anti-Japanese Nationalism Research Articles

Anti-Japanese Nationalism and Economic Growth in the Context of the Diaoyu/ Senkaku Island Dispute

In September 2012, massive and violent anti-Japanese protests broke out in more than 100 cities throughout China. Japanese businesses, restaurants and multinational corporations were targeted and Japanese people were attacked on the streets. The protests were a result of the Japanese Government’s decision to purchase and nationalize three islands in the East China Sea located in the island grouping known as Diaoyu in China and Senkaku in Japan over which both countries have competing sovereignty claims. The purchase occurred only months after nationalist demonstrators from both Hong Kong and Japan independently planted their respective flags on the islands and only a week before the 81st anniversary of the Mukden incident.

Korean Prometheus? Mythifying Benjamin Whiso Lee

This article evaluates the role nationalism played in popularizing the myth of Benjamin Whiso Lee as the “Imaginary Father of the Korean Nuclear Bomb” in the early 1990s. The main argument is that nostalgic recollections of the Yushin dictatorship, anti-Japanese nationalism, and the desire for Korean reunification provided the ideological background for Lee's mythical image. But the image would never have attained the level of myth had physics not enjoyed remarkable popularity. Although Lee, a Korean American theoretical particle physicist, never collaborated with Korean dictator Park Chung-hee, in a series of novels he was portrayed as a martyr and collaborator who led South Korea's nuclear weapons program in the 1970s. Lee was also depicted as laying a cornerstone of nuclear scientific collaboration between North and South Korea. These two aspects of Lee's mythical image were deeply related to the various social contexts, and so powerful was the combination that many South Koreans came to approve of nuclear armament. The story of Benjamin Whiso Lee, a classic example of the relationship between science and nationalism, reveals far more.

Anti-Japanese Popular Nationalism and China’s Approach Towards Japan amid Sino-Japanese Political Tension, 2001–2006

This paper explores the relationship between anti-Japanese popular nationalism and China’s approach towards Japan amid Sino-Japanese political tension from 2001 to mid-2006. Among various factors that may affect the relationship, this research focuses on the interaction between the government and the public expressions of anti-Japanese nationalism in China. Throughout most of this period, Sino-Japanese political relations were seriously strained by historical, territorial and other controversial issues, which stirred up anti-Japanese sentiment in China. However, it was only between 2003 and the spring of 2005 that mass anti-Japanese protests were allowed, or at least tolerated, by the Chinese authorities and played a role in Beijing’s handling of Japan-related controversies. The paper examines China’s domestic political situation during the leadership transition from the third to fourth generation of leaders, which it claims drove the Chinese government’s lenient response to popular anti-Japanese protests and enhanced the prospects for popular nationalism to affect the government’s approach towards Japan.

Politics and Pageantry in Protectorate Korea (1905–10): The Imperial Progresses of Sunjong

In the winter of 1909, at the height of Japan's informal rule in Korea, the protectorate government sent the Korean emperor Sunjong on an extended tour of the provinces. Applying the nation-building techniques of Meiji Japan, the residency-general had intended to promote unity and cooperation through the Korean royal house. Instead, the progresses sparked anti-Japanese nationalism and culminated in expressions of resistance. This article explores the political context of the progresses, the role of the newspapers in Korea and Japan in shaping public opinion, and the contest of official and popular nationalisms in Korea, defined by the symbols of the throne and the national flag.

History, Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging Sino–Japanese Conflict

Anti-Japanese popular nationalism is rising high in China today. Little evidence to date proves that it is officially orchestrated. Nonetheless, Chinese popular nationalism still has deep roots in the state's history propaganda which has implanted pernicious myths in the national collective memory. Fueling mistrust and exacerbating a mutual threat perception, popular nationalism could be a catalyst for future Sino–Japanese conflict over the Taiwan problem, island disputes, and maritime resource competition. The increasingly liberalized but often biased Chinese media, the role of nationalist sub-elites, and the government's accommodation have all contributed to the strength of anti-Japanese nationalism, which cannot be mitigated by bilateral economic interdependence. To rid bilateral relations of the negative historical legacy, the two countries need the vision and determination to remove nationalistic myths and promote a shared history through mutual critique and self-reflection in transnational historians' dialogues.

