Analytic Pragmatism Research Articles

Between Doing and Saying ‘We’ – On Analytic Pragmatism and the Progressive Development of Plural Self-Expression

Between Doing and Saying ‘We’ – On Analytic Pragmatism and the Progressive Development of Plural Self-Expression

Ascription of Content to Provisions of the Law by Judicial Practice. Theoretical Analysis of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal’s Judgments

The article examines the way in which the Polish Constitutional Tribunal operates, which involves replacing its own process of interpreting the provisions under review by accepting the interpretation of another court. The objective of the article is to provide a theoretical account of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal’s conduct to the readers. Therefore, the concepts developed at the Poznan School of Theory of Law are used, namely the distinction between a provision of the law and a legal norm, as well as a distinction between pragmatic and nonpragmatic interpretation. The role of the metatheory used to analyse the Tribunal’s conduct is also played by Robert B. Brandom’s analytic pragmatism. Analytic pragmatism allows the conclusion to be drawn that, through its activity, the Tribunal indicates 1) what an agent must do (within the legal practice) for the vocabulary of normative acts to mean something (PV-sufficiency), and 2) what vocabulary is sufficient to define those practices (VP-sufficiency). The practice of applying the law can be described with the use of the TOTE concept (Test-Operation-Test-Exit). In this case TOTE cycles are open-ended. Therefore, in its further practice, the Tribunal might indicate further practices-or-abilities which are sufficient for the vocabulary of normative acts to mean something.

Pragmatism, Metaphilosophy, Eclecticism

This paper explores metaphilosophy’s role in pragmatism. It does so particularly in relation to pragmatism’s multiplying and competing forms (e.g. classical pragmatism, neo-pragmatism, analytic pragmatism, third-wave pragmatism, new pragmatism, etc.). Focusing on the most comprehensive treatment of metaphilosophy in pragmatism, that of Scott Aikin and Robert Talisse, I argue their attempt to turn pragmatism into a metaphilosophy is problematic. Using a “metaphilosophical minimalism” to address pragmatism’s tendency toward what they label an inward looking and dogmatic “insularity” and “triumphalism” – a tendency that feeds competition among pragmatists – I charge displays that very tendency (it also leads to a regress). I then pivot to outline what I dub “eclectic pragmatism.” This pragmatism embraces the contemporary zeitgeist of the inclusionary, decentered “more.” It does so by abandoning competition over the singular, right form of pragmatism (and indeed philosophy). It embraces the “more,” but not because it is right (which would be an obvious contradiction). Rather, it embraces the “more” because it is “’satisfying.” Simply put, there is a metaphilosophy at work with eclectic pragmatism. It is a “naturalized metaphilosophy” where the “choice” for pragmatism, especially eclectic pragmatism, is seen to stem from psychological and sociological propensities not the necessity of long exalted “reason.”

Shedding Light on the “Eclipse” Narrative: Some Notes on Pragmatism in the Twentieth Century

Shedding Light on the “Eclipse” Narrative: Some Notes on Pragmatism in the Twentieth Century

From analytic pragmatism to historical materialism: Frankfurt school critical theory and the Quine‐Duhem thesis

AbstractMy aim in this paper is to explore an affinity between early critical theory and analytical philosophy. The affinity is in a fairly unexpected area: philosophy of science. I argue that early critical theory embraces a view of science which is a natural if somewhat unfamiliar extension of the pragmatist one defended by Quine. In particular, I argue that Horkheimer has a version of the Quine‐Duhem thesis (“underdetermination of theory choice by the evidence”). How do the Frankfurt and analytical versions of the underdetermination thesis differ? Quine and others have taken the thesis to motivate a form of pragmatism. What this means is that it is certain interests that ultimately determine the choice of theory: chief among them, an interest in simplicity of our theories. However, the Critical Theorists offer us a distinctly historical materialist version of the underdetermination thesis, in which it is the imperatives of the prevailing mode of production, for example, capitalism, which are decisive. The result is an unfamiliar Marxist version of an otherwise familiar thesis from the analytic tradition.

ANTHROPOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRAGMATISM AND PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIO-HUMANITARIAN REDESCRIPTION OF ANALYTIC METHODOLOGY

Purpose. The paper is aimed at studying the specificity of anthropological problematics in pragmatism from the perspective of its ability to be the source of analytic philosophy evolution in the socio-humanitarian direction. Theoretical basis of the research is determined by the works of the representatives of classical pragmatism (C. S. Peirce, W. James, J. Dewey, F. Schiller), neopragmatism (W. V. O. Quine), post-pragmatism (R. Rorty) and analytic pragmatism (R. Brandom). Their works give a clear understanding of the important place of anthropological searches in the theory of pragmatism. Originality. On the basis of the analysis of logical, epistemological and metaphysical ideas formulated by representatives of pragmatism, it is proved that pragmatic methodology is anthropocentric. It is established that the ideological and social foundations of pragmatism can be determined as pluralistic ones due to the attention to the human person. It is revealed that theoretical and methodological searches of pragmatism can be effective in the formation of the socio-humanitarian concepts in analytic philosophy through the specification of strategies for the cognition of human existence in such terms as experience or self and the development of practical ways to justify the truth of knowledge. Conclusions. Pragmatists criticized impersonal, formal thinking, which cannot be an effective means of cognition. Thinking has a social basis and is entirely personal. Justifying its dependence on the socio-cultural sphere and the internal intentions of the subject, it is possible to develop an effective logical theory that operates symbols not only at the syntactic or semantic level but also takes into account the pragmatic aspect of language. Anthropological problematics is also important in the theory of knowledge, the core of which is the notion of pragmatic belief, which enables truth and religious beliefs, since the foundation of the theory of truth is determined by the principle of humanism, and the truth is interpreted as a value orientation. Knowing the external world, we find in it the similarity with us – that’s why the metaphysical foundations of being, according to pragmatism, are personified, and the methodology is defined in anthropomorphic terms. Applying it, the study of human existence is specified in the analysis of psychological and socio-cultural dimensions of such concepts as experience or self. Attempts to comprehend the nature of human existence in pragmatism are empirically grounded. Appealing to science, methodological pluralism, the search for socio-cultural background for thinking and suitable linguistic forms of expression of human experience are the achievements of pragmatism, which are the basis for the socio-humanitarian redescription of analytic methodology.

Znaczenie językowe normy prawnej w poznańsko-szczecińskiej szkole teorii prawa w świetle pragmatyzmu analitycznego

Autor rekonstruuje stanowiska przyjmowane w ramach tzw. poznańsko-szczecińskiej szkoły teorii prawa (Szkoła) dotyczące znaczenia językowego normy prawnej. Pozwala to na unaocznienie pewnych dylematów związanych z przyjmowaniem założeń filozofii analitycznej w teorii prawa. Następnie zwrócono uwagę na wpływ filozofii Kazimierza Ajdukiewicza na pojmowanie znaczenia językowego w Szkole. Problem znaczenia językowego może zostać wyjaśniony przy użyciu definicji równoznaczności, której rdzeń stanowi zbiór dyrektyw danego języka. W ostatniej części tekstu omówione zostały natomiast tezy pragmatyzmu analitycznego Roberta B. Brandoma i sposób jego aplikacji do teorii prawa przez Macieja Dybowskiego. Pragmatyzm analityczny poszerza badania semantyczne o próbę zrozumienia uwarunkowań praktycznych.

