There is nothing unusual about positing security issues as problems; after all, it was not so terribly long ago that the central dilemma in international security regularly and not incorrectly, bore the label, the German Problem (in some variants, the German Question).1 I have myself, on occasion, even employed the concept of to frame discussions of historical and contemporary policy dilemmas associated with aspects of North American security - albeit on the understanding that somehow the source of the contention inhered in actions or perceptions linked to American policymakers, the assumption being that it was Canadians who were left facing the problem in question.2 They were the problem's consumer, not its producer, in keeping with Thucydides's familiar dictum about the strong doing what they can, the weak enduring what they must. Hence the novelty of John MacCormac's 1940 volume, effectively turning the consumptionproduction tables, under the title of Canada: America's Problem.^It is not that anyone seriously believes relations between the two North American neighbours have ever been consistently unproblematic; in reality, bilateral bickering has been a recurring tendency in Canada- US interaction for as long as anyone can remember, and in recent times tales of wrangling featuring the countries' respective leaders - John F. Kennedy's sparring with John Diefenbaker, Lyndon B. Johnson's manhandling of Lester Pearson, Richard Nixon's going head-to-toe with Pierre Trudeau, and George W. Bush's grappling with the tag-team of Jean Chretien and Paul Martin - have become the stuff of small legends. But, really, does anyone think these dustups amounted to anything more than tempests in a continental teapot?So to label Canada, as MacCormac does, not simply a but rather the facing American security planners makes us ask: What exactly could he have been thinking when he wrote this book back in early 1940? In this review essay, I try to come to grips with this question, by posing a pair of subsidiary interrogations that, singly or together, might help provide some perspective on a moment of foremost geopolitical urgency in global and North American security affairs. The first question concerns the worldwide crisis that flared up as the book was in its final stages of the editing and publication process, and it probes whether, in fact, MacCormac had a reasonably accurate read of US views at the time he was elevating Canada to the forefront of American strategic thinking. In other words, did he get his story straight? The second question tries to relate MacCormac to the broader sweep of narrative on Canadian strategic culture, asking whether, in retrospect, it is possible to claim for his book any lasting conceptual - perhaps even theoretical - contributions?Before embarking on this inquiry, a word or two about the author is in order. First, although MacCormac was the Canada correspondent of the New York Times in 1940, he was actually a Canadian, significantly an IrishCanadian (I will explain below why I take this to be significant). Equally important, and less surprising than that he was Canadian is that he was a very gifted writer, something one would have expected from a quality journalist in the golden age of the print media, but not a trait (alas) that universally characterizes recent or contemporary writing on Canada- US relations, to say nothing of on international relations in general. The book is a pleasure to read, even given - one might say, especially given - the span of seven decades separating its publication from our own time. I would hesitate to call it a classic study in Canada-US relations, because it has too many idiosyncrasies to warrant that distinction, but it certainly is a book that could and should be republished, suitably annotated, for today's market.WHAT S YOUR PROBLEM?At the outset, it needs emphasizing that the on MacCormac's mind had absolutely nothing to do with the hissing and dissing that intermittently has characterized interpersonal relations in Canada-US diplomacy. …