The Iranian Nuclear Debate: More Myths Than Facts

Abstract

ABSTRACT: Much of public debate surrounding US policies regarding Iran has been distorted by myths that obscure actual status of Iranian nuclear programs. Similarly, discussions about implications of a nuclear-armed Iran are often built on questionable assumptions requiring more thorough examination. This article dispels these myths, questions these assumptions, and draws important implications for US policymakers in this critical strategic debate. ********** International negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program are once again in limbo. At conclusion of February talks in Almaty, Kazakhstan, Iran's Foreign Minister All Akbar Salehi characterized them as a significant milestone that had reached a turning point, and left him very optimistic and hopeful. (1) Meanwhile, reactions from representatives of so-called P5+1 (United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany) were notably more measured, but hinted at an optimistic assessment as newly confirmed US Secretary of State Kerry characterized February sessions as useful. (2) As so frequently happened in past, however, subsequent talks in April crashed against reality of significant gaps in substantive negotiating positions of P5+1 and Iranian teams. The European Union representative talks, Catherine Ashton, cast a decidedly downbeat assessment of April sessions observing that the positions of [P5+1] and Iran remain far apart on substance.... We have therefore agreed that all sides will go back capitals evaluate where we stand in process. (3) This pause in negotiations offers American policymakers opportunity reassess strategic options regarding Iran's nuclear program. The recent election of Hasan Rouhani as President of Iran gives Obama administration another reason reconsider America's current approach. A coherent strategy requires establishment of clear objectives and a design for employing nation's instruments of power achieve those objectives. In case of Iran, overriding strategic objective of current US policy has been made exactingly clear by President Obama and Vice President Biden. In his speech American Israel Public Affairs Committee one year ago, President Obama said objective of US policy is to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear (4) Vice President Biden reiterated this position nearly verbatim same audience on 4 March 2013 saying goal of US policy is to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear (5) While others outside White House have suggested alternative US policy objectives ranging from preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability ousting current regime in Tehran, these statements by President and Vice President have effectively ended this portion of strategic debate. US policies under President Obama will be guided by paramount objective of preventing Iran's acquisition of a nuclear weapon. Nevertheless, public and internal debates over how United States can best marshal its diplomatic, economic, informational, and military instruments of power accomplish this expressed policy objective will continue for some time. The default option would be maintain current US dual-track approach of offering negotiations while imposing ever-tightening economic and financial sanctions in hope of compelling Iranian concessions on its nuclear program. Others have made case for preemptive military attacks designed destroy Iran's existing nuclear facilities or facilitate a regime change in Tehran. (6) Still others have advocated a strategy emphasizing a diplomatic approach exchanging United States and international recognition of Iran's right enrich uranium in return for commitments from Tehran limit enrichment activities and subject them an intrusive international inspection regimen ensuring nuclear materials are not diverted military purposes. …