Afghan Security Forces Research Articles

Human costs of the Afghanistan war

The war in Afghanistan has been the longest war in United States history. This article argues that from the beginning of the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001, the US conduct of the war posed great dangers for Afghan civilians. It distinguishes between three phases, each of which held distinct risks for civilians. The first phase, from late 2001 to 2009, was marked by the fight against al Qaeda and insurgent forces; the second phase, from 2009- 2010, by counterinsurgency; and the third phase by the transition of security responsibilities from NATO to Afghan security forces. While risk transfer clearly marked the first and third phases, civilians also suffered during the second phase, when the US put a primacy on civilian protection. We argue that neglecting civilian protection has not only been morally problematic but also risks undermining the Western goal of ensuring that Afghanistan will no longer pose a threat to international security.

The dis/embodiment of persuasive military discourse

Persuasive discourse is a fundamental aspect of contemporary asymmetric warfare where the power of military technologies has been displaced by the need for all parties to a conflict to persuade others to act in accordance with particular war aims. Here we suggest that persuasive military discourse evokes corporeality, transforming armies and enemies into individuals, and utilizing powerful corporeal imagery to fantasize ideals or imagine threats. This article investigates the use of the body as a tool of persuasion through an analysis of NATO Psychological Operations materials used in Afghanistan. These materials are primarily used to persuade the local population and Afghan security forces of particular courses of action, whilst simultaneously seeking to dissuade, disrupt and deter Taliban forces. Such an investigation not only offers insights into the ways in which the body becomes a site for political ideals, truths and imaginings but also the extent to which this process masks the lived bodily reality of war.

Better Off Forgetting? Essays on Archives, Public Policy and Collective Memory (review)

Reviewed by: Better Off Forgetting? Essays on Archives, Public Policy and Collective Memory T. Stephen Henderson Better Off Forgetting? Essays on Archives, Public Policy and Collective Memory edited by Cheryl Avery and Mona Holmlund. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010, 240 pp. Paper $24.95, Cloth $55.00. The topics covered in this book probably strike most people, even many academics, as dull and unimportant, yet some of the liveliest public debates in Canada in recent years revolve around records management and public access to government documents. Scandals over party kickbacks from government advertising and the alleged willful blindness of diplomats and military commanders to detainee abuse by Afghan security forces helped trigger federal elections; aboriginal land claims and treaty rights rely to a great extent on the interpretation of archival sources and have the potential to reorder economic and social relationships; and thousands of genealogists and academics joined forces to fight for access to century-old census forms. Archival issues are not as far removed from the public conscience as one might imagine. Cheryl Avery and Mona Holmlund present us with 11 essays on funding, privacy/access, digital media, accountability, and records management that suggest a field not at all rooted in “old dusty paper.” Indeed, the striking thing about this collection is the absence of “traditional” archival roles. None of the contributors gives much attention to questions of acquisition or description of materials, for example. This probably is a reflection of the new demands made of archivists, but one hopes that someone is still writing useful finding aids. The collection begins, understandably, with two chapters on the chronic underfunding of government archives. Marion Beyea explores the recent history of Ottawa’s modest support for national and provincial archives ($2.8 million in 1986 and declining steadily in real terms). Shelley Sweeney examines archives’ share of public “Heritage” dollars, which also flow to libraries and museums. Sweeney and Beyea view the archives’ relationship with libraries and museums as adversarial yet it is governments, not other “cultural institutions,” that are the villains of the budget story. Terry Eastwood argues that the job of keeping governments honest ought to fall, at least in part, to archivists. He approvingly cites a scholar who suggests that archivists need “investigative powers and a records audit role” (p. 152), though this may be the place of auditors and commissions of inquiry. Similarly, Tom Nesmith envisions archivists selecting and analyzing records and presenting their findings to policy-makers and the public. Surely these tasks are better performed by professional historians and public historians? Moreover, archives can present just a fraction of their holdings in sexy, decontextualized installations, either online or on site. Tom Adami and Martha Hunt’s chapter, based on their work preserving the evidence collected for the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, should be read by archivists dealing with Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission and other such inquiries. Adami and Hunt caution against amalgamating evidence, for example, as incriminating testimony for one case might be exculpatory for another (pp. 209–10). Former journalist Robert Steiner closes the volume with a well-written but ultimately naïve piece, in which he argues that “greatness [in journalism or politics] is a matter to which the archivist—with her instincts for the qualities of an authentic source—is uniquely attuned” (p. 216). Steiner does not say what archivists should do with the merely average sources in their collections. The issues of privacy, access, and the moving target of things digital are explored with greater success. Joann Munn Gafuik provides a useful discussion of access-to-information legislation and reminds us of bureaucrats’ ability to adapt to the new rules. Some, such the notorious Chuck Guité, may generate fewer sensitive documents, while others may articulate previously unspoken assumptions to justify policy decisions. Doug Surtees discusses privacy theory at length as it relates to generating records among those with mental and physical [End Page 578] incapacities, but the relevance for archives—even in their records management role—is difficult to locate. The strongest chapter is archivist Terry Cook and historian Bill Waiser’s engaging account of “the census wars,” the decade-long battle over nominal (name...