Analytic Pragmatism and Universal LX Vocabulary

In his recent John Locke Lectures – published as Between Saying and Doing – Brandom extends and refines his views on the nature of language and philosophy by developing a position that he calls Analytic Pragmatism. Although Brandom’s project bears on an extraordinarily rich array of different philosophical issues, we focus here on the contention that certain vocabularies have a privileged status within our linguistic practices, and that when adequately understood, the practices in which these vocabularies figure can help furnish us with an account of semantic intentionality. Brandom’s claim is that such vocabularies are privileged because they are a species of what he calls universal LX vocabulary –roughly, vocabulary whose mastery is implicit in any linguistic practice whatsoever. We show that, contrary to Brandom’s claim, logical vocabulary per se fails to satisfy the conditions that must be met for something to count as universal LX vocabulary. Further, we show that exactly analogous considerations undermine his claim that modal vocabulary is universal LX. If our arguments are sound, then, contrary to what Brandom maintains, intentionality cannot be explicated as a “pragmatically mediated semantic phenomenon”, at any rate not of the sort that he proposes.

Informality and Philosophy: A Response to Margolis

Joseph Margolis argues that philosophy must acknowledge its radical informality. I provide a brief account of what Margolis means by informality and its consequences for the practice of a pragmatist philosophy. I discuss his criticism of Robert Brandom's analytic pragmatism on the grounds that it overemphasizes the potential gains of a formal approach. I highlight two concerns with Margolis’ insistence on informality recommending a reduced emphasis on the consequences of informality for the pragmatist philosopher.

An Hegelian Solution to a Tangle of Problems Facing Brandom'S Analytic Pragmatism

In his program of analytic pragmatism, Robert Brandom has presented a thoroughgoing reinterpretation of the place of analytic philosophy in the history of philosophy by linking his own non-representational ‘inferentialist’ approach to semantics to the rationalist – idealist tradition, and in particular, to Hegel. Brandom, however, has not been without his critics in regard to both his approach to semantics and his interpretation of Hegel. Here I single out four interlinked problematic areas facing Brandom's inferentialist semantics – his approach of perceptual content, to de re attitudes, to perceptual experience and to modality, and then go on to contrast the different approach to these issues that is found in Hegel. While Hegel can helpfully be understood as anticipating an inferentialist semantics as Brandom claims, his is a weak inferentialism in contrast to Brandom's strong version. With his weakly inferentialist approach Hegel can, I suggest, be seen as providing a solution to the tangle of problems facing Brandom in these four areas.

New Perspectives on Analytic Pragmatism

Analytic pragmatism is a framework of analysis elaborated by Robert Brandom, whose goal is to explain the relations between meaning and use according to a systematic and general method of inquiry. In April 2009, a workshop was organized to discuss the recent developments of this new theoretical approach. Brandom delivered three lectures, where he explored some aspects of analytic pragmatism and addressed the motivating themes of this enterprise, while the contribution from the other speakers ranged over specific aspects of the theory. This special issue is the outcome of that workshop. In this introduction we briefly outline the context of the debate and present the contribution to this issue selected from a much wider range of papers, using the reviewing process of Philosophia.

Disagreement, Error and Two Senses of Incompatibility—The Relational Function of Discursive Updating

In Between Saying and Doing: Towards an Analytic Pragmatism, Robert B. Brandom puts forward a general method of formally representing relations between meaning and use (between vocabularies and practices-or-abilities) and shows how discursive intentionality can be understood as a pragmatically mediated semantic relation. In this context, the activity that pragmatically mediates the semantic relations characteristic of discursive intentionality is specified as a practice of discursive updating—a practice of rectifying commitments and removing incompatibilities. The aim of the paper is to take a closer look at the practice of discursive updating and to show that the role of inconsistencies and disagreements in discursive practice can only be fully understood if the interactional dimension of updating processes is taken into account—i.e. if one looks at the explicitly social, interactional role of discursive updating in cases of disagreements between different subjects.

