Agent-structure Problem Research Articles

Boudon, Realism, and the Cognitive Habitus: Why an Explanation of Inequality / Difference Cannot be Limited to a Model of Secondary Effects

Boudon has distinguished between the primary and secondary effects of socialization as a cause of social disparities in education. His explanation of secondary effects, which rests on an analysis of decision-making within opportunity cost constraints, has attracted support from realist sociologists. The empirical evidence, however, suggests that primary effects, largely the result of cognitive socialization in early childhood, may be a more important source of variance than Boudon recognizes. Some implications of this for a general theory of inequality/difference are examined with reference to the character of social explanation and in the context of the realist discussion on the structure-agency problem.

Interaction Ritual Chains. By Randall Collins. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004. Pp. xxii+439. $45.00.

Previous articleNext article No AccessBook ReviewInteraction Ritual Chains. By Randall Collins. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004. Pp. xxii+439. $45.00.Richard MünchRichard MünchUniversity of Bamberg Search for more articles by this author University of BambergPDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by American Journal of Sociology Volume 110, Number 5March 2005 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/431625 Views: 398Total views on this site Citations: 3Citations are reported from Crossref Permission to reprint a book review printed in this section may be obtained only from the author.PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Anthony King Emotion, interaction and the structure-agency problem: Building on the sociology of Randall Collins, Thesis Eleven 154, no.11 (Sep 2019): 38–51.https://doi.org/10.1177/0725513619874929Lauren A. Rivera Go with Your Gut: Emotion and Evaluation in Job Interviews, American Journal of Sociology 120, no.55 (Oct 2015): 1339–1389.https://doi.org/10.1086/681214Paddy Dolan, John Connolly Emotions, Violence and Social Belonging: An Eliasian Analysis of Sports Spectatorship, Sociology 48, no.22 (Apr 2014): 284–299.https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038512474729

The Missing Link Between Structure and Agency: Outline of an Evolutionary Approach to Social Movements

Theories of political opportunity structure (POS) have received ambiguous empirical support. Quite a few studies make a convincing case for POS, some find it to have no measurable effect, others show that it can have different effects in different contexts. The lack of a theory of the mechanisms that link POS to movement action is identified as the fundamental problem behind these divergent results. I suggest a dynamic and relational solution to the structureagency problem that employs an evolutionary mode of causal explanation. I show how such an approach helps us to understand why in spite of limited information and frequent errors of judgment, actors' choices may ultimately reflect structural opportunities. I also discuss how an evolutionary approach can help explain deviations from the predictions of POS theory, e.g., why adaptation to changes in POS is slow, why opportunities are sometimes missed, and why those that are perceived cannot always be seized. I conclude with a discussion of some methodological implications.

The Agent-Structure Problem and Institutional Racism

My aim here is to demonstrate the relevance of meta-theoretical speculation to policy design and implementation through an examination of the agent—structure problem. I then apply this problem to the concept of institutional racism as developed in the Macpherson inquiry into the death and subsequent police (mis)investigation of black teenager Stephen Lawrence. When considered through the lens of the agent—structure problem, the account of institutional racism developed in the Macpherson inquiry still lacks a solid analysis of the structural causes that help explain the phenomenon. Policies developed on the basis of the account will necessarily fail to address some of the causes of institutional racism. Careful attention to the agent—structure problem can help illuminate potentially unexplored areas of the social field that might help in controlling or eradicating racism.

Critical Realism and Critical Philosophy

(2002). Critical Realism and Critical Philosophy. Journal of Critical Realism: Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 49-66.

They Shoot Dead Horses Don't They?

Although the agent-structure problem has been the subject of intense debate within International Relations the focus has been on epistemological problems or reconceptualizations of structure. This article attempts to redress the balance between agents and structures by outlining a theory of agency that shows the manner in which agency is embedded within, and dependent upon, structural contexts. The article takes as a starting point Roxanne Lynn Doty's poststructuralist attempt to address the agent-structure problem and provides a critique of her attempt to locate agency in the indeterminancy of structures. Doty's poststructuralist approach to this problem re-inscribes structuralist determinism predicated upon empiricist ontology. Specifically, it is argued that Doty's approach to this perennial problem rests upon — (i) a mischaracterization of the problem; (ii) an oppositional logic; and, (iii) a series of misunderstandings of the accounts of agency and structure embedded within contemporary approaches to this problem. The article suggests a multi-layered approach to the issue of agency in an attempt to go beyond the aporia identified by Doty.

Institutions and Time: Problems of Conceptualization and Explanation

The new institutionalism in the social sciences has returned questions of the role of institutions to a central position in the social sciences. As important as this has been, it has also helped disclose a number of inherent problems in institutional theory. The structure-agency problem—how to relate change to presumably stable structures—is particularly significant in the theory. This article discusses a variety of approaches to new institutionalism and then points to the way in which each copes with ideas of changing structures that presumably serve as relatively stable guides for action. These theoretical points are illustrated with examples drawn from contemporary administrative reform.

