Anatomy Of Corruption Research Articles

Anatomy of Corruption: Liberal Democracy and the Crisis of the Modern State

In the sociopolitical context, corruption exists when established norms allocating rights and obligations in a society are systemically breached. In modern states, those norms have been reduced to laws, rules, and regulations that are protected by institutions, such as police, courts, and regulatory bodies that define and enforce compliance with these legal norms. It has become increasingly apparent in recent years that institutions of legal compliance are failing both within and among modern states, as well as within the enforcement structures of international insitutions and that these failures are undermining the legitimacy of these political structures and challenging the authority of modern states. Here I examine the origins of the legal-institutional character of the modern state as found in the “liberal democracy” of the United States, and how it demonstrates the fundamental contradiction between “liberalism” and “popular democracy” that now appears as the crisis of the modern state among those states and international institutions that have followed the US liberal-democratic model. The contradiction lies in political structures that rhetorically claim to be democratic, but which are subject to constructions of economic power that are inherently anti-democratic. The 230-year failed effort of the US to resolve this contradiction, which is now appearing as a breakdown in its system of governance, signals the need to critically examine and rethink governance beyond the existing organization of the modern state.

Anatomy of Corruption: An Approach to the Political Economy of Underdevelopment

An examination and critique of the functionalist literature on corruption in the political administration of less developed countries (LDCs) indicate that its claims are without empirical foundation. Its theses with regard to the political, economic and administrative effects in most LDCs contrast with the facts. No benefits for development from corruption are found; market corruption, for example, does not appear to improve allocative efficiency. The erosion in a government's capacity to formulate and implement policies making for economic growth is an obstacle to economic progress.

Anatomy of Corruption in the Nigerian Public Sector

Corruption is a clog in the wheel of progress in Nigeria and has incessantly frustrated the realization of noble national goals, despite the enormous natural and human resources in Nigeria. The article reviews the concept of corruption in line with its forms and effects on the Nigerian State, as well as corruption in public service from Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa’s era to President Goodluck Jonathan’s administration. The article examines the idealistic, resource curse, two public, low risk–high benefit and anomie theories, and consequently adopts resource curse, low risk–high benefit theories to explain causes of corruption in Nigeria. Also, some personal observations and data from Transparency International are utilized to explain corrupt practices in Nigeria. The article concludes that there is corruption in the Nigerian Public Sector because of societal pressure, tribalism, nepotism, low risk–high benefits of involving in corruption among others. The article recommends some measures to combat corruption in Nigeria.

Anatomy of Corruption, and: Ilustrado (review)