International Military Medical Engagement with the Indigenous Health Sector – Afghan Security Forces Medical Services

This paper presents observations from the engagement of international military medical services with the Afghan security forces medical services. It starts by presenting a model for understanding the health sector...

Campaign disconnect: operational progress and strategic obstacles in Afghanistan, 2009-2011

Success in war depends on alignment between operations and strategy. Commonly, such alignment takes time as civilian and military leaders assess the effectiveness of operations and adjust them to ensure that strategic objectives are achieved. This article assesses prospects for the US-led campaign in Afghanistan. Drawing on extensive field research, the authors find that significant progress has been made at the operational level in four key areas: the approach to counterinsurgency operations, development of Afghan security forces, growth of Afghan sub-national governance and military momentum on the ground. However, the situation is bleak at the strategic level. The article identifies three strategic obstacles to campaign success: corruption in Afghan national government, war-weariness in NATO countries and insurgent safe havens in Pakistan. These strategic problems require political developments that are beyond the capabilities of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In other words, further progress at the operational level will not bring ‘victory’. It concludes, therefore, that there is an operational-strategic disconnect at the heart of the ISAF campaign.

Presidents Obama and Karzai Detail Plans to Fully Transition Security Responsibility to Afghan Security Forces by 2014

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Fergana as FATA? Central Asia After 2014 – Outcomes and Strategic Options

After more than a decade at war, the world’s most powerful military withdrew its combat forces from Afghanistan. Having variously pursued counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategies, the invading force had not been victorious, but neither had it been defeated. The superpower left behind a friendly Afghan government and reasonably well-trained and well-equipped Afghan security forces. It also left behind insurgents, including not only local Afghans but also foreign Islamists, whose capabilities had been disrupted and degraded but not defeated. The superpower continued to support its Afghan government allies, rendering financial support, military training, and technical assistance to address the insurgency. However, after two years, new political and fiscal realities forced the superpower to cease its support. Afghanistan descended into civil war, in which Islamic extremists prevailed. In return for their support, the new Islamist government repaid its foreign jihadist allies with safe haven, which they used to train and plan attacks against the United States, among others. They also destabilized Afghanistan’s neighbors, creating conditions in which violent extremism thrived. To the north of Afghanistan, violent extremist organizations focused their attention on the Fergana Valley, a region that lies at the heart of Central Asia and is shared by three states. The scenario described above began in 1989, and the withdrawing superpower was of course the Soviet Union and its Red Army. Drawing historical parallels can be dangerous, and other significant geostrategic events were certainly at work from 1989 to 1991 that affected post-Soviet Afghanistan and its neighbors. Nonetheless, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan holds lessons for the United States when it will eventually transfer security duties to the Afghan government in 2014. As B.H. Liddell Hart famously wrote, “the object in war is to attain a better peace.” 3 Yet, after thirteen years

Obama's AfPak Strategy: Will it succeed in Afghanistan?

Written on 17th January 2010, the article argues that there will not be support for a continued American and Western military presence in Afghanistan for very long, and that building an effective ethnically balanced Afghan Security Forces, improving the quality of governance, redressing the balance of power between different ethnic groups, eliminating corruption, providing better governance, bringing under control the clandestine financing received by the Taliban from donors who view America as an enemy of Islam and a blind supporter of Israel, reducing the financing provided by the opium cultivation and trafficking will take more time than is available. It advocates that the enunciated American Counter terrorism doctrine—15% kinetic, 20% diplomatic and 65% economic—should be applied in practice with money being spent on creation of employment opportunities in proportion to the $100 billion budgeted for the military effort after the troop increase of 30,000 announced by President Obama. Reconciliation with the Taliban and offering them a share of power after having reduced their support base by providing employment and economic opportunities to the Taliban foot soldiers offers the only solution within the available time frame. Welcoming the emphasis on protecting the population as the basic thrust of military activity it suggests that this must be accompanied by military action to clear and hold selected areas traditionally regarded as Taliban strongholds and that in such areas good governance must be quickly established to further the winning of “hearts and minds” among a people who have over the centuries survived by picking the winning side.

