Abstract For the Muʿtazila, “reason” (either as a human faculty or as an abstract process of argumentation and deduction) can uncover the moral properties of actions. In Twelver Shīʿī legal theory, this position was subject to extensive elaboration, and discussions around the relationship between an action’s moral properties and its legal assessments (aḥkām) gave rise to a theory of “necessary correlation” (mulāzama) between legal and moral descriptions of actions. In the thirteenth/nineteenth century, Twelver Shīʿī legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh) experienced a renaissance, and many established concepts were reevaluated, including the theory of mulāzama. One innovative, but controversial, new version of mulāzama was proposed by Muḥammad Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Raḥīm al-Iṣfahānī (d. 1253/1837 or 1261/1845) in his book al-Fuṣūl al-Gharawiyya fī al-Uṣūl al-Fiqhiyya (“The Gharawī Chapters in Legal Theory”). He argued that the correlation was logically necessary, but only at the level of appearance (ẓāhir), leaving the question of “real” (ḥaqīqī) correlation moot. In this article, I examine al-Iṣfahānī’s theory and its reception (and ultimately, its rejection) in subsequent Twelver Shīʿī legal theory.
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