Appellate Division Research Articles

The Last Case [Reprint — (1978) 16:1 Alta. L. Rev. 1

This is an exact reprint of an article published in 1978 in Volume 16 of the Alberta Law Review. It is the story of the last appeal to go from Canada to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, as told by the late Justice Morrow of the Supreme Court of Alberta Appellate Division. This article not only describes the background to a historically significant case that went through the Appellate Division, but also provides the unique perspective of one of its former members. As noted in the original abstract, “[t]he material contained in the reported decisions is interesting but it is hoped the reader will find that the story back of the reports is even more interesting.”

The possible legal development of the intergation rule in the South African law of contract by means of the doctrine of rectification

Article in AfrikaansAs far back as the early twentieth century the Appellate Division in Cassiem v Standard Bank of SA Ltd, held that:“We are bound by the English rules of evidence and the question has therefore to be decided according to English law, the rule being that parol evidence is not allowed to alter, vary, or contradict a written instrument.”The integration rule has always been an integral part of the South African law of contract where the admissibility of the presentation of extrinsic evidence of previous or collateral agreements was considered. In 1998 an extensive report was brought out by the South African Law Commission wherein certain recommendations were made to the Minister of Justice pertaining to, inter alia, the application of the integration rule in the South African law of contract. The Law Commission was of the opinion that the disadvantages of the integration rule outweighed the advantages of legal certainty and finality and recoomended that the rule be abolished and that more subjective evidence should be allowed to ascertain the true intention of the parties. The recommendations by the Law Commission however apparently died a slow death and there has been no attempt since to abolish or modify the rule in the South African legal system.In 'n previous article the view was held that the integration rule is based on a legal rule or legal fiction and that it can therefore be validly abolished or modified by legislation. Legislation is however a drastic step which should only serve as a last resort and other alternatives should first be considered. This article considers one such a possible alternative, namely the remedy of rectification. The focus will be in particular on a brief discussion of the application of the integration rule in the South African law of contract, the field of application and scope of rectification, the relation between rectification and the integration rule, and, lastly, if rectification can be utilised to avoid the strict application of the integration rule and consequently serve as an instrument for the (indirect) abolition or modification of the rule in the South-African law of contract. The conclusion is that the remedy of rectification would in all probability not in all instances be able to avoid the strict application of the integration rule and that legislation seems to be the only workable alternative to abolish or modify the integration rule in the South African law of contract.Keywords: abolish; common intention; extrinsic evidence; integration rule; law of contract; legislation; mistake; modify; rectification; written contract.

In the Matter of the Veto by Governor Chris Christie of the Minutes of the New Jersey Racing Commission from the June 29, 2011 Meeting and the Allocation Action Taken at the Meeting by the New Jersey Racing CommissionCase No. A-6028-10T3, 2012 N.J. Super. LEXIS 186 (Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, December 7, 2012)

Gaming Law Review and EconomicsVol. 17, No. 3 CasesIn the Matter of the Veto by Governor Chris Christie of the Minutes of the New Jersey Racing Commission from the June 29, 2011 Meeting and the Allocation Action Taken at the Meeting by the New Jersey Racing CommissionCase No. A-6028-10T3, 2012 N.J. Super. LEXIS 186 (Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, December 7, 2012)Published Online:17 Apr 2013https://doi.org/10.1089/glre.2013.17315AboutSectionsPDF/EPUB ToolsPermissionsDownload CitationsTrack CitationsAdd to favorites Back To Publication ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmail FiguresReferencesRelatedDetails Volume 17Issue 3Apr 2013 InformationCopyright 2013, Mary Ann Liebert, Inc.To cite this article:In the Matter of the Veto by Governor Chris Christie of the Minutes of the New Jersey Racing Commission from the June 29, 2011 Meeting and the Allocation Action Taken at the Meeting by the New Jersey Racing CommissionCase No. A-6028-10T3, 2012 N.J. Super. LEXIS 186 (Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, December 7, 2012).Gaming Law Review and Economics.Apr 2013.243-248.http://doi.org/10.1089/glre.2013.17315Published in Volume: 17 Issue 3: April 17, 2013PDF download

Justice James D. Hopkins: Jurist, Dean, Scholar and Expert on New York Law

It is an appropriate tribute to our late Dean James D. Hopkins that this edition of Pace Law Review be dedicated to a man who many leaders of the bench, bar, and academia believe is one of the twentieth century’s greatest common law appellate jurists. Dean Hopkins, better known as Judge Hopkins, was Pace Law School’s second Dean from 1982 to 1983, an associate justice of the Supreme Court of New York, and a justice of the Appellate Division for the Second Department from 1962 to 1981. He authored hundreds of significant majority, dissenting, and concurring judicial opinions on New York law, many of which continue to be relevant to the development of substantive and procedural law in the Empire State. Hopkins’s opinions have been cited and relied on by courts throughout the nation. He is recognized and praised as a “compleat jurist,” a leading law reformer, and an outstanding scholar.

