Agnostic Stance Research Articles

Introspection as a Method and Introspection as a Feature of Consciousness

If we take for granted that introspection is indispensable for the study of conscious mental states, the question arises what criteria have to be met in order for introspective reports to qualify as scientific evidence. There have been some attempts to argue (implicitly or explicitly) that it is possible to provide a satisfactory answer to this question while remaining agnostic with respect to questions about the nature of consciousness. Focusing on the aim of using introspection in order to generate phenomenological descriptions of conscious mental states, this paper argues that such an agnostic stance cannot be maintained, because the very meaning of “introspection” remains fuzzy as long as we don't have a clear understanding of how the mind does it. I show that current debates revolve around some of the same issues that were already in the background of debates around 1900, and I argue that a satisfactory treatment of introspection as a method cannot be separated from the aim of providing a satisfactory treatment of introspection as a feature of consciousness.

How Percepts and Concepts Engage the Future

With Humean empiricism and its agnostic stance regarding the future as a foil, I take a bird’s eye view of the links between past and future prescribed by ordinary concepts of everyday things and processes, and by scientific models of phenomenal situations. I argue that they entitle us to claim knowledge of the future—including, where appropriate, its necessary course—in a humanly affordable sense of ‘knowledge’.

The Anti-philosophical Stance, the Realism Question and Scientific Practice

In recent years a general consensus has been developing in the philosophy of science to the effect that strong social constructivist accounts are unable to adequately account for scientific practice. Recently, however, a number of commentators have formulated an attenuated version of constructivism that purports to avoid the difficulties that plague the stronger claims of its predecessors. Interestingly this attenuated form of constructivism finds philosophical support from a relatively recent turn in the literature concerning scientific realism. Arthur Fine and a number of other commentators have argued that the realism debate ought to be abandoned. The rationale for this argument is that the debate is sterile for it has, it is claimed, no consequence for actual scientific practice, and therefore does not advance our understanding of science or its practice. Recent “softer” accounts of social constructivism also hold a similar agnostic stance to the realism question. I provide a survey of these various agnostic stances and show how they form a general position that I shall refer to as “the anti-philosophical stance”. I then demonstrate that the anti-philosophical stance fails by identifying difficulties that attend its proposal to ban philosophical interpretation. I also provide examples of instances where philosophical stances to the realism question affect scientific practice.

Kant on biological teleology: Towards a two-level interpretation

According to Kant’s Critique of the power of judgment, teleological considerations are unavoidable for conceptualizing organisms. Does this mean that teleology is more than merely heuristic? Kant stresses the regulative status of teleological attributions, but sometimes he seems to treat teleology as a constitutive condition for biology. To clarify this issue, the concept of natural purpose and its role for biology are examined. I suggest that the concept serves an identificatory function: it singles out objects as natural purposes, whereby the special science of biology is constituted. This relative constitutivity of teleology is explicated by means of a distinction of levels: on the object level of biological science, teleology is taken as constitutive, though it is merely regulative on the philosophical meta level. This distinction also concerns the place of Aristotelian teleology in Kant: on the object level, the Aristotelian view is accepted, whereas on the meta level, an agnostic stance is taken concerning teleology.

Darwin's Doubts and the Problems of Animal Pain

It is a truism that the influence of Darwin’s work on evolution is profound and ubiquitous. Thus, it should come as no surprise that the first chapter of Frans de Waal’s book, Good Natured, is entitled “Darwinian Dilemmas.” In this chapter, which sets the stage for his splendid discussion of observation of various kinds of moral behavior in primates, de Waal outlines the history of the debate over the biological status of morality since the implications of Darwinism began to be understood. Assuming Darwinism to be correct, moral behavior must have evolved along with all other features of living beings. The rest of de Waal’s book goes on to make a strong inductive case for the evolution of moral behaviors. In so doing, he provides a powerful attack on the traditional supernatural understanding of the origin of morality which takes morality to require a supernatural creator. Although most mainstream Western religious institutions now claim that evolution is consistent with their doctrines of the supernatural creator, the present discussion challenges this alleged consistency of traditional religion and evolution. The main contention of this paper is that if we take both evolution and concern for animal suffering seriously (as Darwin did), then we should reject traditional theism. If one is earnestly moved by the sufferings of nonhuman animals, must this really affect the religious views one holds? For those concerned about animal rights who are not philosophically inclined, the question may not be one that causes any anxiety. But for serious thinkers, the relation between animal suffering and religion is one that needs to be examined. The present paper begins its exploration of the connection between traditional religion and animal suffering by considering the religious opinions of Charles Darwin, who had serious doubts about religion based on the problem of animal pain. Although not all of Darwin’s views on animal suffering have been appreciated by defenders of animal rights, Darwin’s religious progress is of considerable interest, as it demonstrates the development of a persuasive agnostic stance out of a strong concern for animal suffering. The structure of my paper is as follows. Before setting out and defending Darwin’s arguments concerning religion, I begin by considering Alvin Plantinga’s recent (and influential) discussion of a controversial Darwinian passage (dubbed by Plantinga “Darwin’s Doubt”) which casts doubt on the standard interpretation of Darwin as a

