Air Campaign Research Articles

The 'Ology War: Technology and Ideology in the Vietnamese Defense of Hanoi, 1967

The American air campaign against Hanoi in 1967 pushed Vietnamese air defenses to the brink of disaster. By the spring of 1967, continued improvements in U.S. tactics and electronic warfare technology had rendered North Vietnam's SA-2 missiles and radar-controlled anti-aircraft guns virtually impotent against U.S. Air Force aircraft. The Vietnamese were able to rise from the ashes of this potential defeat through intense political indoctrination; research and training; adjustments in the missions and deployment of North Vietnam's missile, anti-aircraft, and fighter units; assistance from communist allies; and American hesitancy and miscalculation.

Seven Principles for Building Peace

In the euphoria that accompanied the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, there was much talk of an outbreak of peace. Today, although the world is no longer menaced by clashing superpowers, the hoped-for peace has proved elusive. What we see now are failed states collapsing into internal ethnic conflict, anarchy, and the warlordism associated with clan-based or tribal societies. Over the past decade, the overwhelming majority of armed conflicts have exhibited this profile, and their number 28 a year, on average is sobering. In our so-called global village, these conflicts inevitably engender terrorism, refugee crises, environmental devastation, transborder criminal networks, and long-term regional instability. The international community has responded to this epidemic by becoming increasingly involved in large-scale peace operations ranging from peacekeeping and peace enforcement to peace building.1 Since its founding in 1945, the United Nations has embarked on 54 such operations. Of these, 41 began after 1988, and 15 are ongoing. As the representative of the United Nations secretary general in Kosovo, I have had the privilege of presiding over the largest U.N. peace-building enterprise ever mounted. The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (unmik) has been given a groundbreaking mandate: to lay the foundations of a lasting peace in the region by creating public institutions from the ground up. Unmik was established on June 12, 1999, with the adoption of U.N. Security Council resolution 1244. This followed a 72-day NATO air campaign directed at ending massive human rights abuses, including the expulsion of half of Kosovo s inhabitants, by the regime of Slobodan Milosevic. When a multinational military force comprising personnel from 37 countries, dubbed KFOR, rolled into Kosovo that June, it found a society in chaos. There was no government. No police. No law. The physical infrastructure was in a state of collapse. Thousands of houses, bridges, roads, and public facilities had been destroyed. Electricity and telephones were virtually nonexistent. Kosovo's mining, cement production, and agricultural industries were defunct. Kfor s first task was to facilitate the return of some 950,000 civilians who had fled from the Serbian security forces. They returned with unprecedented speed, virtually en masse, and unmik had to organize food and water supplies, shelter, and rudimentary medical care for these mostly internally displaced persons. Unmik's mandate was three-pronged. First, it had to assume responsibility for running Kosovo's day-to-day affairs, from policing to operating schools to providing basic utilities. Second, it had to create the institutions and develop the expertise necessary for the people of Kosovo eventually to exercise substantial self-government. Third, it had to facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo's future status. Resolution

Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe by Norman M. s> Naimark (review)

