Agency Frictions Research Articles

Risk Aversion and the Financial Accelerator

This paper studies the role of non-diversified risk and risk aversion for business cycles in a model with agency frictions. We extend the Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist(1999) financial accelerator framework where entrepreneurs are risk neutral to the case of entrepreneurs with constant-relative-risk-aversion preferences. In the presence of risk aversion, non-diversified idiosyncratic risk stabilizes business cycle fluctuations, especially in response to financial shocks.

Bank CEO Optimism and the Financial Crisis

I test theories of the recent financial crisis by studying how banks' pre-crisis investments connect to their CEOs' beliefs. Using different proxies for beliefs, I find banks with larger housing investments and worse crisis performance had CEOs who were more optimistic ex ante. Banks with the most optimistic CEOs experienced 20 percentage points higher real estate loan growth, and 15 percentage points lower crisis period stock returns. Bank decisions appear consistent with CEO beliefs. CEOs' optimism contributed to credit expansions and crisis losses. I do not find evidence that CEOs made housing investments due to agency frictions while aware of impending problems.

The Agency Credit Spread

We study the impact of agency frictions on the price of defaultable debt in the context of a structural model of corporate decisions. Our model features dynamic investment and long-term debt financing, thus allowing us to analyze many types of possible agency distortions: under- and over-investment, debt claim dilution and excess dividend distributions. We show that shareholders’ incentives to deviate from firm (i.e., equity plus debt) value optimizing policies contribute a significant part of a firm’s credit spread, which we refer to as the agency credit spread. As deviations from firm value maximizing policies are most significant when the firm approaches financial distress, typically in economic downturns, the agency credit spread is large. We find that the mismatch in the maturity of assets and liabilities, the liquidation cost of assets, and the operating leverage of the firm are positively associated with the theoretical agency credit spread. We confirm those predictions in a sample of large S&P500 firms.

Costly external finance and labor market dynamics

We study the role of agency frictions and costly external finance in cyclical labor market dynamics, with a focus on how credit-market frictions may amplify aggregate TFP shocks. The main result is that aggregate TFP shocks lead to large fluctuations of labor market quantities if the model is calibrated to the empirically observed countercyclicality of the finance premium. A financial accelerator mechanism thus amplifies labor market fluctuations by rendering rigidity in real wage dynamics. In contrast, if the finance premium is procyclical, which the model can be parameterized to accommodate, amplification is absent, and labor-market fluctuations display the Shimer (2005) puzzle.

Horizon-Induced Optimism as a Gateway to Earnings Management

Recent work in accounting suggests that managerial optimism can lead managers to escalate income-increasing earnings management. In this paper, I examine how a fundamental attribute of the earnings management setting – the amount of time between the earnings management decision and the future reversal – serves as one potential source of managerial optimism. I conduct two experiments to test whether the amount of time between the earnings management decision and the future reversal systematically induces optimism that increases participants’ propensity to engage in behavior that is analogous to accruals-based earnings management and to real earnings management, holding constant incentives, agency frictions, and the information environment. My results indicate that, independent of their innate optimism, the time between the earnings management decision and the future reversal likely encourages managers to overestimate their ability to compensate for current-period earnings management through strong future performance. This optimism, in turn, likely increases managers’ propensity to engage in both forms of earnings management.

Agency Conflicts, Earnings Management, and Conservatism

This paper examines the role of conservatism when an agent can manipulate upcoming earnings before all uncertainty is resolved. An increase in conservatism, by reducing the likelihood of favorable earnings, requires steeper performance pay to maintain the same level of incentives, which in turn increases the equilibrium earnings manipulation. Trade-offs between inducing effort and curbing manipulation predict an interior level of conservatism as optimal. The optimal level of conservatism is positively associated with enforcement, economic profitability and earnings quality, and negatively associated with agency frictions. In particular, we show that more economically profitable firms choose to be more conservative. We also establish that the association between performance pay and manipulation identifies whether conservatism is optimally chosen or exogenously imposed. In an application to debt contracting, we show that optimal conservatism is negatively associated with borrowers’ bargaining power.

Risk-bearing by the state: When is it good public policy?

The global financial crisis brought government guarantees to the forefront of the debate. Based on a review of frictions that hinder financial contracting, this paper concludes that the common justifications for government guarantees—i.e., principal-agent frictions or un-internalized externalities in an environment of risk neutrality—are flawed. Even where risk is purely idiosyncratic—and thus diversifiable in principle—government guarantees (typically granted via development banks/agencies) can be justified if private lenders are risk averse and because of the state's comparative advantage over markets in resolving the collective action frictions that hinder risk spreading. To exploit this advantage while keeping moral hazard in check, however, development banks/agencies have to price their guarantees fairly, crowd in the private sector, and reduce their excessive risk aversion. The latter requires overcoming agency frictions between managers and owner (the state), which would likely entail a significant reshaping of development banks’ mandates, governance, and risk management systems.

