Foreign Policy Aims Research Articles

The Three Points of a Circle

This paper begins from the premise that a key element in comprehending the discipline of International Relations lies in the understanding of state behaviour. This constitutes the main objective of this paper, which focuses on the limited scope of examining one aspect of state behaviour, foreign policy. Foreign policy is examined through the interconnected lenses of ideology and discourse. The argument developed is that ideology sustains foreign policy through the provision of the foundational support that it requires for its perpetuation and through the creation of an overarching narrative that not only explains, but also justifies foreign policy choices. In this context, the concepts of state identity and interests are elevated as two fundamental elements of state behaviour, which are narratively procured via ideology and define the aims of foreign policy and the means of pursuing them. The paper makes clear that the ideological underpinnings of foreign policy require the crucial contribution of discourse as an intervening variable that allows for the narrative performance of identity and the pursuit of foreign policy ends, dictated by identity. Security is conceptualised and exemplified through discourse, with the latter becoming an indispensable element not only of foreign policy, but also of state survival.

THE LOGIC OF EU NORMATIVE POWER IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

This research focuses on comprehending the political logic behind how the EU's normative power is manifested in its engagements within the region. It's evident that numerous studies emphasize the dual role of EU conditionality in the membership criteria for Western Balkan countries, illustrating both normative unity in foreign policy and a complex interaction between interests and norm adaptation. This highlights the intricate nature of the EU's approach in the Western Balkans. The study is grounded in the semi - realist perspective, which argues that democracy norm promotion and peace building constitutes a relevant, but secondary foreign policy aim. It aligns with scholars from various viewpoints who suggest that EU democracy promotion is more strategically motivated for enhancing national security rather than strict ideational diffusion. Instead of a Kantian cosmopolitan approach, the EU's normative power is seen resembling Hobbesian normative homogenization. We argue that striving for a normatively homogenous Europe through ideational diffusion yields varied outcomes in different regions due to distinct structural conditions and institutional practices qualitative methodology, we delve into the achievements and limits of EU normative power in the Western Balkans . The study concludes that normative ideational diffusion rarely results in uniform outcomes even within the region. Thus, during times of crisis and ongoing multidimensional challenges, resilience as norm diversity rather than normative homogenization offers more effective political power implications.

King Henry VII and the case of the missing treaty: Anglo-Hungarian crusading diplomacy reconsidered

Abstract Henry VII of England has never been considered a ‘crusader king’; his monetary contributions towards anti-Ottoman crusading have been characterized by his biographers as little more than bribes designed to constrain the ambitions of would-be pretenders to the English throne. However, an unpublished Anglo-Hungarian treaty of alliance calls such simplistic explanations into question, showing that after the death of his son Arthur, prince of Wales, in spring 1502, Henry VII attempted to insert England into a pan-European platform of anti-Ottoman alliances using the provision of crusade financing as a diplomatic lever. This article shows just how Henry VII’s ‘crusade diplomacy’ worked in practice, arguing for a reassessment of what has long appeared to be the settled question of Henry VII’s foreign policy aims and demonstrating the centrality of the ‘Turkish question’ to early sixteenth-century European diplomacy.

The Islamic State and the independence referendum: The role of foreign policy in maintaining the de facto Kurdish entity in Iraq

AbstractThe onslaught of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (hereafter ISIS) on the Kurdish de facto entity in Iraq in 2014 and the independence referendum in 2017 constituted two important episodes that impacted on the foreign policy of the Kurdish entity in multiple ways. This article analyzes and describes the foreign policies of the entity during and after these two episodes until the end of 2022. It attempts to answer the following two questions: How did the ISIS offensive briefly change the priorities of the Kurdish entity's leadership in terms of its foreign policy goals? Secondly, how did the independence referendum in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and the subsequent events shape the foreign policy priorities of the Kurdish entity in Iraq? Through conducting interviews with high‐level Kurdish politicians and using recently published secondary source materials, this article argues that foreign policy and paradiplomacy played vital roles in the preservation of the KRI during these two very tough periods and that the Kurdish entity had to alter its domestic policy goals to achieve its foreign policy aims and ensure the survival of the Kurdish facto entity in Iraq.

