Anglo-Burmese War Research Articles

Adoniram Judson and the Creation of a Missionary Discourse in Pre-Colonial Burma

In the following paper I argue that Adoniram Judson, the first American Baptist Missionary to Burma, was strongly empathetic with his adopted country. His work as interpreter-translator during the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Yandabo in 1826 and his visits to Ava both immediately before and after the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824-1826), although couched in the language of Christian mission, exhibited characteristics markedly different from the perspective of Ann Judson's memoir, and from those of certain missionary narratives subsequent to his own. I propose to examine aspects of three texts: Ann Judson's An Account of the American Baptist Mission to the Burman Empire ; Henry Gouger's Personal Narrative of Two Years Imprisonment in Burmah ; and Adoniram Judson's deposition to John Crawfurd. I shall also refer to J. Snodgrass' Narrative of the Burmese War (1824-1826) and Henry Trant's Two Years in Ava for other perspectives on some events.

The Fall of Ayutthaya: A Reassessment

Conventional views of the 1760-1767 Burmese attacks on Ayutthaya contend that the Burmese were taking advantage of an opportunity to attack a politically and economically weak kingdom. This article adduces evidence from the Burmese chronicles, from accounts by contemporary foreign observers, and from economic history to argue that Burma's campaigns against Ayutthaya were part of an epic struggle between the two polities that began in the 1500s and continued until the Anglo-Burmese War of 1824-1826. Control of trade was one of the central factors motivating this centuries-long conflict. It was the very strength and wealth of the Siamese kingdom, not its alleged weakness, that motivated the Burmese invaders, who hoped to strike a blow that would knock Ayutthaya out of contention as the trading hub of mainland Southeast Asia.

Confronting the World and Each Other: Chiang Mai in the 1820s

The mid-1820s was a critical period when Siam had to act upon various events: the first Anglo-Burmese War, leading to the rise of British power and the decline of Burma; the visit to Bangkok of a British mission; and the resurgence of Lao power under King Anu of Vientiane. This paper attempts to read the available sources “between the lines” in order to get a grasp of the crucial questions, virtually ignored in the existing literature, of how the Siamese leaders pondered, argued, and planned in reaction to these regional developments. Focusing on Chiang Mai and neighboring principalities in the years 1823-1827, it proposes an insight into behind-the-scenes debates in higher circles.1

Forest Problems in Colonial Burma: Historical Variations on Contemporary Themes

This paper explores aspects of forest management in colonial Burma. After the first Anglo-Burmese war (1824-26), the British initially exploited the teak forests of Tenasserim under a system of laissez-faire forestry. However, the rapid depletion of this resource led to a new approach following the second Anglo-Burmese war (1852) based on the creation of reserved forests dedicated to longterm timber production. As the first case study illustrates, forest officials sought to exclude fire from these forests, believing that fire retarded teak growth. In the process, they imposed restrictions and obligations on villagers, who, in turn, resisted such control through the illegal use of fire, village complicity, labour strikes or slowdowns and incendiarism. If such resistance disrupted forest management, it was ultimately adverse scientific evidence that led to the curtailment of fire protection after the First World War. In the second case study, the related efforts of forest officials to persuade shifting cultivators to plant teak under the taungya forestry system are traced. However, cooperation was only achieved after much conflict. Moreover, in the 1930s, growing scientific doubts about the system in a broader context of economic retrenchment led to its demise. The third case study addresses the politics of non-teak forest management through an analysis of cutch regulation. Efforts to manage the production of cutch, a water extract of the sha (Acacia catechu) tree used for tanning and dyeing purposes, were weakened by inter-departmental differences. But they were also thwarted by the resistance of peasants, traders and shifting cultivators. Such resistance formed part of a broader dynamic of control and resistance that characterized forest management in colonial Burma, but which resonates with political and ecological meaning even today.

The Origins of the Second Anglo-Burmese War (1852–53)

Historical accounts of the Second Anglo-Burmese War (1852–53) emphasize national bias, monocausality and events immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities. Asian historians find Europeans culpable. Governor-General Dalhousie ‘was an imperialist of the deepest dye, who longed to extend his Indian empire at the cost of the Burmese.’ The East India Company in its unquenchable ‘thirst for conquest’ coveted Burma. ‘There was a desire for war on the part of the British trading community in Burma … as it would permanently safeguard commercial interests in the country.’ Anglophile historians blame the Burmese. The ‘intransigence and xenophobia which radiated from the court of Ava… drove [Dalhousie] into war.’ Dalhousie himself blamed an unrestrained military officer whom he labeled the ‘combustible commodore.’ Despite imperial apologetics, critical Englishmen felt unease at the ‘double government's’ Blue Book coverup and sought with mixed success to disclose the ‘whole ugly truth.’

