Anglo-American Special Relationship Research Articles

The British Connection: How the United States Covered Its Tracks in the 1954 Coup in Guatemala

Buried in the memoirs of Anthony Eden, the former prime minister of Great Britain, is a recollection about the ouster of President Jacobo Arbenz of Guatemala in 1954 that reveals much about the character of the Anglo-American special relationship during the Cold War and attests to its enduring effect on the course of international events. Eden, trying to explain his mistaken belief that Washington would back Britain during the Suez crisis, claims that the United States reneged on a tacit agreement to support him in Egypt after Britain assisted the United States in removing Arbenz. In Guatemala, Eden writes, “the United States had encouraged the overthrow of a Communist-influenced government…. We had understood her action there and done what we could not to hamper her in the Security Council. The United States was now behaving in a precisely contrary manner towards us. When this point was put to the United States officials, they had no answer.”1

The Anglo-American Special Relationship

The Anglo-American Special Relationship

The politics of the Anglo-American economic special relationship

The politics of the Anglo-American economic special relationship

The Uncommon Tongue: Recent Writings on the Anglo-American Special Relationship

The Uncommon Tongue: Recent Writings on the Anglo-American Special Relationship

Review Article: The Uncommon Tongue: Recent Writings on the Anglo-American Special Relationship

Review Article: The Uncommon Tongue: Recent Writings on the Anglo-American Special Relationship

Britain, the United States, and the Recognition Of Communist China

During the years following the end of the Second World War the British Labour government was preoccupied with the threat posed by Russia. Britain could not contain Russia on its own; indeed, only the United States possessed the necessary power. At the beginning of 1949 this was emphasized by the newly formed permanent under secretary's committee headed by William Strang. That committee considered the Anglo-American special relationship as the pivot of British foreign policy: British interests were best likely to be ensured by its maintenance and consolidation. An inequality was, however, inherent in the association, and Britain thought that the alliance would be least effective in Asia and the far east, an area where American naivety and selfishness were particularly evident. The spread of Mao Tse Tung's communists across the Chinese mainland emphasized Britain's predicament, especially as, initially, the Chinese were regarded as orthodox communists.

Dependence and deterrence: success and civility in the Anglo-American special nuclear relationship 1962–1982

Dependence and deterrence: success and civility in the Anglo-American special nuclear relationship 1962–1982