The Courts, Futility, and the Ends of Medicine

On august 13, 2010, the appellate division of the Superior Court of New Jersey declined to rule in the matter of Betancourt v Trinitas Hospital,1 a case that raised questions about the limits of medicine in patients with advanced illness. In declining to rule, the judges wrote that resolving such issues in “the context of overheated rhetoric in the battlefield of active litigation” would not positively contribute to the policy debate around medical futility. These comments raise important questions about whether there is a role for the courts in helping to shape the boundaries of medical practice near the end of life. One view is that courts should not provide guidance on medical futility disputes. Texas has formalized this belief into law. The Texas Advance Directives Act bars substantive judicial review when intractable conflict arises between clinicians and patients or their surrogate decision makers. It gives physicians and hospital committees authority to unilaterally withdraw life-sustaining treatment when they believe attempts to extend a patient’s life are inappropriate.2 The state medical associations in California, Washington, and Wisconsin have considered resolutions supporting similar legislation. Another view is that the possibility of appeal to the courts should be preserved because courts have an important role in ensuring fair deliberations between parties (eg, families and physicians) of unequal power.3 Both perspectives neglect a complexity: although judicial intervention is undesirable for the vast majority of decisions in medicine, preserving the possibility of appeal to the courts in medical futility cases may have beneficial effects at the societal level that are distinct from the benefits sought in individual cases. This viewpoint presents a justification for a limited judicial role in intractable futility disputes and delineates 3 potential benefits of preserving this option.

The Appellate Division has spoken - Sequestration Proceedings do not Qualify as Proceedings to Enforce a Credit Agreement under The <i>National Credit Act</i> 34 of 2005: <i>Naidoo v ABSA Bank</i> 2010 4 SA 597 (SCA)

This case note aims to analyse the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Naidoo v ABSA Bank 2010 4 SA 597 (SCA) and to spark some debate as to whether being under debt review in terms of the National Credit Act (NCA) should bar sequestration proceedings in the form of an application for the compulsory sequestration of a consumer’s estate. This decision held that a credit provider does not need to comply with the procedure provided for in section 129(1) of the NCA before instituting sequestration proceedings against a debtor, as such proceedings are not proceedings to enforce a credit agreement. The main issues discussed in this article are whether the court was correct in its interpretation of the relevant provisions of the NCA and whether this decision that allows a creditor to sequestrate a debtor who is attempting to meet his/her obligations under debt review, without informing him/her, is consistent with the principle urging consumers to satisfy all of their financial obligations under the NCA. It is submitted by the author that the court was correct in its interpretation of the relevant provisions of the NCA, but may have overlooked how this decision may impact the principle of satisfaction by the consumer of all of his/her financial obligations. It is suggested by the author that amendments be made to force the creditor to give a section 129 notice to the debtor before seeking sequestration of his/her estate. The author also suggests that once debt restructuring has been granted, credit providers should not be allowed to proceed with sequestration proceedings against the debtor.

Privacy Revisited: GPS Tracking as Search and Seizure

Part I of this Article discusses the facts in People v. Weaver, the majority and dissenting opinions in the Appellate Division, Third Department decision, and the majority and dissenting opinions in the Court of Appeals decision. Part II addresses the question that has yet to be decided by the U.S. Supreme Court—whether GPS tracking of a vehicle by law enforcement constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. Part III addresses the separate question that the Court of Appeals did not address in Weaver—whether the surreptitious attachment of a GPS device to a vehicle constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The Article concludes that law enforcement’s use of a GPS device to track the movements of a vehicle continuously for an extended period of time is a serious intrusion into a motorist’s reasonable expectation of privacy that constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, although the issue is somewhat murkier, the attachment of the GPS device to a vehicle may also constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

