anti-Japanese Research Articles

Anti-Japanese Popular Nationalism and China’s Approach Towards Japan amid Sino-Japanese Political Tension, 2001–2006

This paper explores the relationship between anti-Japanese popular nationalism and China’s approach towards Japan amid Sino-Japanese political tension from 2001 to mid-2006. Among various factors that may affect the relationship, this research focuses on the interaction between the government and the public expressions of anti-Japanese nationalism in China. Throughout most of this period, Sino-Japanese political relations were seriously strained by historical, territorial and other controversial issues, which stirred up anti-Japanese sentiment in China. However, it was only between 2003 and the spring of 2005 that mass anti-Japanese protests were allowed, or at least tolerated, by the Chinese authorities and played a role in Beijing’s handling of Japan-related controversies. The paper examines China’s domestic political situation during the leadership transition from the third to fourth generation of leaders, which it claims drove the Chinese government’s lenient response to popular anti-Japanese protests and enhanced the prospects for popular nationalism to affect the government’s approach towards Japan.

Norman Bethune and field surgery of the Eighth Route Army

With long-term war experience abroad, combined with the actual situation of health work in China, Bethune put forward a series of strategy and theory used in battlefield conditions of rescuing the wounded in China, such as "fire rescue, early debridement", "emergency blood transfusion in battlefield" and "the crowd blood bank", which effectively improved the rate of saving the battlefield wounded rate in the actual war. Combining with his own practice, he invented a variety of surgical instruments and equipment, such as "lugou bridge" medicine cabinet, "Bipp ointment", which have been widely used in the battlefield. He paid more attention to the construction of battlefield hospital, proposed the establishment of "Model Hospital" and "Special Surgery Hospital" in the rear of Anti-Japanese War, founded the health school, and wrote many battlefield medical books and skills data. Bethune trained a large number of medical personnel for the war front, laid the foundation for the field surgery education of the Eighth Route Army.

An Alternative Explanation for Anti-Japanese Sentiment in China: Shifting State-Society Interaction in China's Japan Policy

The historical turbulence between China and Japan started from the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895, and culminated in Japan's invasion of China during World War Two (the Second Sino-Japanese War) between 1937 and 1945. A series of wars caused huge human and material losses in both countries, and both experienced comprehensive transformations during and after the wars. The impact of this historical turbulence is so long-lasting that it still influences both countries' social psyche. Moreover, it continues casting a long shadow upon the current Sino-Japanese relations. The recent turbulence in Sino-Japanese relations partly stems from the historical turbulence. It is much less violent but can also be emotional and worrisome. It started from the early 1980s (the Japanese history textbook controversy in 1982 and the 1985 anti-Japanese student protests in China), and culminated in the anti-Japanese mass demonstrations in multiple Chinese cities in 2005 (Bush 2010; Gries 2005; Reilly 2012; Stockmann 2010; Weiss 2008). In addition to dramatic demonstrations on streets, there are also other forms of movements, such as war reparations movements, in which Chinese war victims demand reparations from the Japanese state and companies (Rose 2005; Xu and Fine 2010; Xu and Pu 2010). Although the tension has existed for many years and surfaced from time to time, the eruption of the nationwide anti-Japanese movements in China in 2005 still shocked many outside observers. Many scholars have tried to explain the anti-Japanese sentiment within current Chinese society that underlies and drives these social movements. Through careful reexamination of the existing literature, this article proposes an explanation for the anti-Japanese sentiment from a perspective that stresses the shifting state-society interaction in China's Japan policy. Specifically, the totalitarian Chinese state's neglect and suppression of genuine social concerns regarding Japan in earlier years, followed by a relatively liberalized state that tolerates societal participation in Sino-Japanese relations, are an importance source of the anti-Japanese sentiment recently observed in China.

