Anti-establishment Parties Research Articles

Review of "Centrist Anti-Establishment Parties in Central and Eastern Europe: Success and Failure" by Sarah Engler

Centrist Anti-Establishment Parties and Their Struggle for Survival By SARAH ENGLER Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023 224 Pages, US$90 ISBN: 9780192873132

Euroscepticism and anti-establishment parties in Europe

ABSTRACT This article explores the relationship between party-based Euroscepticism and parties taking anti-establishment positions in contemporary Europe to map the relationship between these positions. The paper reports on an expert-informed qualitative comparative classification (EiQCC) of parties in 30 European countries conducted 2018–2019 to present a classification of 77 parties as Eurosceptic and anti-establishment. With this, we show that there were a number of different clusters of parties with various relationships between anti-establishment and Eurosceptic positions. The largest cluster showed a strong association between anti-establishment discourses and Euroscepticism. But there were also significant clusters where there was little or no interaction and were either anti-establishment and not Eurosceptic, or Eurosceptic without being anti-establishment. We also identify clusters where there was a weak association between anti-establishment and Eurosceptic positions and where anti-establishment parties had Eurosceptic stances but their position on European integration was either very weakly articulated or of very low salience.

The political economy of financing climate policy — Evidence from the solar PV subsidy programs

We analyze the political impact of a generous solar panel subsidization program. Subsidies far exceeded their social benefit and were partly financed by new taxes on adopters and by electricity surcharges for all consumers. We use local panel data from Belgium and find a decrease in votes for government parties in municipalities with high adoption rates. This shows that the voters’ punishment for a costly policy exceeded the potential reward by adopters who received generous subsidies. Further analysis indicates that punishment mainly comes from non-adopters, who change their vote towards anti-establishment parties.

Substantiating EU citizenship: an unintended route to anti-establishment support

ABSTRACT This study explores the relationship between European Union citizenship and support for anti-establishment parties across the EU’s older and newer, post-communist democracies. By conceptually linking EU support to substantive EU citizenship, this study identifies the contingent nature of EU citizenship’s effect on support for anti-establishment parties. We conduct a multilevel regression analysis across 22 EU member-states, using data generated by a Eurobarometer survey conducted in 2018. This survey counts on support for EU coordinated foreign policy, in addition to conventional EU support measures, enabling an analysis at different levels of EU politics. Findings show that citizens’ support at these different levels depresses their support for anti-establishment parties across old democracies, yet increases it across new democracies. Hence, the effect of EU citizenship emerges as being contingent on whether citizens are in an old or a new, post-communist democracy of the EU, and on where the borders of the EU are drawn. This contingency has potential to be an instrument of deepening the emerging transnational cleavage between liberal, cosmopolitan and traditional, authoritarian values for old democracies and of manipulation by inward looking parochial, populist politics for new democracies. This will affect the nature of European politics and the future of integration.

Populism and Anti-Intellectualism: the Evolution of the Political Views of the Italian "Five Star Movement" (2005–2022)

Among the characterizing features of populism, which has become an integral part of the party-political systems of Western countries, anti-intellectualism is often listed. It is understood as distrust of intellectuals, expert knowledge and the scientific community. Italy, the “political laboratory of Europe,” provides rich material for studying the connection between anti-intellectualism and populism. This article attempts to analyze the role and evolution of anti-intellectualism in populist discourse using the example of the Italian Five Star Movement (M5S). Five Stars, founded by comedian Beppe Grillo and IT entrepreneur Gianroberto Casaleggio, has become one of the main parties in the country, while expressing controversial views from the point of view of the scientific community. Using qualitative text and discourse analysis, the party's official blogs, M5S bills, articles from Italian and foreign media are analyzed. As a result, this work offers a balanced view of the gradual development of anti-intellectual sentiments within the Movement in the context of the overall process of institutionalization of the party into the mainstream of Italian politics during the period of 2005–2022. The subject of this article remains completely unexplored in Russian scientific literature and little studied in foreign science. Analysis of this subject shows that in the process of institutionalization, the long stay of the anti-establishment party in government, populist rhetoric, including anti-intellectual rhetoric, is emasculated and approaches the “mainstream”.

