Anthony Eden Research Articles

Anthony Eden's crises: The cholecystectomy and the Suez Canal.

Anthony Eden's crises: The cholecystectomy and the Suez Canal.

The Background to the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942: The Problem of Compromise Solutions for Lithuania (The Baltic States)

In 1942, when drafting a strategic cooperation treaty between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, the foreign secretary Anthony Eden was responsible for preparing projects to solve the Balts’ problems, based on which the Baltic States could preserve limited sovereignty. This aspect has received little attention in historiography, seemingly because it is treated as an ephemeral, insignificant episode. It cannot be dismissed that the provision of a compromise with the Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, which was in principle impossible, did apply. However, historical material suggests a different conclusion. This article was also inspired by Henry Kissinger’s opinion that it was the idealism of the US president Franklin D. Roosevelt that prevented Western states from reaching a compromise with Stalin. This article reveals what went on ‘behind the scenes’ in big politics: how the Baltic States factor, in itself rather insignificant to the big states, allows for identifying the prime goal of those big states, to seek power and dominance.

Gallstones: The thing in itself.

Content available: Audio Recording.

How not to run international affairs

Abstract This article explores three case-studies—the Munich crisis of 1938, the Suez crisis and war of 1956 and the Iraq war of 2003—as examples of ‘how not to run international affairs’. On the face of it, all three episodes were disasters. Irrespective of whether Munich was strategically correct, Neville Chamberlain's public presentation of the agreement was a clear miscalculation. Anthony Eden created an elaborate pretext for invading Egypt, which was nevertheless so see-through that it destroyed British credibility. Tony Blair appears to have persuaded himself into believing that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction, and basing his case for war upon this idea left him exposed when the weapons were shown not to exist. Whereas it is easy to say that these mistakes should not have been made, it is harder to suggest mechanisms that would prevent leaders falling prey to such delusions, when their immediate political interests appear to depend on them. The article concludes that in these three cases failure was over-determined; on the other hand, there are many everyday crises that foreign policy actors, who understand ‘how not to run international affairs’, succeed in preventing from turning into disasters.

An Iatrogenic Injury? Anthony Eden and the Suez Crisis of 1956.

In 1953, Eden, then Britain's Foreign Secretary, sustained a bile duct injury during a cholecystectomy. After reconstructive surgery at the Lahey Clinic, he continued to experience episodes of cholangitis, notably during the Suez Crisis of 1956. By then prime minister, the crisis ended in a humiliating retreat for Eden and for Britain. The role that his iatrogenic injury, its long term sequelae, and the cocktail of drugs he took to treat them played in his decision making has been an ongoing source of debate almost from the time of the crisis. This article reviews the Suez crisis, Eden's medical history, and the debate over Eden's health.

Anthony Eden, Anglo-American Relations and the 1954 Indochina Crisis, by Kevin Ruane and Matthew Jones

Anthony Eden, Anglo-American Relations and the 1954 Indochina Crisis, by Kevin Ruane and Matthew Jones

Anthony Eden, Anglo-American Relations, and the 1954 Indochina Crisis. By Kevin Ruane and Matthew Jones. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019. Pp. xii+338. $115.00 (cloth); $103.50 (e-book).

<i>Anthony Eden, Anglo-American Relations, and the 1954 Indochina Crisis</i>. By Kevin Ruane and Matthew Jones. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019. Pp. xii+338. $115.00 (cloth); $103.50 (e-book).

