Aggregate Effort Research Articles

Effect of corruption on educational quantity and quality: theory and evidence

ABSTRACT We present a model with corrupt and honest examiners, and applicants with heterogeneous innate ability in the education sector with effort and bribe modelled as substitutes. The results show that ‘strong’ candidates rely only upon effort; ‘medium’ candidates choose positive levels of bribe and effort; ‘weak’ candidates rely only on bribery. They also show that corruption may decrease education quality by lowering aggregate effort while increasing education quantity by increasing the aggregate chances of obtaining a degree, depending on candidates’ ability and the proportion of corrupt examiners. We also find empirical support for the key predictions of the model.

Mechanism Design in Sport Matches: Competitive Balance, Intermediate Targets, and Effort Elicitation in a Three-Stage Contest Game

In sport, various examples of intermediate match targets exist that advantage the target-achieving party’s match outcome. We examine said targets within paired, multi-stage Tullock contest games, one a nested contest with intermediate target and one without. In equilibrium, the aggregate match-effort maximizing League sets a substantial subsequent match advantage to the target-achieving party. The nested Tullock contest with intermediate target elicits higher aggregate match effort than any one-shot Tullock contest. The effect of intermediate targets is fully consistent with that of an aggregate effort eliciting mechanism employed by leagues. Extant empirical literature finds clear demand for such a mechanism.

Pioneering a multi-phase framework to harmonize self-reported sleep data across cohorts.

Harmonizing and aggregating data across studies enables pooled analyses that support external validation and enhance replicability and generalizability. However, the multidimensional nature of sleep poses challenges for data harmonization and aggregation. Here we describe and implement our process for harmonizing self-reported sleep data. We established a multi-phase framework to harmonize self-reported sleep data: (1) compile items, (2) group items into domains, (3) harmonize items, and (4) evaluate harmonizability. We applied this process to produce a pooled multi-cohort sample of five US cohorts plus a separate yet fully harmonized sample from Rotterdam, Netherlands. Sleep and sociodemographic data are described and compared to demonstrate the utility of harmonization and aggregation. We collected 190 unique self-reported sleep items and grouped them into 15 conceptual domains. Using these domains as guiderails, we developed 14 harmonized items measuring aspects of satisfaction, alertness/sleepiness, timing, efficiency, duration, insomnia, and sleep apnea. External raters determined that 13 of these 14 items had moderate-to-high harmonizability. Alertness/Sleepiness items had lower harmonizability, while continuous, quantitative items (e.g. timing, total sleep time, and efficiency) had higher harmonizability. Descriptive statistics identified features that are more consistent (e.g. wake-up time and duration) and more heterogeneous (e.g. time in bed and bedtime) across samples. Our process can guide researchers and cohort stewards toward effective sleep harmonization and provide a foundation for further methodological development in this expanding field. Broader national and international initiatives promoting common data elements across cohorts are needed to enhance future harmonization and aggregation efforts.

OccTest: An integrated approach for quality control of species occurrence data

AbstractAimSpecies occurrence data are valuable information that enables one to estimate geographical distributions, characterize niches and their evolution, and guide spatial conservation planning. Rapid increases in species occurrence data stem from increasing digitization and aggregation efforts, and citizen science initiatives. However, persistent quality issues in occurrence data can impact the accuracy of scientific findings, underscoring the importance of filtering erroneous occurrence records in biodiversity analyses.InnovationWe introduce an R package, occTest, that synthesizes a growing open‐source ecosystem of biodiversity cleaning workflows to prepare occurrence data for different modelling applications. It offers a structured set of algorithms to identify potential problems with species occurrence records by employing a hierarchical organization of multiple tests. The workflow has a hierarchical structure organized in testPhases (i.e. cleaning vs. testing) that encompass different testBlocks grouping different testTypes (e.g. environmental outlier detection), which may use different testMethods (e.g. Rosner test, jacknife,etc.). Four different testBlocks characterize potential problems in geographic, environmental, human influence and temporal dimensions. Filtering and plotting functions are incorporated to facilitate the interpretation of tests. We provide examples with different data sources, with default and user‐defined parameters. Compared to other available tools and workflows, occTest offers a comprehensive suite of integrated tests, and allows multiple methods associated with each test to explore consensus among data cleaning methods. It uniquely incorporates both coordinate accuracy analysis and environmental analysis of occurrence records. Furthermore, it provides a hierarchical structure to incorporate future tests yet to be developed.Main conclusionsoccTest will help users understand the quality and quantity of data available before the start of data analysis, while also enabling users to filter data using either predefined rules or custom‐built rules. As a result, occTest can better assess each record's appropriateness for its intended application.

