Anti-money Laundering Measures Research Articles

Controlling Corruption Through Electoral Reforms and Anti-Money Laundering Measures

Controlling Corruption Through Electoral Reforms and Anti-Money Laundering Measures

The United Nations Anti-Corruption Convention and Money Laundering

Corruption knows no boundaries and is not unique to developing countries, as the recent furore over the alleged BAE (British Aerospace) slush fund and the Al Yamamah defence contracts demonstrates. Furthermore, even where corruption takes place in developing countries, its proceeds are likely to be laundered through the international financial system. Indeed corruption is a crime which relies significantly on the laundering process, which is essential for the corrupt to be able to enjoy the proceeds of crime. It is therefore trite to say that the involvement and cooperation of western States in detecting and preventing the laundering of proceeds of corruption is essential. This paper explores the links between international measures to combat corruption, in particular the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), and international anti-money laundering regimes. Most countries have national laws that address both corruption and money laundering, albeit separately. However, most national laws are by themselves unable to address a problem that is international in character. In response, the international community has adopted a number of regional and international measures. Amongst these, the UNCAC has attracted over a hundred ratifications from both developed and developing countries. The UNCAC is one of the most comprehensive anti-corruption instruments. It criminalises money laundering (Article 23) and includes a range of preventive mechanisms as well as dealing with the proceeds of corruption (Article 14). The aim of this paper is to examine these provisions and assess it against the existing general framework of anti-money laundering measures, including the Financial Action Task Force Recommendations, the Guidelines issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the Wolfsberg Principles on Money Laundering, with a view to seeing how the current framework in dealing with the proceeds of corruption can be improved further.

On the frontline against money-laundering: the regulatory minefield

Intelligence gathering plays a vital role in the ‘war’ against money laundering. Particularly important in this intelligence gathering process is the global network of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) fed by a host of auxiliary (primarily financial) institutions required to report suspicious transactions. This paper briefly reviews the history of the international system of anti-money laundering measures imposed on the financial industry and other regulated businesses, the development of the global network of FIUs and their system of information gathering. It will examine some of the issues that arise from the regulatory framework within which this information gathering takes place. It will also address the issue of instrumental clarity and whether existing and new directives, requirements and approaches are sufficiently clear to enable reporting institutions on the ‘front-line’ to operate effectively.

Organized Crime, Money Laundering,and Terrorism

This article deals with organized crime, money laundering, and terrorism. It traces the differing organized crime dynamics following the events of 1989, and discusses differing interpretations and concepts of organized crime. It then deals with international anti-money laundering measures and perceptions. Linked to this are the similarities—and differences—between money laundering and terrorist financing. There is a growing nexus between organized crime and terrorism which should not be overestimated when meeting the challenge of terrorist financing. The analysis of money laundering that finances the ‘new’ terrorism of the post-9/11 era has been further hampered by remaining locked into static money laundering concepts. This results in intelligence oversights, particularly in the area of exploitation of offshore jurisdictions.

Trusts in prime jurisdictions * By Alon Kaplan and Barbara R Hauser, Eds

It is six years since the first edition of this book was reviewed in Trusts & Trustees (See Trusts & Trustees Volume 7, Issue 5, April 2001, pp. 30–33. The new edition reflects many of the changes in international trust jurisdictions. Geoffrey Shindler sets the scene in his preface. His comment that we have barely seem to have drawn breath since that first edition is reflected in the numerous new and revised chapters of the book. In every jurisdiction where trusts are practised, he says, the overriding concern is the extent that our thoughts have been dominated by regulation and anti-money laundering measures. The trust has been used as the scapegoat for the government's inability to deal with crime—internal and external. He uses succinct phrases in referring to the occasional assumption by governments that: ‘trusts must, by definition, be involved in money laundering in one form or another’. Also international...

Money laundering—a global obstacle

One of the biggest obstacles to maintaining an effective operating international financial system is money laundering. A global phenomenon and international challenge, money laundering is a financial crime that often involves a complex series of transactions and numerous financial institutions across many foreign jurisdictions. In addition, money laundering is also extremely difficult to investigate and prosecute. In this paper, I present a clinical examination of the money laundering process, the international extent of the problem and global efforts to introduce anti-money laundering measures and regulation in recent years.

Working Paper 1: Anti-money laundering

Switzerland is frequently accused of being reluctant to take thorough measures to fight money laundering. Both the Swiss authorities and the banks in Switzerland strongly reject such accusations. We are convinced that our anti-money laundering measures are best market practice.
 What are the reasons for these markedly different viewpoints? Can they be explained by conceptual differences? Are the negative statements the result of insufficient knowledge of our legal provisions, or are they simply motivated by the political desire of the respective commentators to divert public attention from the deficient anti-money laundering policies in their own countries?
 A comparison of our measures with the most important competing financial centres could help to answer these questions. The SFS Stiftung Finanzplatz Schweiz – a foundation initiated by the foreign banks in Switzerland – commissioned Professor Mark Pieth of the Basel Institute on Governance to conduct a comparative study of anti-money laundering regulations in the UK, the US and Singapore, the three financial centres which closely compete with the Swiss private banking sector. Professor Pieth is a renowned expert in the field and has close contacts with the international experts who also contributed to the project with in-depth country studies.

Money laundering: the state of play

The purpose of this paper is to put together a number of issues that I believe are significant in relation to the present state of play in the money laundering arena. In the first place I should state that the work that is being done by not only Australian law enforcement but international law enforcement, governments and regulators is directed at anti-money laundering measures as opposed to money laundering. In other words, we are trying to stop the dirty money from being turned into “clean” money.