Agency Delegation Research Articles

Programmatic alcohol advertising, social media and public health: Algorithms, automated challenges to regulation, and the failure of public oversight.

Ongoing partnerships between transnational alcohol corporations and global social media platforms have transformed alcohol advertising in ways that undermine existing marketing regulations and threaten all forms of public oversight. In this paper I analyse this historic shift, arguing that new forms of programmatic alcohol advertising have emerged out of increasingly intensive processes of datafication on social media. Programmatic advertising is distinguished by increasing automation, turning advertising into a process of continually experimenting on the public to optimise advertising's "outputs", which now include conversions (sales). This experimental process relies on the delegation of agency to profit maximising, algorithmic machines that make alcohol advertising decisions with public health consequences. I contend that public health must now grapple with "algorithmic sovereignty": how private, corporate machines make decisions that challenge regulation and public oversight. Drawing on a case study of Meta's programmatic systems, I argue programmatic alcohol advertising exacerbates existing problems for the regulatory control of alcohol advertising on social media, while introducing entirely novel concerns. Machines make decisions in ways that are efficacious yet obscure, even to those who design and own them and to those who use them for marketing purposes. They allow for the maximisation of profit while obfuscating public oversight of the health impacts of alcohol advertising, and they make decisions in ways that are both predictive and pre-emptive, continuously nudging social media users towards consumption through altering, in real-time, the personalised content they encounter. This leaves established means for public oversight of alcohol marketing operating retrospectively while commodification of social life through alcohol advertising acts in the present to reshape the future. The machinic vision of programmatic alcohol advertising assesses social media users for their commercial utility, not as citizens with health needs, and may be producing evolving negative health outcomes that will only ever be understood in retrospect once their deleterious impact has become evident. Steps towards more effective public health interventions must begin with clearer recognition of these fundamental changes in advertising.

The sense of agency in emerging technologies for human-computer integration: A review.

Human–computer integration is an emerging area in which the boundary between humans and technology is blurred as users and computers work collaboratively and share agency to execute tasks. The sense of agency (SoA) is an experience that arises by a combination of a voluntary motor action and sensory evidence whether the corresponding body movements have somehow influenced the course of external events. The SoA is not only a key part of our experiences in daily life but also in our interaction with technology as it gives us the feeling of “I did that” as opposed to “the system did that,” thus supporting a feeling of being in control. This feeling becomes critical with human–computer integration, wherein emerging technology directly influences people’s body, their actions, and the resulting outcomes. In this review, we analyse and classify current integration technologies based on what we currently know about agency in the literature, and propose a distinction between body augmentation, action augmentation, and outcome augmentation. For each category, we describe agency considerations and markers of differentiation that illustrate a relationship between assistance level (low, high), agency delegation (human, technology), and integration type (fusion, symbiosis). We conclude with a reflection on the opportunities and challenges of integrating humans with computers, and finalise with an expanded definition of human–computer integration including agency aspects which we consider to be particularly relevant. The aim this review is to provide researchers and practitioners with guidelines to situate their work within the integration research agenda and consider the implications of any technologies on SoA, and thus overall user experience when designing future technology.

Taming Sherman's Wilderness

There is little doubt that Congress intended economic regulation under the Sherman Act to develop with flexibility — case-by-case, claim-by-claim. Yet, given the unusual level of interpretation the Act requires, the effort to supply the content of its sweeping prohibitions more closely resembles policy formulation than statutory interpretation. The vagueness of the Sherman Act’s text needs a remedy that a century’s worth of judicial gloss has failed to provide. The modernization of our economy demands a modernized antitrust regime, and reliance on the customary techniques of judicial reasoning may now make less sense. The judiciary is certainly apt to reason by way of analogy and precedent, but the regulatory task increasingly demands enlightened, data-driven analysis. The combination of widespread declines in competition, disagreements over fundamental antitrust philosophies, and fresh swells of public and political fervor demand that Congress do what it did in 1890: respond by updating antitrust’s policy making approach. An additional step toward taming the the economic wilds — toward optimizing clarity, predictability, and outcomes — might be to shift the task of interpreting the Sherman Act to an antitrust agency. Yet, even while an agency solution may be viable, there are some drawbacks. Namely, there are constitutional objections to which the Sherman Act may be vulnerable — under separation of powers principles, such as the nondelegation doctrine, as well as void for vagueness principles — especially if an agency delegation were not accompanied by some level of additional textual clarity.

