American Foreign Economic Policy Research Articles

US-EU Trade Cooperation in the Context of Changing American Foreign Economic Policy

Abstract: The article examines changing dynamics and structure of US foreign with the EU countries, caused by the changes in US foreign policy after D. Trump came to power. The United States sets the general mood in the system of international economic relations, and in particular, in international trade. The strengthening of protectionism, the growth of disintegration processes (revision of the conditions of NAFTA / USMCA, US with­drawal from the TPP, stopping negotiations on the TTIP) is the response of Trump adminis­tration to the challenges faced by the United States. Globalization and liberalization have ceased to meet the interests of the American economy, which has led to a revision of the ideological foundations and practice of foreign economic activity. Statistics show that the United States' economic interest in the EU comes from the competi­tive advantages of individual EU countries. There is a possibility of continuing disintegration in the European Union, since after Brexit the Netherlands and other countries expressed the idea of leaving the Union. This will play into the hands of the United States, which is interested not in a strong united Europe, but in increasing the effectiveness of bilateral ties with individual countries of the European Union. The main conclusion of the study is the following: the globalization process and the interdependence of economies have weakened, and regardless of the results of the presidential elections, regardless of whether the United States will continue to pursue a policy of protectionism and conduct trade wars, whether the crisis of 2020-2021 predicted by UNCTAD and IMF will come true, the EU and the US willbe forced to seek compromises and revise the conditions for reformatting the failed TTIP.

Two Faces of Transnational Finance Capital in American Foreign Policy

이 연구는 미국 금융패권 형성 과정에서 미국 행정부/의회와 초국적 금융자본의 관계와 그의 정치경제적 함의를 모색하는 것을 목적으로 한다. 전간기를 중심으로 초국적 금융자본을 대표하는 제이피 모건(J.P. Morgan)의 사례를 분석한다. 제이피 모건은 미국 국내 산업과 금융 커뮤니티에서의 영향력뿐만 아니라 영국과 프랑스를 둘러싼 국제 정치경제적 네트워크를 기반으로, 초국적 금융자본으로 성장할 수 있었다. 제1차 세계대전 발발과 제이피 모건의 급속한 성장은 세계 금융패권이 영국 런던에서 미국 뉴욕으로 이동하는 데 기여하였다. 초국적 금융자본의 주도하에 미국의 금융패권 획득 의지는 이미 전간기에 드러났다. 국제적으로 제이피 모건은 도스 플랜(Dawes Plan)과 영 플랜(Young Plan)을 실행하는 과정에 적극적으로 참여하였고, 미국 행정부는 제이피 모건의 네트워크와 세일즈 능력을 활용하였다. 미국 의회는 엣지법(Edge Act)과 같은 법 제정을 통해 전간기 금융자본의 해외 진출을 도왔다. 제이피 모건은 자신들의 이익을 보호하고 확대하고자 미국의 국제주의적 외교정책을 지지하였다. 하지만, 국내적으로 미국 행정부는 대법원의 판결을 통해 금융자본을 규제했다. 의회는 반(反) 금융자본 정서에 편승하여 청문회를 개최하고 제이피 모건을 견제하고자 했다. 그럼으로써 미국 대외경제정책의 방향이 국제주의로 나아가는 것을 경계했다. 결국 제이피 모건은 두 개의 회사로 분리되었다.

Who Supports Global Economic Engagement? The Sources of Preferences in American Foreign Economic Policy

AbstractIn this article we bring together opposing international relations theories to better understand U.S. foreign policy, in particular foreign trade and aid. Using votes in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1979–2004, we explore different theoretical predictions about preferences for foreign economic policy. We assess the impact of domestic factors, namely political economy and ideological preferences, versus foreign policy pressures. Our three main results highlight the differential effect of these factors in the two issue areas. First, aid preferences are as affected by domestic political economy factors as are trade preferences. Second, trade preferences, but not economic aid ones, are shaped by the president's foreign policy concerns; for economic aid, domestic political economy factors matter more than foreign policy ones. Third, aid preferences are shaped more by ideological factors than are trade ones, but ideology plays a different substantive role in each. Different constituencies support aid and trade. This finding has implications for foreign policy substitutability, “the internationalist coalition” in U.S. foreign policy, “statist” theories of foreign policy, and the connection between public opinion and legislative voting.

