African Rulers Research Articles

National Design and State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa

This article examines the political geography of state building in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa. The absence of interstate war has produced a unique situation for contemporary state builders in Africa—they have inherited states with relatively fixed borders encapsulating a variety of environmental and geographic conditions, compounded by varying distributions of population densities. The author examines the effects of a variety of strategies that African rulers have employed to enhance their state-building efforts given the type of national design they inhabit. These strategies include the allocation of citizenship, interventions in land tenure patterns, and the adoption and management of national currencies. The author tests the effects of these strategies on several dimensions of state capacity in sub-Saharan Africa from 1960 to 2004 using a variety of statistical analyses. The results indicate that the strategies currently adopted by African rulers have generally failed to substantially augment their capacity.

Chief Zibi Sidinane: Negotiating Moravian Christianity and Settlements in “Nomansland”

The overall context of this article is the interaction between black African rulers, the white Christian missionaries, and the white colonial authorities in late nineteenth century South Africa, as a rapidly changing society increasingly privileged the white population.1 Many black rulers tried to strengthen their positions in troubled and contested regions by calling on the help of Christian missionaries who in their turn saw these requests from black African rulers as golden opportunities for gaining access to peoples otherwise only reached with great difficulty. Thus, mutually beneficial relationships were possible even if, ultimately, the different parties had different agendas and desires. The analyses in this article deal with the triangular relations between the colonial powers, the mission society and black rulers, and tease out the strategies, motives and practices of the three parties.

European literate observers\' perceptions of African rulers in pre-colonial Southern Africa: the case of Zimbabwe C.1850-1890

No Abstract. African Journal of Cross-Cultural psychology and sport facilitation (AJCPSF) Vol. 7 2005: pp. 39-47

Oil, corruption and the resource curse

Popular perceptions of corruption, poverty and the ‘resource curse’ in the oil-rich Gulf of Guinea can be caricatured as belonging to (or falling between) two possible positions. First, the fault lies with oil companies, exploiting, bribing and otherwise abusing innocent Africans. Second, the blame lies with corrupt African rulers, stealing the oil money. There is truth in each position, but this is now a stale, unhelpful debate, obscuring other aspects of the problem. Several themes merit more attention. First, taxation in resource-dependent states is different from what is found in other types of economy. Second, transparency and anti-corruption schemes like the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative focus on revenue flows inside countries, ignoring crucially important transnational flows. Third, natural resources provoke competition and factional politics, fragmenting the public interest. These three lead to a fourth way of conceptualizing the issue–as a systemic one, which is not ultimately the result of bad behaviour (or even of ‘culture’). We should move away from focusing too much on actors and behaviour and instead focus on systems and processes, a shift that will result in different (or additional) policy prescriptions, new (or expanded) branches of economics and political science. This article does not depend on statistical analysis but instead takes a bottom-up view, based on nearly 15 years' research into oil and politics in sub-Saharan Africa, including interviews with numerous key players, to explore the dynamics of the resource curse.

African States and Rulers (3rd edition)2007302John Stewart. African States and Rulers (3rd edition). Jefferson, NC: McFarland 2006. vii+431 pp., ISBN: 978 0 7864‐2562‐4 $115

African States and Rulers (3rd edition)2007302John Stewart. <i>African States and Rulers (3rd edition)</i>. Jefferson, NC: McFarland 2006. vii+431 pp., ISBN: 978 0 7864‐2562‐4 $115

Globalisation in African and Biblical perspectives

The main focus of this article consists of unraveling the meaning of globalisation in terms of its purpose, and determining why many Africans appear to view its goals skeptically. The study is done from a Christian theological perspective, thus the conformity of globalisation to Biblical worldview is also examined. The data were gathered mainly through library consultation. Theoretically, the study is expository and critical. One discovers that globalisation conforms with Afro-Biblical worldviews, but only in so far as it embraces unstinting love of God and the neighbour, universal justice, mercy and compassion. The world itself seems to be realising how interdependent human life is. It is, however, suspected that the owners of the multinational corporations who are drumming up globalisation, have ulterior motives. It was noted that Western institutions, represented by multinationals, have always sought ways to exploit Africa and the Third World in general. At the same time, there is the realisation that no external enemy could succeed without the cooperation of some internal enemy, and there have always been African rulers who collaborate with foreigners to exploit the continent. It is explained that Africa can fare better with globalisation if the leaders are ethically and prudentially upright.