Year One of the Biden Administration: U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Russia

The article provides an analysis of Russia’s role and place in President Biden’s U.S. foreign policy aims. Particularly, this paper explores clashing world order visions, issues pertaining to national sovereignty, post-Soviet space development, sanction policies, climate change issues, and global security. The following research reveals that the rivalry between the United States and Russia influences the system of international relations, because both parties promote substantially different concepts of the future world order. The Biden administration was unwilling to make the necessary concessions to accommodate Russia because 1) there is a huge gulf between the two country’s world views that even makes negotiations between the two almost impossible, and 2) because it does not take Russia seriously and views it as a declining power. As a result, the two sides were unable to come to some kind of negotiated agreement that would have addressed Russia’s concerns including the Ukraine issue. Instead, deterring Russia has become a priority for U.S. foreign policy in critical areas such as national sovereignty, the democratic development of post-Soviet countries, Russian-related human rights issues, and U.S. sanction policies against Russia. Comparing Trump’s presidency to the Biden administration’s first year in office, Biden has championed a more pragmatic narrative towards Russia. Most evidently, this is manifested in problems concerning universal global challenges such as strategic stability, cyber-security, and even aspects of climate change. Nevertheless, the possibility of concluding any serious negotiations between the parties on new world order parameters seems less realistic today than ever before.

“An Empire for Liberty”: Reassessing US Presidential Foreign Policy Rhetoric

ABSTRACTEmpire is central to US foreign policy aims but is rarely taken directly into account in studies of American presidential foreign policy rhetoric. We argue here that in doing such studies, analytic attention should be paid to questions of empire as foundational to the development of the United States and to articulations of the American nation. We examine two historical and two heuristic categories used to understand US presidential foreign policy discourse and argue for refocusing analysis by placing questions of whiteness, empire, and colonialism at the core of those categories.

International activities of German political foundations and American philanthropic funds. A comparative analysis

The paper is aimed at investigating the influence of political foundations upon internal and external policy of a state, analyzing place and role of foundations in international relations. The relevance of the topic under investigation is stipulated by the expansion of semi-official and guerilla diplomacy instruments in governments’ external policy toolkits, which are widely financed by political foundations. The paper deals with the development of contemporary political foundations of the USA and Germany, including comparative analysis of performance features. The classification of foundation functions in the context of international relations is introduced. A conclusion is drawn that German political foundations are designed according to a model of a ministry of foreign affairs with the elements of a political party whereas a typical American philanthropic foundation is based on a model of a business corporation. German representatives tend to be present on the spot, continuously make contacts and keep track of local developments. The Americans apply project-based approach, and aim at creating NGOs or partnerships geared towards concrete actions or tasks making claims for international legitimacy. Foundations in Germany and the US are different in terms of funding models, degree of governmental involvement, scale and methods both serve as proxies and commentators of ruling elites' ideology contributing to foreign policy aims of their countries of origin. Foundations due to distancing from official diplomacy and legal autonomy (although activities of major foundations are frequently adjusted to the policy of a state of origin) achieve a wide room for maneuver. They penetrate into foreign societies and exert influence over sensitive spheres of modern statehood, such as education, domestic policy, expert community, media, etc. Hence a great deal of ties and points of influence “from inside” upon social and power structures of a foreign country are shaped, and could be exploited to further interests of a state of foundations’ origin. Experience of Western foundations is actively employed by other states and organizations, including non-Western. A range of tools could be applied for the strengthening of bilateral and multilateral cooperation within the framework of the Eurasian integration project of Russia according to the principles of mutuality and inclusivity.

The Echoes Of The Reconsecration Of Hagia Sophia As A Mosque In The Conservative Media

This article aims to reveal the entanglement of domestic and foreign political dimensions in the interpretation of the recent conversion of Hagia Sophia Museum in İstanbul, Turkey, into mosque, through a thematic analysis of the coverage of the topic in two conservative media outlets -Yeni Şafak and Türkiye newspapers- between July 1 and September 15, 2020. The findings are grouped in five headings: how the reconsecration is defined, reflections on the causes of the conversion into museum in the Kemalist period, explanation of the causes of the recent decision of reconsecration, the significance of Hagia Sophia in the so-called war between Turkey and global power elites, and replies to the opposition. It is concluded that the foreign policy aims of pursuing an assertive stance vis-à-vis the Western world and forging a unity in the Islamic world under the leadership of Turkey, and the domestic policy aim of consolidating Justice and Development Party’s power in the culturally and politically polarized atmosphere in Turkey are intertwined in the eyes of the conservative proponents of the government.