Privacy Revisited - GPS Tracking as Search and Seizure

Part I of this Article discusses the facts in People v. Weaver, the majority and dissenting opinions in the Appellate Division, Third Department, and the majority and dissenting opinions in the Court of Appeals. Part II addresses the question that has yet to be decided by the U.S. Supreme Court - whether GPS tracking of a vehicle by law enforcement constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. Part III addresses the separate question that the Court of Appeals did not address - whether the surreptitious attachment of a GPS device to a vehicle constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The Article concludes that law enforcement’s use of a GPS device to track the movements of a vehicle continuously for an extended period of time is a serious intrusion into a motorist’s reasonable expectation of privacy that constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, although the issue is somewhat murkier, the attachment of the GPS to a vehicle may constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

Joining the Court: Pierce Butler

Joining the Court: Pierce Butler DAVID SCHROEDER In a four-year span beginning in the summer of 1921, five new members took their seats on the Supreme Court, and three ofthose men—the middle three—arrived on the Bench within four months ofeach other. The first ofthe five was William Howard Taft, who, upon the death of Edward Douglass White, was named ChiefJustice of the United States by President Warren G. Harding. Minnesota corporate lawyer Pierce Butler wrote Taft a genial letter, extending his congratulations and best wishes. “1 felicitate you because it is an honor to any man to be chosen to that, the most exalted position in the world, and because no one who is qualified to discharge the duties of the office can fail to rejoice in attaining it. But the country is to be congratulated much more than you are.”1 Years earlier, former President Taft and attorney Butler both had been involved in the Grand Trunk Railroad arbitration, Taft as one of three arbitrators and Butler as one of two counsel for the Canadian government. Dur­ ing the proceedings, each man sized up the other professionally, and each was favorably impressed; the men developed a cordial per­ sonal relationship, staying at the same hotel and dining together several nights a week. As President, Taft had relished appointing men to the Supreme Court, and as Chief Justice he felt free to offer Harding and Attorney Gen­ eral Harry Daugherty advice on whom they should consider for a number of imminent vacancies. As the Court paused for its 1922 summer recess, the Chief believed it was not inconceivable that four seats might become vacant within a year or two. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., was eighty-one and weakening physically. Joseph McKenna was seventy-nine and ailing mentally. At seventy-three, William Rufus Day had been quite ill earlier in the year and planned to retire soon. Mahlon Pit­ ney was only sixty-four, but he had suffered a stroke the previous year. In addition to the possibility of those vacancies came an actual and unexpected vacancy: John Hessin Clarke resigned to devote his energies to encouraging America’s entry into the League of Nations and “to read many books; to travel; and to serve my neighbors and some public causes.”2 Taft weighed in on Clarke’s resignation and replacement. Ifthis is true [Taft told Harding], and you have appointed Senator [George] Sutherland, I have no doubt he will be PIERCE BUTLER 145 promptly confirmed, and I congratu­ late you on the strength he will give to the Court. Clarke was a good fellow, but I differed with him a good deal in respect to his constitutional views, and I do not think he has been happy on the Court. He lost his sister dur­ ing this last year, who was his only relative, and it has seriously affected his peace of mind. I think, too, he is not in good health, nor do I think that the work on the Court was pleasing to him. It seems a curious circumstance, though I could explain it, that he and McReynolds are bitter enemies, due largely to McReynolds’ overbearing and insulting attitude toward Clarke.3 Sutherland’s appointment was anticipated: he had expressed to Harding his wish for a Court appointment, and Harding had all but promised him the first open seat.4 With Sutherland on the Bench and Day’s retirement imminent, Harding and Harry Daugherty were bombarded with suggestions. Very early, Harding had voiced his desire to appoint a Democrat; a second criterion, that the nominee be a Catholic, seemed reasonable since the only representatives ofthat faith were the late Chief Justice and McKenna, whose seat many expected to be vacant soon. Taft and his alter ego Justice Willis Van Devanter saw John W. Davis, a Democrat and Solicitor Gen­ eral in the Wilson administration, as the best candidate. Charles Hilles, personal secretary to President Taft and Republican party insider during the 1920s, suggested Victor Dowling (a member of the Appellate Division ofthe New York Supreme Court) and Martin Manton (a U.S. Circuit Court judge), both of whom met both criteria. Taft liked Dowling personallybut...

