prices during the industrial revolution. His exploration of the partial evidence on current values of exports and on the East India Company's sales contributed significantly to our understanding of price movements during this period. His work stimulated my research in the surviving firm records. None the less, I continue to believe that he is mistaken in his conclusions. Three issues require response. First, he argues that his cotton textile prices estimate seriously undermines the Crafts-Harley view of British economic growth. Second, he maintains that my procedure seriously underestimates the decline in the price of cotton textiles between the 1790s and the end of the Napoleonic Wars. And third, he asserts the superiority of his estimates based on export valuations. I wish to challenge all three of these assertions. The Crafts-Harley view, properly understood, would not be weakened if cotton textile prices, in fact, fell as fast as Cuenca asserts. However, analytic issues we have discussed but have not emphasized in our presentations would now need emphasis. Certainly gaps in the data make the series of cotton textile prices that I presented weaker than I could hope, but Cuenca's alternative calculations rely on a serious misunderstanding and some questionable assertions. Finally, his belief in the a priori superiority of the trade data cannot be accepted. I While there is no doubt that competing estimates of the rate of decline of cotton textile prices significantly affect interpretation of the history of cotton textiles, I would like first to confront their importance to our understanding of the beginnings of sustained growth in British per caput income. The Crafts-Harley challenge to previously held views of the industrial revolution arose from re-examination of Hoffmann's and Deane and Cole's industrial production estimates. We found no evidence of significant acceleration in per caput growth in any but the famous industries. When we constructed new industrial production indices, largely using Hoffmann's sources, we found that the pioneering estimates had unintentionally overstated aggregate growth. The modest per caput acceleration in the growth of aggregate industrial production that our calculations revealed came almost entirely from the famous industries. Furthermore, our lower estimates of the growth of industrial production led to the conclusion that per caput growth of British national income had been modest before the railway age.