Al Qaeda In The Islamic Maghreb Research Articles

Traditions of maghrebi-saheli statehood and islamic radicalism in Early XXI Century

The significance of this research topic is due to the relevance of the problems of modern state-building in the public and political life of North and West Africa. The purpose of the research project is to analyze the causes and consequences of the emergence of radical movements of political Islam in the Maghreb and Sahel at the junction of the XX and XXI centuries and their connection with the shortcomings of national statehood inherent in both African regions. At the same time, the author focuses on the incompleteness of the state-building process, the weakness of institutions and the low level of justification for drawing state borders as concrete examples of such shortcomings that affected the socio-political climate in the Islamized areas adjacent to the Sahara. Based on the materials of sources and the theoretical model of regional security complexes (RSC), the author identified contradictions and diversity in the ideological and value views of the North African ruling circles, analyzed the methodological and spiritual and political foundations of the deeply rooted relationship between criminal and Islamist groups on the example of the activities of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (аn organization included in the list of terrorist organizations in theRussian Federation is mentioned) and its leaders - Abd al-Malik Drukdel, Mukhtar Belmukhtar, etc. It is proved that “Islamist internationalism” in the Maghreb and Sahel of the 2000s began to take ethnocultural forms, which was caused by the ‘network’ and ‘umbrell’a nature of the AQIM (аn organization included in the list of terrorist organizations in theRussian Federation is mentioned) structure, in which there was no centralized administrative-territorial management scheme. In addition, the distinctive features of the security policy of modern Algeria are shown and the importance of studying interregional contradictions for characterizing the geopolitical and economic reasons for the strengthening of Islamic radicalism in Africa is revealed.

French Operation Barkhane in Africa – success or failure?

Operation Barkhane began in August 2014 and was a continuation of Operation Serval, targeting Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) structures. The main objective of the French armed presence was to support the local military forces in the fight against terrorism, coordinate the international coalition and support the humanitarian action for the benefit of the local population. The aim of the article is to systematize knowledge and investigate the activities of French entities, also within the EU missions, obliged to fight against terrorism in the Sahel, carrying out the largest antiterrorism operation in Sub-Saharan Africa. France's strategic objective was to help the Sahel countries achieve military self-reliance so that they could provide security and stability in the region without the assistance of foreign forces. Ultimately, France decided to withdraw its soldiers from Mali and Burkina Faso at the beginning of 2022 and had terminated its mission earlier. It was the end of Barkhane and the French antiterrorism involvement on a high scale level in the Sahel. The decision to withdraw has a number of implications for international involvement in the region and will greatly weaken the level of security in the region. This would be very dangerous for Europe, which is not ready for another wave of migration, as well as the international threat of terrorism. It must be indicated that France have maintained a relatively secure situation in the Sahel region.

An Effective Model of Countering Terrorist Danger: Successful Experience of Mauritania

The article analyzes the approaches of the Mauritanian authorities to the fight against terrorism. While the countries of the Sahel region are suffering from a crisis caused by the actions of jihadist groups, Mauritania has become a positive exception in this regard. There have been no major terrorist attacks there in the last 10 years, although there are significant problems in the country that make it vulnerable to extremism. These are unresolved political issues, huge social and ethnic differences, and the weakness of the economy. The terrorist group Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which has been organizing terrorist attacks in the country since 2005 and recruiting young Mauritanians into the ranks of jihadists, tried to take advantage of the numerous problems of Mauritania and the popularity of political Islam there. The peak of terrorist activity in Mauritania was 2005–2011, when more than ten attacks were carried out. Since coming to power in 2009, President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz began the formation of a new anti-terrorist strategy that took into account both the Algerian experience and the Mauritanian realities. This strategy was complex in nature and included both military measures and “soft approaches”. Among the military measures, a successful military reform should be noted, affecting military education, increasing the mobility of the armed forces and the capabilities of special forces units. The approach of the Mauritanian authorities to the internal religious and political arena has also undergone a radical change. In addition to offering dialogue to hardliners and the legalization of the Islamist Tevassul party, the approach aimed at involving the nomadic population of remote desert areas in the public space of Mauritania has fully justified itself.

African Policy of France in 2017–2023

The geopolitical transformations of modern times marked the beginning of the end of French dominance in Western and Central Tropical Africa. The article names the main determinants of the process of degradation of the French model of neo-colonialism. Among these, the author refers to the destruction of Libyan statehood, the ensuing invasion of militants of Islamist associations into the territory of the Sahel and the consolidation of Islamists into the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) unit, the uprising of the Tuareg in northern Mali and the proclamation of the unrecognized state of Azawad in the Sahel, the operation of the French troops “Barkhane” in the territory of the countries of the military-political bloc G5S.According to the author, the failure of operation “Barkhane”, the inability of the French troops to effectively resist Islamic terrorists provoked discontent among the citizens of the CAR, Mali and Burkina Faso. In these African states, coups d’état took place, as a result of which puppet pro-French political elites were removed from power and regimes oriented towards Moscow were established.