Anthony Eden, Anglo-American Relations and the 1954 Indochina Crisis

Irrational leaders pose special problems for scholars. Some future historian will have to have a say. What would that be? About Donald Trump? About Boris Johnson? Until recently, the British prime minister most often placed in this category was Anthony Eden, who served as foreign minister from 1951 to 1954, then succeeded Winston Churchill in the top job when the latter stepped down in the fall of 1954. The reason for singling Eden out—as Kevin Ruane and Matthew Jones rightly note—is the minister's extraordinarily reckless behavior in 1956, when Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal and Eden conspired with France and Israel to get it back. Eden's comments about Nasser and general deportment were such that others feared for his sanity. Former Minister of State Anthony Nutting supplied chapter and verse in his book No End of a Lesson.Ruane and Jones turn this image upside down in Anthony Eden, Anglo-American Relations and the 1954 Indochina Crisis. The crisis, for those not familiar, grew out of the battle of Dien Bien Phu, where French armies in Indochina strove to turn back a Vietnamese revolutionary tide that was headed to independence. The United States, having embarked on a crusade against Communism, considered whether to intervene on the French side in that battle, which would have embroiled U.S. troops in Vietnam years before that actually happened. President Dwight D. Eisenhower wavered on intervention and had a hard time resisting the pressure. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles sought to create a political-military framework to enable intervention. Eden played a heroic role in 1954, helping to organize and then co-chairing a conference in Geneva that ended the Indochina crisis without military intervention, by means of agreements that featured a ceasefire in the war and a set of accommodations between France and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.Ruane and Jones reject as phony the claim that the United States never really intended to intervene in Indochina. The importance of this book (which might more manageably be titled just Anthony Eden) is that the authors have mined the record in depth to show how Eden's steadfast opposition to the U.S. intervention bid really did stop Eisenhower and Dulles from bullying their way into war. Ruane and Jones argue that Eden feared the Indochina crisis could lead to nuclear war, a fear that stoked his determination to foil U.S. plans to internationalize the conflict (p. 255). Along the way the authors present British policy—and its effects on Washington's enterprise—in exhaustive detail.This is the most important treatment of the Dien Bien Phu crisis that has appeared in a very long time. Do not miss it.Ruane and Jones do one better, though. They push ahead to Suez and actually attempt to contrast Eden in the annus mirabilis of 1954 with the year of disaster 1956. Interestingly enough, they dismiss claims of a linkage between the Dien Bien Phu and Suez crises. “It makes greater sense,” the authors conclude, “to root Eden's Suez decision-making—including his mistakes and misjudgments—wholly in 1956” (p. 261). The authors also reject the idea that Dulles sought revenge in the Suez crisis for the U.S. failure at Dien Bien Phu. In Eden's memoir Full Circle he devotes more than a hundred pages to the Indochina war, including the full trajectory of the conflict, the conferences at Berlin and Geneva, and intervention. That public account, published in 1960, is ably confirmed in this book. Those who have constructed artificial visions that exalt Eisenhower and denigrate Eden now have an evidentiary mountain to climb.

‘Clouds of Mutual Suspicion:’ Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement in the Mediterranean

This article reconsiders scholarly indictments of Neville Chamberlain’s Mediterranean appeasement strategy. It explains why, out of several alternatives available, Chamberlain prioritized repairing cooperation with Benito Mussolini in the years following the Abyssinia Crisis. This article argues that Chamberlain ultimately decided to pursue an understanding with Italy because the British stood the most to gain from the Italian option. By the summer of 1937, Britain faced the possibility of war in Europe, the Far East, and the Mediterranean. Blocked from pursuing better relations with both the Germans and the Japanese, Chamberlain turned to reconcile relations with the Italians to relieve Britain’s strategic predicament. But an agreement with Italy also offered to strengthen Britain’s imperial position and make progress towards general appeasement. The debate that emerged between Neville Chamberlain and Anthony Eden over the direction of British foreign policy demonstrates that while the Foreign Secretary put forward a number of alternative policies, Chamberlain believed that the Italian option would best serve British interests. For too long, historians have pointed to Eden’s resignation as proof of Chamberlain’s failure to consider alternative policies without an adequate discussion of why he favoured an agreement with the Italians.

Mésentente Cordiale: Italian Policy and the Failure of the Easter Accords, 1937-1938

ABSTRACT British and Italian representatives signed a series of accords, commonly called the Easter Accords, on 16 April 1938. The various agreements aimed to settle several outstanding issues between the two governments and, on the surface, it appeared that both Powers had committed to observe the status quo in the Mediterranean. Two years later, however, fascist Italy and Britain were at war. This analysis argues that Italian foreign policy had three over-arching goals that led Rome to sign the Accords. It wanted to secure definitive British de jure recognition of the Italian conquest of Ethiopia and recognition that Italy was an equal empire with rights in the Mediterranean and Red Sea basins. Benito Mussolini, the Italian dictator, wanted to isolate France from its potential British ally. Italian diplomats and officials also thought that they could use the negotiations to weaken the influence of Anthony Eden, the British foreign secretary. The limited, tactical scope of Italian policy meant little chance existed of reaching a genuine rapprochement.