North Korea-China Relations: An Asymmetric Alliance

IntroductionThe aim of this paper is to examine North Korean threat perceptions in context of Stephen Walt's balance-of-threat theory. This theory argues that states actually react to perceived threat rather than to power, and aim to balance it. North Korea, as surrounded by four powers-China, Russia, Japan, and United States (U.S.)-perceives U.S. policy toward itself, and strengthening of U.S.-South Korea security cooperation, as posing serious threatening challenges. To balance this threat, North Korea has developed an alliance system with People's Republic of China (PRC) based on common ideology,1 anti-Japanese sentiment, and anti-U.S. sentiment. Geographically, North Korea shares an 800-mile-long frontier with China. Historically, China and Korea have had shared relations, symbolized by a hierarchical tributary system. In this age-old relationship, China enjoyed role of big brother to Korea's brother. Culturally, ideologically, and socially, North Korea belonged to Chinese zone of influence. Common threat perceptions alone would have argued for a cooperative arrangement between these two countries. China was vast, powerful, economically strong, and therefore dominant party. Hence, it was a partnership not between equals, but between two unequal states-one strong and powerful and other a client.The Korean Peninsula, Hub of Balance of Power in East AsiaMuch of Korea's history is the story of its struggle, not always successful, to maintain its independence against external pressures.2 Contrary to its name, Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) is located within one of world's most heavily militarized areas. There is little depth between DMZ and capital cities of Pyongyang, which is about 125 km north of DMZ, and Seoul, which is approximately 40 km south of DMZ. Following consolidation of Soviet dominance of Eastern Europe and signing of Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, United States perceived that consequences of a South Korean defeat would be highly detrimental to its own political and strategic interests. Chinese leaders had concluded that intervention in Korean War would temper and caution Washington, whereas inaction would embolden it. Thus, Korean War of 1950-1953 reminded China of importance of Korea to its national security. The Korean War ended, but peninsula remained divided at Demilitarized Zone.Threat Perceptions until 1979: The North Korean PerspectiveThe U.S. Threat. North Koreans harbor a very deep grudge against United States for two main reasons: division of Korea and American occupation of southern part of Korea from 1945 to 1948. North Koreans also resent other American actions taken since 1953, mutual security agreement with South Korea, and maintenance of 36,000 American troops in South Korea. As United States treated North Korea as a mere satellite of Soviet Union, relationship between United States and North Korea developed to take form of ideological confrontation; that is, capitalism versus socialism. From Pyongyang's point of view, a long and unbroken period of American nuclear hegemony in East Asia was inter- preted as a clear threat to its security. North Korea is only country in developing world that has faced a direct threat from a superpower's nuclear weapons from its very inception.3 During Korean War, President Truman (at behest of General Douglas MacArthur, who in July 1950 suggested a plan to use atomic bombs) seriously considered using nuclear weapons, but other allied nations objected.The South Korean Threat. The hostility between North Korea and South Korea is not only mutual but evenly matched. The North Korean version of history argues that Democratic People's Republic (DPRK) in north is only legitimate government representing entire Korean people, and that it was American imperialism and its creature, South Korean regime, that prevented unification. …

A Revised Model of Animosity: The Impact of Anti-Japanese Sentiment on Consumer Behavior in China

This study tests a revised model of animosity for analyzing the impact of anti-Japanese sentiment on consumer behavior in China. The findings show (1) that four antecedents (traditionalism, patriotism, nationalism, and internationalism) affect consumer animosity; (2) that both war animosity and economic animosity have inverse effects on purchase intentions; and (3) that only war animosity negatively predicts Japanese product quality judgments. Theoretical and managerial implications are discussed.

Chiang Kai-shek and the 1947 Reorganization of the National Government

When the Guomindang (GMD) took charge in 1927, it implemented the “political tutelage” system. Participation of other parties in politics was disallowed. But after the Anti-Japanese War (1937–45), under the combined effect of internal and external pressure, the GMD needed to adopt a constitution, reorganize government and establish multi-party participation. The April 1947 governmental reorganization was the starting point of a transformation from a “political tutelage” system to a constitutional system. Though this reorganization introduced many non-GMD members into the government, it did not change the GMD’s one-party dominance. Its desired transformation of China from one-party “political tutelage” into a constitutional democracy still remained limited.

Pacific Cosmopolitans: A Cultural History of U.S.-Japan Relations

Seventy years have passed since the United States and Japan fought a bitter war. Since then the two nations have established an important bilateral relationship, and they are two of the closest allies in the world. How did this volte-face take place? Michael R. Auslin, the director of Japan studies at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, provides answers to this question in Pacific Cosmopolitans. Exploring the history of U.S.-Japan cultural exchanges from the eighteenth century to the present, Pacific Cosmopolitans uncovers “the deep fascination in both countries with an exotic Other, a fascination that soon became a rigorous attempt to maintain permanent contact as well as to study and analyze the fundamental features of each country” (p. 2). A casual cultural exchange in the early 1800s evolved to a more formal exchange in the late nineteenth century. The exchange evolution did not occur linearly, however, because of rising nationalism in Japan and racist anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States during the early twentieth century.

