Ancient Pyrrhonism Research Articles

Wittgenstein and pyrrhonism

The aim of this paper is to assess Wittgenstein’s later philosophy relation to skepticism. Despite the fact that he explicitly rejects it, it is argued that his conception of philosophy has strong affinities to ancient Pyrrhonism, and not to Human skepticism, as some claim. Among other features, it is highlighted that both Wittgenstein and the ancient Pyrrhonist think of philosophy as a therapy requiring some specific abilities, whose goal is to bring about tranquility, leaving everyday life as it is without any dogmatic commitment. Lastly, it is suggested that Wittgenstein renewed this skeptical tradition inventing a new method, or methods, to achieve this goal.

Hume's Scepticism, Pyrrhonian and Academic by Peter S. Fosl

Reviewed by: Hume's Scepticism, Pyrrhonian and Academic by Peter S. Fosl Stefanie Rocknak Peter S. Fosl. Hume's Scepticism, Pyrrhonian and Academic. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2020. Pp. xiii + 378. Hardback, $100.00. Peter Fosl presents an engaging and historically rich account of Hume's skepticism. For those readers interested in deepening their knowledge and understanding of Pyrrhonian and Academic skepticism, both in regard to their origins and their legacy, I highly recommend it. But I also recommend it for those who would like to better understand Hume's skepticism, although I do think there is some tension in Fosl's reading. Before I discuss this tension, a brief summary of the book is in order. Fosl's primary claim is that Hume's skepticism is a hybrid of Academic and Pyrrhonian skepticism. To show this, Fosl divides the book into two parts. In the first, Fosl presents a detailed account of the ancient and modern versions of Academic and Pyrrhonian skepticism. In the second, Fosl argues how and why Hume's skepticism is a combination of Academic and Pyrrhonian skepticism. In chapter 1, Fosl defines "Clitomachian … 'Academic sceptical non-realism'" (31), which, he argues, reflects Hume's position. This kind of "scepticism does not entail making positive epistemological claims about the true and the real, probable or otherwise; and it does not involve any positive epistemological claims, even the minimal epistemic egalitarianism on the basis of epistemic nullity" (34). Fosl also calls this "doxastic scepticism" (171). In chapter 2, Fosl highlights five points about early modern Academic skepticism, "cull[ed] from Cicero," that are "characteristically Humean": (1) "Non-apprehending," that is, one does not affirm or deny truths about reality; (2) "Doxastic moderation," which "produces results that are persuasive … rather than proven" and so is neither dogmatic nor an instance of extreme skeptical doubt; (3) "Limited inquiry," that is, inquiry that is limited to what we can actually experience; (4) "Integrity," which takes priority over making truth claims; and (5) "Modesty," which is opposed to immodest claims to the truth (69–70). Fosl then explains in chapter 3 that, contrary to many common interpretations, ancient Pyrrhonism does not entail the "radical and complete elimination of belief" (110). Rather, Pyrrhonism is not dogmatic and has a number of positive aspects. In chapter 4, Fosl argues that Hume adopts a modern version of Pyrrhonism. In the process, Fosl summarizes the seven Pyrrhonian points that are salient in Hume's skepticism (170): (1) We must conform to appearances rather than dogma (e.g. abstract rational and/or theological inquiry)—and this conformation is "fourfold": we must conform to "a.) nature, b.) custom, habit and tradition c.) passions, and d.) technical arts." (2) We must practice a suspension of belief. (3) This suspension is "Apelletic" (i.e. follows the example provided by the painter Apelles of Kos in the anecdote reported by Sextus Empriricus; see 99–100), that is, open to its fortuitous outcomes. (4) We must not be assertive about the "non-evident or hidden." (5) We must be "zetetic," that is, we must remain open to critique and revision. (6) Our inquiries should end in "undisturbedness, peace or tranquility." (7) We must adhere to common life. [End Page 700] For the remainder of the book (chapters 5–8), Fosl examines how the "Pyrrhonian Fourfold" (210), mentioned directly above, applies to Hume's thought. Specifically, in chapter 5, Fosl argues that Hume's naturalism is "most fundamentally … centered on the ongoing press of nature disclosed through his Apelletic empiricism" (210). According to Hume, there is a "press" of nature (this is a. in the Fourfold) that occurs "prior to any theory of an independent causal order" (203). As such, it informs our theories: "'nature' … [is] an unbidden, resistant, irresistible and non-rational press—the press of impressions, the pressure to conceptualise experiences discursively and to act" (203). To clarify these ideas, Fosl writes, "The 'nature' and 'necessity' that Hume confronts here is neither rationalistic necessity nor the necessity of causal realism. It is rather the pressing, propelling quality of the current of experience that makes possible thinking, perceiving and doing, despite sceptical arguments or fantasies to the contrary...