750 SEER, 8o, 4, 2002 setsout the RussianTable of Ranksand the thirdsurveysthe historyof AngloRussianrivalryin Persia.There is also an extensive and usefulbibliography. Department ofRussian andSlavonic Studies MALCOLMV.JONES University ofNottingham Naimark,Norman M. FiresofHatred. EthnicCleansing inTwentieth-Century Europe. HarvardUniversity Press,Cambridge, MA, and London, 2001. 248 pp. Notes. Index. Li6.95. AT the beginning of Nato's air campaign in Kosovo in March I999, a White House spokesmanwas askedin one of the innumerablebriefingsgiven during the war if atrocitiesagainst Kosovar Albanians had intensifiedsince the start of the bombing campaign. Could he confirm the reports of summary executions, the separation of men and women, the driving out of civilians from their homes? 'If you look at what is going on', the spokesmanadmitted to assembledjournalists,'you have what appearsto be a textbookdefinitionof ethnic cleansing.' A text book definition?Journalistspresent would have been hard-pressed to find one, even though they had been creditedwith coining the term. None existed. But they all knew what was implied: the mass killings, deportation, rape, internment and intimidation that characterized supposedly 'new-old' ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslaviaand world-wide in the I99Os. Used extensively,even by historiansinitiallysuspiciousof itsjournalisticorigins,the term was also applied inconsistentlyand arbitrarily often as a euphemism forgenocide, sometimes to describethe mildestformsof persecution. In thisambitious,comparativestudyof ethniccleansing,Norman M. Naimark , Professorof History at StanfordUniversity, seeks to give the term some much needed precision and legitimize its use as a tool for understandingthe extreme forms that state-buildinghas taken in Europe over the last hundred years. Contrary to the 'ancient hatreds' thesis popularized by Robert D. Kaplan and others,Naimarkseesethnic cleansingas a 'profoundlymodern experience' (p. 6) differentiated from religious and ethnic persecutions of previouscenturiesby the existence of a modern(izing)statewith an exclusivist brandof nationalismand an 'impetusto homogenize' (p. 8), an elite willingto carry this out and an infrastructureto back it up. He studies fives cases: the Armenians and Greeks of Anatolia; the Nazi persecution of the Jews; the Soviet deportation of the Chechens-Ingush and the Crimean Tartars; the expulsion of Germans from Poland and Czechoslovakia; and the wars of Yugoslavsuccession. His comparative approach has a three-fold purpose:to establish a typology of ethnic cleansing;to arrive empiricallyat a definition; and 'to underline the fact that ethnic cleansing has a terrifyingpotential for genocide'(p. 15). Naimarkisolatessixkeycharacteristicsof ethniccleansingwhich, to varying degrees, are common to all his case studies. First and foremost, ethnic cleansing involves violence, since people rarelyleave their homes voluntarily and have to be coerced to do so. Secondly, the cover for ethnic cleansing is invariablywar or its aftermath.Warleads to a habituation of killingand also provides the strategic rationale for uprooting populations. Thirdly, ethnic REVIEWS 75I cleansing has a 'totalistic quality' (p. I90), the aim being to remove all members of an alien groupwith few or no exceptions. Fourthly,and linkedto totality,ethnic cleansinginvolvesnot only the physicalremovalof populations but also the eradication of all traces of theirpresence: streetand town names are changed; books and archives burned; churches and monuments demolished . Fifthly, ethnic cleansing involves the widespread expropriation and theft of property of those who have supposedly grown wealthy off the exploitation of the majority.Finally, ethnic cleansing is 'inherentlymisogynistic ' (p. 195).Women are its primarytargetsnot only because they form the overwhelming majority of the civilian population in times of war but also because they are the 'biological core of nationality' (p. I95), which ethnic cleansing, particularlythroughsystematicrape, aimsto strikeat. Naimark arguesthat there is a crucial distinctionbetween ethnic cleansing and genocide, that is, between the intent to remove a population froma given territory and the intent to exterminate it. Yet he acknowledges that the distinction is often blurred when ethnic cleansing is genocidal in its results even if it not in its intent. That is why, Naimark argues, the cases of the Armeniansand theJews are so instructive.They show how easilywhat began as ethnic cleansingcan 'mutate'into genocide which itselfcan be 'asmuch the completion of a contingentprocessas a blueprintforaction' (p. 82). By making it clear from the outset that a distinction between ethnic cleansing and genocide can and should be drawn, Naimark is able to successfully place the destruction of the Jews in a comparative framework without a hint of relativization. Nevertheless, calling the...

Limiting youth access to tobacco: a failed intervention.

