REVIEWS 593 (p. 110), ‘neoliberal proselytism’ (p. 111) and ‘constitutional expertise at the expense of popular participation’ (p. 113) reads at times like an ahistorical mirror-image of the anti-liberal conspiracy theories about the transition from Communism currently pedalled by conservative populists in Hungary, Poland and elsewhere. It leaves little scope for recognizing the agency of ordinary Eastern Europeans, whether before, during, or after 1989, and their capacity to contest, subvert or reinterpret hegemonic discourses within the context of their own daily lives and experiences. Indeed, for all the lip-service the authors pay to the possibility of alternative trajectories or contrary political imaginaries in their concluding remarks, for much of the book they are in danger of simply replacing one teleological reading of 1989 with another. Department of Humanities Matthew Stibbe Sheffield Hallam University Stoner, Kathryn E. Russia Resurrected: Its Power and Purpose in a New Global Order. Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 2020. xix + 317 pp. Figures. Tables. Notes. Index. £22.99. In Russia Resurrected Kathryn Stoner offers a comprehensive and through overview of Russian foreign policy, a substantial contribution to the important debate over Russia’s foreign policy goals. Vladimir Putin has marshalled Russia’s modest economic resources to stabilize the economy, rebuild the military and project power abroad. Russia makes up for its modest power resources with willingness to take risks and be a ‘disrupter’ of international norms (p. 4). Stoner argues that Russia’s confrontational posture is not ‘natural destiny’ but a ‘strategic choice’ (p. 5) which does not reflect Russia’s national interests. Rather, it is ‘a reaction to domestic political exigencies and an attempt to meet the need to maintain popular support for an increasingly unpopular autocratic regime’ (p. 20). The good news is that Putin’s regime is ‘inherently fragile’ (p. 247), because of the lack of democratic accountability and the uncertainty of succession. Stoner disagrees with Realists who explain Russia’s security posture by referencing deep geographical and historical conditions (p. 238), arguing that ‘[t]he use of Russian power resources abroad is not predetermined by great power politics, geography, or history’ (p. 262). Geography and history are not sufficient to explain why Russia suddenly became more aggressive after 2008. Stoner also argues that ‘Russian capabilities have been underestimated because the wrong measures of power tend to be employed’ (p. 275). She seeks ‘to present a multidimensional understanding of Russian power resources SEER, 99, 3, JULY 2021 594 beyond the traditional means of men, military, and money’. But most of her account relies on quite traditional measures of power, such as the size of Russia’s GDP, population, military spending and numbers of weapons. There are few references to Russian-language sources. The main analytical arguments are laid out in chapters one and eight. Chapters two to seven offer detailed and encyclopaedic descriptions of various dimensions of Russian power. The book therefore is useful as a reference work, but not so easy to read through at one sitting. It would have been nice to see the arguments from chapters one and eight used to structure the analysis in the intervening chapters. Chapter two summarizes Russia’s relations with the post-Soviet states, country by country, while chapter three addresses the ‘far abroad’ — China only gets three pages (p. 109–12): the same as sub-Saharan Africa (pp. 103–06). Chapter four examines the economy, chapter five society, chapter six hard power and chapter seven soft power. Chapters four and five rely on data from sources such as the World Bank and OECD, comparing Russia with other leading powers. No sources are given for the charts in chapter four, though the sources are identified for the charts in chapter five. It is more convenient to look up the data on the internet, where the charts are easier to read and there are precise numbers for each year. Stoner is upbeat about the economy but downbeat about social trends. She describes Russia’s economic performance since 1991 as ‘impressive’ (p. 122). She denies that Russia is a ‘classically oil-cursed state’ (p. 134), saying it ‘was at least modestly successful in diversifying its export structure’ (p. 144). While it is...