The illogic of plausible deniability: why proxy conflict in cyberspace may no longer pay

Abstract Cyber proxies—whether mercenaries, patriotic zealots, pranksters, or simply allies of convenience—are thought to be widespread. By outsourcing to proxies, this logic goes, a host government can plausibly deny its involvement in operations that advance its military and foreign policy aims. This presents central challenge to empirical researchers. If the value of proxies derives from their deniability, this same quality should mean that implausibly deniable types—the types sponsors supposedly wish to avoid—receive disproportionate attention in data and discourse. Accordingly, proxy activity appears to have flagged across several widely used datasets, depending on how the data are parsed. Do proxies still pay? A formal model is used to hypothesize about how new norms of attribution (specifically, the willingness of victims to make accusations on the basis of circumstantial evidence) can encourage capable states to insource more than they outsource. In the model, victims have the power to decide whether denials are plausible. “Usual suspects” who learn that they will take the heat regardless have fewer incentives to rely on proxies. Empirical evidence on insourcing patterns offers backdoor support for this proposition. The findings should decrease our confidence in plausible deniability as a logic for why states outsource to proxies. The paper joins an emerging body of research that has questioned the role of plausible deniability in covert action, including cyber conflict.

The Strategic Implications of India's Illiberalism and Democratic Erosion

executive summary: This article assesses the international implications of illiberalism and democratic erosion in India's domestic politics and considers whether and how Washington should recalibrate its strategic partnership with New Delhi. main argument The U.S.-India relationship is founded on common interests, including a deepening strategic convergence with respect to China. U.S. policymakers also cite a shared commitment to liberal democratic governance as a central reason for closer alignment with India. Yet India's prevailing political culture is not best defined as "liberal," and under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India's commitment to democracy is increasingly in doubt. Erosion is most obvious in the areas of tightened media controls, limits on civil society organizations, and reduced protections for minorities. The evolving character of India's domestic politics is likely to influence India's foreign policy aims and decision-making processes, hard-power capabilities, and the way India relates to other states, including the U.S. policy implications • The U.S.-India strategic partnership is strong and likely to remain durable because of shared concerns about China's power and influence. Yet because India's domestic political culture and international worldview reflect unique historical, ideological, and cultural wellsprings, U.S. policymakers should not assume U.S.-India convergence on liberal aims, including India's commitment to the defense of the liberal international order. • Rhetorically, the Biden administration has attached great significance to liberal democracy and thus risks politically costly criticism if it appears to ignore undemocratic trends in India. To avoid hypocrisy and, most importantly, to set realistic expectations for U.S.-India partnership, U.S. officials should convey their concerns about India's political trajectory forthrightly but bearing in mind that the U.S. has little influence over India's internal politics. • Further erosion of democratic institutions and practices would, on balance, make India a less powerful and predictable international actor, and would reduce its capacity for reassurance and building partnerships with other states, including the U.S. • The U.S. government should monitor political developments in India. If democratic erosion worsens, managing U.S. relations with India will demand a tricky balancing act that preserves and even strengthens partnership in areas deemed critical to geopolitical competition with China without extending U.S.-India cooperation into areas that would mistake India for an entirely like-minded U.S. treaty ally.

Power projection of Middle East states in the Horn of Africa: linking security burdens with capabilities

ABSTRACT The reported militarization of the Horn of Africa by Middle Eastern states has generated great interest among scholars and analysts alike. Their analyses and articles about the projections of power from the Middle East to the Horn of Africa are exaggerated, however, because they underappreciate the extant and enduring security burdens of the states in question and overestimate their national power capabilities. This is largely due to common misperceptions and faulty measures of military power. The question that this article answers is therefore not whether states such as Turkey or the United Arab Emirates (UAE) could redeploy limited military resources extra-regionally, but why would they and for how long? Using empirical data from interviews, defence statistics and data from recent deployments of the UAE and Turkey, we show how these key players are inhibited from prospective, long-term, and sustained deployments extra-territorially. This is supported by our analysis of the two states’ power capabilities (latent and actual) and their security burdens that constrain and limit options for the use of military tools abroad in the pursuit of foreign policy aims. This has led both Turkey and the UAE to engage in various forms of remote warfare involving local partners, allied militias, and mercenaries.

