American National Election Survey Research Articles

Let the people’s will prevail: Self-uncertainty and authoritarianism predict support for populism

Recent years have witnessed a widespread rise of right-wing populism—an ideology maintaining that the will of the people is supreme, but is subverted by antagonistic elites. Drawing on uncertainty-identity theory, three studies (total N = 5,882) tested the hypothesis that uncertainty would only strengthen support for populism among low authoritarian respondents. Studies 1 and 2 were secondary analyses of American National Election Survey (ANES) 2012 and 2016 data. They supported our key hypotheses in explaining support for the populist American Tea Party (Study 1, N = 1,917), and support for right-wing populist ideology and voting preference for Donald Trump rather than Hillary Clinton (Study 2, N = 2,520). Study 3 ( N = 1,445) experimentally manipulated self-uncertainty to allow a causal interpretation, and focused on right-wing populist ideology. The results are discussed in terms of their contribution to uncertainty-identity theory, and their societal relevance in an environment of growing populism.

Economic Hardship Increases Justification of Political Violence

ABSTRACT Acts of political violence have reached a new level of intensity with the storming of the United States Capitol in 2021. In this paper, I investigate whether and how economic hardship affects political violence justification. Using an original two-wave panel survey around the 2020 US Presidential election, two studies from the American National Election Survey (ANES), and an original study from Germany, the results show substantial support for political violence justification among respondents. In both countries, political violence justification is strongly and consistently associated with economic hardship. The study thus shows that political violence justification is widespread, not just in polarised two-party systems, but also in other, less polarised multiparty systems.

The artificial intelligence shock and socio-political polarization

Are artificial intelligence's complimenting and displacing labor market effects corresponding with similar polarization in socio-political beliefs? This study answers this question by analyzing survey data of 26,311 Americans, collected from the American National Election Survey. Data is deployed alongside 22-category Manyika et al. (2017) ‘automation potential’ estimates (proxying for ‘displacement due to AI’) and Michael Webb (2019) ‘AI-exposure’ estimates (proxying for labor complimented by AI). The study summarizes the demographic characteristics and socio-political views of the highly AI-exposed and automation-susceptible groups. It deploys a year and region fixed effects OLS model, with standard error clustered at the occupation level. This study then finds that automation-susceptible ‘losers’ of AI are more likely to be culturally conservative and economically left-leaning. Those complimented by AI are more likely to hold socially liberal and fiscally conservative views. The results suggest AI's labor market polarization may accompany radicalization and socio-political divergence, with implications for vote capture and representation of working-class interests in government.

Politicized science and rural–urban divides: Exploring how rurality in the place of residence and red and blue media use affected attitudes toward scientists before and during the COVID‐19 pandemic

AbstractBased on the concept of place‐based identity, this study disentangles the effects of rurality and partisanship and considers their interactions with red/blue media use in rural–urban divides in attitudes toward scientists. By employing the 2016 American National Election Survey and our 2021 survey data, we investigated how partisanship, rurality, and red/blue media use related to attitudes toward scientists. Analyses revealed distinct roles for partisanship and rurality in predicting attitudes, even after controlling for demographic variables, including family income and education. Compared to those who resided in large metro areas, residents of more rural areas tended to harbor more negative attitudes toward scientists. This tendency was reinforced by red media use in 2021 but not in 2016. Given the dissimilar results in 2016 and 2021 in terms of the interaction of red media use and rurality, we should pay more attention to rural–urban divides in attitudes toward scientists.

Conspiracy believers perceive an ideological match with their party

ABSTRACT Research demonstrates conspiracy endorsement arises from a strong motivation to preserve beliefs. This same motive is implicated in political projection—the degree to which political judgments about groups are anchored on the self. This paper is the first to test the hypothesis that conspiracy endorsement regulates the magnitude of in-group projection. Empirical evidence from the 2012, 2016 American National Election Surveys is presented. Across the ideological spectrum, Democrats and Republicans that endorsed party concordant conspiracies were more likely than party members that did not to perceive strong similarity between their own ideology and the ideology of their party. Whether liberal, moderate, or conservative, conspiracy believers do not consider their ideological preferences as unique. Rather they perceive their ideological preferences as widely shared by in-group party members.