Western Sahara: deep differences over conflict settlement

The conflict in Western Sahara has been going on for thirty-five years, and neither side has won. The parties to the conflict are in an all-or-nothing logic regarding the outcome of this conflict: Morocco preaches the autonomy of the Sahara as the part of the kingdom, and the Algerians and Saharans from the Frente Polisario waives the demands for autonomy. However, in the absence of a clear victory of one of the participants, the political solution need necessarily include a compromise reflecting the balance of power. In an effort to pacify and develop a region that could become a haven for Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Washington, Paris and Madrid could support the new Representative of the Secretary-General in finding a solution that could satisfy all parties, giving this result aspects of compromise. Nevertheless, they will have to take into account both the Saharans as a whole and the geostrategic balance of the region. This article discusses the problems of decolonization and interethnic conflicts. This conflict concentrates the opposition of several geopolitical blocs in one place. On the one hand, he opposes two regional powers: Morocco and Algeria. On the other hand, it opposes two blocs consisting of Morocco and Western countries, against Algeria, a traditional ally of Russia, and large African countries such as Nigeria. This article highlights the inadequacy of international organizations. The issue of stabilizing the situation in Western Sahara is even more important today in the context of Islamic terrorism in the Sahel. Terrorism is spreading in economically and politically unstable countries. The question of the independence of Western Sahara or its integration as an autonomous territory within Morocco must be resolved before terrorism intervenes in Sahari affairs.

Sectarianization, Identity, and How Terrorism Prevails: The Case of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in the Sahel Region of Africa

Various patterns have emerged as a result of globalization when it comes to controlling the kind of threats that a country may face, particularly non-traditional ones. One of them is terrorism, which occurences concentrated in specific places of the world, with North and Sub-Saharan Africa dominating for a variety of reasons. While there are other operational areas contested by various terrorist groups, the Sahel is one of the most well-known, with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) being one of the most infamous terrorist groups. Legacies of weak and corrupt governments and institutions, unenforced border security, historical disadvantages, and crippled economies may serve as catalysts for such groups' growing influence, but this paper would argue that the use of sectarianism as a tool of identity mobilization is one of the reasons for AQIM's prevalence as a terrorist group.

The social media use of African terrorist organizations: a comparative study of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram

The objective of this qualitative study is to raise awareness of the online presence of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Shabaab and Boko Haram by analyzing and comparing their social media activities. The decision that the above-mentioned terrorist organizations shall be selected for inclusion was based on the fact that (I.) they are active in Africa, (II.) they are currently or affiliated with three of the deadliest international terrorist groups in the continent and (III.) they use social media in order to achieve their goals. I conclude that social media is used by all three of the studied terrorist organizations with special attention devoted to mainstream social media platforms, namely Twitter, YouTube and - to a lesser extent - Facebook. Additionally, AQIM, al-Shabaab and Boko Haram seem to have primarily used social media for propaganda purposes, although it was also utilized as a recruitment tool, albeit to varying degrees. Finally, I believe social media can also be used for coordination and funding by the studied terrorist groups; although the small amount of publicly accessible evidence entails qualitative problems, indicating the fact there is room for further research.

Bombing It: The Meaning and Sources of Suicide Bombing Failure

Over the years, political scientists and policymakers have striven to understand the circumstances under which terrorists fail, operationally and strategically. However, the question of failure has less frequently been approached through the lens of any one specific tactic. This article asks: how should one define and understand the sources of suicide bombing failure? After introducing a new definition of suicide bombing failure, the article next uses probit model analysis to test planner (or “architect”) versus militant (or “attacker”) sources of failure by using a unique dataset detailing the suicide bombing efforts of three of the most active African jihadist terror groups which leveraged suicide terrorism from 2007 to 2020 — al-Shabaab, “Boko Haram,” and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (“AQIM”). It finds evidence that choices made by these groups’ “architects,” are most commonly correlated with suicide bombing failures, rather than operational failures by “attackers” themselves.

