Anti-terrorism Policy Research Articles

Spanish Post-3/11 Antiterror Policy: Zapatero's Tyranny of Circumstance and the Dashing of Good Intentions

Elected on a platform of withdrawal from Iraq after the 3/11 train bombings, Spanish socialists sought early on to embark on an antiterrorist policy of negotiation and dialogue with disgruntled Arab and Basque communities. The socialists' early efforts at achieving a historic accord with the Basque separatist organization ETA and its willingness to accommodate and integrate North African diaspora communities have floundered. Faced with repeated terrorist attacks and plots, the socialists have reversed course and have moved decisively toward a more draconian law enforcement model in their prosecution of Basque and Islamist militants.

The Constitution and 9/11: recurring threats to America's freedoms

The announced purpose of U.S. antiterrorist policies after 9/11 was to bring democracy and the rule of law to the Middle East. At home, those values were regularly threatened by illegal, unconstitutional, secret, and unaccountable programs. The Bush administration claimed that terrorists hate America for its freedoms, yet its actions jeopardized those freedoms and brought the reputation of the United States lower in the eyes of the world.Government surveillance. Suspension of habeas corpus. Secret tribunals. Most Americans would recognize these controversial topics from today's headlines. Unfortunately, as Louis Fisher reminds us, such violations of freedom have been with us throughout our history - and continue to threaten the Constitution and the rights that it protects.Distilling more than two centuries of history into a panoramic and compelling narrative, Fisher chronicles the longstanding tension between protecting our constitutional rights and safeguarding national security, from the Whiskey Rebellion to the McCarthy hearings to George W. Bush's War on Terror. Along the way, he raises crucial questions regarding our democracy's ongoing tug-of-war between secrecy and transparency, between expediency and morality, and between legal double-talk and the true rule of law.Fisher focuses especially on how the Bush administration's responses to 9/11 have damaged our constitutional culture and values, threatened individual liberties, and challenged the essential nature of our government's system of checks and balances. His close analysis of five topics - the resurrection of military tribunals, the Guantanamo detainees, the state secrets privilege, NSA surveillance, and extraordinary rendition - places into sharp relief the gradual but relentless erosion of fundamental rights along with an enormous expansion and concentration of presidential power in the post-9/11 era.For Fisher, the Constitution's strength as a guarantor of freedom and rights is only as sound and reliable as our own commitment to the values it describes. Each generation of Americans is asked in essence: do you want a republic or a monarchy? Benjamin Franklin, of course, famously responded: A republic, if you can keep it. Fisher's book reminds us of the political principles we need to rediscover to keep our nation free.

Poetic Injustice: A Case Study of the UK's Anti-Terrorism Legislation

This paper explores effects of anti-terrorism policy and legislation on Muslim immigrant communities, in general, and British-born Muslims, in particular. R v Malik, in which Court of Appeal quashed Samina Malik's conviction on terrorism charges, provides our point of entry into legal discourse on counter-terrorism. Malik's conviction at Old Bailey and subsequent decision of Court of Appeal to declare her conviction unsafe, will serve to highlight three interrelated aspects of anti-terrorism policy and legislation in UK. These two decisions, firstly, will help to examine how legal and policing measures to combat threat of terrorism interact with ethno-cultural relationships in contemporary Britain. Secondly, they will allow us to view UK's anti-terrorism policy and legislation in relation to what David Garland termed culture of control, which marks move from a criminal policy based on penal welfarism to a governance of crime based on the management of risks. Finally, they will throw light on tension between UK government and judiciary.

