Airline Security Research Articles

IDS Models of Airline Security

This article applies an earlier analysis of interdependent security issues to a general class of problems involving discrete interdependent exposure to terrorist risks. Any agent’s incentive to adopt risk-reducing measures depends on the actions of others because of the negative externalities created by not investing in protection. Using airline security as an illustrative example, the authors show that any individual airline will be less likely to invest in security measures as more firms in the industry also fail to invest. For a wide range of parameters, both individual airline and total industry profits can be significantly improved by everyone investing in security. The article discusses the role that private trade associations as well as public-sector actions such as taxes, subsidies, and regulations can play in dealing with the negative externalities caused by interdependent security. The article concludes with suggestions for future research.

Airline Security After the Event

Interviews with airline and security employees and public information are used to examine the real and perceived outcomes of public policy reactions to the terrorist attacks of September 11. The examination uses the classic functionalist perspective of Robert Merton and the more recent insights of Raymond Boudon. Attempts to reduce the threat of terrorist success and to foster confidence in the flying public had mixed results. Clearly governments and airlines were not well prepared for terrorist attacks, a fact that was well known to insiders but not widely known to the public. Many of the illusions of security that preceded the attacks were exposed by discussions and policy reactions following September 11.

How safe are our skies?: assessing the airlines' response to terrorism

The Personal Risk: How Safe Is It to Fly? Air Terrorism Governments Response to Air Terrorism: An Effective Approach or a Dangerous Myth? Practical Airport Security Airline Security In Flight Security Unexplained Crashes: Accidents or Terrorism? The Lessons: Past and Present How to Minimize the Personal Risk When Flying

Consumers and Consumerism in America Today

These remarks were delivered on April 5, 2002, at the Annual Meeting of the American Council on Consumer Interests, in Universal City, California. It's a special privilege for me to deliver the Colston Warne Lecture because of my own personal, academic and professional connections with Colston Warne. As a youth growing up in Amherst, Massachusetts, where Colston taught economics at Amherst College, I was Colston's paperboy. Later I went to Amherst College and was a student of Colston. And then, years later, I joined the Board of Consumers Union. Colston was the founding Chair of the Board of Consumers Union, originally called President, back in 1936, and he served in that capacity for 44 years. When he stepped down, I succeeded him as Chair of the Board, and served as Chair for 21 years. So for the first 65 years of CU's history, there were only two Board Chairs, Colston Warne and me. Then when Rhoda Karpatkin left after 27 years as President of Consumers Union, the Board chose me to be CU's new President, and I've been serving in that capacity for a little over a year. So, from Colston Warne's paperboy to CU's president, there have been multiple connections between me and Colston Warne and Consumers Union, and I'm especially pleased and honored to give the Colston Warne Lecture this year. Let me say a quick word about recent developments at Consumers Union that might be of interest. This week, our web site, ConsumerReports.org, reached the mark of 830,000 subscribers--an increase of 45% in the last 10 months, making it by far the largest publication-based subscription site on the web. In the past year we've added a new service that let's you download Consumer Reports product ratings onto your personal digital assistant. We're exploring opportunities for other products and services--from e-newsletters, to specialty hubs on the web, to presenting information in our print products and other media in ways that appeal to younger audiences as well as others. We're doing more than ever to provide unbiased, research-based information to consumers--when they need it, where they need it, and how they choose to receive it--through Consumer Reports magazine, our web site, and other publications and services. Meanwhile CU's advocates in our offices in California, Texas, Washington, DC, and New York continue to work for consumers on a wide range of issues, including product safety, health care, financial services, food safety, and much more. Today I'd like to share some thoughts with you on the state of consumers and the consumer movement. The need--and the opportunity--for us in the consumer movement to make a much-needed impact has been underscored by the spate of high-profile abuses recently in the marketplace: * the Ford-Firestone debacle, * the California energy crisis with its manipulation of the power supply, soaring energy bills, and rolling blackouts, * the failures in telecommunications after business interests persuaded Congress to deregulate the industry with misleading claims that it would be good for consumers, * the lapses in airline security and public health protection that caught all of us unaware on September 11 and afterward, * and now, of course, the scandal of Enron and the Arthur Andersen accounting firm, and more to come. These breaches of consumer welfare and the public trust have sent shock waves through the American public. They demonstrate all too clearly the need for consumer watchdogs and for strong, vigilant oversight of the marketplace. And that requires the kind of research and expertise on consumer matters that ACCI members are especially able to provide. I see five overarching lessons. LESSON NUMBER ONE: The consumer movement is absolutely essential in pressing for a fair and just marketplace for all consumers, and we've made a huge impact. …

Interdependent Security: The Case of Identical Agents

Do firms have adequate incentives to invest in anti-terrorism mechanisms? This paper develops a framework for addressing this issue when the security choices by one agent affect the risks faced by others. We utilize the airline security problem to illustrate how the incentive by one airline to invest in baggage checking is affected by the decisions made by others. Specifically if an airline believes that others will not invest in security systems it has much less economic incentive to do so on its own. Private sector mechanisms such as insurance and liability will not necessarily lead to an efficient outcome. To induce adoption of security measures one must turn to regulation, taxation or institutional coordinating mechanisms such as industry associations. We compare the airline security example with problems having a similar structure (i.e., computer security and fire protection) as well as those with different structures (i.e., theft protection and vaccinations). The paper concludes with suggestions for future research.