Rebel rivals: reinterrogating the movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa and the roots of Al-Qaeda-Islamic State Infighting in the Sahel

ABSTRACT Terrorist group rivalries have become widely studied since Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda-loyal groups began clashing in Syria. While existing literature finds such rivalries increase terrorist groups’ lethality and longevity, there are few case studies of IS provinces and al-Qaeda affiliates operating in the same geographic area outside the Middle East. One such province-affiliate rivalry that has only recently begun to be explored is between Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISGS) and Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) in the Sahel. This article utilises various primary sources, including group members’ interviews and written statements, to trace the ISGS-JNIM rivalry’s roots to their common Sahel-based predecessor, Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (English: MUJWA; French: MUJAO) and finds literature has under-estimated MUJWA’s split from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) on ISGS’s emergence and inheriting a trafficking and non-scholarly legacy that merged with IS’s uncompromising strategic culture. Building on terrorism studies literature concerning rebel rivalries globally and Sahel-based area studies literature concerning intra-communal tensions, ethno-nationalism, and jihadism, the article argues that despite ISGS’s aspirations to supersede JNIM, the latter’s approach, which reflects AQIM theologians’ restraint and al-Qaeda’s coalition-building, will enable JNIM to become a fixture in the Sahel for the longue durée. Furthermore, the article demonstrates how local conditions and international alliances affected ISGS and JNIM’s conduct of their insurgencies and dialogue with both each other and state actors.

Unpacking “glocal” jihad: from the birth to the “sahelisation’ of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

ABSTRACT Jihadist groups are often analysed either by looking at their global rhetoric, or by focusing on local grievances. Despite the distinctions made between the global and the local issues, these groups often belong to a complex “glocal jihad,” meaning that the borders between local, national, regional, transnational, and global layers, are partially blurred due in large part to the symbolic dimensions and imaginaries shared within the broader jihadist landscape. Rethinking and clarifying the notion of “glocal jihad” and applying it to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) reveals the complex interconnections that exist between the different layers and the ambiguous spatial reality of the group. The glocal jihad is understood as a dialectical process and as a sequence of events and actions occurring in intertwined layers. By analysing the “glocal realities,” this article will attempt to craft a critical understanding of the group.

Al-Shabaab’s Assassinations: Investigating the Uniqueness of Al-Shabaab’s Assassinations via Suicide Bombing

ABSTRACT In the study of terrorism, assassinations and suicide bombings have most commonly been considered as distinct phenomena. In practice, however, Al-Shabaab has shown a proclivity to use suicide bombings precisely as a means of assassination. But just how unique – if at all – is its use of suicide bombing assassinations (SBAs)? Using three unique databases on African suicide bombing combined with data from the Global Terrorism Database, this article seeks to understand the degree of uniqueness of Al-Shabaab’s SBA efforts from 2006 to 2020. In comparing Al-Shabaab to its nearest analogues – Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) – across five different SBA metrics, this article demonstrates how Al-Shabaab is indeed rightly considered to be unique in its tendency to use suicide bombings as a tool for assassinations, at least on the African continent. It concludes by considering just what rationales underlie this proclivity, focusing on group-specific and environmental factors.

A Renewed Al-Qaeda: Strategizing for a Comeback

Al-Qaeda, the premier global jihadist terrorist entity having its footprints in more than 60 countries and responsible for perpetrating the world's hitherto biggest terrorist attacks of 9/11, appears to have adopted a strategy of working in tandem with local Islamist-jihadist groups. This may be regarded as a strategic shift from directing and masterminding international terrorist attacks to collusion with its associated networks, such as Al-Shabab in Somalia and the Taliban in Afghanistan, and promoting local jihadists in Yemen, Sinai, Syria, and West Africa. Al-Qaeda‟s local chapters such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) are also working alongside local Al-Qaeda linked Islamist groups. It appears as if Al-Qaeda no longer subscribes to the approach it adhered to during the times of its former Emir Osama Bin Laden and has substantially re-crafted its strategy under Ayman al-Zawahiri.

Pathways out of the Quagmire ? Perspectives for al-Quaeda in the Sahel

This article focuses on counter-terrorism efforts against al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), its main confederation of combat units. Using literature on how terrorist groups end, the article analyses perspectives for AQIM and JNIM. It describes the conceptual distinction between insurgency and terrorism, and structures insights along six pathways of decline, namely reorientation, repression, decapitation, negotiation, failure or success. JNIM is currently fighting a large-scale insurgency in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, while policy responses remain grounded in the paradigm of counter-terrorism, not counter- insurgency. The search and destroy missions of recently terminated Operation Barkhane did not manage to secure areas, and tactical successes were offset by targeting errors and exactions, fuelling jihadist recruitment. Leadership decapitation – also a focus of future French counter- terrorist efforts - has proved ineffective. The option of negotiations merits further exploration, but France and the Sahelian countries diverge in their approaches. Bottom-up ceasefires have improved local security in some areas, but risk benefiting AQIM in the long term. Finally, violent conflict between AQIM and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) has hurt both groups, and their vulnerabilities to internal strife and the loss of public support could be leveraged more in counter-terrorism efforts.

