This paper studies the efiects of open disagreement on motivation and coordination. It shows how, in the presence of difiering priors, motivation and coordination impose con∞icting demands on the allocation of authority, leading to a trade-ofi between the two. The paper flrst derives a new mechanism for delegation: since the agent thinks, by revealed preference, that his own decisions are better than those of the principal, delegation will motivate him to exert more efiort when efiort and correct decisions are complements. A need for implementation efiort will thus lead to more decentralization. The opposite is true when efiort and decisions are substitutes. Delegation, however, reduces coordination when people disagree on the right course of action. The paper shows that, with difiering priors, the flrm needs to rely more on authority (as opposed to incentives) to solve coordination problems, relative to the case with private beneflts. An interesting side-result here is that the principal will actively enforce her decisions only at intermediate levels of the need for coordination. The combination of the two main results implies a trade-ofi between motivation and coordination, both on a flrm level and across flrms. I derive the motivation-coordination possibility frontier and show the equilibrium distribution of efiort versus coordination. I flnally argue that strong culture, in the sense of homogeneity, is one (costly) way to relax the trade-ofi.