Extra security

The time taken for airline security checks can be reduced, thinks Daedalus, if the amount of luggage everyone takes is reduced. Clothing and laptop computers are on his list.

Biometrics and aviation security

September’s terrorist attacks on the US once again raised the profile of airport and airline security. In this month’s guest features, Mike Dell, Biometric Technology Manager at Neurodynamics, and Calum Bunney, Director of International Biometric and Authentication Consulting examine the role that biometrics could have in future aviation security scenarios.

Forecasting the resurgence of the US economy in 2001: an expert judgment approach

This paper describes a forecast of the date for the resumption of growth of the US economy in 2001. It uses an expert judgment approach within the framework of decision theory, the Analytic Hierarchy Process, as well as its generalization to dependence and feedback, the Analytic Network Process. Note: We request the reader of this article to regard the following in considering our analysis and findings. The forecasting exercise described in this paper was conducted on April 7, 2001, while the final version of the manuscript was accepted for publication in August 2001. The authors clearly could not have taken into account the horrific acts of September 11, 2001 in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania. As is now well known, the events of that day have significantly affected, in a negative manner, consumer and investor confidence both in the US and around the world. Further, they have moved the federal government to consider various budget deficit-exacerbating measures. These include massive financial assistance to the airline industry, emergency financial assistance for New York City, and the upgrading and enhancement (probably under federal control) of airline security systems. Importantly, all these measures come at a time when many analysts project a reduction in tax revenues associated with the economic decline in progress prior to September 11. Clearly, it will be many months before the net effects of these phenomena can be fully assessed in terms of the future course of the US economy. Note: We ask the reader of this article to consider the following in considering our analysis and findings: The forecasting exercise described in this paper was conducted on April 7, 2001, while the final version of the manuscript was accepted for publication in August 2001. The authors clearly could not have taken into account the horrific acts of September 11, 2001 in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania. As is now well known, the events of that day have significantly affected, in a negative manner, consumer and investor confidence both in the U.S. and around the world. Further, they have moved the federal government to consider various budget deficit-exacerbating measures. These include massive financial assistance to the airline industry, emergency financial assistance for New York City, and the upgrading and enhancement (probably under federal control) of airline security systems. Importantly, all these measures come at a time when many analysts project a reduction in tax revenues associated with the economic decline in progress prior to September 11. Clearly, it will be many months before the net effects of these phenomena can be fully assessed in terms of the future course of the U.S. economy.

Safe At Home? An Experiment in Domestic Airline Security

The paper describes a scientific experiment about a contentious policy issue: What costs and disruptions might arise if U.S. domestic airlines adopted positive passenger bag-match (PPBM), an antiterrorist measure aimed at preventing baggage unaccompanied by passengers from traveling in aircraft luggage compartments? The heart of the effort was a two-week live test of domestic bag-match that involved 11 airlines, 8,000 flights, and nearly 750,000 passengers. Working with the Federal Aviation Administration, the authors played a major role in designing, monitoring, and analyzing the live test. However, the live test provided “raw materials” for an assessment of PPBM rather than the assessment itself. As we discuss, there are difficulties in extrapolating from a short experiment involving 4% of domestic flights to the steady-state consequences of systemwide bag-match. Our findings challenge the widely held industry view that PPBM would have grave impacts on domestic operations. We ultimately estimated that, under usual operating conditions, PPBM would delay domestic departures by an average of approximately 1 minute per flight. (Approximately one-seventh of flights would suffer bag-match departure delays, which would average about 7 minutes apiece.) Implementing bag-match would cost the airlines roughly 40 cents per passenger enplanement, and would require virtually no reduction in the number of flights performed. Restricting bag-match to 5% of passengers chosen under a security profile would cut these delays by about 75% and these dollar costs by about 50%.

Upgrading of airport bomb detection urged

The U.S. should spend $430 million in fiscal 1997 alone to protect passengers from terrorist attacks on airplanes, recommends an Aviation Safety & Security Commission chaired by Vice President Al Gore. In addition to upgrading bomb detection equipment and deploying more bomb sniffing dogs at airports, the commission urges stepped-up funding for airport security research. The panel was set up following the explosion of TWA flight 800, the cause of which is still under investigation. President Clinton asked the panel to study airport security, overall aviation safety, and modernization of air traffic control. The initial report makes 20 recommendations on airport and airline security. Some can be implemented right away; others need congressional approval. Praising the commission's work, Clinton urges prompt action on several of his legislative initiatives. Among them is addition of taggants to explosives, including black powder, to aid investigators in finding terrorists. We need all these laws, and we nee...

Skyjacking, airline security, and passenger reactions: Toward a complex model for prediction.

Skyjacking, airline security, and passenger reactions: Toward a complex model for prediction.