Anti-satellite Weapons Research Articles

A Nonlinear Dynamical Model of the Impact of SDI on the Arms Race

We present numerical results from a nonlinear dynamical model with discrete time that simulates the implications of ballistic missile defense systems (SDI) on the arms race between the two superpowers. As dynamical variables we introduce the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), antiballistic missile systems (ABMs) and anti-ABM systems such as antisatellite weapons (ASAT) of each of the two sides. The time evolution of these systems (arms race) is simulated numerically under various parameter assumptions (scenarios). The a priori unpredictability of human decisions is simulated through random fluctuations of the buildup parameters. The results of our idealized model indicate that for most parameter combinations, the introduction of SDI systems leads to an extension of the offensive arms race rather than a transition to a defense-dominated strategic configuration. A reduction in the number of offensive weapons, that is, an approach to a defense-dominated strategy, was observed if either the number of reentry vehicles per ICBM (MIRV) is limited to much smaller values than presently realized or if the accuracy of offensive weapons is significantly reduced. For the case of a strongly accelerated arms buildup (either offensive or defensive), we observe a loss of stability of the solutions that we interpret as a transition to unpredictable chaos. We also incorporate a discussion of economic and risk parameters, both of which also tend to increase with the introduction of SDI systems.

Seeking Stability in Space: Anti-Satellite Weapons and the Evolving Space Regime

Seeking Stability in Space: Anti-Satellite Weapons and the Evolving Space Regime

The Ethics of Space-Based Ballistic Missile Defense

In 1967 the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, commonly known as the Outer Space Treaty. The treaty went into effect on October 10, 1967 and prohibits the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in space or on celestial bodies. Both nations apparently perceived benefits in preventing escalation of the arms race into space. Space exploration could concentrate upon nonmilitary missions such as medical research, or military missions designed to guarantee peace, such as orbiting spy satellites. The weapons-of-mass-destruction clause in the treaty is officially inter preted as including only nuclear weapons. In 1981, the Soviets proposed a treaty at the United Nations calling for a ban on the stationing of weapons of any kind in space and, in 1983, they presented a resolution seeking the prohibition of space based antisatellite weapons (ASATs).1 Of course, Soviet proposals are always met with a great deal of skepticism. Colin Gray, for instance, warns us that Soviet calls for negotiations to prevent the militarization of space are part of a Soviet plan to untrack the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Gray remarks that SDI will need ASATs to defend against Soviet satellites whose mission will be to destroy SDI tracking in stallations on space-based platforms.2 Regardless of what the real intentions of the Soviets are, it is fair to say that the U.S. has undertaken a new orientation toward space-based weapons under President Reagan. In his now famous speech, Peace and National Security, delivered on March 23, 1983, Reagan urged the development of a defensive system which would make nuclear weapons ob solete. The speech presented a vision of a population defense which would free citizens from the threat of nuclear destruction and allow the United States to abandon reliance upon the immoral policy of mutual assured destruction (MAD) for deterrence.3 SDI will be a layered system with many space-based components. The version envisaged by James C. Fletcher, head of the Reagan-commissioned Defense Technologies Study and current director of NASA, involves four defensive layers correlated to the phases of a ballistic missile's flight: boost, post-boost, midcourse, and terminal.4 Three of these layers rely upon space-based weapons. It is doubtful that any of the layers would involve

US Air Force to overhaul its antisatellite weapons programme

US Air Force to overhaul its antisatellite weapons programme

The World of Books

Abstract Abstract La Puce, les hommes et la bombe: l'Europe face aux nouveaux défis technologiques et militaires. By Pascal Boniface and François Heisbourg. Paris: Hachette, 1986. Reviewed by Robert S. Rudney. Les Empires contre l'Europe. By Régis Debray. Paris: Gallimard, 1985. Reviewed by Robert S. Rudney. L'Avenir de la guerre. By Pierre Lellouche. Paris: Mazarine, 1985. Reviewed by Robert S. Rudney. Le Syndrome finlandais. By Alain Minc. Paris: Seuil, 1986. Reviewed by Robert S. Rudney. Strategic Defense: ‘Star Wars’ in Perspective. By Keith B. Payne. Lanham, Md.: Hamilton Press, 1986. Reviewed by Stephen J. Cimbala. Strategic Defenses: Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies and Anti-Satellite Weapons, Counter-measures and Arms Control. Office of Technology Assessment. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986. Reviewed by Stephen J. Cimbala. New Technology and Western Security Policy. By Robert O'Neill, ed. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books/International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1985. Reviewed by Stephen J. Cimbala. 444 Days: The Hostages Remember. By Tim Wells. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Inc., 1985. Reviewed by Joel S. Lisker.

Verification and Risk for an Anti-Satellite Weapons Ban1

Verification and Risk for an Anti-Satellite Weapons Ban1

Aerospace and military: Sandia builds a tough compact computer, the autonomous land vehicle takes a spin, and the Sergeant York gun is axed

In assessing developments in 1985, attention is called to the cancellation of the Sergeant York gun, the controversy surrounding the Amraam missile, and the advances in miniaturization exemplified by the Sandac IV computer. Also discussed are the advances made in developing an autonomous land vehicle and antisatellite weapons.