China and Africa

This article focuses on China's growing engagement with Africa – a subject that has not been given due attention in African studies. Following a review of the various shifts and continuities in Sino-African relations since the 1950s, the study sets out to explain the renewed interest of China in Africa since the end of the 1980s. Africa's interests in China complement much of the agenda being promoted by Beijing. Governing and business elites within Africa see new opportunities in China: trade (growing Chinese markets for African products) and investment opportunities, ways to bolster regime stability, and strategically important partnerships. Particularly attractive for many African rulers is the alternative development model propagated by China: non-interference in state sovereignty, freedom from ‘western hegemony’, and absence of any conditions in giving aid. However, there are also points of tension. One of them is trade since the balance of trade favours China. Local industries (especially manufacturing and textiles) and merchants have been hard hit by the flood of cheap Chinese imports. In addition, the newly created Pan African organizations like the African Union and the New Economic Partnership for African Development(NEPAD) represent a challenge to non-interference in state sovereignty, and call for ‘good governance’.

The Institutionalization of Political Power in Africa

Across sub-Saharan Africa, formal institutional rules are coming to matter much more than they used to, and have displaced violence as the primary source of constraints on executive behavior. From decolonization in the early 1960s through the 1980s, most African rulers left office through a coup, assassination, or some other form of violent overthrow. Since 1990, however, the majority have left through institutionalized means—chiefly through voluntary resignation at the end of a constitutionally defined term or by losing an election. While institutional rules may not yet always determine outcomes in Africa today, such rules are consistently and dependably affecting the strategies through which those outcomes are reached.

The lure of gold: an artistic and cultural history

Table of Contents from: The Lure of Gold Introduction I. The Bronze Age and Early Advanced Civilizations 1. The Discovery of the Sun in Prehistoric and Early Historical Times 2. Egypt: The Gold of the Pharaohs and Gods 3. Self-presentation and Divine Rites: The Gold Cultures of the Ancient Near East 4. Minoan Joie de Vivre and the Mycenaean Cult of Rulers II. Europe in the First Millennium 5. Greece Influences an Age beyond Its Borders 6. The Mysterious Celts and Their Fascination with Gold 7. The Etruscans: Artists and Connoisseurs 8. Rome: From the Modesty of the Republic to the Splendor of the Empire III. Great Non-European Cultures 9. Gold in the Islamic World: Between Moderation and Opulence 10. Gold for Buddha, Kings, and Emperors: Temples, Pagodas, and Insignia of Asia 11. The Discovery of the New World: The Legend of Eldorado 12. The Gleam on the Gold Coast: The Wealth of African Rulers IV. The Western World from the Middle Ages to the Twentieth Century 13. Treasures of the Age of Migrations and the Early Middle Ages 14. Byzantium: The Gold-Glittering Bastion of Christianity 15. The Metaphysics of Light and the Demonstration of Power: Gold in the High and Late Middle Ages 16. The Metal of Artists, Alchemists, and Kings: The Renaissance, the Baroque, and Classicism 17. Gold in the Modern Age Bibliography Index

Vodou: A Sacred Multidimensional, Pluralistic Space

Abstract. This paper uses the language of Vodou doctrine to articulate its key tenets and speak to how the challenge of plurality or diversity in the twenty‐first century has been and continues to be addressed among African and Afro Atlantic spiritual leadership. Following the slave trade and colonialism's aftermath, a pluralistic vision, reflecting the harsh new global order, permitted spiritual sustainability by reconfiguring African ontologisms. Embracing pluralism through annexation of non‐native spiritual practices augmented the power of African rulers, providing them with other epistemes and access to spiritual forces they believed enhanced their position. The issue of preparing for the priesthood in a global or pluralistic society is examined in this essay through the historical and metaphysical framework that shaped the making of our societies.

Legacies of Power: Leadership Change and Former Presidents in African Politics

It was a widely dominant perception until the early 1990's that African rulers do not vacate their office alive. But even in the brutal reality of African politics, transition takes place and diffe ...