Confirming Mathematical Theories: an Ontologically Agnostic Stance

The Quine/Putnam indispensability approach to the confirmation of mathematical theories in recent times has been the subject of significant criticism. In this paper I explore an alternative to the Quine/Putnam indispensability approach. I begin with a van Fraassen-like distinction between accepting the adequacy of a mathematical theory and believing in the truth of a mathematical theory. Finally, I consider the problem of moving from the adequacy of a mathematical theory to its truth. I argue that the prospects for justifying this move are qualitatively worse in mathematics than they are in science.

From power politics to social change: an alternative focus for international studies

Our social circumstance is fundamentally changing, so we are told on this historical morning after the Cold War. What was formerly called the ‘Second World' has suddenly disappeared; apartheid appears to be in final retreat; class structures and gender relations are said to be undergoing substantial shifts; there are increased hopes for disarmament and a wider demilitarization of international life; existing state boundaries and to some extent also the nature of the state itself are deeply in question. At the same time, we of the late twentieth century are allegedly experiencing a world-wide upsurge in religious revivalism, an unprecedented global ecological awareness, a shift from states to markets and from globalism towards regionalism in the organization of the world economy, cascading democratization across the continents and so on. There is widespread talk of ‘a new world order’, of the emergence of what is variously called ‘post-industrial’, ‘post-capitalist’ or ‘post-modern’ society, and of ‘the end of history’. Symptomatic, too, of the pervasively felt sense of transition are insistent calls for new theories, new language, new politics, new institutions and new norms that will be equal to the challenges posed by this purportedly revolutionary world situation. True, sceptics might well argue that dynamism and upheaval of the kind that we are witnessing today constitute defining features of modern social life, and that our generation is but the latest in a long string t o succumb to a secular millenarian delusion that it has been granted the historical privilege of living through the dawn of a new epoch. However, whether they adopt a prophetic or an agnostic stance on the matter, most commentators would agree that the question of social change sits high on the agenda of current world affairs.

The anatomy of Pseudosporochnus: P. Hueberi from the Devonian of New York

Eight structurally preserved specimens originally called Cladoxylon onteorense nom. nud. Hueber 1959, from Hensonville, New York, Cladoxylon dichotomum nom. nud. Hueber 1960 from East Ashland, N.Y., and Cladoxylon hueberi Matten 1974 from East Ashland and Cairo, N.Y., are analyzed in detail for their morphological and systematic significance. The type of C. hueberi from East Ashland, by far the most important specimen, provides the first opportunity in any Devonian member of the Cladoxylopsida for a realistic three-dimensional assessment of the primary xylem system. A main axis contains a highly dissected primary xylem system with 40–50 longitudinally anastomosing primary xylem segments. Distally, the main axis dichotomizes producing two equal branches with 20–25 xylem segments each. The outermost primary xylem consists of a system of radially oriented tracheid plates variously interconnected toward the inside, each with a conspicuous protoxylem strand near the xylem periphery. Traces to densely and three-dimensionally, but not helically, arranged lateral appendages depart singly or in groups of two or three from one to three adjacent peripheral-radial xylem plates. Although direct evidence on the external morphology of lateral appendages is not preserved, many trace groups exhibit conspicuous bilateral symmetry consistent with the interpretation of planate lateral appendages similar to those described for Pseudosporochnus nodosus. Other trace groups may indicate more three-dimensional lateral appendages. One sub-opposite pair of clepsydroid traces is borne at right angles to, and in obvious relationship with, the dichotomy of the main axis. Cortex is heterogeneous, consisting of thin-walled parenchyma with embedded clusters of sclereids and thick-walled parenchyma. These clusters appear responsible for a regular pattern of bumps or pits in compressed regions of the specimen and are closely comparable to those observed in Pseudosporochnus nodosus. A systematic analysis, attempting to view fragmentary evidence from both compressions and permineralizations in a single coherent framework, leads us to hypothesize assignment of the East Ashland and Hensoville specimens to the genus Pseudosporochnus. Although supported by the evidence, the hypothesis of assignment is by no means proven. We propose it, however, because we think that advancing systematic hypotheses conspicuously at risk of being refuted by additional observation promotes far greater understanding than taking an agnostic stance toward systematics implied by the use of “form” taxa. We further clarify our position by suggesting specific observations likely to be made from fossil specimens that might refute our hypothesis.