Imagine this scenario: You are an American citizen. Based on a belief that you are a threat, you are ordered captured and detained by U.S. authorities. While being held pursuant to policy memoranda and orders issued by high-ranking officials in Washington, DC, you are subjected to acts of cruel and unusual physical treatment, which, in your view, violate the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution as well as the United Nations Convention against Torture. Should you be able to file a civil action seeking damages against those high-ranking officials in the executive branch who authorized your torture or should they be shielded from suit on grounds of national security and official immunity? In the recent past, four such cases--known as Bivens actions--have made their way through the federal courts to the appellate level. This article reviews those cases and concludes that, given recent decisions, the plaintiffs in such suits are likely to have their claims barred. Bivens Actions When an official operating color of state violates someone's civil rights as established by the Constitution and federal law, victims have the right to sue for damages under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. (1) Yet, no such federal statute creates a cause of action against federal officials for violating those same civil rights. As a result, victims of civil rights violations by federal officials historically turned to state courts to seek redress, often with mixed results given the diversity of laws across the 50 states. (2) In 1967, Webster Bivens brought suit against six agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics for violations of his Fourth Amendment rights in federal court. (3) Bivens alleged that the agents entered and searched his residence without a warrant and arrested him without probable cause. Arguing that he great humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering, Bivens sought $15,000 in damages from each of the agents for their unlawful conduct. (4) district court accepted the federal government's view and dismissed on grounds that federal law did not create a cause of action against officials operating under color of federal law for violations of civil rights and, moreover, even if it did, the agents were operating in their official capacity and thus were immune from suit. Seizing on the district court's cause of action determination, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. (5) Supreme Court, however, disagreed and reversed. Writing for the majority, Justice William Brennan cautioned that power, once granted, does not disappear like a magic gift when it is wrongfully used. An agent acting--albeit unconstitutionally--in the name of the United States possesses a far greater capacity for harm than an individual trespasser exercising no authority other than his own. (6) Noting the inherent danger in overstepping one's authority, the Court added that the pursuit of a civil action was an appropriate measure for someone whose rights were violated by an official of the executive branch: Historically, damages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty. (7) Because the Supreme Court did not discern any special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress, it held that Bivens was entitled to recover money damages for any injuries he has suffered as a result of the agents' violation of the Amendment. (8) As he wrapped up his opinion, Justice Brennan admonished, The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. (9) Even though Bivens dealt specifically with a violation of the Fourth Amendment, it opened the door for lawsuits alleging violations of the various amendments of the Bill of Rights. (10) Of particular relevance to the post-9/11 torture cases discussed below, in Carlson v. …