Strategic defenses: ballistic missile defense technologies: anti-satellite weapons, countermeasures, and arms control.

Strategic defenses: ballistic missile defense technologies: anti-satellite weapons, countermeasures, and arms control.

Space weapons

Ballistic missile defence (BMD) weapons have much in common with offensive antisatellite (ASAT) weapons. This article reviews the types of space weapons currently under research with descriptions of both BMD and ASAT weapons, and their common areas are indicated. The most important issue is seen as the problems raised by the dual nature of such systems, particularly from the point of view of controlling such offensive and defensive weapons. The article also reviews the question of whether development and eventual deployment of some space weapons may jeopardize existing arms control agreements and complicate any ASAT treaty negotiations.

Scientists and arms control in outer space

Abstract Scientists have a special responsibility in helping to further the goal of arms control in outer space. Allan Din argues that it is incumbent upon them to study the development of weapons and the arms race, influence policy making at the national and international levels, and publicize the necessity of arms control. The author believes that a treaty controlling use of anti-satellite weapons is urgently required, while a long-term goal must be the formation of an international satellite monitoring agency to regulate use of intelligence-gathering indirect weapons.

Space War Ethics

Throughout human history, advances in science and technology have transformed the means by which people are able to kill one another. Most notoriously, in fueling the long and gradual transition from thrown stone to nuclear-tipped missile, scientific knowledge has vastly increased the destructive power of weapons. In the last century, however, science has also produced a revolution in the basing of weapons. While weapons once had to be launched from (or just above) the ground or from ships on the surface of the sea, today's most advanced weapons are designed to be launched from planes high in the air, hardened silos under the ground, or submarines beneath the surface of the oceans. In fact, the capability to launch strategic nuclear weapons from any or all of these three locations is the heart of the posture, on which the defense systems of both modern superpowers-the United States and the Soviet Union-are based.' It is now, or soon will be, technically feasible to turn the triad into a quadrad by placing offensive or defensive weapons in orbit in space. The possibility of doing so is being researched by the U.S. (and doubtless the Soviet) military and was mentioned in President Reagan's so-called star wars speech of Spring 1983V2 Here I shall consider the question whether the development and deployment of such space-weapons systems are desirable from a moral point of view. In doing so, I shall discuss three sorts of space-based weapons systems: space-launched nuclear weapons, space-based antiballistic-missile (ABM) systems, and antisatellite weapons. Somewhat different issues are raised by the three systems, though similar conclusions will emerge in each case.

ASAT arms control: still possible

The history of antisatellite weapons reveals several missed opportunities to limit their development. The superpowers now may face the last chance to control these destabilizing weapons.

Anti-satellite weapons: Reagan backs tests in space

Anti-satellite weapons: Reagan backs tests in space

Antisatellite weapons: First US test of airborne system

Antisatellite weapons: First US test of airborne system

Erratum

In R. Jeffrey Smith's News and Comment article "Antisatellite weapon sets dangerous course" (14 Oct., p. 140), a remark on page 141 (column 3) by Richard Garwin about the usefulness of rockets, balloons, and aircraft to supplant U.S. photoreconnaissance and meterological satellites was inadvertently attributed to Robert Buchheim. And a characterization on page 141 (column 2) of the Soviet antisatellite weapon, or ASAT, was actually made by General Lewis Allen, the former Air Force chief of staff, not by General David Jones, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Finally, a footnote on page 142 should have identified the Patriot as an air-to-air missile, not an air-to-ground missile.

Erratum: Antisatellite Weapon Sets Dangerous Course

In R. Jeffrey Smith's News and Comment article "Antisatellite weapon sets dangerous course" (14 Oct., p. 140), a remark on page 141 (column 3) by Richard Garwin about the usefulness of rockets, balloons, and aircraft to supplant U.S. photoreconnaissance and meteorological satellites was inadvertently attributed to Robert Buchheim. And a characterization on page 141 (column 2) of the Soviet antisatellite weapon, or ASAT, was actually made by General Lewis Allen, the former Air Force chief of staff, not by General David Jones, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Finally, a footnote on page 142 should have identified the Patriot as an air-to-air missile, not an air-to-ground missile.

Administration Resists Demands for ASAT Ban

Administration Resists Demands for ASAT Ban

Antisatellite Weapon Sets Dangerous Course

Antisatellite Weapon Sets Dangerous Course

Minimizing the misuse of space

Some believe (or perhaps hope) that negotiating limits on antisatellite weapon systems is becoming impossible as the United States and the Soviet Union develop such systems and the technological bases for them. Such developments would indeed add to the complexity of negotiations, but they would also clarify, in some detail, what needs to be brought under control, and why. The prospect for controlling antisatellite weapons through negotiations is far from hopeless; the situation is just more clearly urgent.

US defence policy: Anti-satellite weapon still under fire

US defence policy: Anti-satellite weapon still under fire