Ghosts of Empire in Egypt

This article “Ghosts of Empire in Egypte” offer a fresh approach to the Cold War. The full story of Turkey’s ambassador in Egypt and his revenge remained out of the public eye until newspapers offered full details of a plot, clearly aimed at staging: “a military coup, assassinate Gamal Abdul Nasser and other revolution leaders, and re-establishing the monarchy in Egypt.” Great Britain’s prime minister Anthony Eden concluded the maintenance of his country’s Middle Eastern interests demanded the removal of Nasser from power, planning to isolate Nasser inside Egypt, placing a “gradual squeeze on the Egyptian economy in order to ferment popular dissatisfaction with the military regime”.

BBC Independence and Impartiality: The Case of the 1956 Suez Crisis

As the world’s oldest national broadcaster, The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) is unique in its contribution to British life and its level of international influence. The BBC is well known for its historic core mission (to inform, educate and entertain) and commitment to the principles of independence and impartiality. Yet the definition and practical application of these tenets are far from clear-cut. Considered by some to be a quasi-autonomous non-governmental organization, the BBC has been subjected to much criticism throughout its long history regarding its ability to resist State and corporate pressures. This article seeks to explore State pressures in the context of calls for national unity in times of crisis when tensions with the BBC are at their greatest. To this end, a qualitative analysis of the 1956 Suez Crisis is conducted and is linked to the decline of the British Empire. This study shows the limited interpretation of impartiality by the BBC at that time. Anthony Eden’s Conservative government fought a propaganda war at home and abroad in the build-up to military intervention. The BBC’s independence was ambiguous at best, although it emerged from the crisis with its reputation intact due to its insistence on the notion of impartiality.

Is there a standard reaction of surgeons to surgical complications? Study on an interesting historical case

The surgeon has been recognised as the “second victim” of a surgical complication and the long term psychological impact of a surgical adverse event has been demonstrated. However, the immediate and early psychological response to a surgical complication has not been properly investigated. In this manuscript we analyse a well-known historical case of a surgical complication and discuss the early reaction of the surgeon.Sir Anthony Eden, UK Prime Minister in the ‘50s, underwent a cholecystectomy for gallstones, but the operation complicated with a biliary fistula causing jaundice and sepsis. The reaction of the surgeon followed a precise three-stage pattern that can be identified in almost every case of surgical complication. Initially he denied the complication, with a simplistic attitude, but subsequently he felt overwhelmed by the environmental pressure and gave up.The early psychological response of a surgeon to a surgical complication usually follows the three phases of “denial”, “desperation” and “action or get-away”. In the denial phase the surgeon tries to reassure him or herself by diminishing the real burden of the complication and to demonstrate self-confidence. After few days, when it is evident that the complication is more severe than expected, the surgeon changes completely his or her attitude and becomes more and more depressed and anxious. The reaction to phase 2 will determine the subsequent phase 3, where the surgeon would choose between a positive and proactive attitude or getting-away, thus disengaging from the complicated patient.Acknowledging these three phases would help team leaders and colleagues to recognise the need for a supportive, friendly and blame-free environment and to act timely to help the surgeon to overcome the negative impact on his or her personality and career.

One Eye on Hitler, the Other Eye on Stalin: How Britain Explored a British-Soviet Alliance from January to June of 1941

This essay examines how the British Government, in the lead-up to Operation Barbarossa, perceived the notion of an anti-German coalition comprising Britain and the Soviet Union British diplomats, including Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and Ambassador Sir Stafford Cripps, assessed the extent to which the Soviet Government was committed to its Non-Aggression Treaty with Germany and how far Josef Stalin was prepared to appease Adolf Hitler and thereby prevent a military conflict with the Third Reich. As a consequence, following the fall of France to the Germans in the summer of 1940, of Britain perilously standing alone against the might of Nazi Germany, Whitehall looked increasingly to the USSR, a country which many British officials traditionally harboured feelings of grave disquiet over, as a means of salvation. However, British diplomats reported, indeed, lamented, that such was the fear felt by the Soviet Government of a war with Germany, together with Stalin’s ingrained distrust of Britain, that the chances of Moscow abandoning its Non-Aggression Treaty with Berlin and joining forces with London in an anti-Hitler coalition were negligible.

