The recent literature offers several models of the notion of matter of fact supposition1 revealed in the acceptance of the so-called indicative conditionals. Some of those models are qualitative [Collins 90], [Levi 96], [Stalnaker 84]. Other probabilistic models appeal either to infinitesimal probability or two place probability functions ([Adams 75], [van Fraassen 95], [Joyce 99], [McGee 94]). Recent work has made possible to understand which is the exact qualitative counterpart of the latter probabilistic models. In this article we show that the qualitative notion of change that thus arises is hypothetical revision, a notion previously axiomatized in [Arló-Costa 97] and [Arló-Costa & Thomason 96]. This notion is incompatible with AGM as well as with other standard methods of theory change (like Katsuno and Mendelzon's UPDATE). The way in which matter-of-fact supposition is modeled by hypothetical revision is illustrated via examples. The model is compared with other qualitative accounts of the notion of supposition encoded in two-place probability functions (like the one offered in [Hajek & Harper 96]), with models of subjunctive supposition, as well as with some of the well know models of learning. Applications in knowledge representation and in the theory of games and decisions are summarized.