American Israel Public Affairs Committee Research Articles

The Role of the Jewish Lobby Toward US Foreign Policy Making on the 2023 Israel-Palestine War (Case of AIPAC)

This paper examines the complex dynamics of the Israel-Palestine conflict, focusing on the role of interest groups, particularly the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) in shaping US foreign policy. The conflict, rooted in historical and territorial disputes, has seen recurrent escalations, most recently triggered by Hamas attacks on Israel. The United States, a longstanding ally of Israel, provides substantial financial and military aid, with AIPAC exerting influence on policymakers to maintain and strengthen this relationship. Through qualitative research methods and literature studies, the paper analyzes the impact of AIPAC's lobbying efforts on US policy responses to the Israel-Palestine conflict. The article finds that the AIPAC lobby is deeply rooted in US policymaking structures, ranging from vice-president, and higher-echelon staff, to parliament members. This article also finds that since 2021, AIPAC has developed its policy to participate in political campaign contributions. Understanding AIPAC influences, the authors note that ethical considerations are crucial to maintaining a strong and representative democracy in the United States. This paper recommends the US to refocus its national interest because such overly foreign influence on national policymaking has the potential to harm America's long-term relationships and interests in the Middle East if the US can’t make the barrier for foreign interference toward its national interests.

AIPAC’s founding and the evolution of aid to Israel

ABSTRACT This exploration delves into the intricate history of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), navigating its genesis and the concurrent establishment of U.S. aid to Israel. The narrative unfolds against the post-World War II backdrop, exploring pivotal moments involving key figures like Isaiah L. Kenen, Abba Eban, and Louis Lipsky. As the Israeli embassy grappled with challenges in securing financial aid, Kenen’s vision crystallized into the creation of a domestic lobby group. AIPAC, initially known as the American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs (AZCPA), emerged, meticulously navigating the American legislative landscape to advocate for Israel. The lobby’s focus on bipartisan support, strategic alliances, and grassroots efforts paved the way for the landmark Morse–Taft Act, representing the first-ever U.S. financial aid to Israel. The narrative unfolds with a spotlight on Kenen’s strategic maneuvering, demonstrating how he deftly linked Israel’s aid to a broader regional approach, garnering support and mitigating opposition. The bill’s journey through Congress, from committee discussions to public endorsements, reflects Kenen’s orchestration of a multifaceted campaign.

A Critical Discourse Analysis of Anti-Muslim Rhetoric in Donald Trump’s Historic 2016 AIPAC Policy Speech

The primary focus of this study is to explore Donald Trump’s emerging anti-Muslim ideology in his speech delivered at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) during the 2016 U.S. Presidential Elections. The discourse of this speech is loaded with anti-Muslim and anti-Islam linguistic instances. To analyze Trump’s Islamophobic discourse, the study engaged with the ideological square model under the umbrella of critical discourse studies. For data collection, validation and linguistic inquiry, NVivo 12 Plus has also been used. The findings reveal that self-others schema has strongly been evidenced in Trump’s AIPAC policy speech where he tried to depict Muslims in negative terms and successfully presented himself as a “hero” of the nation who wishes to save America from suffering and destruction. In addition, this research exhibited Trump’s obvious attempt to accentuate his virtuous self by using an array of rhetorical strategies in order to imprint negative attributes in terms of high level of Islamophobia.

Mordecai D. Treblow

Mordecai D. Treblow, 86, died on April 26, 2016, in Pittsburgh. “Mordecai was a retired chemist and university professor who was a lifelong member of the American Chemical Society, the U.S. Chess Federation, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the Zionist Organization of America, and the Republican Party. Mordecai loved spending time with his nine grandchildren, Helena, Caryn, Kevin, Nathan, Ethan, Shalom Zev, Etan Zvi, Miriam, and Rina.”—family of Mordecai Treblow Most recent title: chemical consultant and candidate for Pittsburgh City Council Education: B.A., chemistry, University of Pennsylvania, 1955; Ph.D., chemistry, University of Pittsburgh, 1972 Survivors: wife, Sibyl; daughter, Annette Ziegler; sons, Marshall and Michael; nine grandchildren To recognize your late loved one or colleague, submit obituary information at cenm.ag/obits.

