Allocation Of Emission Rights Research Articles

Internalisation of externalities in the Spanish power generation sector. Impact of the national plan of allocation of emissions in the cost of generation.

The electric generation produces damages (externalities or environmental costs) that are not contemplated in the costs of this activity. A way to include these damages in the cost is based on the emission rights. In these instruments the total amount of allowed contamination is fixed. It is assigned to the polluting agents by means of emission permissions, creating a market of these, in which the agents can exchange them based on their interests. In 2005, Spain undertook the National Plan of Allocation of Emission Rights 2005-2007 (PNA 2005-2007). This plan has established an emission limit to the electrical sector and it has been translated in the allocation of emission rights. If this emissions limit is surpassed they must acquire rights that cover the exceeded. Thus, the companies must reduce their emissions without increasing their costs. What mix of generation is have to be implement in order to minimize the emissions, avoiding to charge the emission rights in the total generation cost?. If it is impossible to cover the demand without this extra cost, how to diminish it? These questions can be responded using optimization methods.

Initial allocation of SO2 emission rights based on the combination weighting method: evidence from China's thermal power plants.

Emission trading system is an effective market-oriented means to control pollutant emission, and reasonable initial allocation of emission rights is the premise of its smooth implementation. However, at present, the initial allocation of emission rights depends largely on the amount of emissions, which leads to weak positive guidance effect for enterprises. To explore the optimal initial allocation method of SO2 emission rights, this paper takes 8 thermal power plants in Dalian, China, as the research objects to calculate the initial allocation of SO2 emission rights, because SO2 is the main cause of acid rain, which is one of the most serious air pollution in China, and thermal power plants are among the main SO2 emitters. Firstly, an indicator system is established considering enterprise size, pollutant discharge, and social contributions, as well as pollution control capacity. Then, the combination weighting method is developed through integrating the subjective methods G1 and G2 with the objective ones, entropy and maximum deviation. The empirical results show that the enterprises with more desulfurization equipment or large heating supply are supposed to get more emission rights; the actual emission value of SO2 in half of the enterprises exceeds the theoretical ones; SO2 removal rate, desulfurization equipment quantity, and heating supply exert the most positive effects on the initial allocation of emission rights. The constructed model can be used as a reference for future research of initial allocation of other pollutants' emission rights. Also, the implications have been proposed for the government, industry, and enterprises.

Convergence in Sulphur Dioxide (SO2) Emissions Since 1850 in OECD Countries: Evidence from a New Panel Unit Root Test

The convergence of air pollution is a key assumption in several environmental impact assessment models and one of the major ingredients for multilateral climate agreements and allocation of emission rights. In this paper, the sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions’ convergence among 32 OECD countries is examined using the panel stationarity test of Nazlioglu and Karul [1] that provides for smooth breaks, cross-sectional dependency and heterogeneity across the cross-sectional units. For robustness sake, we have also used a panel stationarity test that accounts for sharp breaks. Overall, the findings reveal that there is convergence of SO2 emissions among the OECD countries. The results imply that adjusting the mean value of the relative SO2 emissions trend path should be a key concern of the OECD nations. Moreover, the findings signify that instead of following independent paths in pollution control, the OECD countries are gravitating towards a similar standard of environmental performance. Moreover, the forecast of future relative SO2 emission figures can be based on its past values.

基于影子价格的排污权定价机制实证研究

目前全球环境污染问题不容忽视，环境保护问题成为世界各国关注的焦点。排污权交易作为能够实现促进经济发展和保护生态环境双重目标的重要手段，在主要发达国家环境治理方面正发挥日益重要的作用。本文建立影子价格模型，推导得出排污权的初次以及二次定价价格。由于我国在推行排污权制度方面仍为一片空白，因此基于影子价格得出的排污权定价公式可以为制度推行者确定排污权价格给予一定借鉴和参考。 Due to the increasingly serious environmental pollution and global environmental governance and protection have become hot topic, as emissions trading to achieve an important means to promote the dual goals of economic development and protection of the ecological environment, in the main developed country environment management is playing a more and more important role. How to reasonable pricing has been the blowdown right trade key factor. This paper analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of the initial allocation of emission rights way, through the estab-lishment of shadow price model and simulation of initial emission permits and secondary pricing mechanism, obtained initial allocation of emission rights price and sewage in secondary trading market equilibrium price can provide a reference role for the government price sell emission rights and determine the secondary market emissions trading price.