African Union Counterterrorism Frameworks and Implementation Trends among Member States of the East African Community

Attacks from violent extremist organisations have reached unprecedented levels in Africa. Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Islamic State and Sinai Peninsula activities account for the majority of high attacks and fatality rates. Their membership cuts across national borders; some have established a presence in local communities, while others are controlling territories in a number of states. This continues to happen despite regional measures such as the Algiers Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (2002) and the African Model Anti-Terrorism Law (2011) to contain the activities of violent extremist groups on the continent. The prevailing argument shows that the African Union has initiated several legislations and protocols to contain terrorism on the continent, but the Union lacks the capacity to enforce legislations. Relying on the cost–benefit theoretical explication, we conclude that member states of the East African Community prefer to partner with external organisations in counterterrorism programmes which result in conflicting cross-border rules and challenges in countering violent extremism in Africa.

A New Direction for U.S. Foreign Policy in Africa

A New Direction for U.S. Foreign Policy in Africa Zachariah Mampilly (bio) and Jason Stearns (bio) President Trump's approach to Africa rightly elicits outrage. His conception of the continent ranges from disinterest—he has only mentioned it three times out of around 20,000 tweets—to outright contempt, such as when he referred to African nations as "shithole countries." For eighteen months, the office of the assistant secretary of state for African affairs was empty or occupied by a temporary official. Almost two years into his administration, there was no ambassador deployed to twenty of Africa's fifty-four countries. Trump has only met with two heads of state from sub-Saharan Africa in the White House. He has proposed large budget cuts for humanitarian funding—including for the flagship President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and UN peacekeeping operations—although these attempts were mostly foiled by bipartisan efforts in Congress. In January, he extended his travel ban to four additional African countries, including Nigeria, the continent's most populous nation and its largest economy, affecting nearly a quarter of the 1.3 billion people on the continent. Appearances, however, are deceptive. While Trump's Africa policy may seem to be a departure, its broad contours have changed little from recent administrations. Since the end of the Cold War, both Republican and Democratic administrations have embraced a mixture of military intervention, free trade, and humanitarian aid on the continent. As a result, Washington has often ended up backing authoritarian regimes, all the while halfheartedly projecting democratic values. Meanwhile, the continent is undergoing transformative changes. Much like Latin America during the 2000s, many African countries once drawn into the U.S. orbit are drifting out of it. With COVID-19 threatening to destabilize African economies and political systems, now is the time for a progressive reset in relations with the continent: a new foreign policy, centered on economic justice and the democratic aspirations of African youth. With the presidential election looming and Joe Biden, the Democratic Party nominee, expected to place Obama-era stalwarts such as Susan Rice and Samantha Power in top foreign policy positions if he wins [End Page 107] Click for larger view View full resolution A Nigerien soldier wearing a U.S. military uniform waits during a training exercise in 2004 in Samara, Niger. (Jacob Silberberg/Getty Images) [End Page 108] in November, progressives must push for a new direction for U.S.–Africa relations or risk entrenching the problematic policies of the past. Beneath the Turmoil, Continuity U.S. foreign policy in Africa has its roots in the Cold War, when it was dominated by fears of communist encroachment. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the continent was viewed as peripheral to core U.S. interests. As a 1995 Defense Department assessment summarized, "Ultimately we see very little traditional strategic interest in Africa." The same dismissive attitude held in the economic sphere. By 2017, exports to the continent stood at just above 1 percent of the U.S. total and direct investment by U.S. companies was even lower. Disengagement was also spurred by missteps and the thorny realities of local politics. In 1993, the deployment of Army Rangers to Somalia in support of a UN peacekeeping intervention ended when eighteen U.S. soldiers were killed and some of their mutilated bodies were dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. This influenced Bill Clinton's refusal to back a more robust UN engagement to prevent the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. His administration instead enthusiastically supported a new generation of rebels-turned-rulers in Rwanda, Uganda, and Ethiopia, only to see them entrench themselves as authoritarian leaders. This trend of opportunistically backing authoritarian regimes solidified after 9/11, when African countries came to be key, albeit secondary, battlegrounds in the global War on Terror. During the 2000s, several militant groups emerged on the continent that were eventually designated as errorist organizations by the Bush and Obama administrations, including the predecessors of al Shabaab in Somalia and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in the Sahel. In 2002, to combat this perceived threat, the United States set up the Combined Joint Task Force...