Unrequited Hope: Obama and Palestine

The early hope that the two-state solution would be implemented during the Obama presidency faded as both the Mitchell and Kerry negotiations failed. Only during his final weeks in office did Obama agree to the US abstaining on a UN vote condemning the ongoing Israeli settlements in territory earmarked as part of a future Palestinian state. After he leaves the presidency, there is a slim chance that Obama might join Jimmy Cater in working to mobilize American voters and taxpayers around efforts by Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) and other movements to oppose pro-Zionist lobbies, especially American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and to force Congress and the President to pressure Israel to withdraw from the Occupied Territories and enable the creation of a de-militarized Palestinian state.

U.S.-Israel Special Aid Relationship Dynamics and Implications for Pakistan

The United States (U.S.) has allocated a total of more than U.S. $ 63 billion economic and over U.S. $ 141 billion military assistance to Israel, more than U.S. $ 200 billion in aggregate over the last six decades. While there are several fluctuations in the amount of aid, there is also a continuum. This paper examines how and why the U.S.-Israel aid relationship is so special and unique. Focusing on historical as well as contemporary U.S. economic and military aid to Israel, the paper explores that, despite some ups and downs, aid to Israel has always remained a constant feature of the ties between the two countries. Israel has not only received the largest amount of aggregate U.S. economic and military aid, but there are also certain other special concessions available to Israel that no other U.S. aid recipient is privileged to avail. The paper identifies key dynamics that play an integral role in keeping the unparalleled U.S.-Israel aid relationship intact. Existing evidence indicates that besides factors such as shared values, including so-called democratic norms, Judo-Christian values and common geo-strategic goals; the Jewish lobby within the U.S., particularly the extremely powerful and well-organized American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is one of the most influential players tilting U.S. foreign policy in favour of Israel. The paper illustrates that Israel is a unique aid recipient which has been receiving billions of dollars in U.S. civilian and security assistance on account of these factors, rather than purely because of Israel's poverty or developmental needs. The study concludes by highlighting the current state of U.S.-Israel aid ties and the implications of overall U.S.-Israel aid relations for Pakistan.

Repenting for What Israel Did to Gaza—Without Condoning the Wrongs Committed by Hamas

Repenting for What Israel Did to Gaza—Without Condoning the Wrongs Committed by Hamas

Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions at Ten Years: Reflections on a Movement on the Rise

<div class="bookreview">Rich Wiles, editor, <em>Generation Palestine</em> (London: Pluto Press, 2013), 256 pages, $24, paperback.</div>When in March 2012, Barack Obama paused briefly from approving orders for drone killings of Pakistani and Yemeni villagers, in order to reassure the attendees at the annual gala of the AIPAC (American-Israel Public Affairs Committee) that, "when there are efforts to boycott or divest from Israel, we will stand against them," the real target of his declaration was elsewhere: the myriad grassroots organizers across the world who have made the global Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) campaigns unignorable. Their mounting influence has provoked efforts to declare them anti-Semitic or illegal from London to Long Beach. In fact, the series of victories across the University of California system has so annoyed its managers that they have hauled in the Caesar of domestic repression, Janet Napolitano, to deal with campus activists. Obama's declaration of support for Israeli colonialism had a simple message to those many activists: back down, because Washington will not.<p class="mrlink"><p class="mrpurchaselink"><a href="http://monthlyreview.org/index/volume-67-number-2" title="Vol. 67, No. 2: June 2015" target="_self">Click here to purchase a PDF version of this article at the <em>Monthly Review</em> website.</a></p>

Nationalism without a Nation?: On the Invisibility of American Jewish Politics

In this article, I launch a wholesale reexamination of the under-studied subject of American Jewish nationalism. With the focus on the road to Israeli statehood, scholars have ignored the complex, contradictory patterns of nationalist identification that marked American Zionist politics in the first half of the twentieth century. I explore this thesis through a re-reading of two key historical episodes: the American Jewish Congress movement of 1914–1920 and the American Jewish Conference, 1943–1949. In the process, I discuss the relationship between liberalism and nationalism in American Jewish political thought; the political conflicts between Jewish nationalism and anti-nationalism; and the nomenclature of Jewish nationhood in the United States. Ultimately, I conclude that the consensus position of American Jewish support for Israel after 1948 emerged only after statist Zionism had been separated from a more capacious form of American Jewish nationalism that existed before 1948. This helps us understand the origins and rise to significance of the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), with implications for the current moment of American Jewish politics.