For the last decade, the most widely used intervention to reduce adolescent smoking has been enactment of “youth access” laws, which make it illegal to sell cigarettes to teenagers. These laws have been required by the federal government to obtain funding for substance abuse programs [1] and were the primary enforcement element of the tobacco regulation proposed by the Food and Drug Administration [2] and struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [3] and the Institute of Medicine [4] recommend youth access controls as part of a comprehensive tobacco control program. All 50 states and over 1000 local governments have passed youth access laws. Unfortunately, while these programs do make it difficult for teens to purchase cigarettes [5–7], they do not affect teen smoking prevalence [8]. The paper by Castrucci et al [9] in this issue of the Journal of Adolescent Health, together with previous studies that reached similar conclusions based on different data sets [10–14], explains why this seemingly logical intervention does not work: As youth access laws make it harder to purchase cigarettes, teens simply get their cigarettes elsewhere. Castrucci et al [9] recognize that it is likely impossible to block noncommercial sources and realistically, in contrast to others [14], do not recommend policies to block these “social sources.” The fact that youth access controls are not associated with lower teen smoking [8] is not surprising because, although most smokers start experimenting with cigarettes in their teens, few teens smoke daily, so do not need to procure many cigarettes, and as Castrucci et al [9] observe, it is these youngest experimenters who are most likely to obtain their cigarettes from noncommercial sources. It has been argued that even if they do not affect youth smoking prevalence, youth access programs are valuable because they are politically safer than policies involving clean indoor air or anti-tobacco media campaigns and that they engage the public and help build coalitions for tobacco control [5,15]. The tobacco industry, however, has done an even better job of using the threat of youth access legislation to organize a large grass-roots network of merchants which has helped the tobacco industry fight a wide variety of effective tobacco control policies, particularly clean indoor air laws [16], and shift the emphasis in tobacco control away from the tobacco industry’s marketing practices. For example, Philip Morris tobacco company is actively promoting messages telling parents to keep their cigarettes away from their kids [17, 18]. Castrucci et al [9] also conclude that “while limiting commercial sources of cigarettes remains an important part of a comprehensive approach to reduce tobacco use, adolescent smoking prevalence will likely only continue to decline with further implementation of policies that are known to decrease tobacco use.” No one can disagree with the second part of this statement—that we should seek implementation of policies that are known to decrease tobacco use: smokefree workplaces and homes [19–23], taxes [20–22, 24, 25], media campaigns [26], and secondhand smoke messages [27]. From the Center for Tobacco Control Research and Education, Institute for Health Policy Studies, Cardiovascular Research Institute, University of California, San Francisco, California This work was supported by NIH National Cancer Institute Grant CA-61021. Address correspondence to: Stanton A. Glantz, Ph.D., Professor of Medicine, Box 0130, University of California, San Francisco, CA 94142. E-mail: glantz@medicine.ucsf.edu. JOURNAL OF ADOLESCENT HEALTH 2002;31:301–302

Nights Underground in Darkest London: The Blitz, 1940–1941

After the tragic events of September 11, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani at once saw parallels in the London Blitz, the German air campaign launched against the British capital between September 1940 and May 1941. In the early press conferences at Ground Zero he repeatedly compared the bravery and resourcefulness of New Yorkers and Londoners, their heightened sense of community forged by danger, and the surge of patriotism as a town and its population came to symbolize a nation embattled. His words had immediate resonance, despite vast differences between the two situations. One reason for the Mayor's turn of mind was explicit: he happened at that moment to be reading John Lukacs' Five Days in London, although the book examines the British Cabinet's response to the German invasion of France some months before bombing of the city got underway. Without doubt Tony Blair's outspoken support for the United States and his swift (and solitary) endorsement of joint military action also reinforced this mental coupling of London and New York. But the historical parallel, however imperfect, seemed to have deeper appeal. Soon after George W. Bush was telling visitors of his admiration for Winston Churchill, his speeches began to emulate Churchillian cadences, Karl Rove hung a poster of Churchill in the Old Executive Office Building, and the Oval Office sported a bronze bust of the Prime Minister, loaned by British government. Mayor Giuliani's televised press conferences immediately after the September 11 attack. “Churchill Mania,” The Economist Nov. 10, 2001. See also, N. Ferguson, “The War on Terror is Not New,” New York Times, Sept. 20, 2001. “Bush Tours the New York Battlefield,” The Times (London), Sept. 15, 2001, 1. William Farish, the American Ambassador in London, thanked the British people for their “magnificent” response to the terrorist attacks and said that Americans now looked to the bravery of the British during the 1940 Blitz bomb attacks as an example of how to “prevail over an implacable foe.” The Times (London), Sept. 21, 2001, 2. An additional curious development was press reports that W. H. Auden's poem “September 1, 1939” (which begins in “I sit in one of the dives/On Fifty-second Street/Uncertain and afraid”) was enjoying popularity on National Public Radio, in internet chat rooms, and even high school discussion groups. This quickly prompted a heated exchange of letters in the Times Literary Supplement about the merits or lack thereof of Auden himself and his poem. J. Lukacs, Five Days in London: May 1940 (New Haven, 2001).

