African State-owned Enterprises Research Articles

The effect of the economic crisis on pay-performance link in South African state-owned enterprises

Purpose: The dissatisfaction with executive remuneration worldwide has increased because it is generally believed to have been instrumental to the 2008 Global Economic crisis. Central to this is the apparent unsatisfactory relationship between business performance and chief executive officer (CEO) remuneration. The primary aim of this study was to compare the pay-for-performance association between CEOs’ remuneration and state-owned entity performance before, during and after the economic crisis. It did so by assessing the chief executive remuneration link with state-owned enterprise performance from the period 2006 to 2014. Design/methodology/approach: Twenty-one schedule 2 state-owned enterprises in South Africa. This quantitative, longitudinal study, obtained secondary data from the annual reports of state-owned enterprises from the period 2006 to 2014. Ordinary least square multiple regression analysis was used as the principal statistical method. Findings/results: The findings indicate that the link between chief executive remuneration and state-owned entity performance demonstrated different patterns in the pre- and post-crisis periods. Practical implications: State-owned entity remuneration committees should place more emphasis on the financial efficiency measurements to enhance efficiencies in South African state-owned enterprises. Shareholders and regulators should take cognisance of measures to be used to assess the potential performance of state-owned entities, through executive remuneration, especially during an economic crisis. Findings could furthermore be of importance to other academics investigating this phenomenon. Originality/value: This research provides additional knowledge to the limited research available on SOEs in South Africa. Further, it reveals that an economic downturn affects the link between CEOs’ remuneration and SOE performance. This addresses a knowledge gap concerning the pay-for-performance link in South African SOEs and in emerging economies in general.

An assessment of corporate governance implementation in state-owned enterprises of the emerging economy

South African state-owned enterprises (SOEs) form a critical cog in the state machinery. The significance of sound corporate governance has become more pronounced as citizens demand more accountability and value in the use of public resources (Vicente, 2020). The paper utilised a qualitative desktop approach, a case study design and thematic analysis to investigate board and executive management practices in the North West Development Corporation (NWDC) corporate governance, factors hindering good corporate governance and lastly recommendations that can be offered to enhance good corporate governance. The NWDC is a regional development finance institution in South Africa, which over the years has continued to implement adverse audit outcomes (AGSA, 2019b). The thematic analysis findings revealed a direct relationship between lack of consequence management and the state of poor corporate governance in the NWDC. The lack of ethical leadership lies at the heart of this morass of SOEs in general. The study, therefore, recommends the full implementation of the existing legislative framework, the Codes on Good Governance and the anti-corruption national strategy in order to inculcate accountability in the South African public agencies that include the NWDC. The paper is relevant in addressing the Auditor-General qualified audits, which underlines the ineffectiveness of the existing SOE governance system by not inherently correlating corporate success with the presence of deeper corporate governance standards and ethical behaviour.

The relationship between the determinants of executive remuneration in South African state-owned enterprises

Orientation: Research on executive remuneration should be able to indicate the necessary elements and dimensions at work when deciding on an executive’s package.Research purpose: The purpose of this article was to review a correlation of elements as determinants of executive remuneration.Motivation for the study: The limited research on executive remuneration tends to focus on how executive pay varies with performance and less on the determinants of executive remuneration.Research design and method: A quantitative research method was used. The target population consisted of executives from 21 South African state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The research design was a cross-sectional study. A categorical multiple regression analysis was performed.Main findings: The research results seem to suggest that there is a significant statistical correlation between organisation size and type of industry; job function and type of industry; organisation size and job function; and the level of education and job function as a determinant of executive remuneration within the context of South African SOEs. However, the extent of the correlations between the determinants of executive remuneration is not the same.Practical/managerial implications: The research results create awareness amongst human resources practitioners and consultants of the extent to which some of the determinants of remuneration may apply in practice.Contribution/value-add: This study highlights the importance of probing further with the effect of size correlation in quantitative research in the context of executive remuneration.