Beyond digital populism: civic culture and visions of political participation among Five Star Movement activists

AbstractThis article deals with the impact of intra-party transformations and access to power on the visions of political participation of activists taking part in populist anti-establishment parties with a strong emphasis on digital participation, using the Five Star Movement (M5S) as a case study. Going beyond studies conceiving the M5S as a populist and digital party, we argue that activists support a democratic ideal based on a civic culture involving a demanding role for ordinary citizens, who should be highly interested in politics and involved locally on a day-to-day basis. A negative vision of the Italian citizen judged as incapable of playing this role accompanies this ideal. Our article also demonstrates how political involvement in the M5S transformed the visions of activists, making them warier of direct democracy and more disillusioned about their fellow citizens. The analysis relies on qualitative semi-directed interviews with former and current M5S activists with diversified socio-demographics, political and participation trajectories in two Italian regions. More broadly, our article shows that the effects of entering government and intra-party reforms reinforcing the leadership at the expense of local activists are particularly strong in anti-establishment parties and clash with the conceptions of participation supported by activists.

Perceived fairness of intra-municipal cohesion politics: Does place of residence affect party preferences?

This paper examines whether beliefs that local decision-makers are perceived to favour certain groups or districts over others, are linked to anti-establishment party preferences, and whether living in an urban or rural area affects this relationship. By taking stock of an original survey of Swedish respondents stratified into densely (urban) and sparsely (rural) populated districts, our results reveal geographical polarisation even within municipalities based on perceptions of how resources are distributed, as well as perceptions of opportunities to influence policy. Individuals who live in densely populated rural areas and believe that groups have unequal influence within the municipality depending on their geographical location tend to be far left. Individuals who have similar grievances about bias in decision-making but live in rural areas tend to be far right. Furthermore, Left Party supporters living in densely populated areas are more likely to perceive bias against poor districts, while rural Sweden Democrat supporters are more likely to believe that urban residents disregard rural concerns. We conclude that local decision-makers are perceived to favour certain groups or districts over others, are linked to an increased likelihood to prefer anti-establishment parties.

Clustering and Analysing Relevant Policy Dimensions of Populist, Left-Wing, Centrist, and Right-Wing Parties across Europe

ABSTRACT This paper is a configurational analysis that creates a new theoretical elaboration of populist parties in Europe in terms of policy choices. The forms of populism that we can see in contemporary Europe are new, relevant and do not have a theoretical representation in the literature. This paper also provides a clearer understanding of the characteristics of populist and anti-establishment parties in Europe, which can provide valuable insights into likely responses to reformed policy environments. To do so, the paper analyses policy positions connected to the populist literature for 242 parties in Europe in 2014 and 2019 using the Chapell Hill Expert Survey and the PopuList Survey data. Groups of parties with similarly held positions in 2014 and 2019 are identified using cluster analysis to investigate whether differences in positions are defined predominately according to a national, east–west, right–left faction or other criteria. The result highlights that rather than across a classical right–left divide connotation, Europe can be divided into four clusters: right-wing populists, a moderate pro-Europe left, a pro-Europe pro-liberalism centre and an intersectional left based on identity politics. Overall, the moderate left and the centrist liberalism centre are the most common parties across Europe, and the other two factions seem to be born as a reaction to these two. However, the other two factions are growing over the years, especially the populist right-wing in Central and Eastern Europe. This brings to light serious policy implications for the future of the European Union and for considering populism simply as a discursive matter.