Sunburst: the rise of the Japanese naval air power, 1909-1941

Serving as a sequel to Kaigun, the prize-winning study of the surface and sub-surface forces of the Imperial Japanese Navy, this work illuminates the rise of Japanese naval aviation from its genesis in 1909 to its thunderbolt capability on the eve of the Pacific War. It provides the most detailed account yet available in English of Japan's naval air campaign over China from 1937 to 1941 and concludes with a revealing chapter on the utter destruction of Japanese naval air power by 1944, in the process explaining its essential strengths and weaknesses.Author Mark Peattie traces the development of the Navy's land-based air power as well as the evolution of its carrier forces. He also treats all the salient aspects of the naval air service: training, personnel, tactics, doctrine, technology, and industrial base. In doing so, he combines data found in previous handbooks with important new information derived from Japanese language sources. The book's appendixes include biographic summaries of important personnel mentioned in the text, detailed drawings and data on Japanese carriers and naval aircraft, and information on Japanese naval air bases and land-based air groups as of 7 December 1941.

The British People, the Press and the Strategic Air Campaign against Germany, 1939-45

This article sets out to explore the way in which the RAF's wartime strategic bombing campaign against Germany was presented to the British people. It seeks to understand the flow of information about Bomber Command activities and the manner in which the media reacted. The essay also seeks to question the idea that there was widespread discontent and unease with British operations, arguing that though the media coverage fell short of explaining the true nature of the British campaign, most people had guessed what it entailed from the information presented to them and supported it.

Russia and NATO toward the twenty‐first century: conflicts and peacekeeping in Bosnia‐Herzegovina and Kosovo

The new Russian‐NATO relationship plunged to the lowest point during NATO's 78‐day Kosovo air campaign in Spring 1999. Despite the difficulties at the political level, the analysis suggests that Russia's participation in joint peacekeeping with US/NATO forces in Bosnia‐Herzegovina (IFOR/SFOR) and Kosovo (KFOR) stand as perhaps the most encouraging aspect of the contemporary Russian‐NATO relationship. These successes in peacekeeping tended to be overshadowed by the serious strains between Russia and NATO in developing a response to the implosion of Yugoslavia. While such practical cooperation between Russia and NATO can contribute to eroding the barriers of the past and to the development of a constructive relationship for the twenty‐first century, these military‐to‐military accomplishments cannot shape broader Russian‐NATO strategic priorities. The article concludes with examination of Moscow's postmortem assessments on Kosovo and evaluation of prospects for the future of the Russian‐NATO relationship in the aftermath of the Yugoslav experience.