ANALYSIS NETWORK INSTALLATION ON INDIHOME AND DOUBLE CONFIGURATION ON DASHBOARD VOICE SERVICE SURVEILLANCE TREG-3

The projects related to management system and business processes have a low risk in every job. This method can be done in overcoming installation problems on Indihome that add performance to customers consists of an aggregate effort to perform maintenance by effectively utilizing and material through the application standard procedures that the company has to develop the system. The business orientation has a correlation between production process focus and performance at the business unit level using the profit impact of marketing strategies database. The relationship between production process focus and financial performance for business units was partially supported using return on sales, and was not supported with return on assets and return on income. The companies have prioritized this Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) plan to manage their daily business activities, such as financial management, procurement, production, projects, human resources, and others. The system can facilitate businesses with real-time and accurate information. The implication is hase degree of production process focus must be recognized as part of a manufacturing strategy that is consistent with an overall business strategy. The method has purpose problems found in the network installation on Indihome and double configuration contained of voice service Treg-3 surveillance to reduce the obstacles that occur in customers. The case study uses the Network Installation method, Activity Diagram, Use Case Diagram, Deployment Diagram, DFD level 0, DFD level 1, DFD level 2

Co-planning and co-design as progress in the implementation of welfare services

AbstractCo-planning (and co-design) of welfare services between public administrations and civic organisations is an innovative approach aiming to enact and maximise aggregate effort and competence contributions among complementary actors in the direction of participation and active citizenship. In our paper, we develop a simple theoretical framework trying to illustrate how it is possible to pursue the first best of an optimal participated planning, design and management approach for welfare services. We examine pros and cons of different solutions reconciling involvement of civil actors and respect of antitrust principles outlining four benchmark models with different characteristics in terms of upstream and downstream participation levels. We outline policy proposals to solve dilemmas related to the difficulty of jointly activating participation, intrinsic and monetary incentives avoiding in the meanwhile collusion and corruption.

When does division matter? Revisiting the optimal contest architecture

We compare the aggregate effort between centralized and decentralized contests. Employing a relatively general setting that admits the ratio-form and additive-noise contests as special cases, we identify the population size elasticity of marginal winning probability as a key determinant of this comparison.

Optimal and fair prizing in sequential round-robin tournaments: Experimental evidence

We experimentally investigate how the prize structure affects the intensity, fairness, and dynamic behavior in sequential round-robin tournaments with three players. We compare tournaments with a second prize equal to either 0%, 50%, or 100% of the first prize. While theory predicts the 50%-treatment to be most intense, we find that aggregate effort is highest in the 0%-treatment. In contrast, our evidence supports the predictions that the 50%-treatment is fairest (though not perfectly fair), whereas the late mover is advantaged in the 100%-treatment and disadvantaged in the 0%-treatment. Also in line with the theory, we identify a strategic (reverse) momentum: after winning the first match, a player increases (decreases) effort in the second match of the 0%-treatment (100%-treatment). Additional findings suggest that dynamic behavior is also subject to a psychological momentum.

Manipulation of moves in sequential contests

In two-player Tullock contests with endogenous timing of moves, the weak player moves early and the strong player follows. This order of moves is the third-best outcome for a contest organiser as it leads to a contest with lower aggregate effort compared to a contest where the players move in reverse order (first best) or simultaneously (second best). We propose that if the contest organiser—who does not know ex ante which player is the strong and which is the weak one—offers a lower price (effort cost) to the player(s) who choose(s) to exert effort early, she can achieve a greater payoff by affecting the contestants’ sequence of moves. We show that there exists no price that generates the first-best outcome. However, there is a price (or a range of prices) that induces both players to move early and receive it, leading to the second-best outcome. We also discuss the case where both players move early but only one receives the low price, e.g., lobbying or Instagram “giveaway” contests.