Aporia:

In this article I examine some significant problems found in current discussions of the `agent-structure' problem in international relations, suggesting that they result in serious gaps and silences. However, I also argue that important openings can be found that point to a more critical, if unsettling, way of conceptualizing agents and structures and the relations between them. Specifically, I interrogate the issues of practices, discourse, and contexts of meanings that are implicit in existing approaches and argue that taking seriously the indeterminancy and undecidability of practice has important implications for the agent-structure problem both in terms of ontological assumptions as well as concrete empirical research.

Revolutionary Collective Action and the Agent-Structure Problem

Unraveling the nexus between agents and structures is fundamental to an understanding of political and social change. The two most prominent methodological approaches to explain revolutionary collective action involve either individual reductionism or structural reductionism. Both approaches result in theoretical inconsistencies and/or explanatory anomalies. An alternative proposed here utilizes the concept offramingdeveloped in behavioral decision theory primarily by Quatrone and Tversky. It directly addresses the agent-structure problem by developing the proposition that individuals evoke alternative decision rules in different structural contexts. The result is greater theoretical coherence and resolution of anomalous cases. Additionally, this model begins to define a new role for ideology in explanations of revolutionary collective action.

Levels of analysis vs. agents and structures: part III

I welcome this opportunity to respond to Martin Hollis and Steve Smith's ‘Beware of Gurus: Structure and Action in International Relations’, their reply to my review2 of their book, Explaining and Understanding International Relations. Their constructive comments have helped me clarify my own thinking, and I hope by extending my previous remarks in the same constructive spirit I can return the favour. In ‘Beware of Gurus’ they took up both issues I raised about their book: the relationship between the levels-of-analysis and agent-structure problems, and that between causal and interpretive explanations. In part for reasons of economy and interest, and in part being more persuaded by their comments regarding to the latter, I shall limit myself here to the former, taking issue in particular with what I see as their reduction of the agent-structure problem to one of levels-of-analysis.

Beware of gurus: structure and action In International relations

The agent-structure problem is not settled by deciding what proportions to put in the blender. Agents and structures do not blend easily in any proportions, and solutions to the problem tend to be unstable. Alexander Wendt's thoughtful review article makes this clear, identifies some of the difficulties, and boldly sketches a possible resolution of them. Since his relections are addressed in part to our recent book Explaining and Understanding International Relations, we welcome the chance to pursue them further. Greatly encouraged by his many friendly comments, we shall concentrate on those suggestive or critical points which have prompted us to think afresh.

What's at stake in the agent-structure debate?

Recent developments in the philosophy of science, particularly those falling under the rubric of “scientific realism,” have earned growing recognition among theorists of international relations but have failed to generate substantive programs of research. Consequently, the empirical relevance of much philosophical discourse, such as that centering on the agent-structure problem in social theory, remains unestablished. This article attempts to bridge the gap between the philosophy and practice of science by outlining a model of international structure based on the principles of scientific realism and by considering its implications for a structural research program in international relations theory. Appealing to Imre Lakatos's methodology of theorychoice, the article presents an ontological case for adopting a “transformational” model of structure over the “positional” model developed in the work of Kenneth Waltz. The article demonstrates that the positional approach offers no conceptual or explanatory hold on those features of the international structure that are the intended products of state action. In conclusion, the article argues that the stakes in the agent-structure debate include the capacity to generate integrative structural theory and the ability to theorize the possibilities for peaceful change in the international system.

The agent-structure problem in international relations theory

While neorealism and world-system theory both claim to be “structural” theories of international relations, they embody very different understandings of system structure and structural explanation. Neorealists conceptualize system structures in individualist terms as constraining the choices of preexisting state agents, whereas world-system theorists conceptualize system structures in structuralist terms as generating state agents themselves. These differences stem from what are, in some respects, fundamentally opposed solutions to the “agent-structure” or “micromacro” problem. This opposition, however, itself reflects a deeper failure of each theory to recognize the mutually constitutive nature of human agents and system structures—a failure which leads to deep-seated inadequacies in their respective explanations of state action. An alternative solution to the agent-structure problem, adapted from “structuration theory” in sociology, can overcome these inadequacies by avoiding both the reduction of system structures to state actors in neorealism and their reification in world-system theory. Structuration theory requires a philosophical basis in scientific realism, arguably the “new orthodoxy” in the philosophy of natural science, but as yet largely unrecognized by political scientists. The scientific realist/structuration approach generates an agenda for “structural-historical” research into the properties and dispositions of both state actors and the system structures in which they are embedded.