What Not to Learn from Afghanistan

This article was first published in the Summer 2002 issue of Parameters. For you all love the screw-guns--the they all love you! So when we take tea with a few guns, o'course you will know what to do--hoo! hoo! Jest send in your Chief an' surrender--it's worse if you fights or you runs: You may hide in the caves, they'll be only your graves, but you can't get away from the guns! --Rudyard Kipling, Screw Guns The screw guns to which Kipling refers were rifled artillery pieces with longer range and more penetrating power than the older smooth-bore guns. They gave British troops a substantial edge over local forces in the colonial wars of the Victorian empire, just as American bombers do for US troops today. Artillery would continue to improve in explosive power, versatility (gas, smoke), and indirect bombardment, leading to its dominant role in World War I. Yet serious military strategist of Kipling's day would have suggested that the British Army disband its infantry and cavalry regiments and reorganize into only artillery brigades. The great wars of the 20th century were won by maneuver, not just firepower. Technology has increased the range and precision of firepower, but the question about maneuver force planning posed by the prominent German tactician of World War I, General Wilhelm von Balck, is still central: How much infantry will be required to utilize the success of the fire of the artillery? Nothing in the violent decades since has changed von Balck's conclusion, are longer principal arms. Each arm has its use, all are necessary. (1) The principal lesson of modern war is the need to operate in combined arms teams to win decisive victories that yield beneficial political change. There are silver bullets that can win wars by themselves, even if fitted with satellite guidance. Nor is war just about blowing things up. War is politics by other means with the aim to determine how territory and people are governed, and to what ends rulers direct their resources. This cannot be done from 15,000 feet in the air. Yet there are those who would argue, on the basis of the air campaigns in the Balkans and Afghanistan, that the United States should restructure its armed forces to rely almost entirely on bombers, with some special forces and perhaps some other light troops (preferably foreign) as auxiliaries. This line of argument has been around since Billy Mitchell claimed in his 1925 book Winged Defense, It is probable that future wars again will be conducted by a special class, the air force, as it was by the armored knights in the Middle Ages. Again, the whole population will not have to be called in the event of a national emergency, but only enough of it to man the machines that are the most potent in national defense. (2) Airpower did play a major role in the wars that followed, but as part of a larger war effort that aimed at the destruction of enemy regimes by conquest, and the remaking of their societies in the image of the liberating armies. From World War II to Vietnam, democracies were established where American troops prevailed and dictatorships where communist troops took hold. But nowhere was the promise of victory through alone borne out. In the Gulf War, which airpower advocates cite as the rebirth of their doctrine, the decision to halt the ground offensive after only four days and without advancing on Baghdad left Saddam Hussein in power. A decade of air strikes and no fly zones has not prevented Hussein from undermining the Gulf War coalition by diplomacy while developing weapons of mass destruction. Mitchell might well have considered his own analogy of fighter pilots to medieval knights more carefully. Though the armored horseman was singularly the most powerful weapon system of his day, performance on battlefields from the Holy Land to Crecy did not always support his claim to glory. …

The Moral Limits of Strategic Attack

American military operations in the post-Cold War era have been punctuated by a twofold desire for casualty avoidance. The first manifestation is a long-standing feature associated with the conduct of war: the preservation of friendly forces. The success of Operation Desert Storm proved that heavy casualties on one's own forces are not necessary for military victory, and, not surprisingly, that conflict indirectly promoted force protection as paramount in subsequent operations. The other manifestation of casualty avoidance is the reduction of noncombatant losses. Of course, the term encompasses noncombatants residing in or belonging to the enemy state as well as in one's own country. Although the idea of noncombatant immunity has a lengthy history traceable to the earliest warrior codes, the reduction of noncombatant casualties, particularly of the enemy, has consistently been overshadowed by claims of military necessity. Arguably, the rise of the modern media, virtually omnipresent, might be credited with helping to renew interest in the protection of noncombatants, since no aspect of conflict now escapes international scrutiny. Complicating matters is the military's current focus on effects-based targeting and operations, perhaps epitomized in the Air Force's doctrine regarding strategic attack. Rather than focusing on engaging enemy forces directly, current doctrine holds that strategic attack is used to destroy the enemy's centers of gravity, those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. (1) The idea is usually attributed to the initial architect of the Gulf War's air campaign, Colonel John Warden, who proposed the existence of five rings or centers of gravity, the most important being leadership, followed by organic essentials, infrastructure, population, and finally the actual fighting mechanism, which is portrayed as the least important. (2) This center-of-gravity concept is certainly reminiscent of Sun Tzu's dictum purporting that the acme of skill is to subdue the enemy without fighting, since capturing forces is preferable to engaging in battle. Hence, attacking the enemy's strategy, not troops, is ultimately what ensures success. (3) However, the nature of the modern battlefield inherently blurs the distinction between combatants and noncombatants; soldiers and civilians are now inextricably woven together in an amorphous battle space, and so the age of segregated battlefields has all but vanished. The obvious problem is which notion--force protection or noncombatant immunity--ought to have priority and to what extent. Intuition, as well as the current modus operandi of the military, might suggest that it is more important for the military leader to preserve the lives of his soldiers even at the cost of greatly increasing the risk to noncombatants, especially when the noncombatant lives in question are not US citizens or allies but rather belong to the enemy state. After all, the prevailing view is that American lives are somehow more important. That view, however, is misguided. A military commander is morally obligated to do as much as he can to preserve the lives of all noncombatants, even if significantly increasing the risk to his own soldiers. This does not necessitate fighting a war devoid of noncombatant casualties--that may well be virtually impossible--nor does it mean that winning is unachievable. Wars can still be fought and won; however, the moral import of noncombatant immunity demands a shift in the current conception of force protection. Force Protection That commanders have a legal duty to protect and ensure the health and welfare of their subordinates during peacetime as well as wartime is incontrovertible. Whether that duty is a moral one is a slightly more open question. Of interest here is not an evaluation of the many plausible arguments that might support such a claim, but the stringency of the moral requirement given that it does exist. …