Anti-Chinese and Anti-Japanese Sentiments in East Asia: The Politics of Opinion, Distrust, and Prejudice

Spanning the presidencies of George W. Bush and Barack Obama, anti-Americanism has become somewhat of a growth industry. Its products are avidly consumed not only in the United States but around the world, often for quite different political purposes. It is not surprising that anti-Americanism plays a large role among traditional enemies of the United States in the Middle East.1 But the same is true of America's allies just across the border, such as Canada and Mexico, and living far apart, such as Australia and New Zealand.2 It would be a big mistake, however, to think that these oppositional sentiments—the complex mixture of opinion, distrust and prejudice—are directed only against America. It plays a role in all parts of the world. Secondary or subordinate states in each world region resent the regional top dog. Such resentment can take various political forms. In Europe, latent anti-German feelings linger, sometimes very close to the surface. When Germany takes a stance against its partners in the European Union, as it has at various times in the unfolding financial crisis, historical anti-German sentiments are quick to appear. Small states in Latin America and Africa also harbour resentment against the self-proclaimed leadership roles of Brazil and Nigeria. And in the Middle East, cross currents of nationalism and religion generate different kinds of political resentment.

Research Note: Japan Studies in China in the Late 1980s

This article adopts a sociology of knowledge perspective to analyze Japan studies scholarship published in China in the late 1980s. The objective of the analysis is to interpret the significant body of scholarship in terms of three of its sociopolitical implications. Firstly, the role of scholarship in its advocacy of Japan as a development model for China will be examined, thereby uncovering one of the multiple historical sources for the Chinese reform. Secondly, Japanese studies scholars, despite their being establishment intellectuals, made bold proposals in the late 1980s for economic, political, and social change. Thirdly, this article will document the Japan studies scholars’ largely positive appraisal of Japan as well as their resistance of anti-Japanese sentiments in the Chinese state and society. Findings indicate that the scholarship deviated from the official line, critiqued the Chinese state, promoted radical reform proposals, positively evaluated Japan, and offered a Japanese model for China’s reform.

Global Festivals Through a National Prism

This study investigates the global—national nexus in the media representation of the Olympic Games and examines the ways in which the notions of globalization and Korean nationalism are represented. Attention is paid to the South Korean media coverage of opening and closing ceremonies of the 2004 Athens Olympic Games. While globalization was promoted through themes such as global friendship and fraternity, the media also framed the event with reference to anti-Japanese sentiments and an expression of unitary Korea nationalism — both of which are central elements of Korean nationalism. On this basis, it is clear that a complex interplay between the global and the national impetus is evident. The media coverage is investigated in a qualitative manner, and a thematic analysis is used. The research, from a process sociological perspective, offers a useful insight into understanding Korean national identity politics in the global era.

The Development of Japanese New Religions in Brazil and Their Propagation in a Foreign Culture