CRITICAL NOTICE OF ROBERT BRANDOM'S BETWEEN SAYING AND DOING: TOWARDS AN ANALYTIC PRAGMATISM

Philosophical BooksVolume 51, Issue 3 p. 160-174 CRITICAL NOTICE OF ROBERT BRANDOM'S BETWEEN SAYING AND DOING: TOWARDS AN ANALYTIC PRAGMATISM JON COGBURN, JON COGBURN Louisiana State UniversitySearch for more papers by this author JON COGBURN, JON COGBURN Louisiana State UniversitySearch for more papers by this author First published: 26 October 2010 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.2010.00508.xRead the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Volume51, Issue3July 2010Pages 160-174 RelatedInformation

Varieties of Analytic Pragmatism

In his Locke Lectures Brandom proposes to extend what he calls the project of analysis to encompass various relationships between meaning and use. As the traditional project of analysis sought to clarify various logical relations between vocabularies so Brandom’s extended project seeks to clarify various pragmatically mediated semantic relations between vocabularies. The point of the exercise in both cases is to achieve what Brandom thinks of as algebraic understanding. Because the pragmatist critique of the traditional project of analysis was precisely to deny that such understanding is appropriate to the case of natural language, the very idea of an analytic pragmatism is called into question by that critique. My aim is to clarify the prospects for Brandom’s project, or at least something in the vicinity of that project, through a comparison of it with what I will suggest we can think of as Kant’s analytic pragmatism as developed by Peirce.

Between Saying and Doing: Towards an Analytic Pragmatism – By Robert B. Brandom

Between Saying and Doing: Towards an Analytic Pragmatism – By Robert B. Brandom

Between Saying and Doing: Towards an Analytic Pragmatism * By ROBERT B. BRANDOM

Robert Brandom's latest book, the product of his John Locke lectures in Oxford in 2006, is a return to the philosophy of language and is easily read as a continuation and development of the views defended in Making it Explicit (1995). The text of the lectures is presented much as they were delivered, but it contains an ‘Afterword’ of more than 30 pages which responds to questions raised when he gave the lectures, and also when they were subsequently delivered in Prague the following year. The published text also contains relatively technical appendices to two of the lectures. The individual lectures engage with some important and difficult issues, often ones that were explored in detail in the earlier book. However, these discussions are located within a broader meta-philosophical context, and it says something about the abstract and difficult character of these views that they provide the main subject matter of the Afterword. This framework affects how we should understand the relations between this book and Making It Explicit too. Although most of the detailed discussions happily belong within the general project of the earlier book, they are offered as illustrations of a framework that is independent of this project. Indeed, Brandom suggests that defenders of the semantic views of David Lewis, for example, could embrace his main message as well as those who favour Brandom's own form of pragmatism.

A “Pragmatist” among Disputed Pragmatists: Robert Brandom’s Between Saying and Doing: Towards an Analytic Pragmatism

A “Pragmatist” among Disputed Pragmatists: Robert Brandom’s Between Saying and Doing: Towards an Analytic Pragmatism

Between saying and doing: towards an analytic pragmatism

Lecture One: Extending the Project of Analysis Lecture Two: Elaborating Abilities: The Expressive Role of Logic Appendix to Lecture Two Lecture Three: Artificial Intelligence and Analytic Pragmatism Lecture Four: Modality and Normativity: From Hume and Quine to Kant and Sellars Lecture Five: Incompatibility, Modal Semantics, and Intrinsic Logic Appendix to Lecture Five Lecture Six: Intentionality as a Pragmatically Mediated Semantic Relation Afterword

ROCKMORE ON ANALYTIC PRAGMATISM

Abstact: This article responds critically to Tom Rockmore's essay “On Classical and Neo‐Analytic Forms of Pragmatism,” which appeared in Metaphilosophy in 2005. Rockmore charges analytic pragmatism with having a conflicted epistemology, relying on incoherent appropriations of Hegel, and maintaining an unpragmatic commitment to metaphysical realism. We rebut these charges by arguing that what Rockmore sees as conflicted in analytic pragmatist epistemology is simply fallibilism, that appropriations of Hegel needn't be as global as Rockmore claims, and that commitments to metaphysical realism need not disqualify philosophers from being pragmatists.

Towards an Analytic Pragmatism

Towards an Analytic Pragmatism