Japan's Deteriorating ties with China: The Koizumi Factor

In April 2005, anti-Japanese protests erupted in many cities in China and marked the lowest point in Sino-Japanese relations in more than 30 years. That these protests took place during the tenure of the Koizumi Administration should come as no surprise. Indeed, the policies and personality of Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro have both contributed to this abysmal state of relations between the two neighbours. The Koizumi Administration has abandoned the low-posture, post-war framework of appeasing Beijing which had the following features: no explicit mentioning of Taiwan as falling within the ambit of the US-Japan Alliance, repeated offering of apologies over its past invasion of the Chinese Mainland and extending generous Official Development Assistance (ODA) in lieu of reparations. This article traces the growing assertiveness of the Koizumi Administration towards China. While the deterioration of bilateral ties is the responsibility and fault of both parties, Prime Minister Koizumi himself is a key problem — not a problem-solver in this worsening of Sino-Japanese relations. A main reason for the rising friction between Beijing and Tokyo is the fundamental shift in the political economy of East Asia: China's rise coupled with Japan's stagnation. The angst of being overshadowed by China's phenomenal economic growth and the fear that this growth will translate into greater Chinese political influence [End Page 275] and military power in East Asia have made many Japanese elites wary, if not hostile, to China. Notwithstanding such sentiments within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the rightwing mass media, the Japanese Prime Minister's personality is crucial in bilateral ties: a more reconciliatory Prime Minister will help mitigate bilateral differences, while a more assertive and combative one will make matters worse. Had Koizumi not adamantly insisted on making annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine (the symbol of Japanese militarism towards the Chinese and Koreans), then the burden of history which bedevils Sino-Japanese relations could have been lightened by half. The following areas of the Koizumi Administration's assertiveness towards China are examined: the decision to end ODA, the issue of an apology over Imperial Japan's invasion of the Chinese Mainland and the unprecedented and explicit mentioning of Taiwan as a common strategic objective for the US-Japan Alliance. It then examines the absence of politicians in the present Koizumi cabinet who are reputedly friendly towards China. The main conclusion is that the departure of Koizumi as Prime Minister will not necessarily lead to an improvement in Sino-Japanese relations. Indeed, Koizumi's successor might be even more assertive and prickly towards China. Ending ODA to China In March 2005, Foreign Minister Machimura Nobutaka officially announced that as of fiscal 2008 when Beijing hosts the Olympic Games, Japan would cease extending new yen loans to China.1 The ostensible reason (tatemae) is that Japanese funds are no longer needed given China's rapid economic growth. The real reason (honne) for ending ODA is the rise of negative sentiment in Japan towards China, stemming in part from the frustration generated by the phenomenon of "China rising, Japan stagnating".2 Many Japanese believe that Japan must stand up to China to avoid being displaced by an ascendant country. [End Page 276] In recent years, Japanese ODA has become less important to China's economic development. By 2004, Japan's cumulative ODA to China was 3.3 trillion yen (USD31.5 billion), a fraction of China's cumulative foreign direct investment of USD563 billion.3 Many Japanese, who are unhappy that Beijing has increased its military budget by more than 10 per cent annually and even offered aid to neighbouring countries, feel that Beijing does not appreciate Tokyo's generous ODA which has been used mainly to help improve the Mainland's infrastructure. They are angered by virulent anti-Japanese nationalism in China as evidenced by the abusive behaviour of Chinese soccer hooligans towards the Japanese national team during...