The Governance of State-Owned Enterprises in Africa: an analysis of selected cases

Whilst some literature is of the view that; it is nearly impossible to cultivate good corporate governance culture in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), others believe that new strategies of implementing corporate governance systems together with political will can deliver SOEs out of their efficiency doldrums. This paper presents a scientific analysis of the contentious view on the possibility of creating efficient governance mechanisms in SOEs, explores the effective cost for governance failures in SOEs in Kenya, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Ethiopia. The paper makes conclusions and recommendation that the determinant factor to the success of SOEs in African countries is underpinned on the response of central government to the challenges of SOEs. Structural reforms, good governance, clear objectives and efficiency requires governments to take a decisive position. As a lasting remedial action, knowing which entities and when to offload them through privatisation, is an option in addressing the governance challenges in African SOEs. For strategic SOEs, the paper recommends that governments should consider listing them on public stock exchanges.

Public ‘say on pay’ activism in South Africa: Targets, challengers, themes and impact

Background: Shareholders and other stakeholders in South Africa are increasingly raising their concerns in public about seemingly excessive executive remuneration. Most of their criticism is rooted in the large and growing wage gap in the country.Aim: The authors investigated the nature of the entities whose executive remuneration policies and practices were publicly criticised, the types of challengers involved in this social movement, key issues raised and the impact that the challengers had on the targeted executives’ remuneration.Setting: Public activism involving five South African state-owned enterprises and 38 companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.Methods: Executives and entities that were targeted in public were identified from three online financial newspapers published between 01 January 2010 and 31 December 2016. A total of 92 events were recorded involving 65 executives. Data on these executives’ emolument and three control variables were sourced from Bloomberg. Descriptive statistics and mixed-model analysis of variance tests were employed to evaluate the quantitative secondary data.Results: In line with the extant literature, most of the targets were large, well-known companies. Individual and minority shareholders represented the largest category of challengers, followed by asset managers and trade unions. The vast majority of concerns centred on the size and composition of executives’ packages and insufficient justifications provided by remuneration committees. The total pay, bonuses and other performance-based incentives decreased significantly in the year after the companies were publicly targeted.Conclusion: The findings suggest that public ‘say on pay’ activism can be an effective mechanism in addressing seemingly excessive executive emolument.

The relationship between chief executive officer compensation and the size and industry of South African state-owned enterprises

Orientation: Concerns about exorbitant executive compensation are making headlines, because executives receive lucrative packages despite state-owned enterprises (SOEs) performing poorly. It appears as if chief executive officers (CEOs) are not being held accountable for the performance of the SOEs.Research purpose: The purpose of the study was to determine whether the size and the industry of an SOE had an impact on CEO compensation packages.Motivation for the study: A greater understanding of the relationship between CEO remuneration and the size and type of industry of SOEs would assist with the standardisation of CEO remuneration and linking CEO pay to SOE performance.Research approach/design and method: A multiple regression analysis on a pooled dataset of 162 panel observations was conducted over a 9-year period. Financial data of 18 SOEs were extracted from the McGregor BFA database and the annual reports of SOEs.Main findings: The findings show that the size of an SOE does not influence the total compensation of CEOs. However, larger SOEs pay larger bonuses due to these SOEs being in a stronger financial position to offer lucrative bonuses. CEO’s remuneration was aligned within certain industries.Practical/managerial implications: The findings emphasise the need to link CEO compensation with SOE performance. Standardisation in setting CEO compensation and implementing performance contracts should be considered.Contribution/value-add: The study confirms that CEO pay is not linked to performance and not justified when considering SOE size or industry.

Determinants of executive compensation in South African state-owned enterprises

This research explores the determinants of executive compensation in South African state-owned enterprises (SOEs). A quantitative research approach wasfollowed and secondary data analysis was carried out. The target population consisted of 222 executives in 21 SOEs. This research has shown that the size of the organisation, type of industry and job function can be considered significant and positive determinants of executive compensation in South African SOEs. The findings of the present research also show that demographic characteristics are not significant determinants of executive compensation and should therefore not be taken into consideration when determining executive compensation in South African SOEs.

Executive Remuneration: Industry and Job Family Effects

ABSTRACTThis research explores the distribution of executive remuneration based on the type of industry and job family in South African state-owned enterprises. A regression analysis of secondary data collected on 222 executives was conducted. The overall results based on pairwise comparison suggest that the distribution of executive remuneration across various categories of industry was the same except between forestry—defense, forestry—telecommunications, defense—telecommunications, and energy—development funding. However, the results also indicated that there was no difference in the distribution of remuneration across various categories of job families in South African state-owned enterprises.