An analysis of group contests with the possibility of a draw

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>This paper investigates Tullock group contests with the possibility of a draw in which the winner, if any, shares the prize with other players in his group, and each group's sharing rule is private. Considering the draw is exogenously determined, we investigate the strategic choice of the sharing rules and individual effort. We find that introducing the draw into the contest has negative effects on individual payoff, while players would increase the sharing rule. When groups are symmetric, the possibility of a draw decreases all group's individual effort. In the model with asymmetric groups, the draw has a non-monotonic effect on the aggregate effort and individual effort of the strong group with larger value for the prize. Next, considering the draw is endogenously given, we investigate the strategy for maximizing aggregate effort. In the asymmetric model, when groups' values of the prize are dispersed enough or the organizer cares much more about the strong group, introducing a draw into the contest would increase the aggregate effort. However, no draw is most beneficial to the aggregate effort if the organizer puts more weight on the weak group. Finally, a numerical example is given to analyze and illustrate the results.</p>

Asymmetric technologies in contests

I consider a contest between two risk-neutral players over a common-value prize, in which one player has a linear cost-of-effort function and the other a strictly convex cost-of-effort function f. I show that if the value of the prize is above (below) a certain threshold level, then the equilibrium aggregate effort in this contest is larger (smaller) than in a contest in which both players are characterized by the strictly convex cost-of-effort function f, and smaller (larger) than in a contest in which both players are characterized by a linear cost-of-effort function. Therefore, in contrast to the general result in the literature, asymmetry in contests can increase competition.

Hunting for the discouragement effect in contests

The “discouragement effect” (DE) is mentioned routinely as a reason for why heterogeneity is detrimental for incentives in contests. It serves as a theoretical argument for various policies aimed at homogenizing contestants.We show that in static, noisy contests, the DE is not as generic and robust as often implied in the literature. We divide widely used contest models into two classes. In the first class, heterogeneity either decreases or increases aggregate effort. In the second class, the effect of heterogeneity depends crucially on how it is defined. Hence, the DE cannot serve as a go-to argument for why heterogeneity in contests is undesirable.

Influence of aggregate gradation and compaction on compressive strength and porosity characteristics of pervious concrete

ABSTRACTThis study examined the influence of aggregate gradation on compressive strength and porosity in Pervious Concrete (PC) subjected to various compaction efforts. Two aggregate gradations 12–18 and 18–25 mm were recombined in different proportions in the range of 10–50% to obtain five different gradations. PC specimens were cast with these five aggregate gradations by applying standard Proctor compaction, varying efforts from 0 to 75 blows. Test results indicated that wet density and compressive strength increased with compaction effort at higher rate for specimens casted with Aggregate-to-Cement (A/C) ratio 2.5 than 5.0, but porosity reduced at almost the same rate for both A/C ratios. Compressive strength reduced when aggregate gradation with larger size particles increased, however porosity increased. Altering aggregate gradation or compaction effort yielded no significant change in PC properties for A/C ratio of 5.0 than it did for 2.5. The developed mathematical models predicted compressive strength and porosity of PC mixes in terms of aggregate gradation and compaction effort. The highest mean deviation and relative error of model prediction were 1.377 MPa and 10.4% for compressive strength, and 1.414% and 5.8% for porosity, respectively.

Optimal Accuracy of Unbiased Tullock Contests with Two Heterogeneous Players

I characterize the optimal accuracy level r of an unbiased Tullock contest between two players with heterogeneous prize valuations. The designer maximizes the winning probability of the strong player or the winner’s expected valuation by choosing a contest with an all-pay auction equilibrium (r≥2). By contrast, if she aims at maximizing the expected aggregate effort or the winner’s expected effort, she will choose a contest with a pure-strategy equilibrium, and the optimal accuracy level r<2 decreases in the players’ heterogeneity. Finally, a contest designer who faces a tradeoff between selection quality and minimum (maximum) effort will never choose a contest with a semi-mixed equilibrium.

Staffing problems with local network externalities

This study examines how an organization assigns agents to interactive jobs embedded in a network. We employ a two-stage linear quadratic game with local complementarities, in which the underlying network represents the interrelated jobs that an organization seeks for staff. Under the assumption that employees have heterogeneous abilities, the organization assigns individuals to jobs in an attempt to maximize aggregate effort or aggregate payoff. Two problems are considered when maximizing the total effort. First, we assume that each agent’s ability is single dimensional and show that the planner should match the ordinal ranking of an agent’s ability level to the job indexed by the same ordinal level in the centrality ranking. Second, we assume that agents are experts in different jobs, implying that each agent’s ability is multidimensional. We show that the optimal staffing problem is essentially an assignment problem that can be solved by the Hungarian algorithm in polynomial time. Finally, we consider an optimal staffing scenario to maximize the total payoff. Finding all permutations of n agents has high computation time complexity. To solve this problem, we design a heuristic algorithm.