Seeking shelter in the anthropocene: challenges and opportunities for Taiwan

The Anthropocene is an emerging concept that defines the challenges for international relations due to human activity altering the Earth on a planetary scale. The debates around the Anthropocene as a study of international relations are in infancy without a comprehensive theory to articulate its ramifications on the foreign and security policies of nation-states. This study aims to examine the challenges and opportunities posed for Taiwan in the Anthropocene. The research concludes that the Taiwanese foreign and security policy in the Anthropocene can find opportunities by seeking new social, economic, and political alliances as proposed by the Shelter Theory. These opportunities could help mitigate the dangers of this new phenomenon and allow Taiwan to reach its economic and foreign policy aims without exposing itself to future shocks.

Turkish Neutrality in the Second World War and Relations with the Soviet Union

ABSTRACT According to official Turkish and Western historiography, following the key victories against the German forces, Soviet leadership changed its position and started putting pressure on Turkey. Accordingly, the Soviet–Turkish relations changed significantly from being considered friendly until March 1945, when Molotov initiated his note denouncing the 1925 Treaty of Friendship with Turkey and demanded a base in the Straits area and the return of Kars and Ardahan to the Soviet Union. Only after such demands, Turkish government decided to move away from the Soviets and requested help from the US. I have several points of reservation about this argument: first, the Soviet–Turkish relations were never very friendly. Essentially, a common enemy incited provisional collaboration between the two. Second, for the leadership of the Turkish Republic, alliance with the Soviet Union was always counted as temporary, and their essential foreign policy aim had always been acceptance by the Western alliance. Third, the Soviet demands regarding the Turkish Straits were in no sense a surprise, a shock. For centuries, the rulers of Russia had wanted some control over the Straits, linking the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Finally, many accounts focus on the Soviet demands regarding the Straits and Eastern provinces in isolation. The crisis over the so-called Soviet demands and Turkish response happened at a time global interstate system was going through a major transformation: as the Second World War was coming to its end, the American administration had the ambition to impose a New World Order. Former imperial power, British Empire, no longer had the financial and military capacity to hang on to their vast territories.