Studying dimensions of representation: introducing the Belgian RepResent panel (2019–2021)

This research note presents the RepResent Belgian Panel (RBP). The RBP is a voter panel survey consisting of four waves fielded to a sample of voters in Belgium around the May 2019 federal, regional, and European elections in Belgium. It provides unique data on about 250 variables for a quota sample of the same respondents, pre-2019 elections (N = 7351), post-2019 elections (N = 3909), one year after the elections (N = 1996), and 2 years after the elections (N = 1119). The RBP panel dataset was designed to analyse voters’ political attitudes and behaviours, notably on different dimensions of democratic representation, and with a specific focus on democratic resentment (e.g. citizens’ attitudes towards democracy such as distrust and alienation, but also behaviours such as abstention, protest, or voting for anti-establishment parties). Its longitudinal structure allows to explore the political dynamics at play in Belgium throughout the lengthy government formation process. Finally, the last two waves of the RBP were fielded during the Covid-19 pandemic, allowing to explore public opinion before and during this global crisis. The RBP should be of interest to scholars of public opinion and electoral studies.

Challengers or the Establishment? How Populists Talk About Populists

ABSTRACT Several western European countries recently experienced the establishment of more than one populist actor in their party system. While we know how populists attack the political mainstream, we lack knowledge on how populists talk about other populist actors. Conducting content analysis of campaigning communication on Twitter and 23 interviews with populist MPs in Germany, Italy and Spain – countries characterised by the presence of various populisms – we find that populists demonise each other perceiving themselves as adversaries. Populists attribute a malicious and extremist character to the (populist) opponent when the latter is ideologically distant indicating the decisive role of host ideologies. Positive evaluations only occur by overlapping policy position. Some specificities emerge in Italy, where established populists behave more like the mainstream. Being populist as such does not unify political actors in the fight against the establishment: populists appear at least as hostile towards other anti-establishment parties as towards the mainstream.

The local party voter: A localist anti-establishment voter?

In several countries, local parties have increased their share of votes in local elections. This development has received limited scholarly attention compared to the immense interest paid to the fates of national level anti-establishment parties. Against this backdrop, we ask if something distinct characterizes those who choose to vote for genuinely local alternatives compared to other anti-establishment voters. Sweden is taken as the case in focus, a country where local parties have grown in numbers and strength throughout the past three decades. We view local parties as a part of a broader ‘anti-establishment’ family, and we explore if their voters a) are similar to those who vote for the most pronounced anti-establishment party in Sweden (Sweden Democrats), or b) if local party voters are a distinct anti-establishment category in their own right. Drawing on a survey data from 49 Swedish municipalities, we find that local party voters indeed distinguish themselves from both Sweden Democrat's voters and voters for the old and established parties, thus making them a distinct anti-establishment voter category of their own. These voters distrust their local politicians but at the same time are civically engaged.

Variations in vaccination uptake: COVID-19 vaccination rates in Swedish municipalities.

Facing the threat of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, vaccines are important for limiting the spread and consequences of the pandemic. In this study, we provide a descriptive overview of the within-country variations of vaccine rates by examining to what extent voter turnout, support for an anti-establishment political party (Sweden Democrats), presence of first-generation immigrants, and Evangelical religiosity are associated with the within-country variation in vaccine uptake rates. We use official register data for municipality-level vaccine rates and municipality-level regressions with regional fixed effects. Our analyses show that vaccine uptake, on average, is lower in municipalities where the anti-establishment political party Sweden Democrats has higher vote shares and where a larger share of the population is first-generation immigrants. We discuss that potential explanations for these associations between vote shares for an anti-establishment party and shares of first-generation immigrants could be lower levels of trust in institutions and language barriers.