Japan's Deteriorating Ties with China: The Koizumi Factor

In April 2005, anti-Japanese protests erupted in many cities in China and marked the lowest point in Sino-Japanese relations in more than 30 years. That these protests took place during the tenure of the Koizumi Administration should come as no surprise. Indeed, the policies and personality of Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro have both contributed to this abysmal state of relations between the two neighbours. The Koizumi Administration has abandoned the low-posture, post-war framework of appeasing Beijing which had the following features: no explicit mentioning of Taiwan as falling within the ambit of the US-Japan Alliance, repeated offering of apologies over its past invasion of the Chinese Mainland and extending generous Official Development Assistance (ODA) in lieu of reparations. This article traces the growing assertiveness of the Koizumi Administration towards China. While the deterioration of bilateral ties is the responsibility and fault of both parties, Prime Minister Koizumi himself is a key problem — not a problem-solver in this worsening of Sino-Japanese relations. A main reason for the rising friction between Beijing and Tokyo is the fundamental shift in the political economy of East Asia: China's rise coupled with Japan's stagnation. The angst of being overshadowed by China's phenomenal economic growth and the fear that this growth will translate into greater Chinese political influence [End Page 275] and military power in East Asia have made many Japanese elites wary, if not hostile, to China. Notwithstanding such sentiments within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the rightwing mass media, the Japanese Prime Minister's personality is crucial in bilateral ties: a more reconciliatory Prime Minister will help mitigate bilateral differences, while a more assertive and combative one will make matters worse. Had Koizumi not adamantly insisted on making annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine (the symbol of Japanese militarism towards the Chinese and Koreans), then the burden of history which bedevils Sino-Japanese relations could have been lightened by half. The following areas of the Koizumi Administration's assertiveness towards China are examined: the decision to end ODA, the issue of an apology over Imperial Japan's invasion of the Chinese Mainland and the unprecedented and explicit mentioning of Taiwan as a common strategic objective for the US-Japan Alliance. It then examines the absence of politicians in the present Koizumi cabinet who are reputedly friendly towards China. The main conclusion is that the departure of Koizumi as Prime Minister will not necessarily lead to an improvement in Sino-Japanese relations. Indeed, Koizumi's successor might be even more assertive and prickly towards China. Ending ODA to China In March 2005, Foreign Minister Machimura Nobutaka officially announced that as of fiscal 2008 when Beijing hosts the Olympic Games, Japan would cease extending new yen loans to China.1 The ostensible reason (tatemae) is that Japanese funds are no longer needed given China's rapid economic growth. The real reason (honne) for ending ODA is the rise of negative sentiment in Japan towards China, stemming in part from the frustration generated by the phenomenon of "China rising, Japan stagnating".2 Many Japanese believe that Japan must stand up to China to avoid being displaced by an ascendant country. [End Page 276] In recent years, Japanese ODA has become less important to China's economic development. By 2004, Japan's cumulative ODA to China was 3.3 trillion yen (USD31.5 billion), a fraction of China's cumulative foreign direct investment of USD563 billion.3 Many Japanese, who are unhappy that Beijing has increased its military budget by more than 10 per cent annually and even offered aid to neighbouring countries, feel that Beijing does not appreciate Tokyo's generous ODA which has been used mainly to help improve the Mainland's infrastructure. They are angered by virulent anti-Japanese nationalism in China as evidenced by the abusive behaviour of Chinese soccer hooligans towards the Japanese national team during...

A study on the logic and psychology of the anti-Japanese nationalism in China

A study on the logic and psychology of the anti-Japanese nationalism in China

The Chinese Communists' Road to Power: The Anti-Japanese National United Front, 1935-1945.

The Chinese Communists' Road to Power: The Anti-Japanese National United Front, 1935-1945.

<sc>shum kui-kwong</sc>. <italic>The Chinese Communists' Road to Power: The Anti-Japanese National United Front, 1935–1945</italic>. (East Asian Historical Monographs.) New York: Oxford University Press. 1988. Pp. xii, 312. $36.00

shum kui-kwong. The Chinese Communists' Road to Power: The Anti-Japanese National United Front, 1935–1945. (East Asian Historical Monographs.) New York: Oxford University Press. 1988. Pp. xii, 312. $36.00 Kui-Kwong Shum. The Chinese Communists' Road to Power: The Anti-Japanese National United Front, 1935–1945. (East Asian Historical Monographs.) New York: Oxford University Press. 1988. Pp. xii, 312. $36.00. James E. Sheridan James E. Sheridan Northwestern University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The American Historical Review, Volume 95, Issue 2, April 1990, Pages 561–562, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/95.2.561-a Published: 01 April 1990

The Chinese Communists' Road to Power: The Anti-Japanese National United Front (1935–1945). By Shum Kui-kwong. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. xiv, 312 pp. $36.00.