A Mid-Victorian Coverup: The Case of The “Combustible Commodore” and the Second Anglo-Burmese War, 1851–1852

The origins of the Second Anglo-Burmese War in late 1851 were the subject of a Mid-Victorian bipartisan and bureaucratic coverup throughout 1852-53. The Government of India in Calcutta had successfully maintained a policy of “non-intercourse” following removal in 1840 of its diplomatic representatives from Burma despite frequent uncoordinated calls for remonstrance by merchants, missionaries and military administrators. In 1851, a convergence of factors, most notably the alleged mistreatment of British subjects in Rangoon, captured the President in Council's attention in Calcutta resulting in a policy change which led to armed intervention. Calcutta's renewed interest in Burma occurred while politicans in London prepared to scrutinize the bureaucratic relations between the London-based Cabinet and the East India Company.Official discussions in Calcutta about Burma occurred while Governor General Dalhousie was “up country on progress” and at the very time that the Council wanted to test its capacity to act independently. The Council resorted to a unit of the Royal Navy then in Calcutta enroute from Acheh to the Persian Gulf. Commodore George Robert Lambert offered to deliver letters to Burmese authorities in Rangoon and negotiate on behalf of the English subjects. Lambert's reputation for moderation recommended him to Calcutta officials. His instructions from Council and private letters from Dalhousie advised caution and the avoidance of confrontation. Yet Lambert, a line officer, ultimately responsible to the Admiralty in London, could conceivably ignore Calcutta's wishes and chart his own course.

Crisis of Kingship: Dynasticism and Revolt in Burma, 1837–1852

One of the most obscure periods in modern Burmese history comprises the reigns of King Tharrawaddy (1837–1846) and his eldest son, Pagan Min (1846–1852). Historians have relied, to varying degrees, on Colonel Henry Yule's unsympathetic and inaccurate retelling of court gossip which portrays the two monarchs as bestial lunatics who murdered and plundered at will. This assessment is as exaggerated as it is simplified and ignores the very real structural problems the Burmese nation experienced between the first and second Anglo-Burmese Wars.

Epistles Written on the Eve of the Anglo-Burmese War

Epistles Written on the Eve of the Anglo-Burmese War

Dilemma of the British Representative to the Burmese Court after the Outbreak of a Palace Revolution in 1866

By the middle of the nineteenth century, Britain had established a firm foothold in Burma. As a result of the Second Anglo-Burmese War which broke out in 1852, Britain acquired the delta area of the country's most important river, the Irrawaddy. This, added to what she had previously gained from the First Anglo-Burmese War of 1824, had placed under her control, the entire Burmese seaboard.

Arakan and the First Anglo-Burmese War, 1824-25

The prominence given to the British operations in Arakan during 1942–43 serves to remind us that the India-Buima coastal plain from Chitta-gong to Akyab and south to Ramree and Cheduba Islands was the scene of a difficult campaign during the First Anglo-Burmese War in 1824–25. In the current operations, as in the advance more than 100 years ago, the greatest difficulties are those of transport and supply. These are due to the fact that the entire region is highly malarious, deeply interlaced by a maze of tidal creeks and estuaries, and that it consists of a series of jungle clad parallel ridges and river valleys, which lie directly across the desired line of advance. In fact, except for the ridges, the area bears a striking resemblance to the Pearl River estuary between Canton and the sea.

Americans and the First Anglo-Burmese War

Under Alaungpaya (1752-1760) and his successors in the last dynasty of Burmese kings, the Burmese Empire expanded from Tenasserim to Assam. The Burmese became convinced that their arms and strategy were invincible. Merchant adventurers during this period and before gave exaggerated accounts of the power and wealth of Burma. This period of expansion was concurrent with the rise of British power in India. Thus British India, along its eastern frontiers, had as a neighbor a state powerful and ambitious, glorying in its recent conquest of Siam and its defeat of the Chinese invasion of 1769. By 1824 a series of acts of aggression by the Burmese along the Chittagong frontier between India and Burma resulted in a declaration of war between the two powers. This war was the first of three Anglo-Burmese wars in which Burmese independence was extinguished. At the outbreak of the war there were seven American citizens living in the territory of the Burmese king. A Mr. and Mrs. Wade and a Mr. and Mrs. Hough were in Rangoon, Doctor Jonathan Price and Mr. and Mrs. Adoniram Judson were in Ava. At this time there were probably more Americans than British-born subjects in Burma. All the Americans were in the employ of the American Baptist mission board. Though small in number, the character of the service performed by these Americans, acting as interpreters and peacemakers between the Burmese and the English, is of such importance that it would seem to justify a description of their activities. When the British transports sailed up the Rangoon River May 1o, 1834, after a rendezvous in Port Cornwallis in the