Analysis Of Obligations Research Articles

Anticipation under the human right to science and under other social and cultural rights

ABSTRACT This article analyses how the right to science can benefit from the obligations and mechanisms related to anticipation of other, social and cultural rights. It considers how these obligations can be extended to the right to science and how they can benefit the right to science by ricochet. Hence, this article shows, on the one hand, the potential that the obligations of prevention, precaution and due diligence, when applied to, social and cultural rights, have to be extended into the context of the right to science. This analysis of obligations is followed by identifying mechanisms capable of addressing the anticipatory dimension required for implementing this right. It is therefore explored, on the other hand, how mechanisms such as indicators and HRIAs, considered useful in the framework of, social and cultural rights, can play a role in the implementation of the anticipatory aspects linked to the right to science. This analysis is based mainly on the interpretative function of quasi-judicial and jurisdictional human rights bodies.

Actions in the Interest of Others Without Commission: Problems of Theory and Practice

The article discusses the conditions for qualifying actions in someone else’s interest without a mandate and the requirements that must be met in order to obtain the right to reimburse the expenses incurred. The problems that arise in judicial practice during the qualification of these actions are identified. A comparative analysis of obligations arising from actions in the interest of others, and obligations from unjust enrichment. The author concluded that obligations from actions in the interests of others and obligations from unjust enrichment should not be mixed, and therefore there was a need to develop more clearly defined criteria to distinguish between the scope of these obligations.

The Role of Medical Students During a Pandemic: A Duty or a Choice

During a pandemic, it is unclear whether medical student participation in clinical responsibilities should be mandatory or voluntary. While many students have shown an interest in participating in the response to disasters, including pandemics, the number is not one hundred percent. This eagerness to serve should be lauded and appreciated, but it must not be misconstrued with a duty to act when one does not reasonably exist. It has long been held that physicians, as professionals, hold a duty to act because of their responsibility to society. Ethicists argue that, even when risks to the physician are present, their unique ability to heal supersedes these risks to themselves. From this, it can be assumed that the duty to heal for a student should be determined by their individual abilities as well as the ways in which they would be able to assist during the pandemic. A thoughtful ethical analysis leads to two possible positions regarding the duty of a medical student. In the first position, students are seen as either not having the same abilities as physicians or as existing on a spectrum between lay-people and physicians. In either case, students could not have the same duties as physicians if they did not have the same abilities, though one could argue that they should practice up to their current abilities just as physicians are required to. According to the second view, which is based on philosopher Judith Jarvis Thomson’s analysis of obligation, it is mandatory that everyone do what they can to avoid moral indecency (Figure 1). In this case, students have a duty to act up to their current abilities, and to do otherwise would be indecent when the state of the world requires their assistance (Figure 2). To prevent students who want to volunteer simply due to their role as a trainee should be seen as unethical. Rather, in order to avoid moral indecency, we should carefully weigh the benefit each specific student can bring given their level of training to the amount of supervision required for their activities.

Till Death Us Do Part? A Critical Analysis of Obligation and Choice for Spousal Caregivers

Research demonstrates a significant number of carers identify obligation or lack of other alternatives as the reasons they undertake informal care. By utilizing critical discourse analysis, this research explores choice for informal caregivers in contemporary Australian social policy. Analysis demonstrates increasing shifts in policy toward choice in consumer-directed care, a feature absent for those who provide care. Familial care is a central pillar of Australian social policy, as it is in many liberal and conservative welfare regimes. Analysis reveals that these core social policies are fundamentally incongruent, with significant implications for individuals and social work practice.

An Analysis of Obligation of Prohibition of Concurrent Offices to Local Council Members

An Analysis of Obligation of Prohibition of Concurrent Offices to Local Council Members

The Point of Studying Ethics According to Kant

Many readers of Kant’s ethical writings take him to be primarily concerned with offering guidelines for action. At the least, they write about Kant as if this were the purpose of his ethical writings. For example, Christine Korsgaard, in her influential article Kant’s Analysis of Obligation: The Argument of Groundwork I, writes that, ‘‘the argument of Groundwork I is an attempt to give what I call a ‘motivational analysis’ of the concept of a right action, in order to discover what that concept applies to, that is, which actions are right.’’ 1 Similar comments are not hard to find in the secondary literature. This, however, is a fundamentally misguided way of reading Kant, since he repeatedly asserts that we do not need to do moral philosophy in order to discover which actions are right. We already know how to behave morally and do not need philosophers to tell us this. ‘‘Common human reason,’’ Kant argues, ‘‘knows very well how to distinguish in every case that comes up what is good and what is evil, what is in conformity to duty or contrary to duty.’’ 2 Because people with pre-philosophical understanding know how to act morally, the purpose of moral philosophy cannot be to provide us with a set of rules for correct behavior. If we take Kant’s claims about common human reason seriously, then his aim in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals cannot be to discover which actions are right. It is instructive on this point to compare Kant’s conception of moral philosophy with Christian Wolff’s. Wolff’s ethics was dominant in Germany during Kant’s philosophical development, and Kant himself based his ethics lectures on a textbook written by one of Wolff’s followers, Alexander Baumgarten. Unlike Kant, Wolff is an intellectualist who believes that there is no gap between recognizing an act as good and the act of willing it, He therefore believes that immoral behavior is always the result of mistaken beliefs about goodness. Thus, he can claim; ‘‘The knowledge of good is a motive of the will.... It cannot happen the one does not will an inherently good act if one distinctly conceives it ... So if

Kant’s Analysis of Obligation

One of the debates of recent moral philosophy concerns the question whether moral judgments express internar' or external reasons.1 Ac cording to internalists, if someone knows or accepts moral judgment then she must have motive for acting on it. The motive is part of the content of the judgment: the reason why the action is right is reason for doing it. Ac cording to externalists, this is not necessarily so: there could be case in which I understand both that and why it is right for me to do something, and yet have no motive for doing it. Since most of us believe that action's being right is reason for doing it, internalism seems more plausible. It cap tures one element of our sense that moral judgments have normative force: they are motivating. But some philosophers believe that internalism, if cor rect, would also impose restriction on moral reasons. If moral reasons are to motivate, they must spring from agent's personal desires and com mitments.2 This is unappealing, for unless the desires and commitments that motivate moral conduct are universal and inescapable, it cannot be re quired of everyone. And this leaves out the other element of our sense that moral judgments have normative force: they are binding. Some internalists, however, have argued that the force of internalism cuts the other way. If moral reasons must motivate, and I show you that action is morally right, I have ipso facto provided you with motive for doing it. Moral reasons motivate because they are perceived as binding.3 A good person, ac cording to these internalists, does the right thing because it is the right thing, or acts from the motive of duty. Many of the moves in the contemporary debate were anticipated in the debate between the Rationalists and the Sentimentalists of the eighteenth century. At the center of their dispute was the notion of obligation, term they used primarily to refer to the normativity of duty. The term obliga tion is source of confusion, because an is sometimes used loosely as synonym for a duty, required action. But obligation refers not so much to the action as to the requiredness of the action, to its normative pull. We say that we feel obliged, or are under obligation, to express our sense that the claims of morality are claims on us. The idea that moral conduct is obligatory, like the idea that moral judgments express in