Does System Justification Promote Establishment Voting? Mainstream Politics in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom

Throughout Europe and North America, mainstream political parties have ceded electoral support to antiestablishment parties from the far left and far right. We investigate the hypothesis that individual differences in system justification—the psychological tendency to defend and justify the overarching social system—would be negatively associated with antiestablishment voting, even among citizens who would otherwise be inclined to support radicalism. In three large, nationally representative surveys conducted in France (N = 14,432), Germany (N = 1,168), and the United Kingdom (N = 2,337), we observed that system justification was positively associated with voting for establishment parties and negatively associated with antiestablishment voting. System justification was associated with reduced support for antiestablishment parties on the right and left—even among respondents who were high on ethnic intolerance, opposition to the European Union, economic distress, and support for income redistribution. Thus, all other things being equal, system‐justification tendencies reinforce political moderation, establishment voting, and therefore social stability.

Right-wing populist parties and their appeal to pro-redistribution voters

As anti-establishment parties, right-wing populists (RWPs) have been successful in attracting the politically discontent. This article shows how this appeal of RWPs asymmetrically affects citizens on the economical left and right. Building on previous work, the analysis examines how anti-establishment status conditions not only the effect of political disaffection, but also the effect of redistribution preferences on RWP support. A multilevel analysis using nine waves of the European Social Survey and a composite anti-establishment measure reveals that where RWPs are more established, strong pro-redistribution preferences drive voters away from these parties even more than voters are attracted to them based on political distrust. Political distrust more than outweighs the countervailing effect of pro-redistribution preferences only where RWPs are less established. There, pro-redistribution voters are a particularly suitable target as they are also more politically dissatisfied. These findings help to understand when and why RWPs can attract different segments of society.

Post-Communist Junctures, the Left, and Illiberalism: Theory with Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe

While many post-communist European party systems have experienced the rise of anti-establishment parties, not all have been equally vulnerable to challengers attacking both cultural and economic liberalism. This article borrows insights from scholarship on Latin American politics and develops a critical juncture approach to understanding the linkages between economic liberalization and political illiberalism in 15 post-communist democracies during the 1990-2020 period. It argues that contingent political dynamics during post-communist junctures shaped ensuing legacies by conditioning the long-term programmatic positions and variable electoral performance of “traditional” leftist parties. This path-dependent process culminated in variable electoral viability of illiberal parties with incentives for ideological differentiation and organizational capacities to adopt those economic positions that were most likely to be electorally rewarded. By focusing on variable incentives, resources, and constraints, the article challenges previous scholarship and advances and tests a novel theoretical framework based on a probabilistic approach to critical juncture analysis.

Theorizing Populist Radical-Right Foreign Policy: Ideology and Party Positioning in France and Germany

AbstractThe success of anti-establishment parties across Europe has fueled debate on the role of populism for foreign policy and its contemporary contestation. The almost-election of Marine Le Pen to the French presidency in 2017, the successes of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany's 2017 and 2021 federal elections, and the central role these populist radical-right (PRR) parties henceforth play in structuring political debate make their wider foreign policy positions an issue of central concern. Yet, we still lack a thorough understanding how populism and radical-right ideology jointly produce a distinct foreign policy positioning beyond European integration. This article tries to narrow this gap by conceptualizing PRR positioning on trade, climate change, development policies, hegemony, and security and defense issues. The comparative analysis of official documents and voting behavior reveals only subtle differences between the Rassemblement national and the AfD, while demonstrating broad commonalities that have the potential to inform research across other cases and world regions on PRR parties’ foreign policy positioning.

‘Fix the system!’ Variations of anti-establishment normalisation strategies in comparative perspective

This article explores how different anti-establishment parties (AEPs) can themselves strategically enact an image of both distinctiveness and ‘normality’ behind their political offer. For this purpose, we directly measure and map diverse anti-establishment normalisation strategies by analysing 142 social media campaigns of radical right, left, and ‘centrist’ AEPs and their conventional competitors during 23 elections in Europe during 2010–2019. We find that while AEPs presented themselves as fundamentally distinct from ‘politics as usual’, they simultaneously attempted to normalise their contestation supply across and within two dimensions: mainstreaming and streamlining. Using regression analysis, we further find that the degree to which AEPs rhetorically normalised their supply was positively and significantly associated with their broader electoral appeal ceteris paribus, controlling for substantive issue positions, parliamentary experience and position in government. Concurrently, the effects of particular normalisation strategies and their specific calibration varied for the radical right and left. The findings deepen our comparative understanding of diverse anti-establishment strategies used in party competition.