Executive compensation: executive attributes and group decision-making effects in South African state owned enterprises

Executive attributes and group decision making effects are explored in the determination of executive compensation. A purposive sample was drawn, which comprised 20 respondents chosen for their expertise relating to executive remuneration in South African state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The study was carried out by conducting primary data collection through one-to-one interviews. Thematic analysis technique was utilised for data analysis. Findings in this study describe executive compensation as a fit between executive attributes and organisational strategic objectives, and multi-perspective engagement of all critical stakeholders of the organisation which includes internal and external sources.

Governance at South African state‐owned enterprises: what do annual reports and the print media tell us?

PurposeThe overall objective of the study was to track, over a two‐year period, the reported incidences of corporate governance transgressions at five strategic South African state‐owned enterprises (SOEs).Design/methodology/approachTransgressions for each SOE were documented against the Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development's framework of best practice in governance for SOEs by reviewing annual reports and newspaper article citations over a two‐year period.FindingsWhile political intervention in the operational running of each SOE is apparent, government appears not to have fulfilled its oversight role of ensuring the sound governance of SOEs according to best practices. While the SOEs appear to comply with external governance demands, compliance to internal, self‐regulated governance appears to be lacking.Research limitations/implicationsThe use of annual reports and media reports to document governance practices are open to subjectivity. The broader extrapolation of findings based on five SOEs must be undertaken with caution.Practical implicationsThe present study alerts government to potential areas of corporate governance practices at South African SOEs that warrant attention. As South Africa has recently joined the BRICS bloc of developing countries, the findings from the present study could afford a starting point for future comparative study among this group of countries, which appears to evidence similar challenges with regard to governance within their SOEs.Originality/valueThe present study begins to elevate the debate on corporate governance at South African SOEs from public rhetoric to a deeper understanding of the nature of the major problems that warrant attention. Although limited in scope, the study contributes to the scarce academic literature on public sector corporate governance in Africa in general, and in the South African SOE sector in particular.

Back to the Future for African Infrastructure? Why State-Ownership is No More Promising the Second Time Around

Too many African state-owned enterprises (SOEs), particularly those in infrastructure sectors, have a long history of poor performance. African governments and donors labored through the 1970s and 1980s to improve SOE performance through “commercialization”— —i.e., methods short of ownership change. These generally failed, giving rise, in the 1990s, to much more heavy reliance on private sector participation and ownership. This approach produced some successes, but Africa’s private participation in infrastructure (PPI) initiatives have been comparatively few and weak. A number of those that have been launched have run into problems, to the point where both investor and African government interest in the approach has waned in the last few years. The reform is not popular—surveys of public opinion in 15 African countries reveal that only a third of respondents prefer private to stateowned firms. Nonetheless, African states (and their supporters) should not jettison the PPI approach. Rather, they should acknowledge its limitations, and recognize the large scope and moderate pace of the preparatory measures required both to improve their investment climates and to make PPI work effectively.

The Evolution of Enterprise Reform in Africa: From State-Owned Enterprises to Private Participation in Infrastructure - and Back?

Many African state-owned enterprises (SOEs), particularly those in infrastructure, have a long history of poor performance. From the outset, SOE financial and economic performance generally failed to meet the expectations of their creators and funders. By the late 1970s, the situation was alarming, and by early 1980s, critical. The poor financial performance of SOEs became so burdensome to government budgets that it attracted the attention of the international financial institutions, or IFIs. In response, in the 1980s, the World Bank approved SOE reforms that could be summed up in the term commercialization. By the mid-1990s, however, the idea of making SOEs function efficiently and effectively under government management was largely abandoned by the IFIs and privatization and private participation in infrastructure, or PPI became the order of the day. Once more, however, the results were disappointing. PPI has not been as widely adopted as anticipated, nor has it generated the massive resources and changes hoped for, nor has it been widely accepted as beneficial by the African public. The findings of recent studies in Africa suggest that PPI should not be jettisoned, and that the more productive path is to recognize the limitations of the approach, and to work harder at creating the conditions needed to make it function effectively. This will entail, as many have recognized, an end to the view that public and private infrastructure provision is a dichotomy - a case of either-or, one or the other - and a better appreciation of the extent to which the performance of each is dependent on the competence of the other. In other words, for the private sector to perform well, public sector capacity must be enhanced. Moreover, proposed tactics of reform should fit more closely with the expectations and sentiments of the affected government, consumer base, and general population. This broader approach implies, probably, a reduction in the scope and, certainly, a reduction in the planned speed of operations. Improving infrastructure performance is a long-term matter.