Analysis Of Strategic Interaction Research Articles

Analysis of strategic interactions among distributed virtual alliances in electricity and carbon emission auction markets using risk-averse multi-agent reinforcement learning

The incorporation of carbon emission auction market (CEAM) and ancillary service market (ASM) is an emerging trading paradigm in active distribution network (ADN). Such regime not only promotes the elimination of carbon emission, but also facilitates the secure operation of power network, especially considering the participation of distributed virtual alliances (DVAs) consisting of renewable distributed generators (RDGs) with uncertain output. In this research, a bi-level bidding and market clearing dynamic programming model is developed for in-depth analysis of market participants’ bidding strategies and market equilibrium. This model allows DVAs to modify their bidding strategies in the energy market (EM), ASM and CEAM based on the market clearing results and uncertainty of RDG output. Also, a new Meta-Learning based Win-or-Learn-Fast (MLWoLF-PHC) algorithm, which not only enables the fully distributed bidding strategy modification, but also performs well considering uncertainty as a risk-averse method, is proposed to solve this model. Its computational performance, the market equilibrium analysis, and the impact of CEAM on the converged market clearing price of EM and ASM would be thoroughly investigated and examined in the case studies.

Who benefits from offline investment: an analysis of strategic interactions between e-book pricing and bookstores’ investment

Who benefits from offline investment: an analysis of strategic interactions between e-book pricing and bookstores’ investment

Interfering via ASEAN? In the Case of Disaster Management

It has been argued that the non-interference principle is given more emphasis than democracy and human rights in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Yet a certain kind of consensus has emerged: ASEAN members may become involved in one another’s domestic affairs as long as they do so via ASEAN organs and instruments. This can be seen in co-operation on disaster management. Since the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre) was established in 2011, the definition of a “disaster” appropriate for regional management has been broadened. Careful analysis of this case shows that, each for its own strategic reasons, ASEAN organs and institutions began to be useful for both “giving” and “receiving” member states. This article’s analysis of strategic interaction among member states yields useful insights on how intervention via multi-lateral frameworks shapes both the behaviour of domestic decision-makers and the dynamics within regional organisations.

Analysis of Strategic Interactions in the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Through the Prism of the Game Theory

Introduction. The paper attempts to analyze possible and probable strategic moves of the primary and secondary actors in the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Methods. To analyze this conflict the author uses the mathematical theory of games and some mathematical models and methods. The main methods and models include the following: Nash equilibrium, sequential game, Zermelos theorem, Zermelo-Kuno algorithm, and games with commitments. As the publication is an analytical and computational work, it mainly includes literature related to methodology and theory. Analysis. The publication not only contains the analysis of the strategic interactions between Armenia and Azerbaijan as primary actors, but also includes Russia as a secondary participant. Results. As a result, the author has drawn several conclusions. Firstly, the strategic interactions between two actors differ from strategic interactions among three actors in terms of possible payments and preferences. Secondly, in the strategic interactions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the most likely interaction profile will be “A2 , B1 -C2 ” (not recognizing the independence of Nagorno Karabakh and not declaring war on Armenia) with a payment of “0:0”. The third conclusion is on the qualitative difference between the sequential game and the game with commitments among Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia. In the second case, the Nash equilibrium consists of not recognizing the separatist regime by Armenia, not supporting Russia’s desire for Armenia to recognize and not declaring war on Armenia: SPNE = {E2, R4, A8}. However, unlike the first option, the equilibrium obtained in the game with commitments takes on a more stable structure in relation to different political processes.

From Nash to Cournot-Nash equilibria via the Monge-Kantorovich problem.

The notion of Nash equilibria plays a key role in the analysis of strategic interactions in the framework of N player games. Analysis of Nash equilibria is however a complex issue when the number of players is large. In this article, we emphasize the role of optimal transport theory in (i) the passage from Nash to Cournot-Nash equilibria as the number of players tends to infinity and (ii) the analysis of Cournot-Nash equilibria.

Strategic Interactions in Goffman’s Captivation

E. Goffman character analyzes into mutual conditionality of concept of physical and social borders abilities of persons for acquisition, disclosure and concealment of information scare. Analysis of strategic interaction relies in Goffman’s book on explication capability expedient utilization or duping of partner. Strategic captivation of interaction is game about zero amount, where increment is loss second actor. Our safety is not natural something in structure of social world, but it dates from socially array rule behavior We lived as spies in our daily life if, social world would seem as enclosing scare, where in each moment and it is possible to meet potential cause for fear place.