This article will examine Omoto, Konkokyo, and Rissho Koseikai as examples of New Religions among Brazilians of Japanese descent, and Sekai Kyuseikyo, Soka Gakkai, and Reiyukai as Japanese new religions that have expanded through propagation to Brazilians of a non-Japanese ethnic background. It will examine the spread of Japanese new religions in the new cultural environment of Brazil, which factors caused the movements to remain only among Japanese-Brazilians, and which factors caused the movements to spread to non-ethnic-Japanese communities. The article will also look at the phenomenon of many Brazilians of Japanese descent who came to work in Japan in the 1990s, and the large impact that has had on Japanese new religions with regard to organizational restructuring. It will also look at how this was a new development for the religions of the ethnic Japanese community in Brazil, and as an opportunity for propagation among Brazilians of non-Japanese ethnic background. keywords: Brazil - Japanese immigrants - new religions - Omoto- Konkokyo - Rissho Koseikai - Sekai Kyuseikyo - Soka Gakkai - Reiyukai (ProQuest: ... denotes non-USASCII text omitted.) THE HISTORY of Japanese migration to Brazil began with the mass migration of 1908, and Brazil now has the largest population of people of Japanese descent of any country in the world outside Japan. It is generally true that, concomitant with migration, religion also migrates, but in Brazil's case, the formal propagation of the religions of the Japanese community did not begin until after the Second World War. Before the war, it was thought that the introduction of Buddhism or Shinto in a country where Catholicism was virtually a national religion would only act to inflame anti-Japanese sentiment, so the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs only permitted the migration of Catholic missionaries, and requested a self-imposed restraint on all other missionary activity. In this respect, the Brazilian case contrasts with the case of both Hawai'i and the United States, where temples and shrines were built for existing Buddhist sects shortly after Japanese migration began. Nevertheless, individuals took their personal religious beliefs with them, and there were those who had immigrated to Brazil for missionary purposes, despite migrating under the guise of agricultural immigrants. As a result, by the 1930s, the development of sects such as Seicho no Ie ..., Tenrikyo ..., Omoto ..., and Honmon Butsuryushu ... became evident. Nonetheless, it can be said that the official propagation of Japanese religion in Brazil, especially Japanese new religions,1 only began after the war. The Buddhist sects Jodo Shinshu Honganji ..., Shinshu Otani ..., Soto ..., Jodo .. ., Shingon ..., and Nichiren .. Buddhist Sects all became evident in Brazil in the 1950s, while the new religious sects Sekai Kyuseikyo ... and PL Kyodan (PL ..) appeared in the 1950s, Soka Gakkai ... and Konkokyo ... in the 1960s, Rissho Koseikai ..., Reiyukai ..., Sukyo Mahikari ..., and GLA in the 1970s, Shuyodan Hosekai ... in the 1980s, and Agonshu ... and Kofuku no Kagaku ... in the 1990s. Therefore, many Japanese new religions have entered Brazil, but this article will focus on Omoto, Konkokyo, Rissho Koseikai, Sekai Kyuseikyo, Soka Gakkai, and Reiyukai in particular. In all cases, their propagation was initially focused on the Japanese-Brazilian population, but in some cases, propagation went beyond these ethnic Japanese communities, widely attracting non-Japanese Brazilians, while in other cases, propagation did not go beyond the Japanese community. The object of this paper is to examine the factors which influence the success or failure of a new religion in its propagation and adoption by groups outside the ethnic Japanese population.2 Perspectives Two dimensions will be explored in an effort to trace the development of the propagation of new religions in a foreign culture and to examine the factors that have influenced their development: the classification of Japanese new religions and the issues they dealt with and were forced to resolve in their propagation in another culture. …

The Politics of Anti-Japanese Sentiment in Korea: The Case of MacArthur Line of June 1948

Pacific FocusVolume 6, Issue 2 p. 65-81 The Politics of Anti-Japanese Sentiment in Korea: The Case of MacArthur Line of June 1948 Sung-hwa Cheong, Sung-hwa CheongSearch for more papers by this author Sung-hwa Cheong, Sung-hwa CheongSearch for more papers by this author First published: September 1991 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1976-5118.1991.tb00089.xRead the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Volume6, Issue2September 1991Pages 65-81 RelatedInformation

JAPAN'S DEFLATIONARY HANGOVER: WAGE STAGNATION AND THE SYNDROME OF THE EVER-WEAKER YEN

Japan still suffers a deflationary hangover from the great episodic yen appreciations of the 1980s into the mid-1990s. Money wages are still declining, and short-term interest rates remain trapped near zero. After Japan's "lost decade" from 1992 to 2002, however, output has begun to grow modestly — but through export expansion and associated investment rather than domestic consumption. This export-led growth has been helped by a passive real depreciation of the yen: prices and wages in Europe and the United States have grown, and are growing, faster than in Japan. As the yen becomes weaker in real terms, American and European industrialists and politicians are again complaining that the yen is too weak (Japan bashing II?) — although the pressure on Japan to appreciate is not yet as great as it now is on China. But Japan is trapped. If it does appreciate the yen, its fragile economy will be driven back into outright deflation. The only solution is to stabilize the nominal dollar value of the yen over the long-term, but this step will not necessarily be immediately effective in placating foreign mercantilists. Under foreign pressure to appreciate the renminbi, China, with its booming economy, is now in a similar position to Japan's of more than 20 years ago. Policymakers in China should resist pressure to go down the same deflationary road as Japan.