Modeling and analysis of air campaign resource allocation: a spatio-temporal decomposition approach

In this paper, we address the modeling and analysis issues associated with a generic theater level campaign where two adversaries pit their military resources against each other over a sequence of multiple engagements. In particular, we consider the scenario of an air raid campaign where one adversary uses suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) aircraft and bombers (BMBs) against the other adversary's invading ground troops (GTs) that are defended by their mobile air defense (AD) units. The original problem is decomposed into a temporal and a spatial resource allocation problem. The temporal resource allocation problem is formulated and solved in a game-theoretical framework as a multiple resource interaction problem with linear attrition functions. The spatial resource allocation problem is posed as a risk minimization problem in which the optimal corridor of ingress and optimal movement of the GTs and AD units are decided by the adversaries. These two solutions are integrated using an aggregation/deaggregation approach to evaluate resource strengths and distribute losses. Several simulation experiments were carried out to demonstrate the main ideas.

A Game Theoretical Multiple Resource Interaction Approach to Resource Allocation in an Air Campaign

In this paper we propose a multiple resource interaction model in a game-theoretical framework to solve resource allocation problems in theater level military campaigns. An air raid campaign using SEAD aircraft and bombers against an enemy target defended by air defense units is considered as the basic platform. Conditions for the existence of saddle point in pure strategies is proved and explicit feedback strategies are obtained for a simplified model with linear attrition function limited by resource availability. An illustrative example demonstrates the key features.

Spaces of unintended consequences: The Ground Safety Zone in Kosovo

In the spring of 1999 NATO conducted a 79-day air campaign against Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to force that country to cease the ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians and to force the withdrawal of Yugoslavian forces from the province. In June of 1999 a NATO led military force (KFOR or Kosovo Force) entered Kosovo to reestablish a safe and secure environment. Shortly thereafter ethnic Albanian armed extremists groups launched an insurgency in the neighboring Presevo Valley of Southern Serbia in a bid to join the predominantly ethnic Albanian population of that area with Kosovo. The rebels used the five-kilometer wide Ground Safety Zone, established by NATO, as a sanctuary from which to attack Serb police and military units. NATO and KFOR found themselves in the predicament of having to halt this insurgency while maintaining the peace in Kosovo. This paper provides a case study in applied political geography that examines the unintended consequences of creating an uncontrolled political and security space in the midst of a zone of conflict. Additionally, this paper will present a revised application of the concept of Peace Geography for the Post Cold War Era. Peace Geography involves the elements of association, disassociation, and isolation. These elements proved to be critical in bringing the Presevo Valley Insurrection to a peaceful conclusion, and this revised and updated peace geography shows great promise for future peacekeeping operations.

Validation of Training Efficacy through Analogical Transfer between Expert Knowledge Representations and Training Environment Representations

Thirty-four Air Force aircrew personnel were tested at Air Force Special Operations Command on their identification of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Several types of SAMs were simulated and presented to participants using a state-of-the-art training system incorporating high-fidelity terrain and voice recognition. The SAM simulations were driven by perceptual visual models and flight behavioral models. Participants identified the model of SAM, and the accuracy of trajectory (whether or not the SAM would hit their simulated aircraft). Participants were assigned to either a novice group (no combat experience) or expert group (combat experience in either the Kosovo or Iraqi air campaigns). The experts outperformed the novices, demonstrating the importance of developing simulation trainers based on perceptual and cognitive principles, and the importance of empirical validation of those principles by experts.