Part of the gender gap in voting for Democrats arises because a higher proportion of women than men voters are Black

Women voted for the Democratic candidate more than men did in each US presidential election since 1980. We show that part of the gender gap stems from the fact that a higher proportion of women than men voters are Black, and Black voters overwhelmingly choose Democratic candidates. Past research shows that Black men have especially high rates of death, incarceration, and disenfranchisement due to criminal convictions. These disparities reduce the share of men voters who are Black. We show that the gender difference in racial composition explains 24% of the gender gap in voting Democratic. The gender gap in voting Democratic is especially large among those who are never-married, and, among them, the differing racial composition of men and women voters is more impactful than in the population at large, explaining 43% of the gender gap. We consider an alternative hypothesis that income differences between single men and women explain the gender gap in voting, but our analysis leads us to reject it. Although unmarried women are poorer than unmarried men, and lower-income voters vote slightly more Democratic, the latter difference is too small for income to explain much of the gender gap in voting. In short, the large gender gap among unmarried voters is not a reflection of the lower incomes of women's households but does reflect the fact that women voters are disproportionately Black. We used the General Social Survey as the data source for the analysis, then replicated results with the American National Election Survey data.

Sexual identities and political solidarities among cisgender women

This study addressed the relative liberalism of White lesbians. In doing so, we compared sexuality differences in White women’s reactions to sexual, gender, and racial hierarchies. In the end, our analysis of 2,950 women from the American National Election Survey (ANES) suggested three trends. First, lesbians and bisexual women rejected and challenged heteronormativity more than heterosexual women. Second, the relationship between sexual identities and feminist commitments was less consistent. Lesbians and bisexual women perceived higher levels of sexist discrimination than heterosexual women did, but sexual identities did not always predict involvement in feminist social movements. Third, lesbian women generally displayed greater support of antiracist activism than bisexual or heterosexual women. However, this greater lesbian concern over racial biases did not translate in sexual differences in antiracist activism. Implications for these findings were explored, as were suggestions of future research.

Sexual Identities and the Role of Marriage in Social Movement Activism

Though marriage is seemingly attached to the private sphere and politics to the public sphere, marriage and politics operate as intertwined institutions. Political parties routinely pitch themselves as “the protector of family values” and getting married can shift a person’s political commitments. Studies generally agree that married people in different-sex marriages are more conservative than single or divorced individuals, but there is uncertainty as to whether same-sex marriages have the same political ramifications. This study examined data from the 2010–2102 American National Election Survey and found that sexual identity sometimes modifies the conservative elements of marriage (n = 3815). Same-sex marriages inspired greater participation in antiracist, queer, and feminist social movements while different-sex marriage showed an inverse relationship. Implications for how these findings require a rethinking of the marriage and politics are addressed as well.

What predicts perceived discrimination among white Americans? Findings from two nationally representative studies

AbstractMany national or racial majority groups increasingly perceive discrimination against their group, despite objective indicators of advantage. The present studies simultaneously test three individual‐level explanations of perceived discrimination among White Americans: system legitimizing beliefs, economic precarity, and group interest, in addition to corresponding predictors at the context (state) level. Using multilevel analysis, we analyzed nationally‐representative data from the 2016 American National Election Survey (N = 2631)—an election period marked by discourse about majority group grievances. Results showed that, at the individual level, system‐legitimizing beliefs (symbolic racism, conservatism, realistic, and symbolic threat) predicted perceived discrimination among Whites, as did objective (income) and subjective (perceived financial insecurity) economic precarity. Conversely, group interest (indicated by White racial identification) was not a significant predictor. At the state level, support for the Republican candidate also predicted perceived discrimination. These findings replicated with data from the 2012 American National Election Survey (N = 3261). We discuss the implications of White Americans’ discrimination claims in the current socio‐political climate.

Latinx identification with whiteness: What drives it, and what effects does it have on political preferences?

AbstractObjectiveWe seek to determine the antecedents of self‐categorization as white and white identity salience among Latinx people. We also investigate the effects of both on Latinx's political preferences.MethodsWe perform multivariate regression analyses using the 2012 American National Election Survey (ANES). The survey included 1005 Latinx U.S. citizens.ResultsWe find that Latinx citizens with a strong Latino consciousness and more educated Latinx are less likely to self‐categorize as white, while those with a higher income are more likely to do so. Furthermore, we find that white identity salience correlates positively with being a Republican and a conservative and with opposition to welfare. Still, it is not a significant predictor of anti‐immigrant policy preferences.ConclusionMany Latinx show a strong attachment to white identity, and these affective ties to whiteness correlate with conservative political orientations.

