richard R. La Croix. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972. Pp. xii + 137) This modest but original little work is not another refutation or defense of the ontological argument. Such polemics presuppose that the ontological argument of Anselm has been adequately identified. The author attempts to recover Anselm's own line of thought. According to La Croix, there are three interpretations of the Proslogion. (1) The "traditional" interpretation is that Pros. II is the one argument Anselm offers for God, and that it is logically complete. (2) The "new" interpretation of Malcolm, Charlesworth, etc. holds that Pros. III contains a new argument, or at least that a new argument can be constructed from III. (3) The author's own or third interpretation, which holds that there is only one argument, constituted by the entire Proslogion, and that chapters II and III do not offer independent arguments and do not claim to prove that God exists. Although La Croix's prose is repetitive and heavy-footed, his exegesis of Anselm is very persuasive. His indicating certain propositions by arbitrary code letters, rather than writing them out, is completely unnecessary and makes impossible demands on the memory of the reader. But the content of this little book is in many respects very good and comes much closer to Anselm's own thought than many other much-touted but fundamentally arbitrary interpretations. The author's basic line, that Pros. II and III merely prove that that-than-which-no-greater-can-be-conceived exists, and that chapters V to the end show that that existing being has the attributes of God, seems altogether convincing . He concludes that Anselm's argument is formally valid. Yet in the brief evaluation of Anselm's reasoning, La Croix doubts whether the argument really proves the existence of God, since, in his view, any existential claims at all can be established merely by selecting the appropriate assumptions. In any case, the validity of his illuminating exegesis is independent of his evaluation of Anselm's argument. For those who can overlook the author's tendency to repeat himself and to labor the obvious, much can be learned from this valuable little work. The book suffers, however, from the most curious and fundamental limitations. The bibliography lists only works in English. Although half-a-dozen lines are quoted in Latin, it is obvious that the author is working from Charlesworth's translation. He has no independent grasp of the original Latin texts. He seems unfamiliar with Anselm's other works, even those which have been translated, and his exegesis of this particular argument is not supported by an understanding of Anselm's philosophy as a whole. The most valuable secondary literature on Anselm is ignored for the simple reason that it is written in French or German, which are the chief languages of research in mediaeval thought. Gilson's great article in French, perhaps the best thing ever written on the original meaning of Anselm's proof, is not mentioned in this work. So, this book is a contribution to current philosophical controversy rather than to mediaeval scholarship. PAUL I. W. MILLER University o/Colorado Diderot: The Virtue o/a Philosopher. By Carol Blum. (New York: Viking Press, 1974. Pp. viii + 182. $8.95) This relatively short book on Diderot is very well written. In fact, its style is so deceptively simple that one might be misled into believing that the work is not profound 482 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY or scholarly. The more closely one reads, however, it becomes quite clear that its attractive style succeeds in making a scholarly work interesting for Diderot scholars as well as for the non-specialist. As I perused this work by Professor Blum, I found myself in agreement with most of her astute and penetrating observations. I did, however, find myself frequently wondering whether on two points, one fairly important, the other minor, the author could be as dogmatic or definite as she is. The more significant matter was the degree to which Diderot was preoccupied with the importance he attached to the public's acceptance of himself as...