A Bayesian Theory of Games: An Analysis of Strategic Interactions with Statistical Decision Theoretic Foundation

This paper introduces a new game theoretic equilibrium which is based upon the Bayesian subjective view of probability, BEIC (Bayesian equilibrium iterative conjectures). It requires players to make predictions, starting from first order uninformative predictive distribution functions (or conjectures) and keep updating with statistical decision theoretic and game theoretic reasoning until a convergence of conjectures is achieved. Information known by the players such as the reaction functions are thereby incorporated into their higher order conjectures and help to determine the convergent conjectures and the equilibrium. In a BEIC, conjectures are consistent with the equilibrium or equilibriums they supported and so rationality is achieved for actions, strategies and conjectures. The BEIC approach is capable of analyzing a larger set of games than current Nash Equilibrium based games theory, including games with inaccurate observations, games with unstable equilibrium and games with double or multiple sided incomplete information games. On the other hand, for the set of games analyzed by the current games theory, it generates far lesser equilibriums and normally generates only a unique equilibrium. It treats games with complete and perfect information as special cases of games with incomplete information and noisy observation whereby the variance of the prior distribution function on type and the variance of the observation noise term tend to zero. Consequently, there is the issue of indeterminacy in statistical inference and decision making in these games as the equilibrium solution depends on which variances tends to zero first. It therefore identifies equilibriums in these games that have so far eluded the classical theory of games. Finally, it also resolves inconsistencies in equilibrium results by different solution concepts in current games theory such as that between Nash Equilibrium and iterative elimination of dominated strategies and that between Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and backward induction (Subgame Perfect Equilibrium).

The dynamic relationship between the federal funds rate and the Eurodollar rates under interest‐rate targeting

PurposePrevious literature for the relations between the market interest rates and the targeted or target rate of the Federal Reserve paid little attention to Eurodollar market rates. The present paper attempts to fill this void.Design/methodology/approachThe study investigates the dynamic relationship between the federal funds rate and three short‐term Eurodollar deposits rates. Cointegration analysis is utilized to examine the long‐run relationships between the short‐run dynamics of the market and targeted rates through a vector error‐correction mechanism.FindingsThe study shows strong evidence that, while the Eurodollar rates and the federal funds rate move together over time regardless of procedural differences in targeting, how they co‐move, especially how they adjust toward long‐run equilibrium, appears to be related to the targeting procedural changes.Research limitations/implicationsFurther research should be conducted for the theoretical analysis of strategic interactions between the monetary authority and market participants in the domestic and external financial markets.Practical implicationsThe result suggests that the Fed may affect the market interest rates through a policy of changing the federal funds rate target by a “fixed” amount for the foreseeable future. Such a policy has improved the market's ability to predict the size and timing of the changes in the target rate.Originality/valueThe results of the paper give some new insights into the interactions between monetary policy operations and market interest rates, which is of interest to researchers, monetary authorities, and financial market participants.

Credible Spatial Preemption through Franchising

The analysis of strategic behaviorfrequently revolves around the problem of identifying commitment technologies that credibly expand strategic opportunities. This article revisits the question of spatial preemption to investigate the potential for organizational form to serve as a commitment in the effort to deter entry. The analysis demonstrates first that delegation of pricing authority to independent outlet operators through a franchise contract can deter entry. Moreover, this delegation can be made credible in the sense of being renegotiation-proof through appropriate contractual design. * The analysis of strategic interaction is frequently centered around the dynamic problem of commitment. Often, actions that appear to enhance strategic performance fail to coincide with contemporaneous utility or profit maximization and so cannot be considered credible. Consequently the focus of strategic analysis is often on identifying commitment technologies that credibly expand strategic opportunities. A case in point is the study of spatial preemption. Schmalensee ( 1978 ) and Eaton and Lipsey ( 1979) both suggested that a monopolist who arrived first to a differentiated product market could preempt entry by filling up the space of products. In this way, the monopolist could restrict the market area available to an entrant's differentiated product so that, with competitive pricing on the monopolist's neighboring products, the entrant's net profits would be below zero. These models overcame the commitment problem that plagues efforts to deter entry by simple limit or predatory pricing by employing the technology of spatial location. Judd ( 1985 ), however, showed that these models merely traded one commitment problem for another: since entry reduced prices at the monopolist's locations as well as the entrant's, the monopolist faced the incentive to shut down locations and raise prices in the event that entry did occur. Judd argued that in the absence of exit costs, the monopolist would in fact remove the locations in response to entry. Consequently the monopolist was left with the same set of strategic opportunities available in the absence of the technology of spatial location.

Algorithms for hierarchical power

A flexible concept of hierarchical power is developed within the framework of noncooperative game theory to extend the systems-theory approach to the analysis of strategic interactions among decision makers having asymmetric roles. The definition focuses on the rules of play, rather than the structure of the model, to capture the asymmetry of the decision makers' positions. Hierarchical power involves the ability of a decision maker to choose a strategy in the knowledge of the opponent's choice. The effects of incorporating hierarchical power in a game are studied, a procedure for computing the hierarchical-power outcome when there are two decision makers is developed, and a computational method for assessing the stability of outcomes based on the rules of hierarchical power is also given. Computer programs have been developed to ease the computations involved in both these applications. The use of these stability concepts indicates that hierarchical power tends to stabilize cooperative behavior in many noncooperative situations. An exploratory study of two well known classes of games involving two decision makers shows that hierarchical power can provide a new technique for analyzing conflicts within hierarchical systems of decision makers.