AMERICAN FRIENDS AND RUSSIAN RELffiF 1917 - 1927 (Part II) By John Forbes* State Department Dealings LINCOLN Steffens, the journalist, and William C. Bullitt, later i to be American Ambassador to Russia, made, in February, 1919, an unofficial tour of investigation in Russia at the instance of Colonel House, who needed first-hand information on conditions there for his work in Paris. They returned to make a secret report to the effect that the Soviets wanted peace and food, and would give the first for the latter. This was seen by some Peace Conference delegates as one more factor favoring the erection of the cordon-sanitaire. But Henry Scattergood of the American Friends Service Committee in Paris informed the home office that the French believed the American relief organizations and financial interests, by working together, would capture the Russian market from France. The private agencies and the governments ought rather, said the French, to form some sort of international committee for Russian relief under Herbert Hoover and Fridtjof Nansen, a committee to which the League of Nations, the League of Red Cross Societies, and the Comité Internationale de la Croix-Rouge ought to be invited to give support . Hoover carried these proposals to the attention of the organizatons concerned, but the plan became involved in the tangles of inter-allied military intervention in Russia, and nothing further came of this potentially tremendous project.1 * John Forbes is a member of the faculty of Blackburn College, Carlinville, Illinois. The first part of this article appeared in the Spring Number. xSee The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, 1847-1920 (New York: Macmillan, 1951), chap. 45. It is doubtful, incidentally, whether all the foreign and domestic relief agencies in Russia ever fed more than one-quarter of the people who, at any one moment, needed food. It is also doubtful whether the main officers of the private or governmental agencies working in Russia often enjoyed one-quarter the comradeship experienced by obscure and happily interdenominational workers running about in pursuit of their duties at the farthest reaches of the distribution web. 121 122Bulletin of Friends Historical Association United States government agents kept close watch, both at home and in the field, on the AFSCs Russian relief as it developed, as did the State Department. In December, 1919, the State Department, replying to the AFSC, declared that relief supplies could now be sent to Russia without any violation of State Department or War Trade Board policy, but that no passports to Russia would be issued. But, the Department added, if your people are willing to go at their own risk, and to make no claim upon the United States for protection once they enter Russia, and if they will surrender their passports at the border to a United States representative, expecting them to be returned at the time of their last exit from Russia, they may go. Dealings with the State Department in regard to the securing of passports and permissions to ship supplies continued, subject to the exigencies of the Department's Russian policies. In August, 1921, on the occasion of a security campaign, the American Relief Administration induced President Harding, who approved Friends Russian work both in principle and practice , to instruct the State Departments to issue no passports to AFSC personnel whom the ARA could not endorse. But in January, 1922, the AFSC learned from the ARA office in New York that the State Department had, without public announcement , instructed its European representatives henceforth to amend the passports of Quaker personnel entering Europe in transit to Russia, or already in Russia, so as to allow these workers in pursuit of their duties to enter Russia at any point. The Committee expressed thanks to the State Department for ". . . making it possible for the American Friends Service Committee to continue its work in Russia under its own name." Wilbur Thomas, the AFSCs resolute executive director, noted at this time, "We are just beginning to see light after a long, extremely complex and hazardous season of trouble with the State Department and the public over our work in Russia. Many of our Executive Board have often said, 'What's the use? Let's close the Service...