THE CONFLICTUAL CRAFT

Abstract Are contemporary philosophers to follow Pyrrho of Elis in adopting his skeptic craft or at least core aspects of it as a reaction to the fact that, since immemorial times, persons have been engaged in disputes in metaphysics? Over the last 2500 years or so, most Western philosophers have not done so in being more influenced by Aristotle’s dogmatic craft than by Pyrrho’s skeptic one. Over the last fifty years or so, a few Brazilian neo-Pyrrhonist philosophers, such as Oswald Porchat, Otavio Bueno and Plinio Junqueira Smith, have done the opposite in aiming to spell out the pertinence of Ancient Pyrrhonism to contemporary philosophy. On its part, this essay makes a case for the claim that one is to react to the stated fact by adopting a conflictual craft that promotes a synthesis of Pyrrho’s skeptic craft and the dogmatic craft. This synthesis: brings to light the core features of the skeptic and of the dogmatic craft; problematizes the dogmatic craft by means of the skeptic one and vice-versa so that the shortcomings of these crafts are avoided; and aims to keep certain positive aspects both of the skeptic craft and of the dogmatic one.

New Essays on Ancient Pyrrhonism. Edited by Diego E.Machuca. Pp. xi, 207, Leiden: Brill, 2011, €97.00/$133.00.

The Heythrop JournalVolume 57, Issue 1 p. 190-191 BOOK REVIEW New Essays on Ancient Pyrrhonism. Edited by Diego E. Machuca. Pp. xi, 207, Leiden: Brill, 2011, €97.00/$133.00. Robin Waterfield , Robin Waterfield Lakonia , GreeceSearch for more papers by this author Robin Waterfield , Robin Waterfield Lakonia , GreeceSearch for more papers by this author First published: 14 December 2015 https://doi.org/10.1111/heyj.55_12307Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Volume57, Issue1January 2016Pages 190-191 RelatedInformation

Sextus and Wittgenstein on the End of Justification

Following the lead of Duncan Pritchard’s “Wittgensteinian Pyrrhonism,” this paper takes a further, comparative and contrastive look at the problem of justification in Sextus Empiricus and in Wittgenstein’sOn Certainty. I argue both that Pritchard’s stimulating account is problematic in certain important respects and that his insights contain much interpretive potential still to be pursued. Diverging from Pritchard, I argue that it is a significant and self-conscious aspect of Sextus’ sceptical strategies to call into question large segments of our belief systemen masseby exposing as apparently unjustifiable fundamental propositions which are closely related in their linchpin role to Wittgenstein’s hinge propositions. In the first instance, the result is a more complex account of both a deeper affinity between Wittgenstein’s approach to hinge propositions and Sextus’ approach to what I termarchaipropositions and a divergence between the two. In the second instance, I suggest how the comparison withOn Certaintycan be illuminating for the interpreter of Sextus. In particular, it can help us to see how the Pyrrhonist’s everyday conduct—common assumptions to the contrary notwithstanding—involves rational procedures of justification, in line with a naturalism reminiscent of Wittgenstein. Furthermore, it can help us to reflect on the Pyrrhonist’s attitude to what Wittgenstein would have called her ‘worldview’. Throughout, I suggest that the comparison with Wittgenstein is interesting, although it must be cashed out differently, not only on the interpretation—or, perhaps, strand—of ancient Pyrrhonism which has the sceptic exempt ordinary beliefs from her suspension of judgement, but also on the interpretation (or strand) which has her disavow all beliefs categorically.

Itinerari libertini tra Parigi e Vienna : l'abate Lenglet du Fresnoy dalla storia erudita all'ermetismo

Between XVII and XVIII centuries, along Europe, the libertine culture assimilates new natural philosophy’s laical and rational achievements . Indeed, on one side it delves into the ancient Pyrrhonism’s points; in the same time and on the other side it considers the Hermeticism’s Renaissance legacy. This is an erudite and daring operation, which is against the tide and disparaging of ecclesiastical bans. Prime movers were key people as John Toland and Anglo-Dutch free-thinkers, Eugene Prince of Savoy and his intendant Baron Hohendorf, Pietro Giannone and – in Paris – abbot Lenglet du Fresnoy. The abbot, prolific writer and reader, easily moves from his first period studies about French history – in keeping with the European erudition over Deism and radical Enlightenment – to the rescue of magical – hermetical tradition in his last years. His own extensive literary work, known but never fully analyzed, is important and valuable.

Da Arte de Pirronizar

The aim of this article is to show how the relatively brief presentation of the argumentative way of the Pyrrhonists, included in the longest chapter of the Essais, “The Apology for Raymond Sebond”, can be understood as a fundamental part of Montaigne’s poetic and philosophical reinvention of ancient pyrrhonism. The stress laid there by Montaigne on such characteristics of the pyrrhonian attitude as self-irony, dialectical plasticity and absence of any kind of sectarism, is accordingly studied and considered in the broader context of his personal interpretation of ancient pyrrhonism, in many relevant aspects differing from the characterization of that philosophy as outlined by Sextus Empiricus.