Supreme Courts as Courts of General Original Jurisdiction

In a common-law jurisdiction, “Supreme Court” is not always the name of a court of final appeal. There are 41 Supreme Courts and Supreme Courts of Judicature with general original jurisdiction. They cover 60 political units, including Australian states and territories, Belize, Brunei, Canadian provinces and territories, Gibraltar, Singapore, and Samoa. The Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court is the common court of six Commonwealth countries and three United Kingdom territories. The oldest among them is the Supreme Court of New York,A court with the name “Supreme Court” or “Supreme Court of Judicature” can have general appellate jurisdiction in addition to general original jurisdiction. Examples: New York, Palau. Otherwise, there is a separate court with general appellate jurisdiction. Examples: Falkland Islands, Gibraltar.In some jurisdictions, a second appeal is possible. Examples: to the New York Court of Appeals from the Appellate Division; to the High Court of Australia from an Australian state.This article provides a list with the names of the political units served by Supreme Courts or by Supreme Courts of Judicature with general original jurisdiction; a statement whether a Supreme Court or a Supreme Court of Judicature of a political unit has both general original jurisdiction and general appellate jurisdiction, or only general original jurisdiction; and further information.See New Judiciary Article for the New York Constitution

Unilateral Refusal of Treatment and Patient Abandonment: Betancourt v. Trinitas Hospital, Brief of Amicus Curiae, Law Professor Thaddeus Mason Pope

Betancourt v. Tinitas Hospital is now pending before the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court. Trinitas Hospital is appealing a March 2009 trial court injunction, ordering its physicians to continue providing life-sustaining medical treatment (particularly dialysis) that these providers judged to be medically inappropriate and outside the standard of care. In early 2009, patient Ruben Betancourt was in a permanent vegetative state with multi-organ failure and slim prospects for recovery. Still, the patient’s daughter, Jacqueline, would not accede to recommendations to stop dialysis and switch to palliative care. When it became apparent that providers might unilaterally withdraw Mr. Betancourt’s life-sustaining treatment, Jacqueline sought injunctive relief. In March 2009, the trial court issued a final order appointing Jacqueline as guardian, and requiring Trinitas Hospital to continue the life-sustaining treatment. New Jersey has long been the “proving ground” for healthcare law at the end of life. This case squarely and explicitly presents the core medical futility question: “Must physicians provide life-sustaining treatment they think medically inappropriate just because it is requested by the patient’s substitute decision maker?” The Betancourt case is unique and important. Almost all previous futility cases were framed in far more narrow and coincidental ways, in terms of EMTALA, for example. Therefore, this case may provide much-needed and much-wanted guidance not only in New Jersey but also across the United States and beyond. Accordingly, the case has attracted amicus briefs from, among others: the New Jersey Hospital Association, the Catholic Healthcare Partnership of New Jersey, the Medical Society of New Jersey, Not Dead Yet, ADAPT, New Jersey Physicians, the Greater New York Hospital Association, Agudath Israel of America, and the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America. In this amicus curiae brief, law professor Thaddeus Pope supports the position of Plaintiff/Petitioner Jacqueline Betancourt. He argues: (1) that the disputed treatment is within the standard of care, (2) that in any right to refuse critical care treatment is conditioned on transferring the patient, (3) that the New Jersey advance directives act is irrelevant to the dispute since the patient did not have an advance directive, (4) that Jacqueline is the appropriate guardian, and (5) that New Jersey statutory and Supreme Court authority forbid the judicial creation of a new internal dispute resolution mechanism making the hospital’s own ethics committee a forum of last resort.