Agency Costs, Information, and the Structure of Corporate Debt Covenants

We analyze the determinants of covenant structure in private debt contracts. While previous studies have demonstrated a relationship between firm characteristics and the overall strictness of loan contracts, few studies have examined why covenants are written on a range of accounting variables and what determines their selective use. Using a simple model of firm investment where firms face uncertain cash flows and investment opportunities, we characterize the conditions under which it is optimal for a debt contract to specify a restriction on investment or to specify a minimum cash flow realization. Consistent with this model, we find that the application of covenants based on these variables is not necessarily monotonic in firm risk. While the financially riskiest firms tend to employ capital expenditure covenants, cash flow and net worth covenants are most common among moderately risky firms with greater profitability and firms with stronger banking relationships. The results also highlight the importance of debt covenants in both mitigating agency frictions and maximizing the value of future private information.

Credit Default Swaps and Sovereign Debt with Moral Hazard and Debt Renegotiation

A defining friction of sovereign debt is the lack of collateral that can back sovereign borrowing. This paper shows that credit default swaps (CDS) can serve as collateral and thereby support more sovereign borrowing. By giving more bargaining power to lenders in ex-post debt renegotiations, CDS becomes a commitment device for lenders to extract more repayment from the debtor country. This ex-post disciplining effect during debt renegotiations better aligns the sovereign's ex-ante incentives with that of the lender. CDS alleviates agency frictions that are present in any lending contracts but are particularly difficult to mitigate in sovereign debt context. As a result, CDS enables the borrower to raise more external capital.

Limits of Arbitrage

We survey theoretical developments in the literature on the limits of arbitrage. This literature investigates how costs faced by arbitrageurs can prevent them from eliminating mispricings and providing liquidity to other investors. Research in this area is currently evolving into a broader agenda, emphasizing the role of financial institutions and agency frictions for asset prices. This research has the potential to explain so-called market anomalies and inform welfare and policy debates about asset markets. We begin with examples of demand shocks that generate mispricings, arguing that they can stem from behavioral or from institutional considerations. We next survey, and nest within a simple model, the following costs faced by arbitrageurs: (a) risk, both fundamental and nonfundamental; (b) short-selling costs; (c) leverage and margin constraints; and (d) constraints on equity capital. We finally discuss implications for welfare and policy and suggest directions for future research.

Limits of Arbitrage: The State of the Theory

We survey theoretical developments in the literature on the limits of arbitrage. This literature investigates how costs faced by arbitrageurs can prevent them from eliminating mispricings and providing liquidity to other investors. Research in this area is currently evolving into a broader agenda emphasizing the role of financial institutions and agency frictions for asset prices. This research has the potential to explain so-called market anomalies and inform welfare and policy debates about asset markets. We begin with examples of demand shocks that generate mispricings, arguing that they can stem from behavioral or from institutional considerations. We next survey, and nest within a simple model, the following costs faced by arbitrageurs: (i) risk, both fundamental and non-fundamental, (ii) short-selling costs, (iii) leverage and margin constraints, and (iv) constraints on equity capital. We finally discuss implications for welfare and policy, and suggest directions for future research.

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Limits of Arbitrage: The State of the Theory

We survey theoretical developments in the literature on the limits of arbitrage. This literature investigates how costs faced by arbitrageurs can prevent them from eliminating mispricings and providing liquidity to other investors. Research in this area is currently evolving into a broader agenda emphasizing the role of financial institutions and agency frictions for asset prices. This research has the potential to explain so-called market anomalies and inform welfare and policy debates about asset markets. We begin with examples of demand shocks that generate mispricings, arguing that they can stem from behavioral or from institutional considerations. We next survey, and nest within a simple model, the following costs faced by arbitrageurs: (i) risk, both fundamental and non-fundamental, (ii) short-selling costs, (iii) leverage and margin constraints, and (iv) constraints on equity capital. We finally discuss implications for welfare and policy, and suggest directions for future research.

Capital Market Pressure, Disclosure Frequency-Induced Earnings/Cash Flow Conflict, and Managerial Myopia (Retracted)

We examine the effects of increased capital market pressure and disclosure frequency-induced earnings/cash flow conflict on myopic behavior. In our experiments, experienced financial managers choose between projects where a conflict exists between near-term earnings and total cash flow. Managers more often choose projects that they believe will maximize short-term earnings (and price) as opposed to total cash flows in response to increased capital market pressure resulting from a pending stock issuance, holding constant agency frictions and other stock market pressures. When faced with increased capital market pressure, changes in disclosure frequency cause managers to behave more or less myopically depending on the impact of the change on the pattern of earnings and the resulting earnings/cash flow conflict. Our study provides insights into managers' beliefs about stock market pressures, mandatory reporting, and the availability of alternative communications channels, and contributes to literature on managerial myopia and earnings management, as well as current debates over disclosure frequency.