Skill sets and competencies for the modern military surgeon: Lessons from UK military operations in Southern Afghanistan

Introduction British military forces remain heavily committed on combat operations overseas. UK military operations in Afghanistan (Operation HERRICK) are currently supported by a surgical facility at Camp Bastion, in Helmand Province, in the south of the country. There have been no large published series of surgical workload on Operation HERRICK. The aim of this study is to evaluate this information in order to determine the appropriate skill set for the modern military surgical team. Method A retrospective analysis of operating theatre records between 1st May 2006 and 1st May 2008 was performed. Data was collated on a monthly basis and included patient demographics, operation type and time of operation. Results During the study period 1668 cases required 2210 procedures. Thirty-two per cent were coalition forces (ISAF), 27% were Afghan security forces (ANSF) and 39% were civilians. Paediatric casualties accounted for 14.7% of all cases. Ninety-three per cent of cases were secondary to battle injury and of these 51.3% were emergencies. The breakdown of procedures, by specialty, was 66% (1463) orthopaedic, 21% (465) general surgery, 6% (139) head and neck, 5% (104) burns surgery and a further 4% (50) non-battle, non-emergency procedures. There was an almost twofold increase in surgical workload in the second year (1103 cases) compared to the first year of the deployment (565 cases, p < 0.05). Discussion Surgical workload over the study period has clearly increased markedly since the initial deployment of ISAF forces to Helmand Province. A 6-week deployment to Helmand Province currently provides an equivalent exposure to penetrating trauma as 3 years trauma experience in the UK NHS. The spectrum of injuries seen and the requisite skill set that the military surgeon must possess is outside that usually employed within the NHS. A number of different strategies; including the deployment of trainee specialist registrars to combat hospitals, more focused pre-deployment military surgery training courses, and wet-laboratory work are proposed to prepare for future generations of surgeons operating in conflict environments.

A new approach to Afghanistan

A request by military commanders for more troops will bring to a head a growing debate about the West's purpose and strategy in Afghanistan. Allegations that the presidential election was rigged have seriously undermined current policy. There are indications of a new approach that will place less emphasis on combat while maintaining a commitment to empower Afghan leaders and train Afghan security forces, while putting the military focus on targeting al-Qaeda.

Die neue US-Strategie für Afghanistan und Pakistan

S&F Sicherheit und Frieden , Seite 251 - 259

Reflections on medical aspects of ISAF IX in Afghanistan

This paper is a personal review of my experience as the Medical Adviser in the NATO Headquarters of International Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan from August 2006 to February 2007. It is in 5 sections, medical plans and operations, clinical issues, supporting the Afghan Security Forces Medical Services, supporting Health Sector Reconstruction and Development and preventive medicine. It concludes with a short summary of personal lessons.

Privatizing war and security in Afghanistan: Future or dead end?

An assessment of the employment of mercenaries in Afghanistan gives mixed results. U.S. armed forces appear to have been happy with the Afghan Security Forces and ad hoc militias and only replaced them because of political reasons or because they felt that they were no longer needed. By contrast, the work of private security companies seems to have satisfied few. While in the short term no practical alternative to their use existed, it is not obvious that this option saves any money to the governments involved in the medium and long-term. Moreover, private security contractors are not subject to the control of military authorities, nor to military discipline. Their record of abusive behavior is indisputable and probably played a significant role in alienating the Afghan public. Unless much changes, the potential of private security companies in peacekeeping does not appear to be a bright one.

Averting failure in Afghanistan

The current US and NATO strategy in Afghanistan involves establishing security with a light footprint. However, the deteriorating security environment demonstrates that this strategy has not been s...

Building Democracy After Conflict: Bullets, Ballots, and Poppies in Afghanistan

Abstract: Mid-course policy adjustments along with building momentum produced progress on key nation-building pillars in Afghanistan by late 2004. A wider role for U.S. and international forces, the growing size of the Afghan security forces, and the diminution of the warlords have combined to gradually increase security. Initially slow reconstruction has picked up the pace, but serious questions remain about the structure of international assistance delivery in post-conflict situation. State-building has seen the most progress, as the graduated transition envisioned by the Bonn Accords continues to achieve important individual targets, such as the January 2004 constitution and October 2004 presidential elections. Important challenges loom for 2005, most notably the persistent anti-Western insurgency, continuing presence of warlords and their militias, booming opium economy, and complex parliamentary elections.