INTRODUCTION The acceptance of planning and contraceptives by a society depends very much on its inner life style. Religious edicts, social mores and tradition may impose restrictions on aspirations to limit size. However, when a population group is situated amidst a modern society, even its most conservative elements do not remain entirely unaffected by this dimension of the modem world. Such a phenomenon took place among the very traditionally inclined Arab society living in Israel. The change in attitude started very slowly with the establishment of the State in 1948, but gathered speed over the next four and a half decades. However, the knowledge about the effect of modernization and industrialization on the Arab population in Israel remained mainly empirical in nature. Although no documented data are available regarding contraceptive utilization by the Arab population in the pre-State period, it seems reasonable to assume that little or no use was made of artificial means by this community, as evidenced by the number of children per family. Religious fatalism, norms intricately interwoven with tradition, and the emphasis on the essential needs of the extended and the clan, were all conducive to a high fertility rate in this society that lived primarily off the land (Eisenbach, 1978). However, the economic value of children in an agrarian society is debatable. Caldwell (1976a, b), for example, believes that the household economics of a farm demands a number of children to ensure a labor force. In other words, offspring constitutes a valuable economic component in the agrarian society. Mueller (1975) holds a different view, maintaining that children until the age of 15 years have a negative economic value, since their needs surpass their productivity. Their contribution to labor income, he opines, lags far behind the economic burden they place upon a farming family. A factor that affects Moslems in all walks of life is the rigid gender differentiation. Children are not considered equal, a son being much more valuable than a daughter. While sons are regarded as the pillars of the family, daughters rank far below them, not seldom to a point where they are seen as a burden on the household (Granqvist, 1950). Al-Haj (1983) also found gender inequality among urban Arabs in Israel. This centrality of the sons is strengthened by the precept that continuation of the line is ensured only through male descent. The male's supreme position is further enhanced by his crucial role in matters of inheritance, especially where land is the central issue. If the husband predeceases his wife without leaving male heirs, his estate will irrevocably be divided among his brothers and their children, with consequent deprivation of the widow's rights. Hence, in these circumstances planning becomes a viable concept only where there is (sufficient) male offspring. A nuclear with only daughters will find it extremely difficult to withstand the societal pressure, and in the majority of cases the couple will continue to enlarge the in a frantic attempt to sire a son. In the deliberations of Arab families in Israel whether or not to practise planning, the focal point is the choice between a large family and a larger family (Al-Haj, 1983). In either case, the decision making process regarding the number of children, or birth spacing, starts with the marriage and often ends only in the post-menopausal period. Although a trend toward independence and freedom from the eternal influence of the clan and extended is discernible among the younger generation of Moslems (Al-Nouri, 1980), many still adhere to ethnic mores and religious tradition. This strong allegiance to tradition by the Moslems is the propellant for the high birth rate in Arab countries (United Nations, 1986; Table 1). Indeed, Farid (1984) found that both young and older Arab women unequivocally support the notion of numerous offspring. …