The Iranian Nuclear Debate: More Myths Than Facts

ABSTRACT: Much of public debate surrounding US policies regarding Iran has been distorted by myths that obscure actual status of Iranian nuclear programs. Similarly, discussions about implications of a nuclear-armed Iran are often built on questionable assumptions requiring more thorough examination. This article dispels these myths, questions these assumptions, and draws important implications for US policymakers in this critical strategic debate. ********** International negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program are once again in limbo. At conclusion of February talks in Almaty, Kazakhstan, Iran's Foreign Minister All Akbar Salehi characterized them as a significant milestone that had reached a turning point, and left him very optimistic and hopeful. (1) Meanwhile, reactions from representatives of so-called P5+1 (United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany) were notably more measured, but hinted at an optimistic assessment as newly confirmed US Secretary of State Kerry characterized February sessions as useful. (2) As so frequently happened in past, however, subsequent talks in April crashed against reality of significant gaps in substantive negotiating positions of P5+1 and Iranian teams. The European Union representative talks, Catherine Ashton, cast a decidedly downbeat assessment of April sessions observing that the positions of [P5+1] and Iran remain far apart on substance.... We have therefore agreed that all sides will go back capitals evaluate where we stand in process. (3) This pause in negotiations offers American policymakers opportunity reassess strategic options regarding Iran's nuclear program. The recent election of Hasan Rouhani as President of Iran gives Obama administration another reason reconsider America's current approach. A coherent strategy requires establishment of clear objectives and a design for employing nation's instruments of power achieve those objectives. In case of Iran, overriding strategic objective of current US policy has been made exactingly clear by President Obama and Vice President Biden. In his speech American Israel Public Affairs Committee one year ago, President Obama said objective of US policy is to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear (4) Vice President Biden reiterated this position nearly verbatim same audience on 4 March 2013 saying goal of US policy is to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear (5) While others outside White House have suggested alternative US policy objectives ranging from preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability ousting current regime in Tehran, these statements by President and Vice President have effectively ended this portion of strategic debate. US policies under President Obama will be guided by paramount objective of preventing Iran's acquisition of a nuclear weapon. Nevertheless, public and internal debates over how United States can best marshal its diplomatic, economic, informational, and military instruments of power accomplish this expressed policy objective will continue for some time. The default option would be maintain current US dual-track approach of offering negotiations while imposing ever-tightening economic and financial sanctions in hope of compelling Iranian concessions on its nuclear program. Others have made case for preemptive military attacks designed destroy Iran's existing nuclear facilities or facilitate a regime change in Tehran. (6) Still others have advocated a strategy emphasizing a diplomatic approach exchanging United States and international recognition of Iran's right enrich uranium in return for commitments from Tehran limit enrichment activities and subject them an intrusive international inspection regimen ensuring nuclear materials are not diverted military purposes. …

Reimagining Judaism

Reimagining Judaism

Why has the United States not bombed Iran? The domestic politics of America's response to Iran's nuclear programme

Why has the United States (US), under both the Bush and Obama administrations, refrained from attacking Iran even though US officials have depicted the Iranian threat in all but apocalyptic terms and even though a loud chorus in Washington has been persistently calling for a preventive strike against Iran? I present an analysis—informed by Graham Allison's famous bureaucratic politics model—of the main political and bureaucratic forces in Washington acting to promote or impede a preventive attack on Iran's nuclear sites. I argue that America's abstention from attacking Iran should be understood not as a coherent national response to Iran's nuclear programme but rather as (in Allison's terms) an ‘intra-national political outcome’ resulting from the ‘pulling’ of ‘Iran Threat’ interests—primarily Vice President Cheney's camp in the Bush White House, members of Congress, and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)—and the countervailing ‘hauling’ of the Pentagon, the military's top brass, the intelligence community and the Department of State. The main reason why neither the Bush nor the Obama administration has opted for a military strike is that the ‘haulers’, who were led by a formidable bureaucratic-political player, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, have had the upper hand over the hawkish ‘pullers’.

C1. Pm Benjamin Netanyahu, Address at the Annual American Israel Public Affairs Committee (Aipac) Policy Conference, Washington, 22 March 2010 (Excerpts)

C1. Pm Benjamin Netanyahu, Address at the Annual American Israel Public Affairs Committee (Aipac) Policy Conference, Washington, 22 March 2010 (Excerpts)

Introduction

Pro-Israel advocacy in the United States has come under a great deal of critical scrutiny in recent years. Denunciations of the excessive influence of the “Israel Lobby” on US foreign policymaking toward the Middle East, allegations of espionage leveled against high-ranking employees of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), and arguments over whether pro-Israel organizations adequately represent American Jewish opinion have all served to put the pro-Israel lobby in the public spotlight.