Multi-Centrism in History: How and Why Perspectives Matter

November/December 2004 · Historically Speaking 27 a two-part concept that included the idea of the "good king" as well as the "witch king." Good kings were virtuous rulers, and promises to lookout for the poor, protect the weak, and serve the communitywere a regular part ofthe oaths that kings swore on their coronations . Their opposites were the wicked kings whoused the same powers both temporaland occult to enlarge their personal wealth and power, and thus, like the private merchants who might also participate in the occult as well as the material world, were suspected of witchcraft. The elaboration of these sorts of schemes, to the degree that they can be teased from original source material, is certainly an interesting twist on political theory and can help to illuminate other political theories advanced in other areas. The rulers ofthe African polities thatwere regularlyvisited byslave traderswerenotnecessarily just warlords, personally enriching themselves and perhaps subject to witchcraft accusations for the unholy connivance with strangers. They might be important slavers and good rulers at the same time, at least in the eyes of their subjects. Queen Njinga of Matamba (r. 1624-1663), an important participantin the slave trade, was both loved and feared for her alleged occult powers. Like manyothers, she regarded the taking ofslaves as an integral part ofwarfare, and as long as her subjects accepted the basis for her wars, they could live with their consequences for the slave trade. One might do well to conceive of the polities ofAtlantic Africa as "fiscal-military states" much as the states ofWestern Europe were at the same time. Groups from within an area grasped at local resources or long distance trade to negotiate with other powerful groups to enhance their power and to make war. European states engaged in nearly constant warfare and an equally constant search for the means to pay for it, and revolutions broke out when the two ran into each other. African rulers managed to build larger and more centralized states through similar strategies, and the acquisition of slaves as dependents was one part ofthe equation, just as the sale of slaves to European merchants was another part. If the resources ofAmerica enabled kings ofSpain, Portugal, France, and England to enhance their fiscal and military power, then the slave trade helped African rulers to increase their domestic power and expand their domains. And for them, too, revolution might be the result of too great a push and too big a distance between ambition and results, as the seductive combination of strategic designs and the means to pay for them through captives brought African rulers too deeply into the slave trading economy. When Beatriz Kimpa Vita accused the kings ofKongo indirectlyof witchcraft in 1704 for failing to end wars and unite the country, she was expressing in the terms ofthe political philosophyprevalent at the time a revulsion for the particular sort of fiscal-military state that Kongo represented. However, this does not mean that other kings in other times who were regarded as "good kings" might not make war on their neighbors and enslave the captives, so long as the wars were regarded as necessary. Miller clearlyputs his finger on the point of greatest interest for world historians by focusing thus on the slave trade, for it is a great moral issue and also one that forces us to examine closelythe complexities ofAfrican society and the state, touching as it does on conceptions ofpower and legitimacy and on the relationship between Africa and Europe. Once we go beyond seeing the slave trade as Europeans raiding the African coast (which rarelyhappened) or theworkings ofa simple "gun/slave cycle" inwhichAfricanweaknesses were cynically manipulated by Europeans, we can begin to enter into a world of complex politics that raises not only questions intrinsic to the slave trade but also to the use ofpower in general. Thus, though I question some of his specifics, I wholeheartedly endorse Miller's largerpointthatwe oughtto considerAfrican dynamics as a part ofworld history to be placed alongside the historyofotherregions. Africa has its own unique political, ideological , and economic history. Adding it to the larger picture ofworld historywill enrich our understanding ofother areas with a different combination of circumstances and...

NEPAD and Prospects for Development in Africa

To many Africans engaged in anti-colonial struggles during the 1950s and 1960s independence implied the end of the European rule and the subsequent control over governance by national elites. The newly emerged governments were expected to promote a public policy agenda aimed at enhancing the ability of the indigenous peoples to use their resources and talents productively to tackle the problems of poverty and deprivation. At the same time the end of European rule was expected to usher in a new era that would respect ethnic diversity and promote the peaceful coexistence of numerous ethnic groups that had prevailed through the centuries. Moreover the new governments were expected to remedy historical injustices by empowering the hitherto marginalized segments of the society-rural inhabitants women inhabitants of the urban periphery and many ethnic minority groups-so as to enable them to effectively participate in post-independence economic growth and development. The new governments were expected to restructure property rights especially with regard to environmental resources so as to achieve social equity in their allocation and in sustainable development. It is important to remember that during colonialism the Europeans had abrogated the property rights of the indigenous peoples with regard to land and other environmental resources. In addition the Europeans had also engaged in excessive exploitation of the continents natural resources for the benefit of the metropolitan economies. While some indigenous sections (mostly urban educated and skilled individuals and those traditional African rulers who had been co-opted into the colonial administrative system) shared economic benefits the African masses at large remained impoverished. (excerpt)

Positive Expression of Negative Attributes: An Aspect of Yor�b� Court Poetry

There are official royal bards at the courts of prominent African paramount rulers who sing in praise of these monarchs. Although it is the exaltation of the kings that dominates the bards' production, there are also traces of criticism of the monarchs' unpopular policies and high-handedness. Such critical comments, however, are not easily identifiable because they are often presented in figuratively dense language. Using the court bards in the palace of the Alaafin of Oyo, a prominent Yoruba ruler, as a case study, this paper explains how the bards employ poetic skills and diplomacy in discharging this difficult responsibility. It is my claim in this paper that the production of Yoruba royal bards must be correctly interpreted before it can be meaningfully related to events in the society. While it is true that the material of the poetry might have been taken from common daily occurrences, it has to undergo some form of aesthetic adornment to become poetry. The purpose of this paper is to unmask the bards' tactics of criticizing their patrons.