To Make a Rainbow - God's Work in Nature

The Torah lays out a rich idea of God’s governance in the Scroll of Esther: Circumstance lays the warp, but human choices weave the woof of destiny. God remains unseen. Delegation of agency, including human freedom, is implicit in the act of creation: God does not clutch efficacy jealously to his breast. Biblically, God acts through nature, making the elements his servitors. Miracles do not violate God’s covenant with nature. Maimonides, following rabbinic homilies, finds them embedded in that covenant. Divine agency is clearest today in evolution and its special case, the emergence of autonomy and the rise of consciousness and personhood.

The political economy of technofetishism

The ethnography of human-object relations in native Amazonia can help to illuminate the role of technological artifacts in modern society. Rather than abandon the categories of subject and object and of Society and Nature, as suggested by proponents of the ontological turn, anthropologists can compare subject-object transformations and the naturalization of social power relations in the two contexts. In native Amazonian animism the attribution of subjectivity and agency to artifacts often includes personhood and intentionality, while in modernity technological objects tend to be perceived merely as autonomous agents, but both these kinds of perceptions can be understood as statements about fetishized social relations. In the former case an external observer can conclude that the delegation of agency to artefacts is dependent on human consciousness, while it is generally believed that technology operates independently of human perceptions. However, in acknowledging the ultimate dependence of modern technology on exchange rates and financial strategies in a globalized economy, we realize that the agency of modern artifacts is also dependent on human subjectivity. In shifting the focus of comparative anthropology from ontology to political economy, we can detect that modern technology is a globalized form of magic.

Innovative Agency Flow: The Case of Whitewater Paddling Community

This paper investigates the innovation activity in an amateur community. It implements the case study method to analyze the intensive innovation creation process that was going on in the whitewater paddling community during the last two decades of the twentieth century. We apply the notion innovative agency to get a deeper understating of the process of innovation creation, and to identify all actors of innovation. Further we trace the process of innovative agency delegation between actors. We find out that two radical innovations and many incremental innovations emerged in this community. We conclude that their emergence was shaped by creative and competitive environment of the whitewater paddling community.

Meroni Circumvented? Article 114 TFEU and EU Regulatory Agencies

This paper conceptualizes the somewhat neglected constitutional and constitutive roles of Article 114 TFEU in the establishment and functioning of EU integrated market supervision mechanisms. Relying on a virtually unlimited interpretation of that provision by the Court of Justice, EU institutions and Member States have been able to design an institutional ‘supranational operational support’ narrative that allowed for the expansion of supranational agencies as extensions of national supervisory bodies operating in an EU integrated administration framework. This paper submits that this interpretation of Article 114 TFEU incorporates a template within which a nascent ius commune underlying the organization and operationalization of EU internal market supervision mechanisms can effectively take shape. That template allows for circumvention of some infamous agency delegation limits and grants Member States and national authorities a more direct role in a supranational system of integrated administration. In doing so however, new constitutional problems are created that have not been adequately addressed by the post-Lisbon Treaty framework. This paper identifies those problems and their impact on the emergence of integrated EU market supervision structures.

Democracy on the Margin: Architectural Means of Appropriation in Governmental Alteration of Space

A recurrent dilemma of democracy—how to accommodate the marginal—is addressed here in relation to the possibility for citizens to contribute to changes in urban space. This study investigates the preparatory phase of the architectural renewal of a square, looking at both the general issue of equal rights to space and the more particular question of participation in planning processes. Although official procedures for the inclusion of opinions and rights are in place, marginalisation is seen to ensue from the planning authorities' response to the opinions of the community and individuals concerned. The study presents a theoretical basis for suggesting how an extended categorisation of the delegation of agency in planning policy—possibly also embracing a modification of the architect's role—could influence the borderline between what is regarded as marginal and what is not.

Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules Versus Principles Versus Rents

In our self-regulatory system of corporate law, the job of insisting on trustworthy numbers devolves in the first instance on the gatekeepers. It follows that the auditors take the brunt of the blame and that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (the Act), the legislation intended to address the scandals and restore confidence in the securities markets, responds by regulating the profession. More accurately, Sarbanes-Oxley triggers the start of a political process intended over time to produce a new regulatory regime. The statute follows the standard regulatory strategy of delegating most of the task of devising the new regime's terms to an administrative agency, a new Public Oversight Board (POB). The regulatory outcome remains open accordingly. High financial stakes imply an ongoing political contest over the POB's political and institutional gestalt and the terms of any new regulation. The resulting uncertainty, although regrettable, probably could not have been avoided. Unfortunately, Sarbanes-Oxley does not stop with an open-ended delegation of authority respecting the audit function to a new agency. The Act goes on to address the substance of Generally Accepted Accounting (GAAP). It does this first in section 108(d), which requires the SEC to study the system to ascertain the extent to which it is principles-based, as opposed to rules-based, and to tell us how long it will take for us to achieve a system; and second, in section 108(a), which requires the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and any other approved standards-setting body to adopt procedures ensuring prompt consideration of new rules reflecting international convergence on high quality standards. Given an ongoing political contest respecting the shape of the POB and its regulatory program, critical questions need to be asked about these substantive initiatives. More particularly, this Article asks whether substantive intervention into the articulation of GAAP could trigger just the sort of regulatory error that the agency delegation model, followed in respect of the POB, was intended to avoid. Principles-based accounting and international however desirable in the abstract, have to be considered in light of the institutional contexts in which they would operate and effect consequences. Principles and convergence, by themselves do little to constrain rent-seeking behavior on the part of managers and auditors. Absent antecedent institutional reform that ensures auditor independence and lessens the negative impact of rent-seeking and influence activity on audit quality, perverse effects could follow in the event that sections 108(d) and 108(a) influence GAAP's future shape. Unfortunately, Sarbanes-Oxley does not ensure the requisite institutional reform; it merely holds out the possibility of reform. Part I describes Sarbanes-Oxley's delegation to the POB, surveying the issues the Act leaves open and the ongoing political contest respecting their resolution. Part II situates the principles-based that the Act commends in the context of the Enron disaster. This discussion begins with a story currently in circulation - that Enron exemplifies the abuses of rules-based under GAAP and demonstrates the need to move to principles-based accounting. The discussion then falsifies the story, showing that Enron violated both rules and standards under GAAP. Full responsibility for the disaster goes to the enforcement of GAAP's rules and standards by Enron's auditor rather than to the rules and standards themselves. The discussion then broadens, explaining why the relative merits of rules and principles are being debated in respect of GAAP at this time, and how the principles-based argument rests on a false premise, holding out risks for audit quality.

Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political Theory Perspective

Cost-benefit analysis is analyzed using a model of agency delegation. In this model an agency observes the state of the world and issues a regulation, which the president may approve or reject. Cost-benefit analysis enables the president to observe the state of the world (in one version of the model), or is a signal that an agency may issue (in another version). The roles of the courts, Congress, and interest groups are also considered. It is argued that the introduction of cost-benefit analysis increases the amount of regulation, including the amount of regulation that fails cost-benefit analysis; that the president has no incentive to compel agencies to issue cost-benefit analysis, because agencies will do so when it is in the president's interest, and otherwise will not do so; that presidents benefit from cost-benefit analysis even when they do not seek efficient policies; that agencies and their supporters ought to endorse cost-benefit analysis, not resist it; and that cost-benefit analysis reduces the influence of interest groups. Evidence for these claims is discussed. Finally, it is argued that courts should force agencies to conduct cost-benefit analyses in ordinary conditions, but that they should not force agencies to comply with them.

Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political Theory Perspective

Cost-benefit analysis is analyzed using a model of agency delegation. In this model an agency observes the state of the world and issues a regulation, which the president may approve or reject. Cost-benefit analysis enables the president to observe the state of the world (in one version of the model), or is a signal that an agency may issue (in another version). The roles of the courts, Congress, and interest groups are also considered. It is argued that the introduction of cost-benefit analysis increases the amount of regulation, including the amount of regulation that fails cost-benefit analysis; that the president has no incentive to compel agencies to issue cost-benefit analysis, because agencies will do so when it is in the president’s interest, and otherwise will not do so; that presidents benefit from cost-benefit analysis even when they do not seek efficient policies; that agencies and their supporters ought to endorse cost-benefit analysis, not resist it; and that cost-benefit analysis reduces the influence of interest groups. Evidence for these claims is discussed. Finally, it is argued that courts should force agencies to conduct cost-benefit analyses in ordinary conditions, but that they should not force agencies to comply with them.