The Chinese Communists' Road to Power: The Anti-Japanese National United Front (1935–1945). By Shum Kui-kwong. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. xiv, 312 pp. $36.00.

The Chinese Communists' road to power: the Anti-Japanese National United Front, 1935-1945

Based on thorough examination of Chinese, Japanese, and Western source materials, the author re-examines inter-party politics within the Chinese Communist Party in the period 1935-45. He shows that the Chinese Communists had learnt from their defeat in 1934 that they could not challenge the Guomindang with only the support of the peasants. They therefore devised the anti-Japanese national united front policy, which united all sectors of the population.

Thai Society During World War II

Because she was not a Western colonial country, but an Asian Kingdom and a member of the Axis Power, wartime Thailand was free from Japanese military administration and a able to keep aloof from warfare after the friendly entry of the Japanese army, Thai political leaders assumed a pattern of “compromise” rather than “hostility” in response to the Japanese impact. Although intellectually, most Thai leaders did not agree with the Japanese idea of “The Great East Asia Go-prosperity Sphere, ” they accelerated an allied relationship with Japan to avoid a possibly critical situation of Japanese militarism sweeping all over the country. For her own national benefit in facing increasing Japanese power in Southeast Asia, Thailand put pressure on the anti-Japanese boycott movement of the Chinese within a country, sat on her fence of neutrality and tried to remain out side the Japanese military occupation until the opening day of the war. Even after December 8, 1941, when she recognized the friendly entry of the Japanese army, Thailand tried hard to stand behind the bay line by contributing economic ally to the Japanese military operation in Burma, Malaya and Singapore.In wartime, Pibul Songkram, Prime Minister of the Government, promoted Rathaniyom (Patriotic Movement) and Thai Yai (Great Thai Nation Movement through which he wanted to keep national stability based on of traditional Thai sentiment rather than the idea of individual freedom from the Constitutional Revolution in 1932. In terms of motivation, therefore, these movements were quite different from the Japanese idea of the “Co-prosperity Sphere.” Meanwhile, the dynamics of the anti-Japanese “Free Thai” movement were accelerated by Thai elites and university students then in the United States and the United Kingdom. There they carried out the actual plan to develop their resistance against Japan. On the other hand, Thai leaders, except several domestic “Free Thai” leaders, outwardly continued their friendly relations with the Japanese while secretly linking up with the “Free Thai” members in order to find a new place for themselves after the war. With the benefits of this duality, they reserved their own clear cut opinion and left rooms for changing attitudes to their advantage.Chinese leaders in economic circles also had similar patterns of response. Although they started the anti-Japanese National Salvation Movement in 1937, which was motivated from loyalty to their native land, they joined neither the all Chinese united front in Southeast Asia nor the overseas Chinese good-will tour party to Chungking and Yennan in 1938. However, from 1938 the Chinese in Thailand began cooperating with the national policy of the Thai government and, after war erupted, made contributions by procuring for the Japanese army. In reply to a requisition for labour for army railway construction between Burma and Thailand in 1943, the Chinese again tried to keep their security in the country by means of economic cooperation in offering munitions war, rather than by sending labour power for dreadful construction. In the meantime, however, they donated funds secretly to members of the “Free Thai” movement. Chang Lan-ch'en, former President of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Thailand, was a leader of pro-Japanse group during the war, but was able to return to the some position again in 1948 and held thee post until 1961 when he died. Pibul was also reinstalled in his former position in 1948 and was Prime Minister until 1957. These two political and economic leaders began to leave room for changing attitudes by the end of the war, to enhance their reinstatement in the post-war period.