The Local, National, and International Politics of SlaveryEdward Everett’s Nomination as U.S. Minister to Great Britain Matthew Mason (bio) On July 16, 1841, President John Tyler nominated Edward Everett to be the United States’ minister to Great Britain. The Senate debated Everett’s nomination in executive sessions; this dragged on intermittently until Everett’s appointment was confirmed by a 23–19 vote on September 13, the last day of this special session of Congress.1 The Senate’s executive sessions were secret, but as the delay grew protracted word leaked out that southern senators opposed Everett’s appointment because they considered him a dangerous abolitionist. Those in the press who seconded that opposition based it on public letters Everett had written while governor of Massachusetts in the late 1830s. The resulting press furor in the North produced talk of retaliation and ultimately disunion. The storm dissipated when Everett won confirmation, but its lightning had illuminated how interconnected local, national, and international questions could be in American politics when slavery was at issue. Most historians of American foreign relations have underrated the links between sectional domestic politics and international questions. Those who call for study of these connections continue to take the posture of voices in the wilderness, insisting quite rightly that both political and diplomatic historians could benefit from increased interchange.2 In recent years, scholars of the sectional politics of slavery in the Civil War era have turned their attention increasingly to the international arena.3 But the Everett episode adds to this emerging picture by demonstrating that what a politician said with an eye to reelection to his state capital could reverberate in deliberations in the nation’s capital concerning who should represent the nation in a great foreign capital. The Everett confirmation imbroglio thus highlighted how vulnerable national party coalitions were to sectional disruptions by epitomizing the multiple angles from which such disruptions could appear. At a time in which the Whig Party already faced serious sectional and ideological cleavages, the confirmation combat placed even greater pressure on party unity. [End Page 3] Northern Whigs, previously among the staunchest of unionists, shocked many observers by indulging in bitter sectional rhetorical responses to the threat to Everett. And while Democrats were happy, from a partisan point of view, to inflict travail on a Whig nominee and potentially divide their opponents, only southern Democrats found opposition to Everett on grounds related to slavery a straightforward proposition. The course of the debate and the Senate’s eventual endorsement of Everett, however, demonstrated how loyalty to party and the Union could triumph over sectional politics. Within the framework of southern politics, the Democrats and southern rights men in this debate employed a classic version of what scholar William Cooper has called “the politics of slavery,” in which antebellum southern politicians accused the other party of unsoundness on slavery. In this cycle of “sectional one-upmanship practiced by the two parties,” the standard charge was that one’s own northern allies were reliable on slavery, while the other party’s northern men were rank abolitionists. Although pushing the slavery issue into state and sectional politics in this way proved counterproductive to keeping it out of national politics, Cooper argues, neither party could seem to help itself.4 But while national party managers were caught off guard by the controversy, they neither found themselves paralyzed by it nor blundered through it, proving creative and resourceful in managing the final vote. Furthermore, the months-long war of words demonstrated the passionate devotion to the Union among southern Whigs. Strongly committed moderates may seem oxymoronic to us, but southern Whigs, as leading unionists, deserve more attention than most modern scholars have paid them.5 They were certainly much in evidence in key roles during the Everett confirmation dispute. While this controversy seems to have genuinely shocked many observers, Everett was not one of them, despite being much farther removed from Washington than they were. Upon receiving word of his nomination while traveling in Europe, he wrote in his diary that he “should not be surprized if some opposition—perhaps successful—should be made to it from the South.”6 This reaction showed...
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