Turkey's Foreign Policy: Opportunities and Constraints in a New Era

Turkey's Foreign Policy:Opportunities and Constraints in a New Era Evren Balta (bio) and Soli Özel (bio) writing in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the soviet Union and the reshuffling of regional and global alliances, Malik Mufti took note of how Turkish political elites confronted this new world. He wrote, "those responsible for determining its foreign policy—motivated by considerations of fear, honor and profit—are casting their eyes back in time in search of clues on how best to proceed" (1998, 32). According to Mufti, what shaped the elites' response to the changing circumstances was a combination of external threats and opportunities coupled with domestic constraints. Focusing on strategic culture, he identified two competing lines among the foreign policy elites: daring and caution. Until the 1990s, Turkey's foreign policy establishment continued to err on the side of caution based on lessons learned from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. According to this view, the Ottoman Empire collapsed mainly as a result of Ottoman elites' adventurous foreign policy and their expansionist and greedy outlook. More importantly, during the Cold War, the hallmark of Turkish foreign policy was an approach that prioritized a stable national interest defined by the sanctity of Turkey's borders and a predominantly Western orientation (Aydın 2000). This high degree of continuity and uniformity was not just limited to Turkey, as the foreign policies of small and middle-sized countries mostly reflected the bipolar nature of the international system that left little room for developing an independent [End Page 539] foreign policy. In such a polarized international setting, multilateral institutions enhanced the negotiation power of small/middle powers (Matarrazzo 2011, 55). Not atypically for such countries, Turkey sought to adhere to membership in the key multilateral frameworks of the Western camp (the Council of Europe 1949, the OECD 1948, and NATO 1952) in order to intensify its negotiation power and security, enhance its international status, and compensate for its relative lack of independent foreign policy (Aydın 2000; Yılmaz 2012). As the Cold War came to a close, a persistent call for a more assertive foreign policy emanating from the newly established political parties, emerging leaders, and public intellectuals occupied the public sphere in the 1990s. Exaggerating the passivity of Turkey's foreign policy establishment, this new orientation asked for a more dauntless outlook and wanted to replace the status-quoism of Turkish foreign policy with a search for missed or new opportunities. In fact, the end of the Cold War had fundamentally altered the context within which Turkish foreign policy was conducted, and it gave way to multiple waves of foreign policy activisms (Öniş 2011, 15). Yet Turkey's foreign policy remained predominantly Western-oriented until the mid-2000s. During the first two decades of the twenty-first century, the pendulum shifted more towards the daring side, what Mufti called the "Imperial tradition," after the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP) took office in 2002. Initially, the party adopted extensive reforms that aimed to democratize Turkey's political system with hitherto unmatched political will and popular support. These moves, which were also in response to the European Union's "harmonization packages" that could qualify Turkey for EU membership, received strong and sustained support domestically, as they did from Turkey's democratic allies and even some neighboring publics (Akkoyunlu, Nicolaïdis, and Öktem 2013, 22). Beginning with the AKP's second term (2007), however, Turkey's foreign policy veered sharply away from the EU. Instead, enhancing Turkey's hegemonic role in the Middle East replaced the goal of integration with the West [End Page 540] and became the central aim of foreign policy particularly after the series of protest movements that engulfed much of the Arab World in 2011. Frequent crises and abrupt shifts in Turkey's foreign policy outlook have heightened the debate between the AKP and its critics, the latter criticizing the AKP for pursuing a mostly adventurous foreign policy. The debate intensified after 2011, when not just the Middle East but the international system entered a period of flux and uncertainty. It was a period in which traditional verities of international and regional norm setting...

25 years of Jordan-Israel peace-making: from ‘warm peace’ to ‘cold peace’?

ABSTRACT 2019 marked the 25th anniversary of normalizing Jordanian-Israeli relations and the ‘warm’ peace-making between the two countries. Representing key partners and neighbours in the Middle East, Jordan and Israel have maintained political and economic ties since 1994. The pro-Western stance of both countries, and their common interest in maintaining regional stability, led Jordan and Israel to pursue similar foreign policy aims regarding various regional upheavals, as well as the Palestine-Israeli dispute. Jordanian-Israeli relations have, however, been caught amidst shifts in the US’s Middle East Policy under the Trump administration, which has raised questions over the status of Jerusalem and the West Bank. With respect to these developments, this article argues that the disaccord between the US/Israel and Jordan over these two places reveals that a politics of identity remains a pillar of the Kingdom’s stability and survival. Although both countries are being confronted with the same regional challenges, particularly in the wake of the war in Syria, the re-emergence of the rhetoric of ‘Jordan is Palestine’ – which poses the country as an alternative homeland for Palestinians (al-watan al-badil) – nowadays constitutes the top security concern for the Hashemite monarchy, and has the potential to undermine Jordanian-Israeli relations going forward.

Polish-Russian Cross-Border Cooperation from the Perspective of Polish Foreign Policy. General View

Due to geopolitical location, North-Eastern Polish regions (voivodships) have a big potential for the development of cross-border cooperation. This kind of international activity can have impact on regional development. Polish authorities on the central, regional and local levels initiate, run and co-finance cross-border projects designed to promote integration, understanding and co-operation across the border. According to the aims of the Polish foreign policy the basis of the long-term strategy of regional development of the North-Eastern Poland could be its geographical position and long-established co-operation with Kaliningrad Oblast. Institutional framework of contacts are: intergovernmental agreements, agreements establishing Euroregions, agreements between regional and local authorities. The cross-border cooperation between Warmia and Mazury Region and the Kaliningrad Oblast could be important part of the Polish foreign policy towards Russia. KEYWORDS: Cross-border cooperation, Kaliningrad Oblast, Warmia and Mazury Region, Foreign Policy of Poland, Polish-Russian Relations.