Japan, 1936–1945: Fascism or Communism?

August 2006 marked the sixtieth anniversary of Japan's defeat in World War II. It is usually said that Japan was dominated by ruling fascist capitalists and landowners who wanted war in order to secure access to colonial resources and markets. The actions of the Allies after the war, mostly led by the United States, stemmed from this belief, including such policies as taking land from the former owners and distributing it among farmers, and dismantling the zaibatsu cartels by taking the shares from the largescale capitalists and selling them. Recent research on the Japanese wartime economy, however, has cast doubt on this view. For the capitalists and landowners, peace and markets were far more profitable than war and colonial dominance. Japanese capitalists reaped great profits before the war, not from Japan's colonies, but from trade with the United States and Asia, especially with America- and British-owned companies that operated in and around Shanghai, and European colonies such as Singapore and Malaya. Japan's military incursions into povertystricken northeast China yielded little of value to Japanese capitalists. On the contrary, they had the adverse effects of restricting trade with the United States and the United Kingdom (and their colonies), and arousing anti-Japanese sentiment in China. Similarly, cheap grain imported from Japan's colonies did nothing to increase the profits of the large Japanese landowners, whose main source of profits came from exporting silk products to the United States. The military and the government bureaucrats regulated and controlled Japan's economy after the military took over the government in 1936. The policies they adopted are fascinating. First of all, workers' fights were substantially strengthened, with companies prohibited from firing or reducing the wages of their employees. At the same time, the profits and rights of the capitalists and landowners were greatly reduced. Dividend payments to the shareholders were restricted to an extremely low level, and companies were forced to name their presidents not from among the shareholders or the founding families, but from among the workers. Rent paid by tenant farmers and rental-property residents was set by fixed contracts, which could not be unilaterally broken by the landowners.

Citra Penjajahan Jepang di Indonesia yang Terpantul dalam Beberapa Novel Pramoedya

Images of Japanese troops which drawn by Pramoedya in his works indeed related with his own experiences. Pramoedya through his characters portrays his view on humanities. Pramoedya depicted the brutality of Japanese troops in their occupation in Indonesia. All Japanese propaganda delivered false messages and caused disasters for Indonesian people. Japanese culture retardation and their brutality made the author suffer and down. Even though his novels associate with anti Japanese occupation and patriotism among the youth, humanities issues in fact appear as a strong theme in all his works.

China's Exchange Rate Trap: Japan Redux?

Today’s American mercantile pressure on China to appreciate the renminbi against the dollar is eerily similar to the American pressure on Japan to appreciate the yen that began over 30 years ago. Indeed, the yen went all the way from 360 to the dollar in August 1971, at the end of the Bretton Woods period of fixed exchange rate parities, to touch 80 to the dollar in April 1995. Then the American government relented and announced a strong dollar policy that signaled the end of “Japan bashing”. But the overvalued yen, and the expectation of appreciation, destabilized the Japanese financial system; the bubble economy of the late 1980s was followed by a deflationary slump and a zero-interest liquidity trap in the 1990s [McKinnon and Ohno 1997]. At least some of today’s critics of East Asian countries’ pegging to the dollar would agree that international saving imbalances rather than misaligned exchange rates are the root cause of the U.S. current-account deficit. One can argue whether it is mainly a saving deficiency in the United States or a saving glut in the rest of the world [Bernanke 2005]. Either way, the central position of the United States under the world dollar standard gives it alone an unlimited international line of credit in its own currency. However, suppose that the U.S. trade deficit is misdiagnosed to result from a misaligned exchange rate, so that a surplus country on the dollar’s periphery is forced to appreciate against the world’s dominant money. It will suffer a slowdown in economic

The Revival of Chinese Nationalism: Perspectives of Chinese Intellectuals

This article examines how Chinese intellectuals understand mass nationalism in China. Understanding their perspective is useful when analyzing the meaning and repercussions of nationalist trends throughout the 1990s , as well as its future course. While playing a major role in its revival Chinese intellectuals actually have a very pragmatic view of nationalism based on China's goal of building a prosperous and powerful nation. They also play a role in influencing public opinion and the government's policy-making process. In the short to mid term, the public expression of anti-U.S. or anti-Japanese sentiments through nationalism is not likely to become extreme, as this would run counter to China's current development strategies and goals.

Nationalism, Indignation, and China's Japan Policy

The recent upsurge of anti-Japanese sentiment in China should not be reduced to elite instrumentality, the Chinese Communist Party merely fomenting nationalism to legitimize its rule. Anti-Japanese sentiment in China today has deeper popular roots in evolving narratives about China's national past and in debates over the very meaning of being "Chinese" at the dawn of the 21st century. These popular sentiments, furthermore, are increasingly constraining China's elite as they seek to make China's Japan policy.

Anti-Japanese sentiment and the responses of two Meiji intellectuals

Anti-Japanese sentiment and the responses of two Meiji intellectuals

Hong Kong and Communist Guerrilla Resistance in South China, 1937–1945

Hong Kong and Communist Guerrilla Resistance in South China, 1937-1945 By Gordon Y.M. Chan Throughout its history as a British colony, Hong Kong's politico-economic uniqueness had always been regarded. as a valuable asset by revolutionaries and political dissidents in modem China. For instance, it is well known that Sun Yatsen and his followers had actively exploited the colony's differences with the mainland to try to overthrow the rule of the. Qing Dynasty. They used Hong Kong as their important operational base and organized there no less than eight revolutionary attempts during the years between 1895 and 1911.1 However, a far less recognized and analyzed fact is that Hong Kong had also performed quite a substantial role in the Chinese Communist revolution. Indeed, for a long time before 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had made Hong Kong its headquarters for directing revolutionary activities in Guangdong and sometimes even the whole of South China. Surprisingly, despite Hong Kong's significant involvement in the Communist movement, which can be dated back to the movement's inception in 1921, it has so far attracted little scholarly attention.2 Therefore, it is the objective of the present paper to shed light on this underexplored topic by examining Hong Kong's relationship with the Communists' guerrilla resistance in the province of Guangdong during the Anti-J apanese War (1937-1945). China's war with Japan is generally believed to be a pivotal period for the rise of the CCP, which succeeded in seizing rural control by launching largescale guerrilla activities behind the enemy lines. Although the main arena for thjs guerrilla warfare was in North China, the Communists were far from absent in the south even after Chiang Kai-shek's repeated "encirclement campaigns" to expunge them. In particular, the Party3 was able to develop its guerrilla forces in Guangdong and established there its only two wartime bases in South China, one in the East River valley and the other on Hainan Island.4 It is normal for many scholars, who are obsessed with explaining the Communists' wartime success , to belittle these two small Communisthases. Unfortunately, such endeavor obscures the fact that in the last years of the war their existence actually gave rise to Mao Zedong's ambitious plan for a rapid expansion of Communist power in South C.hina. This plan would very likely have come to realization had it not been thwarted by the Japanese surrender in August 1945.5 Twentieth-Century China, Vol. 29, No.1 (November,2003): 39-63 40 Twentieth-Century China Nevertheless, it is true that the Communist bases in Guangdong were less consolidated than their northern counterparts, and precisely for that reason, as this paper will argue, their survival depended considerably on their connections with Hong Kong. While Hong Kong possessed many advantages, its real importance to wartime Communism in South China cannot be fully appreciated unless they are viewed in light of the Party's position in Guangdong during the AntiJapanese War. The relationship between these two issues will therefore be taken up in the first part of this paper, while the second part focuses on elucidating Hong Kong's contributions to the Communists' guerrilla resistance. These contributions can be divided into four areas: providing manpower to the guerrilla forces, supplying them with funding and other material aid, acting as a communication link between the local Communist bases and the Party Center inYan' an and serving as an arena for the Party's pursuit of the anti-Japanese united-front propaganda. A~ REASONS FOR HONG KONG'S IMPORTANCE Hong Kong's politico-economic advantages. Originally a small fishing village, Hong Kong emerged rapidly into a commercial city after its cession to the British in 1842. With its good harbor and well-established commercial facilities , Hong Kong prospered tremendously from its entrepot trade and, by the end of the nineteenth century, had already become an economic hub of Southeast China.6 Due to this development, Hong Kong possessed an efficient system of communication, which also conveniently linked Guangdong with other parts of the world. For instance, many migrants from Guangdong, the province which probably boasts the largest number of Chinese abroad...