Abstract
ABSTRACT It is astonishing how many researchers adopt a counterterrorism agenda and suggest researching terrorist learning in order to shape security countermeasures. Posing different questions would lead to different answers. One such question would be, “What makes terrorist learning different?” Terrorist groups operate clandestinely, which means the environment in which they learn is different. This paper investigates the context in which Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has learned. Thus, a qualitative case study analysis of the influence of meso- and macro-level factors on AQIM’s tactical and strategic patterns between 1999 and 2013 will shed light on terrorist learning. Meso-level influences are conceptualised as cooperation and ultimate merging with Al Qaeda, and macro-level influences as government action. The result is puzzling: AQIM has learned tactically from Al Qaeda and strategically from counterterrorism. This is puzzling because scholars commonly question whether it is possible to learn under pressure. Nevertheless, AQIM’s learning has been more profound when faced with pressure than when cooperating voluntarily. The sustainable answer to the question of the political implication thereof is not how to boost counterterrorism measures but how to redefine them. If what is different about terrorist learning is above all the context, we need to question the context.
Highlights
In The Consequences of Counterterrorism, Crenshaw (2010) addresses the political consequences of counterterrorism and its negative impact on civil liberties
This paper investigates the context in which Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has learned
The case of AQIM provides an example of terrorist learning that can be analysed to examine the impact of both meso- and macro-level influences on changes in terrorist group tactics and strategies over time
Summary
In The Consequences of Counterterrorism, Crenshaw (2010) addresses the political consequences of counterterrorism and its negative impact on civil liberties. While Mumford and Hunter paint a complex picture of organisational innovation, they pledge for differentiation and ask, “Which forms of change are more likely to stimulate innovation on the part of organizations?” (2005, 50) In a similar vein, Crenshaw poses the question: “Is it possible to distinguish sources of innovation according to type?” (Rasmussen and Hafez 2010, 42) In the literature, the context of terrorist learning is roughly differentiated as being either internal or external. In a Rand Report, Mumford and Hunter (2005, 58) refer to causal ambiguity, which describes how strategic planners have difficulty determining the impact of their choices because of the complexity of the environment This, they argue, is especially the case for groups operating in secrecy and under high levels of threat. The case of AQIM provides an example of terrorist learning that can be analysed to examine the impact of both meso- and macro-level influences on changes in terrorist group tactics and strategies over time. A brief overview of AQIM’s historical background is provided and AQIM’s tactical evolution and strategic shifts are subsequently analysed
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