The 2009 Israeli Election: A Bump in the Road to Peace?

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. Gilead Sher, interview with author, December 8, 2008 (lawyer, chief of staff and policy coordinator for former prime minister Ehud Barak, and key figure Meretz). 2. It was not just a question of the number of rockets fired but also of their increasing range. For an authoritative analysis of the war see Anthony H. Cordesman, “The ‘Gaza War’: A Strategic Analysis” (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, February 2, 2009), http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/task,view/id,5250/. 3. Yossi Alpher, “Too Early For Despair,” Bitterlemons.org, edition 7, February 16, 2009, http://www.bitterlemons.org/previous/bl160211ed7.html#isr1. 4. Natasha Mozgovaya, “Obama: We Will Aggressively Seek Lasting Middle East Peace,” Haaretz, January 23, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1057919.html. 5. Yuval Karni and Itamar Eichner, “Livni: Electing Netanyahu Will lead to a Rift with U.S.,” Yedioth Ahronoth, January 25, 2009, 2. 6. For a discussion of the renewed calls for electoral reform, see Amnon Rubinstein, “Plenty of Brakes But No Engines,” Jerusalem Post, February 17, 2009, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1233304810588&pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull; Moshe Arens, “The Electoral System and the Voter,” Haaretz, February 10, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1062722.html; Shlomo Avineri, “The Good and the Bad of the System,” Haaretz, February 19, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1065365.html. 7. Alpher, “Too Early For Despair.” 8. The results were: Kadima 28; Likud 27; Yisrael Beitenu 15; Labour 13; Shas 11; United Torah Judaism 5; UAL Ta'al 4; National Union 4; Hadash 4; Meretz 3; Balad 3; Jewish Home 3. See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 10, 2009, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/History/Modern+History/Historic+Events/Elections_in_Israel_February_2009. 9. The 32nd government of Israel was sworn in by a majority of 69 to 45 votes. Five of the Labour members of the Knesset abstained. Initial posts were distributed in the government as follows: Likud 15; Labour 5; Yisrael Beitenu 5; Shas 5. See “Netanyahu Government/Who's Who in the New Cabinet,” Haaretz, April 1, 2009, http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasen/spages/1075505.html. 10. Dana Weiler-Polak, “Record 20,072 Israelis Filed for Unemployment in March,” Haaretz, April 6, 2009, http://haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1076532.html. 11. “Israel's Netanyahu Government, the Annapolis Process and a ‘Two-State Solution,’” Beyond Images Web site, Briefing 238, April 5, 2009, http://www.beyondimages.info/docs/B238.doc. 12. Avigdor Lieberman, speech, Jerusalem, Israel, April 1, 2009, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/About+the+Ministry/Foreign_Minister/Speeches/Statement_by_incoming_FM_Avigdor_Liberman_1-Apr-2009.htm. 13. “Obama's Remarks to Turkish Parliament,” Washington Wire: Wall Street Journal Blogs, April 6, 2009, http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2009/04/06/obamas-remarks-to-turkish-parliament/. 14. See “Abbas Lays Down Terms for Renewing Peace Talks,” Haaretz, April 5, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1076521.html. Even the relatively mild statement by Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller that “Universal adherence to the NPT itself, including by India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea … remains a fundamental objective of the United States,” provoked a frisson of alarm in Jerusalem. See Barak Ravid, “‘Making Israel Sign Nuclear Treaty Won't be Miracle Cure for World Ills,’” Haaretz, May 7, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1083236.html. 15. The response amongst some sections of the Jewish community within the United States to the arrival of Lieberman in power was extremely negative. See Eric Yoffe, “Confronting Our Demagogue,” Forward, February 17, 2009, http://www.forward.com/articles/103108/. For a broader discussion of changes in Jewish attitudes within the United States, see Hilary Leila Krieger, “U.S. Jews Back Obama's Mid-East Path,” Jerusalem Post, March 23, 2009, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1237727519689&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull; Nathan Guttman, “The Pro-Israel Lobby – ‘Alive, Well, and Bipartisan?’” Haaretz, March 25, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1073714.html. For a more recent discussion of how the new mood revealed itself during the recent American Israel Public Affairs Committee [AIPAC] conference, see Nathan Guttman, “AIPAC Confronts a New Reality as Obama's Agenda Becomes Clear,” Forward, May 15, 2009, http://www.forward.com/articles/105680/. Additional informationNotes on contributorsJonathan MarcusJonathan Marcus is diplomatic correspondent for the BBC World Service. He travels to Israel often and broadcasts frequently on Israeli politics and diplomatic developments in the Middle East