Exclusionary Citizenship: Public Punitiveness and Support for Voting Restrictions

Much scholarship has discussed how the expansion of the carceral state in the U.S. has consequences for other facets of the democracy. Specifically, felony disenfranchisement laws create a class of “carceral citizens” comprised disproportionately of racially minoritized individuals, and voter ID laws likewise closely mirror racialized segregation efforts that parallel the effects of justice system policies. Despite these clear theoretical linkages, little research has examined whether the anti-welfarism, anti-immigrant attitudes, and symbolic racism which fuel public punitiveness similarly increase support for voting restrictions. Further, it is unknown whether punitiveness itself intervenes in these relationships. Analyses of data from the 2020 American National Election Survey (N = 7,453) reveal considerable overlap between the sources of both punitiveness and voting restriction policies, and punitiveness sets an indirect path through which these social sensibilities influence support for voting restrictions. Further, party-specific analyses reveal that these associations generally are stronger for Democrats than Republicans.

Deeds, Not Words: Sexual Identities and Antiracist Activism Among White Americans

ABSTRACT Sexual minorities of color often speak about racism in White lesbian and gay communities while White sexual minorities often consider themselves liberals, especially for issues of racial justice. This study explored this contradiction by analyzing the role of sexual identities in predicting antiracist thoughts and actions of self-identified White people. Data from the 2010–2012 American National Election Survey provided information on the racial consciousness and social movement participation of White people (N = 2,552). In the end, sexuality differences in racial attitudes was somewhat or partially confirmed as White lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals endorsed fewer racial stereotypes and saw more racism than did White heterosexuals. However, these liberal sentiments of White lesbians, gays, and bisexuals were connected more to thoughts more than to political actions. Implications for methodological choices for studying race and sexuality were included, along with ideas for better understanding activism across racial lines.

Sexual Identities and Reactions to Black Lives Matter.

IntroductionThis study traced sexuality differences in Black Lives Matter (BLM) approval before using theories of “political distinctiveness” to explain why sexuality differences occurred.MethodsA random sample of 3489 US adults completed the 2016 wave of the American National Election Survey (ANES) Time Series project. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions assessed differences in BLM support by reported sexual identity when adjusting for possibly relevant covariates.ResultsLesbians, gays, and bisexuals (LGB) backed BLM more than heterosexuals. Increased LGB support of BLM was driven by sexuality differences in racial backgrounds, marital statuses, perceptions of police biases, approval of Black empowerment, authoritarianism, and emotional bonds to people of color.ConclusionsSexual identities shape reactions to antiracist social movements. LGB alignment with BLM is partly due to sexual discrepancies in demographic qualities, group memberships, and the way sexual identities alter an awareness of social biases.Policy ImplicationsGreater LGB liberalism, plus the queer friendly nature of BLM, offers greater prospects in the creation and maintenance of intersectional social justice movements that seek to improve the lives of racial and sexual minorities.

How Intersectional Threat Shapes Views of Gun Policy: The John Wayne Solution

Abstract Guns are highly visible in the news, in politics, and in American culture more broadly. While most Americans support some gun control, a significant and vocal minority of Americans are firmly opposed. Drawing on work from the recently developing sociology of modern gun culture, we propose an intersectional threat model—wherein perceived threats to multiple privileged identities provoke a distinct response—for understanding the positions Americans take on gun policies. Using data from a 2018 national survey conducted by the American National Election Survey, we find a robust role for perceived threats along gender, race, and citizenship lines in opposition to background checks for private sales and an assault weapons ban as well as support for arming teachers. Interactions reveal multiplicative effects: that gender threats matter more when racial and immigrant threats are also felt. We discuss implications for the prospect of policy and for understanding the pro-gun alt-right movement and other potential applications of intersectional threat.

Perspectives on Gender Stereotypes: How Did Gender-Based Perceptions Put Hillary Clinton at an Electoral Disadvantage in the 2016 Election?

AbstractResearch on gender stereotypes has largely emphasized that women candidates are evaluated differently compared to their male counterparts. In this article, I argue that such differential evaluation put Clinton at an electoral disadvantage in the 2016 election. I develop my expectations based on the differences between feminine stereotypes and masculine stereotypes and how voters’ perceptions of the latter match the longstanding popular expectations for political leaders, in a way that advantages men as candidates and disadvantages women. I also expect that a “gender affinity effect” influenced the election, with Democratic women being more likely to vote for Clinton. In this article, I rely on data from the 2016 American National Election Survey to evaluate the role of gender affinity effect and gender stereotypes in Clinton’s electability. The results show that masculine personality traits had the largest effect and were more fundamental for winning the White House. They also show that there was no significant evidence of a gender affinity effect among Democratic women in terms of voting for Clinton. These results offer new insights into voters’ gender stereotypic perceptions of Clinton and their consequences for the electoral fortunes of women candidates in general.