From the Great Depression to Bretton Woods: Jacob Viner and international monetary stabilization (1930–1945)

This paper examines Jacob Viner's contribution to the debate and the policy decision-making concerning international monetary policy from the Great Depression to the Bretton Woods agreements. An outstanding member of the so-called ‘early Chicago School of Political Economy’, Viner was actively engaged in the debate over the causes and cures of the Depression, emphasizing the important role international economic problems played in producing its onset and in reinforcing its duration. During the 1930s Viner was an outspoken supporter of international monetary cooperation, set up to secure exchange rates stability, which he regarded as a paramount factor in restoring business confidence and fostering recovery. As a close assistant to Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr, Viner was able to exert a positive influence on the administration's foreign economic policy, from the Gold Stabilization Act of 1934 to the Tripartite Agreement of 1936. Although not directly involved in the Bretton Woods Conference, he played a role in preparing the ground for the establishment of multilateral agencies such as the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. By means of his unpublished papers and other archival sources, as well as his writings, I shall examine Viner's analysis of the Great Depression, his contribution to the debate over American foreign economic policy and his work as economic adviser from 1930 to 1945.

U.S. Foreign Economic Policy and the Significance of the National Economic Council

Research demonstrates that the National Economic Council (NEC) and the decision-making process through which economic issues must pass are essential components in the evolution of American foreign economic policy. This article will examine the functions and responsibilities of the NEC in the making of U.S. foreign economic policy under Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. It selects key policies, namely international monetary policy, fiscal policy, and trade liberalization, and examines key issues within each in order to provide tentative answers to questions regarding foreign economic policy and the emergence and development of the NEC. Also, this article supplies an overview of the large body of research on international economics and foreign economic policy. Furthermore, it identifies key U.S. foreign economic policy issues developed and coordinated by the NEC. The article concludes with a discussion of to what extent the NEC is a significant development in U.S. foreign economic policy and in the making of foreign policy.

The Politics of Trade: American Political Development and Foreign Economic Policy.

The Politics of Trade: American Political Development and Foreign Economic Policy.

The Politics of Trade: American Political Development and Foreign Economic Policy.

The Politics of Trade: American Political Development and Foreign Economic Policy.

The Politics of Trade. American Political Development and Foreign Economic Policy. By Cynthia A. Hody. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1996. Pp. ix, 210. $45.00.

The Politics of Trade. American Political Development and Foreign Economic Policy. By Cynthia A. Hody. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1996. Pp. ix, 210. $45.00.

The politics of trade: American political development and foreign economic policy

The politics of trade: American political development and foreign economic policy

Mining for the Corporatist Synthesis: Gold in American Foreign Economic Policy, 1931?1936

Economic crises can do strange things to people. The Great Depression of the 1930s certainly was no exception. Normally sober men began to talk as if they were going to join the ranks of those who put on placards and parade the streets declaring that the end of the world is nigh. In April 1933, for example, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt decided to take the United States off the gold standard, Lewis A. Douglas, his director of the Bureau of the Budget, proclaimed “the end of Western civilization,” while Bernard Baruch, another of his advisers, contemplated “mob rule” and a “revolution more drastic than the French Revolution.”1 The historian's task is to understand such crises as their participants experienced them but to place them in the context of a greater historical process, using the more discerning perspective that the passage of time affords. Over the last two decades, corporatism has emerged as one of the most promising analytical tools for achieving this task and for forging a new synthesis in American diplomatic history.2 The approach is ambitious. Its proponents argue that it offers a framework that comprehends both the internal and the external sources of American diplomacy.

National Security Versus National Welfare in American Foreign Economic Policy

Policies of freer trade and greater economic openness became a hallmark of U.S. foreign economic policy after World War II. American policymakers came to accept that the improvement of economic conditions abroad correlated directly with prosperity at home. During that period, U.S. support for policies of economic openness assumed the compatibility of economic liberalism and national security.

After Reagan: Confronting the Changed World Economy. By C. Michael Aho and Marc Levinson. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988. 245p. $19.95. - Beyond Globalism: Remaking American Foreign Economic Policy. By Raymond Vernon and Debora Spar. New York: Free Press, 1989. 246p. $22.95.

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Beyond Globalism: Remaking American Foreign Economic Policy

The article reviews the book “Beyond Globalism: Remaking American Foreign Economic Policy,” by Raymond Vernon and Deborah L. Spar.

The State and American foreign economic policy

The State and American foreign economic policy

Manufacturing Consensus: The Institutionalization of American Private Interests in the Tokyo Trade Round

The Tokyo Round trade negotiations that culminated in 1979 represented the most complex and far-reaching set of multilateral agreements on trade in history. These negotiations, which got under way in 1975 under sponsorship of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), differed from previous multilateral trade negotiations in their focus on nontariff barriers. Earlier trade rounds concentrated on lowering tariff levels. The shift to negotiations over nontariff issues, however, expanded greatly the range of commercial interests at stake and posed new legal and administrative challenges for governments. Nontariff barriers by their very nature involve impediments to trade that are embedded in domestic statutory law.' Agreements over such issues necessarily involve legislative action, serving to draw more domestic commercial interests into the process and attenuating the authoritative position of the executive. More than ever before, government officials in the Tokyo Round were engaged in two-sided bargaining-with both domestic commercial interests and with foreign governments. By most accounts, however, the Tokyo Round was remarkably successful, as was the American government's role in these negotiations.2 Forty-one countries, whose trade constitutes 90 percent of world trade, signed the final agreements. These multilateral agreements were concluded in Geneva in April 1979, and the Carter administration submitted necessary and appropriate legislation to Congress in June. Following procedures agreed upon in the 1974 Trade Act, which provided for a fast track legislative review of the provisions, the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 was passed by Congress and signed into law in only a few weeks time.3 The quick ratification of the multilateral agreements by the United States government is surprising and poses a theoretical puzzle. The conventional image of a fragmented and penetrated American state would lead one to expect a very different outcome. According to this weak state image, the institutional structures of government decision making provide easy access for private groups and few capacities for executive officials to pursue independent policy goals. More so than in other advanced industrial countries, American foreign economic policy reflects the biases and pressures of private social groups.4 From this perspective, one would have expected much more difficulty in negotiating and implementing the Tokyo Round agreements. These institutional obstacles to executive control of policy were exacerbated by unique domestic political problems that confronted the Carter administration in the late 1970s. The administration was experiencing a stark erosion of domestic political support, which served

Beyond globalism: remaking American foreign economic policy

Beyond globalism: remaking American foreign economic policy

The State and American Foreign Economic Policy

The State and American Foreign Economic Policy

Beyond globalism: Remaking american foreign economic policy by Raymond Vernon and Debora L. Spar. New York: The Free Press, 1989, 246 pp. Price: $22.95 cloth

Journal of Policy Analysis and ManagementVolume 8, Issue 4 p. 684-688 Book Review Beyond globalism: Remaking american foreign economic policy by Raymond Vernon and Debora L. Spar. New York: The Free Press, 1989, 246 pp. Price: $22.95 cloth Henri J. Barkey, Henri J. Barkey Henri J. Barkey is an Assistant Professor with the Department of International Relations at Lehigh University.Search for more papers by this author Henri J. Barkey, Henri J. Barkey Henri J. Barkey is an Assistant Professor with the Department of International Relations at Lehigh University.Search for more papers by this author First published: 1989 https://doi.org/10.1002/pam.4050080418 AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Volume8, Issue41989Pages 684-688 RelatedInformation

Introduction: approaches to explaining American foreign economic policy

Despite its relative economic decline, the United States remains the dominant power in the world economy. The foreign economic actions taken by American officials, whether they involve trade, technology transfer, or the value of the dollar, continue to have profound consequences for other states in the international system, as well as for American domestic politics and economics. Thus, it is not surprising that the study of American foreign economic policy attracts considerable scholarly attention, and presently constitutes a major portion of the subfield of international political economy.

Trade as a strategic weapon: American and alliance export control policy in the early postwar period

The study of postwar American foreign economic policy recently has been informed by a dual conventional wisdom: that the American state is relatively weak domestically, yet powerful internationally. Domestic weakness refers to the ability of private actors to penetrate and influence the state; to the institutional fragmentation and decentralization of the state apparatus; and to the difficulties state officials encounter in extracting resources from domestic society and in achieving their policy preferences in the face of domestic opposition. International strength, on the other hand, refers to the high degree of resources controlled by the United States relative to other nation-states, and to the ability of state officials to translate those resources into influence over international outcomes. In the early postwar period, America's external strength more than compensated for its internal weakness, and enabled state officials to pursue effectively their primary foreign economic policy objective: the creation of a liberal international economic order, characterized by the free movement of goods and capital across borders and by stable exchange rates.