The Law: Constitutional Understandings of the War Power

Recent war powers debates have seen the emergence of two opposing viewpoints. Those who advocate close adherence to the Constitution and who assume congressional predominance in matters of war have squared off against those who point to modern political realities that require presidential independence and power. This article argues that the resulting interpretive dichotomy is both false and unnecessary. The Constitution created a vigorous executive in the conduct of foreign affairs, checked and balanced by an equally powerful Congress. This is borne out by analysis of the language of the Constitution, by an examination of its intent, and by judicial doctrine. An additional method of interpretation, structural argument, integrates text, intent, and doctrine and provides a theoretically sound and politically feasible framework for the exercise of the war power by the political branches.

A Hierarchical, Distributed Architecture of Command and Control

Command and control of a joint air campaign are to plan, execute and control operations of a joint air campaign that may be necessary to resolve a crisis and conflict.i i Command and control must q...

Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War by Julie A. s> Mertus (review)

REVIEWS 577 Mertus, Julie A. Kosovo.How Mythsand TruthsStarted a War.University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, CA, and London, I999. xxii + 378 pp. Photographs.Tables. Notes. Index. $55.00; $I9.95. Kosovo burston to the scene in I999, when the US militarybecame engaged in an air campaign under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). By that date,Julie Mertushad alreadybeen delving deeply into the dynamics of conflict in Kosovo between Serbsand ethnic Albanians. Her book, Kosovo: HowMythsandTruths Started a War,is a thought-provokingbut necessarilylimited effort to understandthe origin and direction of this longstandingand brutalconflict. Quoting Tzvetan Todorov on the need to examine 'more or less truths'in order to appreciate the complex social and psychological processesby which popular beliefs were formed and maintained in Kosovo after the death of Josip Broz Tito, Professor Mertus reviews several key incidents in the evolution of ethnic animus there. Specifically,she chronicles student demonstrationsin 198I, the alleged sexual wounding of a Serbian peasant in I985, the barracksshooting of four soldiersby a young ethnic Albanian soldier in the Yugoslav army, and the alleged poisoning of ethnic Albanian school children in I990. She illustrateswell the wildly divergent interpretationsof these incidents through interviewsof Serbs and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. The 'truths' relating to these events are the 'hidden transcripts', a term attributed to James Scott, which serve to intensify a conflict through story telling and re-telling. The irreconcilable nature of the beliefs detailed in the book reflecta depth of suspicion,fear and hatredof 'the other' (a sociological concept) which provided the foundation for armed conflict. Written in the styleof testimoniesof human rightsviolations, thisis the most compellingpart of herbook. Assertingthat the warwas ignited by relativelyrecent 'storytelling'(p. xxi), ProfessorMertusidentifiesboth a cynicaleffortbypoliticalelitesto orchestrate conflict and a popular predisposition to confrontation rooted in issues of identity and nationalism. She presents a convincing case for the inevitability of the warwhich resultedin I999. Indeed, if she is trulywriting,as she asserts, to help 'policymakers[... .] understandKosovo', then perhapsthe key insight she offerswould be the futilityof the currenteffortby the United Nations to impose a multi-ethnic society in Kosovo. The book in this respect is a testamentto the primacyof intolerance. Since NATO troops were deployed, nearly 8oo,ooo Kosovars who had been driven out of the province by Serb forces have returned. A spate of killingsand abuses against Serbs, Roma, and others ensued, resultingin the flight of upwardsof 200,000 persons, mostly Serbswho have gone to Serbia. Those Serbsinterviewedin the book who statedthat ethnic Albaniansdesired 'ethnic cleansing' in Kosovo proved to be right. Again, this is not surprising, given the passion and intensityof the animosityreportedbyJulie Mertus. As this book was being finished in i998, the situation in Kosovo was deteriorating and the prospect of widespread armed conflict emerged. This possibilitywas not unexpected. For severalyears, commentators and experts 578 SEER, 79, 3, 200 I hadpredictedconflictin Kosovo, andeffortsproliferatedbynon governmental organizations(NGOs) at conflictprevention. ProfessorMertusanalysesthese effortsandfindsthemwanting.While hercategorizationof theNGOs working in Kosovo is somewhat simplistic and a bit derisive ('war tourists', 'flag planters','seedplanters',and 'nearlyinvisiblehands'),some of the insightsshe offersresonate with the professionallytimid 'do no harm' school of developmental assistance identified by Mary Anderson. Mertus's exhortation to internationalNGOs to workconstructivelywith local counterpartsis as valid as it is elusivein a humanitarian'marketplace' where achieving a high profile and obtainingpublicityarenecessaryto securefunding.Lackof coordination, competition over turf,and inadequate accountabilityresult. ProfessorMertus's I998 postscriptshows that she favoursthe cause of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, and she urges NGOs to 'not pretend to be neutral', touching brieflyon a major debate among humanitariansthat itself is rifewith 'hidden transcripts'and relative'truths'. The recent electoraldefeatof Slobodan Milosevic at the time of thiswriting will be a key determinantof Kosovo's future,likelyunderminingthe quest of the ethnic Albanians for independence. But a return to normalcy will be difficultto achieve. Indeed, this book shows that the repatriationof Serbs to Kosovo could sparknew conflict. Council onForeign Relations ARTHUR C. HELTON New-York Webber, Stephen L. School,Reformand Societyin theNew Russia.Studies in Russianand EastEuropeanHistoryand Society. Macmillan,Basingstoke and London in association with the Centre for Russian and East EuropeanStudies,Universityof Birmingham,2000. XX+ 252 pp. Tables. Figure.Appendices. Notes. Bibliography...