Settled Law in Unsettling Times: A Lockean View of the War on Terror

Settled Law in Unsettling Times:A Lockean View of the War on Terror Clement Fatovic (bio) As is often the case with ideals, professions of support for the rule of law have been much more widespread than agreements on its meaning during the so-called war on terror. Even though debates over the use of indefinite detentions, military commissions, "enhanced" interrogation techniques, warrant-less wiretaps, and other controversial policies are sometimes portrayed in the media as disputes between those who insist on following established laws at all costs and those who view established laws as obstacles to critical national security interests, both the proponents and the critics of these practices can make reasonable claims that the law is on their side. There is undoubtedly a mixture of hypocrisy, cynicism, and grandstanding in some of these invocations of the law, but everyone seems to agree that in a liberal democratic society it is difficult—if not impossible—to justify any policy, program, or measure that lacks a solid basis in law. Whether sincere or not, everyone appears to accept that law is the only legitimate basis for government action. However, there is a historical and theoretical tradition within liberalism originating with John Locke that justifies the use of extralegal action in certain circumstances. Locke's account of the extralegal power he calls "prerogative" may provide insights into the meaning and limits of the rule of law in dealing with extraordinary challenges. Legality and Legitimacy in the War on Terror A good part of the debate over the war on terror has focused on the legality of policies adopted by the Bush administration—many of which have actually been continued with little change by the Obama administration.1 Criticisms that many anti-terrorism policies violate the rule of law range from cautious claims they "often skirt the legal perimeter"2 to furious charges that they are "plainly illegal."3 For instance, some note that the use of waterboarding violates a variety of laws against torture, including the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment," Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A. Opponents also argue that the Bush administration had circumvented the procedural requirements established by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and simply ignored the prohibition against indefinite detentions "except pursuant to an act of Congress" mandated by the Non-Detention Act. Critics often point to court decisions in Rasul v. Bush (2004), Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006), Boumediene v. Bush (2008), and other high-profile cases invalidating elements of the government's detention policies as vindication of their arguments that many aspects of the war on terror have been illegal. Contrary to assertions that the Bush administration exhibited utter disregard for the law in its efforts to prevent "another 9/11," there is evidence that the Bush administration actually took an "excessively legalistic" approach in seeking to justify some of the most controversial policies it adopted in the first few years after the attacks.4 Even Justice Department lawyers who raised moral or political objections to the use of harsh interrogation tactics agreed "the methods themselves were legal."5 This is not to say that the law was never distorted (e.g., on prohibitions against torture) or ignored (e.g., through presidential signing statements), but that administration officials vigorously defended counter-terrorism policies within the framework of existing laws they believed were amenable to an expansive understanding of unilateral executive power. Even former deputy assistant attorney general John Yoo, who has complained that "many people have an exaggerated view of the role of law" when it comes to dealing with the threat of terrorism, has consistently maintained that the anti-terrorism policies adopted in the wake of September 11 are lawful.6 Likewise, former Vice President Dick Cheney, who has been the most outspoken defender of the Bush administration's policies, has followed Yoo's lead in arguing that officials had sufficient legal authority to intercept communications involving suspected terrorists, detain them indefinitely, and use "enhanced" methods of interrogation. As Cheney explained in a nationally televised speech, "In seeking...

Terrorism before the EC Courts. An Analysis on the Legitimacy of Blacklists between Security Interests and Protection of Fundamental Rights

This paper analyses the main EC courts’ case-law with regard to counter-terrorism policies, insisting on the EC regulations on freezing assets of terrorists and people and entities associated with the terror network. In this respect, the analysis deals with the issue of legitimacy of such freezing lists, by distinguishing between those founded on EU decisions and those on UN resolutions. In light of the relevant case-law, this work examines the role of ECJ in the construction and the protection of fundamental rights (which the EU is based on) in the EU anti-terrorism policies. Starting from these considerations, the paper intends to dwell on the effectiveness and the consistency of the protection of rights in counter-terrorism matters. From a methodological point of view, the research pays attention to two “ sides” : the inner one, where limits to the discretion of Institutions are the principal means of protection, and the outer one, where the protection of individual rights is qualified by the relation between EU and UN legal systems.

Against both Bin Laden and Belliraj: Lessons from Moroccan Counterterrorism

The question about the relationship between al-Qaeda and terrorist organizations operating at the national, regional and international levels has been at the centre of the debate concerning appropriate policy responses to both. Debates focus on the question whether to treat terrorism mostly as a home-gown, grassroots phenomenon, or something significantly inflamed by foreign encouragement and sponsorship. Evidence from Morocco suggests that the national and regional terrorist organizations exhibit varying degrees of affiliation with al-Qaeda, ranging from acting as local franchises to complete independence. The Moroccan state's response to this flexible situation is evaluated in the three case studies, each reflecting the case of terrorist organization or cell that has been dismantled. They show that Moroccan anti-terrorism policy has been generally successful, despite some erosion in human rights. The framework used in the study examines the sequence of events that led to the dismantling of the organization studied, the demographics of its membership, its ideology, and its targets. The holistic response, which combines heightened levels of law enforcement, socio-economic reform, and religious restructuring, is helping Morocco with its war against both domestic and international terrorism and may offer hints for counterterrorism elsewhere.

The Impact of Terrorism and Anti-Terrorism on Capital Markets

This paper investigates the effect of continuous terror attacks and anti-terrorism policy on stock and bond markets and on the risk premium required by investors. The empirical findings are based on a unique sample of 280 terror events experienced in Israel and 58 targeted killings carried out as anti-terrorism policy during the Intifada years, 2000-2003. Based on daily and intra-daily data of share prices and an index of terror intensity, our main findings are: i) share prices declined by about 0.48% on average following each terror attack but the decline in share prices was due to continued deterioration in expected future cash flows and not due to increased risk premium; ii) anti-terrorism policy had an insignificant effect on share prices; iii) short-term government bonds substituted for investment in stocks in response to terror attacks.

Public Support and Terrorism: The Putin Paradox

The increase in the number of terrorist attacks in Russia suggests that anti-terrorist policies have failed to solve the Chechen terrorist problem. The Putin paradox, named after Russia's president Vladimir Putin, is the capacity of the incumbent government to maintain or even increase its popular support while suffering increasing terrorist attacks. This paper presents a dynamic model where government's public support is related to terrorist attacks and counter-terrorism ac- tivities, and it shows that the Putin paradox is one of the possible steady state solutions of the model. In the Putin paradox case the equilibrium level of government's public support is positively impacted by the equilibrium number of terrorist at- tacks.

Dutch Revise Policy Blocking Iranian Students

NONPROLIFERATION The Dutch government this week backed away from an antiterrorism policy that had led one university to reject applications from Iranian students and triggered a loud protest among academics. But researchers complain that the revised policy will still make it hard for Iranian scholars and students to study in the Netherlands, and they fear that such policies could spread throughout Europe. The original policy was the government's attempt to implement a 2006 United Nations resolution that asks all nations to “prevent specialized teaching or training of Iranian nationals … [in] disciplines which would contribute to Iran's proliferation [of] sensitive nuclear activities and development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.” Last fall, the Dutch education and foreign affairs ministers told all universities to exercise “vigilance” in admitting Iranian students. In December, the University of Twente in Enschede announced that it would no longer accept Iranian students because the Dutch Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) had asked for a guarantee that Iranians on campus would not gain any sensitive knowledge. Officials at the Eindhoven University of Technology said they would consult Dutch intelligence officials while considering Iranian applicants for admission. Academics and students protested the new policy, calling it overly broad and discriminatory. Their objections were heard: This week, Twente officials said that INS has agreed to withdraw its demand for a guarantee and that the university would reopen its doors to Iranians. Robert Dekker, a foreign ministry spokesperson, says the government still intends to implement the U.N. resolution by barring Iranian students from admission to certain fields. (Students already enrolled face no such restrictions.) “The ministries and the universities are discussing which studies might fall under the resolution,” Dekker told Science . The exclusion could include degree programs that are not directly related to nuclear technology but involve sensitive topics, he says. Mehmet Aksit, a software engineering professor at Twente, wor ries that the revised policy could toughen an already restrictive visa policy toward Iranians. Although measures to stop nuclear proliferation are appropriate, Aksit says the Netherlands “should encourage intellectual exchanges with Iran.”

This is an Exception: Humanitarian Legal Expertise and its Role in Anti-Terrorist Policy

International lawyers practicing human rights and the law of armed conflict may be understood as particular kind of expert community. Building on that community's self-understanding of their craft, this paper argues that humanitarian legal experts play a role that is not only different, but diametrically inverse, to the role played by other communities of experts when interacting with power. Where experts frame issues and influence policy makers, legal experts justify. And they do so, because their expertise leaves them no other option. Using the example of the so-called shoot-to-kill policies, the author addresses the role of legal expertise in the war on terror, and uses it as a proxy to asses the role of international law, as such, in anti terrorist policy.

International Law as Administration: The UN's 1267 sanctions Committee and the Making of the War on terror

This article is written as an effort to escape the dialogue of the deaf between those who believe that international law can do no wrong in the war on terrorism and those who argue its utter irrelevance. It argues that international law can be seen as a tool for governance of the suspended space between war and peace, characteristic of the so-called war on terror. Through the case of the terrorist blacklist administrated by the UN's 1267 Committee, it shows how administrative law, and not the law of war, is the paradigm of the international legal order within antiterrorist policy. International law, then, is not to be read as a matter of rights, but as a legal form, which features independent agency. It is in the legal form and its design, and not in the current obsession with compliance, where the possibilities of resistance in this new time exist.

Charkaoui and Bill C-3: Some Implications for Anti-Terrorism Policy and Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures

Charkaoui and Bill C-3: Some Implications for Anti-Terrorism Policy and Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures

Do Democracy and Free Markets Protect Us From Terrorism?

This study empirically tests what has become a central component of US anti-terrorism policy under the Bush administration: that terrorism is a byproduct of illiberal political and economic systems. Employing a series of statistical analyses on incidents of terrorism in 153 countries from 1986 to 2003, the author finds that variables measuring democracy and degree of economic openness are not significant predictors of terrorism. However, the study does find that experience of state failures is significant, thus providing empirical backing for a small, descriptive body of scholarship linking failed states to terrorism.

A Survey of Cross-Border Trade at a Time of Heightened Security: The Case of the Niagara Bi-National Region

Introduction In a recent article on the new border security environment facing North America, Ackleson (2003) notes that much work remains to be conducted to evaluate the complex dynamics of post-9/11 tri-national commercial relationships under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Although his article is primarily focused upon the U.S.-Mexico border security environment, his call for more empirical research that includes normative components and expanded coverage of emergent theoretical and policy issues is equally relevant for studies of Canada-U.S. cross-border business transactions. Similarly, Cutter et al. (2003) argue that at a time of increased concern over terrorism, regional and international research priorities must be directed to understanding ... how borders function, especially flows of goods and people, and how borders constrain or enhance trans-jurisdictional responses to issues such as immigration, disaster response, refugee movements, weapons proliferation, narco-terrorism, or environmental degradation (225). Unfortunately, very little research has focused upon the potential impacts of terrorism upon cross-border commerce. This is a surprising neglect, because the short--and long-term impacts of new border security regulations have potentially profound implications for foreign commerce, international direct investments, the location of production, and the growth and development of local and regional economies. It is within the context of this call for more empirical work on the impacts of the post-9/11 security regulations that the following questions are posed. First, are the new anti-terrorism policies for cross-border commerce that have been put in place by the U.S. government since 9/11 serving, in effect, as non-tariff trade barriers and therefore trumping the long-standing objective of maintaining a relatively open international border between the U.S. and Canada? Second, what are the principal costs to those North American companies that must comply with the new security mandates in order to engage in cross-border commerce? Third, what are the likely strategic responses of U.S. and Canadian companies to these new security regulations when it comes to decisions related to supply chain logistics (e.g., shipping routes, transportation modes), direct foreign investments, and the location of production? Finally, and equally important, what are the possible long-term implications of these business decisions for North American patterns of production, direct investments, and regional economic growth and development? Background and Study Area Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the U.S. government introduced a number of anti-terrorist regulations that pertain specifically to the flow of goods and services through U.S. seaports and across the nation's international land borders. At least 15 security-based initiatives have been introduced and/or strengthened since 9/11 (see Table 1), and several more are in the pipeline (mentioned later). Most of these new regulations are aimed at reducing the vulnerability of the nation's trade and transportation infrastructure, which facilitates the movement of more than 16 million cargo containers and other shipments that enter the U.S. annually by ocean vessel, truck, rail, and air. For example, the Container Security Initiative (CSI) involves a partnership arrangement between the U.S. and more than 20 countries to place U.S. Customs agents within the gateways of those countries to inspect U.S.-bound cargo. Some of these initiatives are also designed to combine greater security measures with procedures for expediting commerce. Thus, for example, the Free and Secure Trade (FAST) program allows for the pre-approval of truckers for pass-through clearance at the U.S.-Canada border. In this case, however, both the companies and drivers must also qualify for the C-TPAT voluntary program (Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism), which means that U. …

European anti-terrorism policy : a trans-atlantic perspective

European Anti-Terrorism Policy: A Trans-Atlantic Perspective European counter-terrorism policy since 2001, unlike that of the United States, has centered on the reinforcement of existing domestic law enforcement instruments and on multilateral action internationally creating at least the outlines of a distinctive ‘European model.’ Structural models, either realist or culturalist, provide at best partial explanations for this. A more complete analysis should take into account the role of political leaders and partisan politics, the perceived effectiveness and subjective status of available policy instruments, and the role of multiple and competing programmatic elites within the state.

All in this together? Group representations and policy support

The present research explored the relationship between how Canadians perceived the quality of intergroup contact with Americans and their support for different antiterrorism policies, considering the potential mediating role of intergroup representations specified in the Common Ingroup Identity Model. Canadian students (n=360) completed questionnaires that assessed their perceptions of the quality of intergroup contact with Americans, group representations, and reactions to various policies tied to the war against terror. Specifically, we tested a model of how perceptions of the quality of intergroup contact, along the dimensions specified by the Contact Hypothesis, predict different representations of the two groups (Canadians and Americans), and then how these different representations predict reactions to antiterrorist policies. Structural equation modeling analysis supported the predictions, revealing the pivotal role of group representations for policy views.

Draining the Swamp: Democracy Promotion, State Failure, and Terrorism in 19 Middle Eastern Countries

This study empirically evaluates the question of whether or not the promotion of democracy in the Middle East will reduce terrorism, both in terms of terrorist attacks sustained by Middle Eastern countries and in terms of attacks perpetrated by terrorist groups based in Middle Eastern countries. Using a series of pooled, time-series negative binomial statistical regression models on 19 countries from 1972 to 2003 the analysis demonstrates that the more politically liberal Middle Eastern states—measured both in terms of democratic processes and in terms of civil liberties protections—are actually more prone to terrorist activity than are Middle Eastern dictatorships. The study demonstrates, furthermore, that an even more significant predictor of Middle Eastern terrorist attacks is the intensity of state failures, or episodes of severe political instability that limit central government projection of domestic authority, suffered by states in the region. States that are unable to respond to fundamental challenges to political stability posed by internal political strife, ethnic conflict or the phenomenon of “stateless areas,” geographic or political spaces within states that eschew central government authority, are significantly more likely to host or sustain attacks from terrorist groups. The findings have implications for current United States antiterrorism policy toward the Middle East and provide a statistical/empirical foundation to previous studies on the relationship between terrorism and state failure.

Social values and material threat: the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection

Since the outset of Europe's role in the War on Terror, the protection of Europe's 'critical infrastructures' has been a central focus of the anti-terrorist effort. The purpose of this article is underscore the challenges involved in conceptualising critical infrastructure and its protection in terms of social values. These difficulties, we will suggest, are not merely roadblocks standing in the way for effective anti-terror policy making. They challenge European policy makers in all fields to revisit and reflect upon the meaning and aim of anti-terror protection.

Security Council's Anti-terror Resolutions and their Implementation by Member States: An Overview

In the framework of the fight against international terrorism the UN Security Council (SC) has adopted targeted sanctions against individuals and corporate entities. Furthermore, it has imposed on states a number of obligations of a general nature. The implementation of all these measures — some of which bear on sensitive aspects of criminal law and procedure — is left to the Member States. This article attempts to provide an overview of national implementation practices, based on the national reports submitted by states pursuant to the relevant SC resolutions. Besides the many difficulties encountered by states in implementing SC resolutions, the encroachment of anti-terror measures on human rights is a cause for concern. The current attitude of the SC, which has integrated human rights considerations into the security concerns that inspire its action under Chapter VII of the Charter, should enhance the perception of legitimacy of its anti-terror policy and, arguably, improve the effectiveness of its measures.

Appeasing nihilists? Some economic thoughts on reducing terrorist activity

Recent contributions to the economics of terrorism have given contradicting recommendations for campaigning against terrorism, from the proposal to deprive terrorists of their resources to the proposal of raising the opportunity costs of terrorism by increasing the wealth of the affected regions. Within a simple framework which differentiates between the decision to become an active terrorist and the decision to support terrorists and which allows for reciprocal reactions to anti-terrorism policies, it is argued here that undifferentiated deterrence may indeed backfire, but so may an increase of the opportunity costs of terrorism. A very targeted anti-terrorism policy aimed only at active terrorists would then be the most reasonable remaining approach.