“Easy” and “hard” issues: Attitude extremity and a role of the need to evaluate

AbstractBackgroundThis article addresses the topic of issue polarization among the mass public, focusing on the classic typology of “easy” and “hard” issues (Carmines and Stimson, 1980) and the influence of the individual‐level motivational variable, which is the need to evaluate.ObjectiveCarmines and Stimson (1980) suggest that issues are characterized by their “hardness,” the degree of how much issues are easy to understand and make political evaluations. This article contends that the NTE would positively relate to attitude extremity of “hard” issues, which require extensive motivations for political judgment but would not necessarily be associated with attitude extremity of “easy” issues, which do not require such motivations.MethodsIn the analyses, four “easy” issues (abortion, same‐sex marriage, affirmative action, and gun control) and four “hard” issues (immigration, tax, health care, and climate change) were selected to compare the effects of the NTE on attitude extremity, based on previous literature. The data of 2016 American National Election Survey was used to test the hypotheses.ResultsThe analyses using the data of the 2016 American National Election Survey supported the hypotheses by showing that the need to evaluate was related to increased attitude extremity on all “hard” issues, whereas need to evaluate was not associated with extremity on “easy” issues except the issue of affirmative action.ConclusionNeed to evaluate is related to attitude extremity on “easy” and “hard” issues.

Review: Racial Stasis: The Millennial Generation and the Stagnation of Racial Attitudes in American Politics, by Christopher D. DeSante and Candis Watts Smith

Review: <i>Racial Stasis: The Millennial Generation and the Stagnation of Racial Attitudes in American Politics</i>, by Christopher D. DeSante and Candis Watts Smith

Why Trump Became a ‘Confederate’ President

Abstract This article explores the causes for and the contemporary ramifications of the realignment of the American South with the Republican Party. Using the American National Election Surveys (ANES) Time Series Cumulative Data File (1948–2016), the 2016 and 2020 Blair Center Polls, and the election tracking data compiled by Richard Berg-Andersson and Tony Roza at www.thegreenpapers.com, the author first explores the role that racial animus, anti-feminism, and religious fundamentalism played in white southern voters’ emergence as the Republican Party base. Second, the author considers the structural advantages that this prominence in the GOP gives southern whites in the primary nomination process and to what degree these advantages benefitted Donald Trump in 2016. Finally, the author explores the influence of Racial Resentment, Modern Sexism, and Christian Fundamentalism on the 2016 Republican primary elections and the 2016 and 2020 General Elections.

The “Trump” Effect: Political Elite and Support for Free Trade in America

While previous literature has offered two broad categories of explanation for individual trade preferences: economic self-interest and non-economic factors, we contend that during times of intensified elite discourse on trade, individuals may follow elite opinions to form their opinions on trade. Utilizing data from the 2016 American National Election Survey, we examine the effect of Trump’s protectionist views and rhetoric on public trade opinion. We argue that there was a “Trump effect” on trade attitudes among the mass public in 2016 and this effect went beyond the party line, meaning that Trump supporters, regardless of their partisanship, were more likely to be influenced by his protectionist views and to adopt anti-free trade positions. Moreover, we suggest a conditional effect of political knowledge on the “Trump effect” of trade opinion. Our empirical tests offer strong support for both hypotheses, suggesting a significant “Trump effect” on public trade opinion in 2016.

Geographic Differences of Individual Views toward the Role of Government

Government, through the provision of public services, plays an integral role in the lives of American citizens. In consequence, public opinion of government involvement has been consistently measured through the use of national surveys in order to better evaluate the public’s reaction to specific public policies. While measuring of aggregate public opinions on government involvement is valuable, there are certainly differences across various groups of Americans. The United States may be divided when it comes to partisanship and ideology, but perhaps there are also significant divisions between Americans based on their geography, or “place”. Using data from the American National Election Survey from 1994-2008, this study examines the differences in opinion on government spending towards public services, welfare programs, and Social Security. Rooted in the idea that different “places” harbor varying degrees of support for the government, I hypothesize that the role of government is viewed differently between urban and rural America, further demonstrating that America experiences an urban-rural division in regard to perceptions of American politics. The findings demonstrate that ideology drives Americans’ support for these specific policies and that “place” can serve as a conditioning effect on the standard ideological view. Specifically, liberals living in rural areas are less supportive of government spending than their liberal counterparts living in more urban areas. Additionally, rural liberals are less supportive of welfare spending; however, are more supportive of Social Security than liberals from urban areas.