Shield and sword: the United States Navy and the Persian Gulf War

Essential reading as part of the Chief of Naval Operation's Professional Reading Program!Though not so well known as the land and air campaigns, the campaign at sea in the 1991 Gulf War was vital in subduing Saddam Hussein's invasion forces and driving them out of Kuwait. U.S. Navy surface ships and submarines launched hundreds of cruise missile attacks against Iraqi targets throughout the war, and carriers sent air strikes deep into enemy territory. The battleships Missouri and Wisconsin bombarded hostile targets while U.S. sailors joined U.S. Army and Royal Navy helicopter crews in additional actions. SEAL missions, global sealift actions, mine countermeasures, and operations in support of the economic embargo were still more contributing factors to the complex joint warfare effort.Details of these naval operations are thoroughly documented and analyzed in this authoritative study, conducted by the Naval Historical Center and published in limited numbers in 1999. It is based on previously classified action and lessons-learned reports, interviews with participants, and studies conducted by the Center for Naval Analyses and the Department of Defense. The book includes candid evaluations of leadership effectiveness, interservice relations, and methods of command and control. It also analyses the effectiveness of various weapons and sensors, including the Tomahawk land-attack missile, the EA-6B Prowler electronic warfare aircraft, the Aegis battle management system, and unmanned aerial vehicles. Winner of the Navy League's Theodore and Franklin D. Roosevelt Naval History Prize and favorably reviewed by military scholars and foreign affairs journals, this credible historical account captures the drama as well as the detail of a modern victory at sea.

Rolling Thunder and Linebacker Campaigns: The North Vietnamese View

AbstractNorth Vietnam has the dubious distinction of having more combat experience against U.S. air power than any other nation in the world. Rolling Thunder, the first U.S. bombing campaign against North Vietnam (1965–68), lasted longer than U.S. air operations in Europe during World War II. When one adds the 1972 Linebacker air campaign against North Vietnam and the almost nine-year bombing campaign against the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos, only Iraq, with the air campaigns of Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom book-ending a twelve-year (1991–2003), low-intensity confrontation against U.S. aircraft over the no fly zones, faced U.S. air attacks longer. The air battles over Iraq, however, cannot be compared with the battles fought in the skies over North Vietnam. During the course of the war, more than 1,100 U.S. fixed wing aircraft were lost in combat operations.

Collapse and Reconstruction of Ajudicial System: The United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor

Within the span of only a few months in 1999, the United Nations was faced with one of the greatest challenges in its recent history: to serve as an interim government in Kosovo and East Timor.In Kosovo, in response to massive attacks on the Kosovar Albanian population, including orchestrated and wide-scale “ethnic cleansing,” the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conducted an eleven-week air campaign against Yugoslav and Serbian security forces and paramilitary groups. The campaign resulted in the agreement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to withdraw all Yugoslav and Serbian security forces from the territory. On June 10,1999, one day after the suspension of NATO’s air strikes, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 (1999), establishing the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK).