The “Trump” Effect: Political Elite and Support for Free Trade in America

Joseph Essig,Ceren Keser,Ping Xu,James C Garand

doi:10.1177/1532673x21992124

Joseph Essig, Ceren Keser + Show 2 more

Open Access

https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673x21992124

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Abstract

While previous literature has offered two broad categories of explanation for individual trade preferences: economic self-interest and non-economic factors, we contend that during times of intensified elite discourse on trade, individuals may follow elite opinions to form their opinions on trade. Utilizing data from the 2016 American National Election Survey, we examine the effect of Trump’s protectionist views and rhetoric on public trade opinion. We argue that there was a “Trump effect” on trade attitudes among the mass public in 2016 and this effect went beyond the party line, meaning that Trump supporters, regardless of their partisanship, were more likely to be influenced by his protectionist views and to adopt anti-free trade positions. Moreover, we suggest a conditional effect of political knowledge on the “Trump effect” of trade opinion. Our empirical tests offer strong support for both hypotheses, suggesting a significant “Trump effect” on public trade opinion in 2016.

Highlights

Taken together, these findings suggest that theories on public opinion formation based solely on economic interests or party-driven changes cannot capture the whole story of trade opinion, and that the persuasive power of political elites does not necessarily only operate through a partisan channel
Even though Mutz’s (2017) recent work on trade opinion ascribed the change of Americans’ trade opinion to party realignment, we argue that the effect of political elites might be another important reason for the change and the Trump effect could go beyond partisanship
One’s political knowledge and education levels both have a positive and significant effect, but nationalism has a negative and significant effect on the dependent variable. These results suggest that individuals with lower levels of education, lower levels of political knowledge, or stronger nationalist views are more negative about open trade

Summary

Introduction

These findings suggest that theories on public opinion formation based solely on economic interests or party-driven changes cannot capture the whole story of trade opinion, and that the persuasive power of political elites does not necessarily only operate through a partisan channel. The “Trump effect” should be larger among more knowledgeable Trump supporters because they are more likely to acquire political messages on trade and more able to analyze and accept Trump’s messages consistent with their anti-openness predispositions.

Results

Conclusion