Contrary to what the name suggests, the recent work of Howard Margolis (1987) and Ronald Giere (1988) demonstrates that the “cognitive turn” in the philosophy of science is not simply the application of cognitive science to the study of science. For one thing, neither one is what Jerry Fodor (1981) has called a “methodological solipsist,” that is, someone who wants to account for thought processes without presupposing an account of the world of which those thoughts are about. Margolis, in fact, comes perilously close to Fodor’s anti-cognitivist foe, J. J. Gibson (1979), whose “ecological” perspective requires that an organism’s thought processes be specified in terms of structures in the environment, “affordances,” capable of satisfying the organism’s desire to know. The Margolian focus on overcoming “barriers” to alternative “habits of mind,” as the psychic basis of Kuhn’s paradigm shifts, only serves to highlight this broadly “functional” side of thinking that typically has no place in cognitive science.