Rejoinder to Mearsheimer and Walt

In their reply, Professors Mearsheimer and Walt focus quite reasonably on my two main claims: that their research methods are flawed and that their evidence is weak. But they begin, tellingly, by citing a range of indirect evidence that appears to depict a powerful “Israel lobby.” Lots of knowledgeable Washington insiders, they say—policymakers, journalists, candidates for office, and the like—say and do things that seem to acknowledge the “lobby's” power. I draw attention to this opening for several reasons. First, it is not clear how much weight some of this evidence will bear. Take, for example, theNational Journalsurvey of members of Congress that Mearsheimer and Walt cite twice in their reply (and once in their book). In this survey, conducted once, in 2005, seventy-three members of Congress (out of 535—less than 15 percent) responded to the question, “Which two interest groups do you believe are most effective on Capitol Hill?” Of these respondents, thirteen (less than 20 percent of the sample) mentioned American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) as one of their two choices. It seems something of a leap from the observation that a dozen or so members of Congress said once that AIPAC is “effective” (which might mean any number of things) to the inference that AIPAC—or the lobby more generally—is powerful. Or take the observation that important politicians regularly address AIPAC's annual conference and make friendly speeches when they do. Surely these same politicians visit other such organizations regularly. And when they appear before, say, the AFL-CIO or the NAACP, surely they say nice things about the issues that these organizations and their conference attendees care about. Successful politicians rarely voice open disagreement with the people they are talking to. But are we to conclude from this behavior that the AFL-CIO and the NAACP, or any other groups that regularly receive such visits, are powerful? Again, this inference requires something of a logical leap.

National Security and the Press: The Government's Ability to Prosecute Journalists for the Possession or Publication of National Security Information

In 2006, then Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales raised the possibility that journalists could be prosecuted for publishing national security information. In addition, the federal government's prosecution of two former lobbyists for the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) for possessing and disseminating national security information has been called an attempt by the government to prosecute individuals who behave like journalists. This article identifies existing laws under which the press could be criminally prosecuted for the possession and/or publication of national security information and describes how the courts have addressed those laws. The article concludes that while there is support for Constitutional protection for journalists in these cases, the Supreme Court of the United States is unlikely to interpret the First Amendment as protecting journalists from prosecution for possessing and/or publishing national security information. Therefore, the article contends that Congress should amend the statutes outlined herein to limit prosecution to instances when there is evidence of intent to harm the United States.

B3. President George W. Bush, Remarks to the Annual AIPAC Conference, Washington, D.C., 18 May 2004 (excerpts).

President Bush's forty-minute address to a crowd of some five thousand delegates at the annual conference of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) was interrupted by twenty-four standing ovations. Particularly noteworthy is the president's frequently drawn parallel between Israel and Iraq. Bush is the third sitting president ever to address the lobbying group. The speech is carried on the organization's Web site at www.aipac.org

A Success Story: President of Four-Generation Family Business Talks About Strategy, “Giving Back,” and Gubernatorial Aspirations

Steve Grossman, Democratic candidate for governor of Massachusetts in 2002, is president of MassEnvelopePlus in Somerville, MA, a full-service printing and graphic design firm started by his grandfather in 1910 and now a fourth-generation family business. He is also founder and president of Givenation.com, which helps nonprofit organizations raise funds online. Steve has played a prominent role in both national and state politics, most recently as national chairman of the Democratic National Committee, which he helped revitalize from 1997 to 1999, president and chairman of the Board of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee from 1992 to 1996, and chairman of the Massachusetts Democratic Party from 1991 to 1992. A strong believer in grassroots politics, he remains an active member of the Ward 7 Newton Democratic City Committee. He was also a leader of many philanthropic, civic, and cultural organizations over the years.

Le lobby juif américain

Aipac, the leading pro-Israel lobby in Washington has become a major force in shaping United States policy in the Middle East, although the perception of its strength may be larger than the reality. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee, founded in 1954, is the only American Jewish organization officially registered with the U.S. Congress to lobby on behalf of legislation affecting Israel. Aipac is not a Political Action Committee and does not directly contribute funds to political campaigns. The root strength of Aipac lies not so much in its skills in public relations, access to media, and ample financing, as in the congruence of the lobby's objectives with elite perceptions, coalition building with non-Jewish groups and deep pro-Israeli sentiment in public opinion.