Human rights and ideology in foreign policy discourse: A case study of U.S. State Department Human Rights Country Reports 2000–2019

The promotion of human rights has faced challenges in recent years in the United States and elsewhere. In this study, human rights discourses are examined in the context of strategic foreign policy rhetoric by the United States. The routine of foreign policy statements is meant to create audiences receptive to U.S. foreign policy aims, but also reveals underlying ideologies and assumptions. The analysis examines U.S. State Department Human Rights Country Reports between 2000 and 2019. The results show that the assumed ideal model of human rights is heavily based on U.S. political tradition. The performance of other countries is evaluated against the ‘exceptionalist’ U.S. model without consideration of different cultural or societal contexts. Linguistic choices are made to highlight the agency of authorities and events, which can be seen as a strategy of diplomatic face-saving. In some cases, countries are evaluated on an unequal basis based on political expediency.

Reagan’s Cold War on Immigrants: Resistance and the Rise of a Detention Regime, 1981–1985

Abstract Through migrant and activist testimonies, media coverage, and government documents, this article explores the modes of resistance inside and outside of immigration detention that arose in response to new, more punitive detention policies enacted by the Reagan administration that specifically targeted Caribbean and Central American asylum-seekers in the early 1980s, and the modes of retaliation adopted by the administration in response. It argues migrant detention operates as a form of counter-insurgency, re-centering the geopolitics of asylum within the transnational scope of counter-insurgent warfare and its role in the rise of carceral trends more broadly. Reagan’s “Cold War on immigrants”—defined as a suite of new immigration enforcement measures that was adopted by the Reagan administration during its first term and buttressed the subsequent growth of the detention system—sparked mass resistance. Mounting public dissent against Reagan’s foreign and immigration policies, as evidenced by “inside-outside” and transnational activism, Jesse Jackson’s 1984 presidential campaign, and the Central America peace and Sanctuary movements, prompted the administration to wage a total war against its opponents to maintain its immigration control and foreign policy aims. The contemporary US immigration detention system emerged, and continues, out of this dialectic of resistance and retaliation.

The multilateral challenge to the American post-Cold War hegemony : the origins of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it seemed the United States was the only global Power able to influence the geo-political outlook and aimed at exporting the values of democracy and free market. However, Moscow and Beijing did not accept what they called hegemonism, since both claimed a first-class role in the global scenario; therefore, they started working together for a multilateral world, establishing quite a close relationship within the frame of the so-called Shanghai Five, involving also four former Soviet republics of Central Asia. This area had become pivotal for access to energy sources and saw conflicting interests at stake. While the Russians wanted to safeguard their monopoly market and pipeline facility network, the Chinese pursued diversification of their oil and gas supplies. On the other hand, Washington aimed at keeping the door open to American companies. The scenario closing the millennium was very different from what had occurred ten years previously. Apart from economic contrasts, there was the ideological challenge dominating the international debate. The White House spoke about democracy and human rights, thus making such values one of its foreign policy aims. On the other side of the Pacific, China and Russia promoted stability, territorial integrity and national sovereignty as main pillars of the new XXI century challenges, to which the struggle against separatism and terrorism was added. In a few words, though not described as an alliance oriented against any country, the 2001 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation seemed to portray a world once again divided into two blocs

The Rule of the Three, the “third force”, and The Quiet American

This paper explores the three reception phases of the story The Quiet American – the 1955 novel by Graham Greene, its first film adaptation by Joseph L. Mankiewicz in 1958 starring Michael Redgrave, Audie Murphy, and Giorgia Moll, and the later adaptation from 2002, directed by Phillip Noyce and starring Michael Caine, Brendan Fraser, and Do Thi Hai Yen. In this sense, it aims to understand the reactions, appropriations, and the chronological depictions associated with each of the three works, and to present the story of the “third force” in the context of the Rule of the Three (omne trium perfectum). As such, the principle of the Rule of the Three presents the three main characters, coming from three contrasting countries with diverging foreign policy aims, in three complex dimensions (historical, cinematographic/ artistic, and political/ individual). The findings suggest that the time of release, the cast, as well as the individual spin of specific historical events have granted each of the three works very distinct results. Ultimately, their legacies witnessed disproportionate peaks of success, with some being categorised as persistent rather than particular. Without being mutually exclusive, both the novel and the two respective movies have succeeded in informing, educating, and entertaining the public about the socio-political quagmire that marked the 1950s turmoil in Việt Nam.