Market-Based Instruments for Climate Change Policy in Canadian Provinces

Climate change is a complex and global problem which necessitates action on multiple scales and levels. While reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and adapting to climate change represent important policy challenges, the literature documents many cases of small to medium size governance units that have successfully addressed common pool resource management problems. In North America, sub- national governments, states, provinces, municipalities, and networks of private actors, have taken initiatives to address the climate issue, at times going so far as to regulate GHG emissions, using a great variety of instruments including voluntary agreements, emission norms, taxes, permits, planning, and infrastructure investments. Thought too early to assess with any certainty the effectiveness of these experiments, they represent a vast and interesting laboratory providing insight into how communities mobilize to address the climate crisis and resolve such issues as target setting and the allocation of emission rights. This panel aims at taking stock of these experiments and addressing the following questions: How and why have sub-federal initiatives on climate change occurred? What is the role of policy diffusion in their adoption? What problems have occurred during implementation? What roles are played by international regimes and national/federal governments in their emergence and for their future? And finally, given the disparities of targets and instruments observed, can they be linked or harmonized.

Oppose, Support, or Hedge? Distributional Effects, Regulatory Pressure, and Business Strategy in Environmental Politics

What explains the choice of corporate political strategy in environmental politics? Drawing on recent models of actor strategy formation in political economy, this article argues that basic material interests of firms are translated into strategies in the context of institutional environments. I advance a typological model that posits how distributional effects—positive versus negative—and perceived regulatory pressure—low versus high—interact in leading firms to adopt one of four ideal-type strategies: opposition, hedging, support, and non-participation. This article examines the model through the case of corporate strategies in the making of the European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme. The article contributes to theory-building on business strategy in environmental politics by offering a probabilistic explanatory model, and it flags hedging strategies as an increasingly prevalent form of business behavior.

Close Examination of the Principle of Global Per-Capita Allocation of the Earth’s Ability to Absorb Greenhouse Gas

In this Article we attempt to narrow the gap between developed and developing countries’ respective perceptions of justice in the context of climate change. We show that, in spite of its intuitive appeal, the equal per-capita argument is not grounded in any general moral principle and therefore cannot provide an answer to the question regarding what would be a fair allocation of emission rights. We argue that the underlying moral theory is global distributive justice theory, which unfortunately can only be of very limited help. We briefly discuss the various particular principles/considerations that are offered in the literature either in support or in criticism of the equal percapita allocation and find that upon close analysis they generally support the developing countries’ view, but not a per-capita allocation of emission rights. We conclude with a practical suggestion.

Initial Allocation of Emission Rights Difficulties and Solution Strategies

Being as a China's environmental management policy Emissions trading system is an important innovation, it has been adopt for many years, but the initial allocation of emission rights is becoming a constraining bottleneck in the implementation of China's emissions trading depth. In this paper, tracing the initial allocation of emission rights at home and abroad related to the theory and practice based on the analysis of our initial allocation of emission rights by the current difficulties exist. This legislation recognized property rights from the environment. The environmental capacity of the scientific definition, and market-based emissions trading and other dimensions of proposed initial allocation of emission rights to promote a fair, impartial and efficient response to protect its trade measures to promote domestic emissions trading depth provides a new idea.

Study on the Concept of Per Capita Cumulative Emissions and Allocation Options

Global long-term emission reduction targets need well defined options for equitable allocation of greenhouse gas emissions. Scholars from developing countries put forward the concept of equitable per capita cumulative emission rights. There are four possible operational definitions resulting from this concept. These potential options for allocation of emission rights are expressed with mathematical equations. Through simple simulation, this paper reveals the advantages, disadvantages and characteristics of each option. CitationYu, S., X. Gao, C. Ma, et al., 2011: Study on the concept of per capita cumulative emissions and allocation options. Adv. Clim. Change Res., 2(2), doi: 10.3724/SP.J.1248.2011.00079.