Rebel diplomacy and digital communication: public diplomacy in the Sahel

Abstract Most research on social media as a tool for public diplomacy focuses on its use by recognized international actors to advance their national interest and reputation, deliver foreign policy objectives or promote their global interests. This article highlights the need for paying more attention to non-state diplomacy in conflict situations outside the western world. We examine how rebel groups use new media to enhance their communications, and what the motivations behind this are. Our public diplomacy perspective helps convey the scope of rebel communications with external actors and provides insights for policy-makers seeking to ascertain the nature, intentions and capacities of myriad rebel groups. Our focus is on the Sahel region, where numerous such groups vying for international attention and support make use of multiple social media channels. We analyse two groups in Mali: the MNLA, a Tuareg secessionist group; and Ansar Dine, a Salafist insurgency with ties to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Our qualitative analysis of Ansar Dine and MNLA communications on several digital platforms helps identify these African rebel groups' international and local framing activities. Rebel groups use public diplomacy nimbly and pragmatically. The digital age has fundamentally changed which stakeholders such groups can reach, and we suggest that social media increase the power they are able to carve out for themselves on the international stage.

Terrorist learning in context – the case of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

ABSTRACT It is astonishing how many researchers adopt a counterterrorism agenda and suggest researching terrorist learning in order to shape security countermeasures. Posing different questions would lead to different answers. One such question would be, “What makes terrorist learning different?” Terrorist groups operate clandestinely, which means the environment in which they learn is different. This paper investigates the context in which Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has learned. Thus, a qualitative case study analysis of the influence of meso- and macro-level factors on AQIM’s tactical and strategic patterns between 1999 and 2013 will shed light on terrorist learning. Meso-level influences are conceptualised as cooperation and ultimate merging with Al Qaeda, and macro-level influences as government action. The result is puzzling: AQIM has learned tactically from Al Qaeda and strategically from counterterrorism. This is puzzling because scholars commonly question whether it is possible to learn under pressure. Nevertheless, AQIM’s learning has been more profound when faced with pressure than when cooperating voluntarily. The sustainable answer to the question of the political implication thereof is not how to boost counterterrorism measures but how to redefine them. If what is different about terrorist learning is above all the context, we need to question the context.

Boko Haram’s Factional Feuds: Internal Extremism and External Interventions

ABSTRACT This article examines the factions, leadership, and internal organization of Boko Haram, the terrorist group which has operated to devastating effect in parts of northern Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. It finds the group’s leadership has been significantly more centralized than previous literature has acknowledged. The leadership was also extremely ruthless but enforced group cohesion by killing anyone who sought to defect. Group members attempted to defect and depose the leadership in 2012 and 2016 by seeking external interventions from Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), respectively. In the first instance Boko Haram’s leadership demonstrated control and influence by forcing defectors back into submission, but in the second instance ISIL-backed militants deposed the leadership in a rebellion and coup. The loyalty to ISIL of jihadist commanders and foot soldiers in Nigeria explains why only the rebellion and coup succeeded in 2016 even though AQIM provided greater material support to the first set of defectors in 2012. This article contributes to research on internal dynamics of Boko Haram, the relationships between Al Qaeda and ISIL and their allied and affiliated organizations, and the costs and benefits of extreme leadership for terrorist groups.

Boko Haram, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Shabaab – Similarities and Differences

The authors offer an analysis of the genesis, evolution, and strategies of three Islamist extremist groups in three parts of Africa: al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in the borderland of Algeria and Mali; Boko Haram in the borderland of Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon; and al-Shabaab in Eastern Africa. Through examining the three comparative case studies they argue that the religious agenda of these groups plays the role of a façade only. The most important reasons of the spread of terrorism in all three regions are related to the political and economic conditions, feelings of relative deprivation, low level of trust in government authorities and the frustration of marginalised groups.

Countering Violent Extremism in the Sahel

As a military Malian airborne officer, my involvement in the fight against violent extremism harkens back to the year 2009 when the American Special Forces trained with my regiment, the 33rd Airborne Regiment, to defeat Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Since then, I have covered thousands of miles in the Malian desert, escorting convoys, looking for weapons caches, and assaulting terrorist hideouts. My recent passage at the U.S. Army War College graced me with the time to reflect on my past experiences, the breadth of knowledge and the analytical tools to diagnose strategic threats, identify key vulnerabilities, enabling factors, opportune moments, and finally craft a theory of victory.