States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control. By Jeffrey Herbst. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000. 280p. $55.00 cloth, $17.95 paper.

In this important reappraisal of Africa's political evolution over an extended period, Jeffrey Herbst engages in a dialogue with scholars of comparative and African politics on the causes of state weakness and the possibilities for state redesign. Herbst argues that state consolidation in Africa has been complicated by the problem of extending authority over its distant territories. Low population densities have been a long-standing obstacle encountered by precolonial, colonial, and independent African rulers alike. It has proven expensive for leaders at the political center to project power over peoples and territories far from the capital city. As a result, rural areas have been neglected, particularly by colonial regimes, and urban areas have been favored in terms of public services and amenities.

Les négociants juifs d'Afrique du Nord et la mer à l'époque Moderne

The Jewish traders of North Africa played a crucial role in the sea trade during the 16th, 17lh and 18lh century. The Jewish of the Maghreb ports involved in the Mediterranean trade constituted a kind of aristocracy who refused to be assimilated to the local Jews. They called themselves « Livournais ». Expelled from Spain and Portugal, they kept their original language and spoke arabic and became the middlemen between North African rulers and European trading ports. They often held position of trust with the rulers.

Warlord politics and African states

Focusing on the examples of Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Zaire, this text demonstrates how African rulers hold on to power while severed from foreign aid and subjected to collapsing economies and disappearing bureaucracies.

The slave trade: the story of the Atlantic slave trade, 1440-1870

After many years of research, award-winning historian Hugh Thomas portrays, in a balanced account, the complete history of the slave trade. Beginning with the first Portuguese slaving expeditions, he describes and analyzes the rise of one of the largest and most elaborate maritime and commercial ventures in all of history. Between 1492 and 1870, approximately eleven million black slaves were carried from Africa to the Americas to work on plantations, in mines, or as servants in houses. The Slave Trade is alive with villains and heroes and illuminated by eyewitness accounts. Hugh Thomas's achievement is not only to present a compelling history of the time but to answer as well such controversial questions as who the traders were, the extent of the profits, and why so many African rulers and peoples willingly collaborated. Thomas also movingly describes such accounts as are available from the slaves themselves.

The Clinton Administration and Africa: Private Corporate Dimension

Prior to the start of the colonial era in Africa in the late 19th century, European states conducted relations with African rulers through a variety of means. Formal diplomatic exchanges characterized relations with polities that Europeans recognized as states, between European diplomats and officials of the Congo Kingdom of present-day Angola, Ethiopia, and Liberia, for example. Other African authorities occupied intermediate positions in Europeans’ views of international relations, either because these authorities ruled very small territories, defended no fixed borders, or appeared to outside eyes to be more akin to commercial entrepreneurs than rulers of states. Relations between Europe and these authorities left much more room for proxies and ancillary groups. Missionaries, explorers, and chartered companies commonly became proxies through which strong states in Europe pursued their relations with these African authorities. So too now, stronger states in global society increasingly contract out to private actors their relations toward Africa’s weakest states. Especially in the United States, but also in Great Britain and South Africa, officials show a growing propensity to use foreign firms, including military service companies, as proxies to exercise influence in small, very poor countries where strategic and economic interests are limited. This privatized foreign policy affects the worst-off parts of Africa—states like Angola, the Central African Republic, Liberia, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone—where formal state institutions have collapsed, often amidst long-term warfare and disorder.

The Clinton Administration and Africa: Private Corporate Dimension

Prior to the start of the colonial era in Africa in the late 19th century, European states conducted relations with African rulers through a variety of means. Formal diplomatic exchanges characterized relations with polities that Europeans recognized as states, between European diplomats and officials of the Congo Kingdom of present-day Angola, Ethiopia, and Liberia, for example. Other African authorities occupied intermediate positions in Europeans’ views of international relations, either because these authorities ruled very small territories, defended no fixed borders, or appeared to outside eyes to be more akin to commercial entrepreneurs than rulers of states. Relations between Europe and these authorities left much more room for proxies and ancillary groups. Missionaries, explorers, and chartered companies commonly became proxies through which strong states in Europe pursued their relations with these African authorities. So too now, stronger states in global society increasingly contract out to private actors their relations toward Africa’s weakest states. Especially in the United States, but also in Great Britain and South Africa, officials show a growing propensity to use foreign firms, including military service companies, as proxies to exercise influence in small, very poor countries where strategic and economic interests are limited. This privatized foreign policy affects the worst-off parts of Africa—states like Angola, the Central African Republic, Liberia, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone—where formal state institutions have collapsed, often amidst long-term warfare and disorder.