A Simplified Judiciary Article for the New York Constitution

This essay suggests adoption of proposed article VI (Judiciary), as the substitute for present article VI (Judiciary) of the New York Constitution. Proposed article VI is needed, because present article VI is verbose, and the present New York court structure is complex. Verbosity: There are 15,397 words in present article VI. The complete United States Constitution has about 7,600 words. Complexity: A “unified court system” (present article VI, section 1(a)) exists, but only in the sense that New York courts are unified bureaucratically through the Office of Court Administration, which oversees court operations. The overseer bureaucracy notwithstanding, New York courts are not unified structurally. There are fifteen courts. Some courts are for the whole of the state, and some courts are for parts of the state. There are several ways to select judges and justices. To cure verbosity, proposed article VI has 4,246 words. That constitutes a reduction of about 70% in the number of words. There are concomitant improvements of constitutional expression and exposition. To cure complexity, proposed article VI should provide for six courts. All the courts, except the Town Courts, should be state-wide courts. There should be but two ways of selecting judges: nomination by a governor, subject to the consent of the Senate, and election. The Office of Court Administration would not be affected by proposed article VI. The names of the major New York courts (Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Court of Appeals) would be retained in proposed article VI, except that the name of the Supreme Court would revert to Supreme Court of Judicature, its original name. Many jurisdictions across the common-law world, New York among them, are served by a Supreme Court or by a Supreme Court of Judicature, the distinctive feature of which is general original jurisdiction. Further, the names of the major New York courts have deep roots in the past. Continuity of nomenclature is an aspect of legitimacy. Other essays about revision of the New York Constitution are: New Preamble and New Bill of Rights Article for the New York Constitution New Suffrage Article for the New York Constitution New Legislature Article for the New York Constitution New Executive Article for the New York Constitution New Officers and Civil Departments Article for the New York Constitution New Local Governments Article for the New York Constitution Eight New Articles for the New York Constitution See Supreme Courts as Courts of General Original Jurisdiction Corpulent Paychecks for New York Judges and Justices

WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST AWARD FOR JUDICIAL EXCELLENCE ADDRESS

The William H. Rehnquist Award is one of the most celebrated judicial honors in the country. It is given each year to a state court judge who demonstrates the “highest level of judicial excellence, integrity, fairness, and professional ethics.” The 2008 recipient, Jonathan Lippman, was recently appointed and confirmed as Chief Judge of the State of New York. Chief Judge Lippman was previously the Presiding Justice of the Appellate Division of the First Judicial Department of the New York State Supreme Court. He was appointed New York's Chief Administrative Judge by Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye and served from January 1996 to May 2007 and was responsible for the operation of a court system with a $2.4 billion budget, 1300 state‐paid judges, 2300 town and village judges, and 16,000 nonjudicial personnel. Among his numerous professional activities, Chief Judge Lippman served as president of the Conference of State Court Administrators from 2005 to 2006 and was the vice‐chair of the National Center for State Courts from 2005 to 2006, where he was a member of the Board of Directors from 2003 to 2007. During his tenure, Chief Judge Lippman has been the recipient of numerous awards and recognitions, including the 2006 Fund For Modern Courts Cyrus R. Vance Tribute for Vision, Integrity and Dedication to the Fair Administration of Justice Personified by Cyrus R. Vance (November 27, 2006); the New York County Lawyers’ Association Conspicuous Service Award in Recognition of Many Years of Outstanding Public Service (September 28, 2006); and the Award for Excellence in Public Service of the New York State Bar Association's Committee on Attorneys in Public Service (January 24, 2006). Chief Judge Lippman received a Bachelor of Arts in Government and International Relations from New York University, Washington Square College, where he graduated cum laude in 1965. He also received his J.D. from New York University in 1968. Below is the speech he delivered after accepting the William H. Rehnquist Award from U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John G. Roberts.

Recent Developments in Health Law: Constitutional Law: Despite Reservations, the Second Circuit Defers to State Court's Determination That a Preponderance of the Evidence Standard is Constitutional for Recommitment of NRRMDD Defendants –Ernst J. v. Stonea

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently upheld United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York Judge's denial of petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court held that it was not objectively unreasonable for the Appellate Division to conclude, in light of clearly established federal law as expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States, that a New York statute providing for the recommitment of specific defendants who plead not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect (NRRMDD) under a mere “preponderance of the evidence” standard does not violate either due process or the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Judicial Decisionmaking and the Use of Panels in the Canadian Supreme Court and the South African Appellate Division

Research on the U.S. Supreme Court suggests that judges' decisions are influenced by their policy preferences. Moreover, judges behave strategically to facilitate outcomes that conform as close as possible to those preferences. We seek to generalize this assertion to judicial actors in two very diverse social systems: Canada in the post-Charter years and apartheid-era South Africa. Specifically, we analyze the use of panel assignments by the chief justices in both countries. We find that chief justices do behave strategically. Chief justices in both countries do not assign judges to panels randomly but rather are influenced by the tenure and ideology of the sitting judges and the issues presented in the case.