Facing the Dictators: Anthony Eden, the Foreign Office and British Intelligence, 1935–1945

This article uses the inter-war and wartime career of Anthony Eden, as a vehicle to understand the little understood relationship between secret intelligence, British Foreign Secretaries and the Foreign Office. While secret intelligence is no longer the ‘missing dimension’, it once was in studies of diplomatic and political history, its use by British Foreign Secretaries remains a neglected subject. The article also sheds important new light on the Foreign Office’s wartime use of intelligence, especially diplomatic signals intelligence (SIGINT), a subject often overshadowed by the use of military SIGINT from Bletchley Park, showing the close relationship between intelligence officials and British diplomats in guiding British foreign policy. As Foreign Secretary in the 1930s and 1940s, Eden showed himself to be a skilful reader of intelligence reports, using this information as he went about crafting Britain’s policy towards the increasingly bellicose powers of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan.

Concealing Collusion: The Suez Crisis, Political Memoirs and Official Secrecy, 1956–1969

Abstract The Suez crisis in 1956 has long been recognised as a watershed in British history—precipitating the fall of Anthony Eden’s government, accelerating the end of empire, and underscoring how weak Britain had become on the international stage, especially in relation to the United States, which emerged from the episode as undeniably the senior partner in the ‘Special Relationship’. Less understood is the important role that the crisis played in weakening the foundations of official secrecy in Britain, especially what might be described as the social underpinnings of secrecy. This article explores how sensitive details about Suez eventually came to light in the period 1956 to 1969, despite concerted and sometimes cunning efforts by the Whitehall machine to prevent disclosure. Contrary to conventional wisdom, which suggests that socialist parliamentary firebrands like Michael Foot proved the most difficult to control, it is argued that the greatest challenge to secret-keepers came from senior conservative politicians writing memoirs—chief among them Eden himself—who were headstrong, not easily intimidated, and unafraid to bypass rules and codes of discretion to vindicate their careers. Fascinatingly, memoir writers not only ignored legal mechanisms such as the much-feared Official Secrets Act, but, against the backdrop of profound social and cultural change, they also dismissed attempts by mandarins to exploit gentlemanly bonds and loyalties, which in the past had been an effective method of promoting self-censorship by members of the elite.

‘In the way’: intelligence, Eden, and British foreign policy towards Italy, 1937–38

In 1937–1938 a divide emerged over Italian appeasement between Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and his Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden. Chamberlain wanted to appease Mussolini with de jure recognition of his Ethiopian conquest. Eden disagreed and even resigned over the matter. Historians have struggled to define clearly Eden’s resistance. The intelligence archive allows for a reassessment of British policy towards Italy and Eden’s resignation. It shows that secret intelligence was central to Eden’s decisions and demonstrates the importance of intelligence in diplomatic history. It shows that Eden, almost alone, correctly read ambiguous intelligence on Mussolini and recognized him as an enemy of Britain.

24 In sickness and in power

24 In sickness and in power

Ministers at War: Winston Churchill and His War Cabinet. By Jonathan Schneer.New York: Basic Books, 2014. Pp. xxiv+324. $29.99.

<i>Ministers at War: Winston Churchill and His War Cabinet</i>. By Jonathan Schneer.New York: Basic Books, 2014. Pp. xxiv+324. $29.99.

British Attempts to Forge a Political Partnership with the Kremlin, 1942–3

In February 1943, the British Foreign Office launched an initiative to open discussions with the Soviet Union on postwar aims, a subject which had been off-limits since the disputes over Soviet frontiers during the negotiation of the Anglo–Soviet Treaty in early 1942. Joseph Stalin’s response was to treat the approach seriously, and to request concrete proposals that would lead to a firm formal agreement. The British immediately pulled back, and no progress on political issues was attempted until later in the war. This article analyses this rarely-discussed episode, focusing on how British indecisiveness, at a crucial stage of the war, and the lack of political will of Anthony Eden, led to confusion and mixed messages being sent to the Soviet government. Attempts to build a solid political component to the wartime alliance and to reach agreement on the key issues of a postwar European settlement prior to the end of the war were delayed not so much by the ideological gulf between the allies as their different cultures of diplomacy and the customary processes of their bureaucracies. Ultimately progress was made when each began to adopt elements of the approach of the other.