Better Late Than Never: Predictors of Delayed COVID-19 Vaccine Uptake in Poland.

In this study, regression models were created to explain the increase of COVID-19 vaccination rates in 378 Polish sub-regions. In order to trace the factors that could explain the willingness to delay vaccination, vaccination rates were compared for age groups of 20 years and more for 30 June 2020 and 31 January 2021. Initially high vaccination rates, rather than leading to the gradual exhaustion of the pool of those wishing to get vaccinated, were a very good predictor of the share of the remainder willing to do so, which increased the divergence between sub-regions in nominal vaccination rates. Support for Eurosceptic and anti-establishment parties was a strong predictor of persistent vaccine hesitancy. Ideological divergence from the mainstream appeared to reinforce vaccine hesitancy, and this relationship remained highly relevant even when controlling for possible time or spatial lag. Markers of social inclusion and social capital—voter turnout and employment rate—remained statistically significant even when controlling for time lag, thus implying clear relevance of trust in the public message. The share of the population with higher education remained a highly relevant factor as well, though in the 20–39 age bracket it predicted a higher vaccination rate, while in all older brackets it was a negative predictor—this implies that those people had already made up their minds. Delaying vaccination seems predominantly explainable by political views, as well as social exclusion and the historical specificity of sub-regions. On a regional level, there was actually a paradoxical Spearmans Rho correlation (0.641) between the share of population refusing mandatory vaccination for kids and the percentage of people receiving a COVID-19 vaccine, which further undermines the idea that overall observed vaccine hesitancy was in any meaningful way affected by anti-vaccine movements.

Emotions of protest in times of crisis: representation, dislocation and remedy in the Greek ‘squares movement’

ABSTRACT This paper focuses on the 2011 ‘squares movement’ in Greece to enquire into the importance of (popular) sovereignty for mobilized individuals in relation to representation and crisis. We draw on tools of political theory and discourse analysis, adopt a ‘bottom up’ ethnographic perspective, and incorporate insights from social movement studies and the sociology of emotions. The aim is to reconstruct the key narratives and frames used by individuals to make sense of their motivations and aspirations, but also to trace the movement’s legacy. Our data is drawn from archival research in media outlets and semi-structured interviews with individuals that participated in or observed the ‘squares movement’. Our findings highlight the importance of the moment of dislocation and its destabilizing effect on individuals, while stressing the positive/productive aspect of crisis. Using emotions as a thread that runs through the mobilization and links it to subsequent ones, we highlight the explanatory value of our analysis for understanding the radical realignment of the political system and the rise of anti-establishment parties, and show how a cycle of tensions at the heart of representation that opened up in 2010 seems to have now closed.

Where has the protest gone? Populist attitudes and electoral flows in Italian political turmoil

What happens when anti-establishment political actors gain strength, enter institutions, and even become the new establishment? To what extent are their electoral profiles and the demands behind them normalised by the system? This article uses ITANES surveys to investigate voters’ reactions to the different paths taken by the three main protagonists of the 2016-2020 Italian populist wave: the M5S, the Lega, and FDI. In particular, it uses panel data to study the evolution of populist attitudes and protest drivers, as well as their connection with electoral flows and parties’ strategic choices. The most striking change concerns the redefinition of the political outlook of 5-star voters, who have significantly reduced their populist stances. However, the transformation of the M5S into a government party produced significant outflows of voters who already in 2016 expressed greater resentment towards political elites. These dynamics have largely favoured parties of the populist right – the Lega and then especially FDI – which have preserved or even reinforced their (electoral) profile as anti-establishment parties.