Authority of the National and Local Governments under the Constitution

Constitution came to include the principle of local autonomy in its provisions. Second, we will describe how those constitutional provisions regarding the local governments have developed in relation to the national government. These findings will show the centralization of national power and the erosion of local autonomy in postwar Japan. Third, we will describe how local governments today seem to cope with centralized national power. The focus of our discussion of national-local relationships will not be on the state of local autonomy that the Constitution anticipated at the time of its enactment. Instead, the discussion will deal with the state of local autonomy as it has evolved under the Constitution. Local autonomy under the current Constitution is based on the principle of civilian control, and this principle should never be compromised lest characteristics of local autonomy be changed. Otherwise, local identities based on the nature, the culture, and the mentalities of each district may be weakened or even lost. There always must be an adequate sharing of governing functions between the local and central governments. Today, however, the national government tends to manage even matters of local concern as national matters by delegating authority to the heads of the local communities through laws and government ordinances. In Japan this procedure is called agency delegation; however, local government should not be obliged to follow this procedure all the time. In the next section, this article will discuss the specific ways in which autonomy should be practiced.

Information, transaction costs, and the organization of distribution: The case of Japan's general trading companies

This paper develops a transaction cost analysis of the organizational choice for distribution in foreign trade. Implications for the choice between internal organization and agency delegation are drawn and tested with data from Japan's general trading firms. The patterns of agency delegation experienced by these companies are shown to be consistent with the view that the governance cost problems associated with the acquisition and transmission of information have a systematic impact on the organization of trading activities. Specifically, the integrated mode of distribution is ascribed to the hazards of incomplete contracting posed by the existence of a previously disregarded specialized asset, brand name capital.

Common Marketing Agency as a Device for Facilitating Collusion

In a variety of markets firms voluntarily and independently delegate control over certain aspects of marketing to common agents. In this article we present an explicit model of agency delegation where firms noncooperativelY select agents, name output prices, and choose compensation schemes. We exhibit an equilibrium in which all strategic variables-not merely the marketing choices delegated to agents, but prices as well-are selected perfectly cooperatively. This cooperative equilibrium is very simple and attractive. each firm sets the collusive output price, and employs a commission scheme to compensate the agent. Although each

Studies in the Grammar of Early Archaic Chinese

Abstract1. Wei occurs between formally complete sentences, with equal probability of indicating coordinate or conditioned sequence. (Empirically replaceable without change of reference in LAC by yu or tsê ). 2. Wei introduces Time and Place indications. (Empirically replaceable in EAC without change of reference by tsai ). 3. Wei occurs in delegation of agency. (Empirically EAC "Verb/ Delegating Agent/wei" = LAC "Agent/wei/Agent/Verb"). 4. Wei determines verb for modality "wishing and willing" (cf. subjunctive use of in LAC). 5. Wei occurs as restrictive of nouns, "to the exclusion of all else", only", or verbs "merely", and of post-posited elements via the verb "only" (as also it is preserved unchanged in LAC). 6. Wei occurs as verb "to think of", "ponder over" (cf. szu ) and "to wish for, yearn for" (cf. yüan ) (cf. LAC yi-wei "think of as"). 7. Wei occurs as copula in determinative sentences in regular (A/B), reversed (B/A) and modal forms. (Replaceable by shih in LAC where wei as copula is modal). 8. Wei is polar counterpart of fei "it is not so" contra "it is so"; "it is not because" contra "it is because". (Replaceable by shih in LAC, which does not occur in this usage in EAC). 9. Wei, in cause and consequence sequences, introduces cause, whether cause is distributed as wei/cause/consequence, or consequence/wei/cause, or Agent/wei cause/verb (cf. use of wei in LAC in causal sequences).