Reviewed by: Anatomy of Corruption, and: Ilustrado Catherine Diamond Anatomy of Corruption. By Malou Jacob. Tanghalang Pilipino, Cultural Center of the Philippines, Manila. 24 January 1998. Ilustrado. By Paul Dumol. Tanghalang Pilipino, Cultural Center of the Philippines, Manila. 6 February 1998. Click for larger view View full resolution Cely (Irma Adlawan, center) and other members of the cast in Tanghalang Pilipino of Manila’s production of Malou Jacob’s Anatomy of Corruption, directed by Dennis Marasigan. Photo uncredited. Click for larger view View full resolution George de Jesus III, Ony de Leon, Irma Adlawam, (as Cely, center), Len Ag Santos, and Lambert de Jesus in Tanghalang Pilipino of Manila’s production of Malou Jacob’s Anatomy of Corruption, directed by Dennis Marasigan. Photo uncredited. In 1998, the Republic of the Philippines celebrated the centennial of its Declaration of Independence. Tanghalang Pilipino, the resident company in the Cultural Center of the Philippines, contributes two perspectives on Philippine independence and its contemporary democracy. Concomitant to the centennial, Artistic Director Nonon Padilla has also framed his company’s eleventh season around the theme of “the individual and today’s Philippine society.” Anatomy of Corruption, a satirical comedy, reveals not only the pervasiveness of corruption in modern Philippine institutions, but explores the ways in which it steals into the fabric of social life of even the most morally rigorous individuals. Ilustrado, a biographical musical about José Rizal, the designated father of Philippine revolution, is the final play in a trilogy featuring Rizal’s two influential novels, Noli Me Tangere and El Filibusterismo. Tanghalang’s two offerings not only present the dilemmas of the individual resisting pressures of society, but also the ambiguous position of the Filipino hero at both ends of the twentieth century. Not only do the texts focus on the isolation of individual activists, but the staging of both productions heightens their sense of alienation. Both productions convey serious messages, yet they employ a variety of popular techniques—slapstick, comic stereotypes, and popular music—to reach their audiences. Both perhaps also suffer from their protagonists’ lack of humor and aloofness from the other characters, which inadvertently distances them from audience sympathies, as well. In Anatomy, we see Cely, engagingly played by one of Manila’s foremost actresses, Irma Adlawan, on her first day as an attorney in the Family Court, which handles cases of adoption, divorce, and child support. In a bright red suit, contrasting with the dim gray of the bureaucratic office, she navigates her way around the small stage crowded with the occupants of seven desks. She is given all the cases that come to the office, while her superiors play cards and her subordinates eat, flirt, and purchase unnecessary goods from the vendors who magically appear every payday. The three pairs of petitioners with their accompanying lawyers, all played by the same four [End Page 531] actors, arrive each time through the audience via a front ramp. Their hysterical over-the-top performances supply most of the play’s humor. Ony de Leon and Len Ag Santos as the various combatant couples carry on their ludicrous arguments, as Cely tries to be the voice of reason, such as when presiding over their separation and dividing their fruit stand—fruit by fruit. Gary Lim, a popular comic actor, brings down the house every time he enters as either the Moslem or the gay vendor, exploiting stereotypes with comic disingenuousness. Ethnic humor is still viable on the Philippine stage, as evinced by Julius Comia playing a pompous pipe-smoking Chinese who comes to the court to adopt a Filipino surname. The crisis occurs when Cely refuses a kickback, saying she did nothing but what she was supposed to do at her job. This throws the office members into consternation, since it means they will not get their cut. With the tacit consent of the senior attorney, they hide files, rendering Cely impotent. The climax comes when a satisfied petitioner leaves an envelope on her desk. Cely tries, though fails, to return the money, and absentmindedly sticks it in her purse. Noticing the gesture, the boss accuses her of being as corrupt as the rest. Despite her protests that she intends to...

The Anatomy of Corruption: The Practice of Pension Fund Trustee Decisionmaking

The model of pension plan trustee decisionmaking introduced in a previous paper is extended here emphasising aspects of the social psychology of investment decisionmaking, including collegiality and the necessity of justification. To give the analysis structure, I begin with the framing logic of Kahneman and Tversky and introduce three different frames structuring decisionmaking, starting with the ‘weapons of influence’, the ‘strategies of justification’, and, finally, the ‘emotions of relationships’. The focus of the paper is on how and why corruption occurs in trustee decisionmaking, especially concerning community development projects. Implications are drawn from the model of corruption for current debate over the proper scope of regulation. It is argued that the current system of trust law and case-by-case adjudication is inadequate in the face of the systematic nature of corruption and the potential harm occasioned by corrupt trustee decisionmaking. It is also argued that the model of corruption sketched in this paper can be applied to a wide range of investment decisions, not just community development projects (the initial reference point for the paper).

Anatomy of Corruption: An Approach to the Political Economy of Underdevelopment

Abstract. An examination and critique of the functionalist literature on corruption in the political administration of Less Developed Countries (LDCs) indicate that its claims are without empirical foundation. Its theses with regard to the political, economic and administrative effects in most LDCs contrast with the facts. No benefits for development from corruption are found; market corruption, for example, does not appear to improve allocative efficiency. The erosion in a government's capacity to formulate and implement policies making for economic growth is an obstacle to economic progress.

The Anatomy of Corruption in Trade Unions

The Anatomy of Corruption in Trade Unions