Reflection on the climate negotiations: a Southern perspective

The post-2012 climate agenda needs to be redefined to account for inequalities in emissions distribution, energy security, food security and poverty reduction. Consumption in developed countries is the main driver for increasing CO2 emissions. The limited focus on industrial emissions targets shifts attention away from the need to change consumerism, behaviour and expectations. Paradoxically, although developed countries contribute a substantial share of emissions, those worst affected by climate change will be developing countries with the least amount of adaptive capacity. A focus on industry emissions further reduces developing countries' potential for economic growth and infrastructure development to deal with adverse impacts. The allocation of emission rights need to be based on a more appropriate model of human rights. A more constructive way forward in the current climate negotiations is a focus on transformation of the global economy and human activity in ways that ensure patterns of resource use are common for all countries.

A Governance Perspective on the Choice between “Cap and Trade” and “Credit and Trade” for an Emissions Trading Regime

This article discusses from a legal point of view an alternative approach towards allocating tradable greenhouse gas emission rights. The present EU greenhouse gas emission allowance trading regime starts from a decentralised allocation of emission rights, based on rather vague criteria stipulated in an annex to the greenhouse gas emissions trading Directive, and with much discretion left to the Member States. This approach, where most of the allowances are given free of charge to industries, entails that different amount of allowances can be given to equal installations vested in different Member States, is vulnerable to lobbying activities, does not stimulate at full force new climate-friendly options, and moreover appears to be an administratively complex instrument. Because of the fact that the present method contains such disadvantages, there is a serious need for examining alternative options. Besides auctioning, which is thus far politically seen not attractive because of the negative effects on the global competitive position of industries, it is also interesting to examine the so-called “credit-and-trade” regime as being a possible future approach towards allocating greenhouse gas emission rights in Europe and probably on a wider scale too. This approach fits better into the polluter-pays principle, deals easily with new entrants and closures, and is a concept from which harmonisation within the EU could be realised. It also contains some regulatory complexities, as all allocation mechanisms do. However, the concept has strikingly been subject to little debate in the literature thus far, and the merits of it compared to the other methods of allocation should be closely examined too.

Distributive Justice and Climate Change. The Allocation of Emission Rights

Abstract The emission of greenhouse gases causes climate change. Therefore, many support a global cap on emissions. How then should the emissions allowed under this cap be distributed? We first show that above average past emissions cannot be used to justify a right to above average current emissions. We then sketch three basic principles of distributive justice (egalitarianism, prioritarianism, and sufficientarianism) and argue, first, that prioritarian standards are the most plausible and, second, that they speak in favour of giving people of developing countries higher emission rights than people of industrialised countries. In order to support this point it has to be shown, inter alia, in what ways the higher past emissions of industrialised countries are relevant for today’s distribution of emission rights.

Equal Emissions per Capita over Time - A Proposal to Combine Responsibility and Equity of Rights

After Future climate policy regimes may be based on the Kyoto-Protocol or on other policy instruments such as carbon-taxes. Any effective regime based on the Protocol requires the determination of the concrete contributions by each Party. This involves namely the time of contribution and the quantification of the contribution itself. By now many proposals exist for the two issues, as for example thresholds like GDP per capita for the question of timing or emissions per capita for an allocation of emission rights. Based on the two justice principle responsibility and equity of rights that form the basis for the so-called Brazilian Proposal and Contraction & Convergence respectively, a new approach is developed: Future emission rights are allocated on the basis of equal emissions per capita over time. By so doing not only are emissions per capita (EPC) taken into account during the allocation but also their evolution over time. I show that nations with high EPC may even be allocated negative quantities of emissions right due to their historical burden. On the other hand, Parties with low EPC would be allocated large amounts of fair air which can increase the incentive to accept absolute emission targets. Even though this approach may currently lack political acceptability, it offers another analytical reference point for the political bargaining process on future allocations.

On the efficiency of environmental instruments in a spatial economy

This paper develops an efficiency criterion to evaluate environmental policy instruments in a spatial economy. We call an environmental policy regime at the regional level efficient if it guarantees not only an efficient distribution of emission permits within a region, but also an efficient locational pattern of mobile firms across the regions of a federation. Using marketable pollution rights or emission taxes, efficiency in this broad sense can only be achieved if revenues of regional environmental agencies are not transferred to regional firms. Direct controls neither support an efficient allocation of emission rights within a region nor locational efficiency of firms.