Phenomenological and mechanistic modeling of recreational angling behavior using creel data

Improved understanding of angling behavior in recreational fisheries can help managers account for partial controllability in systems in which angling effort is not directly regulated. Relevant aspects of angling behavior include fishing participation, site choice, and catch-and-release actions and can be considered at scales of both aggregate fishing effort and individual-decision-making. Using creel survey data collected across eight fishery seasons, we predicted aggregate angling effort (e.g., daily number of boating trips engaged in fishing) and characterized influences of individual trip-based site choice for recreational fisheries acting on fall-run Chinook salmon and coho salmon near the mouth of the Columbia River, United States of America. We applied an overdispersed Poisson likelihood-based generalized linear model with an autoregressive structure to aggregate boating effort and a multinomial logit model to trip-based site choice decisions among separate ocean and estuary fishing zones. Predictive models explained 71% and 79% of out-of-sample and in-sample variability in aggregate effort, respectively, and included the covariates weekend status, Chinook salmon catch rate, tidal range, and pre-season expectations of fish abundance. In addition to reinforcing the importance of Chinook salmon catch rate and tidal range, site choice model selection revealed influences of weather, fishery restrictions, expected fishery season lengths, and the individual-specific characteristics of boat length and guide status on decision-making. Model results provide predictive models for short-term fishery planning, highlight heterogeneity in individual decision-making, and illustrate the value of standardized creel data for evaluating angling behavior.

Non-exclusive group contests: An experimental analysis

We experimentally study a non-exclusive group contest in which contestants actively participate in multiple groups simultaneously. We compare the results of this contest to those of an exclusive group contest in which each contestant belongs to a single group. In contrast to theoretical predictions, we find that the non-exclusive group contest generates less aggregate effort than the equivalent exclusive group contest. We hypothesize that groups in the non-exclusive group contest are less responsive to their rival group’s effort than those in the exclusive group contest. Likewise, on the individual level, players in the non-exclusive group contest are more likely to free-ride on their group members’ contributions. Our data indicate that non-free-riders in the non-exclusive group contest are more likely, over time, to allocate their effort toward a single group. This finding is consistent with previous findings that players facing a complex strategy space tend to focus on specific winning combinations. Moreover, given that players are affected by their group members’ contributions, they tend to exert their effort primarily toward a single group. Taken together, our findings suggest that a non-exclusive group contest may evolve, over time, into an exclusive group contest.

Sequential round-robin tournaments with multiple prizes

We examine the fairness and intensity of sequential round-robin tournaments with multiple prizes and heterogeneous players. A tournament is called fair if the winning probabilities in each match depend only on the players' characteristics but not on the sequence of matches. We show that tournaments with three players will be fair if and only if the second prize is valued half of the first prize. The optimal prize structure may, however, be subject to a trade-off between fairness and intensity (measured by the players' expected aggregate effort). By contrast, there is no prize structure for which tournaments with more than three players will be fair if the sequence of matches is exogenously fixed. Our analysis suggests that many tournaments of major sporting events are inherently unfair.

Entry regulations and optimal prize allocation in parallel contests

In parallel contests, the contest organizer controls the entry of heterogeneous contestants by regulating access to the contests and determining the prize allocation across contests. The organizer can prevent a contestant from entering more than one contest. I show that the organizer allows entry to multiple contests and uniquely sets identical prizes across contests to maximize aggregate effort in all contests. Independent of the entry regulation, I find no sorting effects. Thus, a contest with a relatively high prize does not necessarily attract contestants with higher abilities. Furthermore, I discover interesting spillover effects of prizes between contests in the case of restricted entry regulations. For instance, the individual (aggregate) effort increases (decreases) in a contest if the prize in another contest increases. The endogeneity of contestants’ participation drives many of these results.

A partially exclusive rent-seeking contest

This study presents a novel contest model in which interest groups compete for partially exclusive rents, and the number of winners is endogenous. Partial exclusivity can explain the low empirical estimates of rent dissipation that create the Tullock paradox. However, partial exclusivity also increases aggregate effort and social waste. The effort-maximising contest design follows a simple rule of limiting the expected number of winners to half the number of contestants.