Capitalism, Calculus, and Conscience

IN JUNE 2002, in a 4-to-1 decision, the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court ruled that it's okay to rip off the children of New York City. The Appellate Division judicial crew overturned a landmark ruling by Manhattan Supreme Court Justice Leland DeGrasse. DeGrasse had outraged Gov. George Pataki and his business and political cronies by ruling that New York's state funding system deprived city children of their right to a basic education. Responding to the complaint of a coalition of parents and teachers, DeGrasse ordered reforms to bring certified teachers, reduced class sizes, up-to-date texts, and upgraded technology to city schools that lacked all these things. He ordered that all New York City schoolchildren must be afforded the same kinds of educational opportunities as children in more affluent sections of the city and in the suburbs. In DeGrasse's decision didn't have any of the tricky nuances employed by the Business Roundtable or the U.S. Congress, among others. For DeGrasse, reform meant spending money to make more democratic by making sure that all children in New York had equal access to the types of schools that affluent students consider their due. Politicians and their corporate handlers didn't sit still for such a ruling. Equity is not on the capitalist, corporate, congressional agenda. Along with their brethren around the country, politicos in New York operate according to the rule handed down from the summit convened at IBM headquarters when Bush the Elder was in office and Clinton was the education governor of Arkansas. This rule decrees that schools must find their gold in high standards and the hoopla surrounding testing, not in the public purse. These fellows draw on what passes for research and is issued by those at Heritage, Fordham, Manhattan, Cato, et al. -- ideologues who chant the mantra, We've tried throwing money at schools. It doesn't work. Pull up your bootstraps, and raise your test scores. Right. Their slogan might be, Just Say No to Low Test Scores. Money doesn't solve problems; high- stakes tests solve problems. Led by Gov. Pataki, the state of New York appealed DeGrasse's ruling. And there we have for the global economy in a nutshell: the state sues to make sure remains better for the rich and worse for the poor. The Global Economy Swamps the Schoolhouse In writing the New York Appellate decision, Justice Alfred Lerner explained why city children must be treated differently from children living in more affluent areas. Society needs workers in all levels of jobs, the majority of which may very well be low-level. That's a direct quote.1 Thus does the global economy engulf the schoolhouse, and the children are discarded as so much refuse. The method is clear: announce that schools must prepare all to be high-tech workers; then cook the books so that 20% to 30% fail the high-stakes tests and don't receive diplomas. That's the test failure rate. Hordes of others, seeing they aren't going to pass the test, drop out before reaching the 10th grade, where the exam is administered. To make the 10th-grade passing rate look rosier, more and more districts are holding students back in ninth grade, and dropout rates are increasing in middle school. Examining data from the Massachusetts Department of Education, noted analyst Anne Wheelock has reported a 300% increase in dropouts from middle school between 1995 and 2000.2 Dropouts from middle school. That's what happens when you start retaining children in primary grades. The global economy needs these dropouts. If schools are successful in turning out swarms of well-educated youngsters, who's going to flip our burgers and clean our toilets at minimum wage? Who'll sell merchandise for Wal-Mart? Work in day care? Take a look at the job projections from the Center for the Study of Jobs and Education in Wisconsin.3 They include data on jobs throughout the U. …

Judicial decision-making and the use of panels in the South African Appellate Division, 1950-1990

Against a body of established theory suggesting that Courts are social constructs which mirror the societies in which they reside and that judicial outcomes frequently reflect prevailing political and other societal attitudes, the present article examines the extent to which judges can also act strategically to maximize their preferred outcomes. It does so through an empirical analysis of the behaviour of six Chief Justices who presided over South Africa's highest court--the Appelate Division--in the era of apartheid between 1950 and 1990.

State of New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division Third Judicial Department:Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, Inc. et al. v. Pataki et al.

State of New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division Third Judicial Department:<i>Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, Inc. et al. v. Pataki et al.</i>

Judges Educate Colleagues About Mental Illness

Judges Educate Colleagues About Mental Illness

Duty of Care: No Higher Standard of Tort Liability for Incapacitated Patients

In NX v. Cabrini Medical Center, New York's highest court overruled a divided Appellate Division and held that, as a matter of law, a jury could find a hospital negligent for its failure to protect a patient from sexual assault. The court refused, however, to adopt a higher standard of tort liability for health-care providers who treat incapacitated patients.