Determining who is a public figure under the actual malice rule of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan1 has troubled courts more than 20 years, despite the guidance provided by the U.S. Supreme Court. In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Bulls,2 public figures were said to be intimately involved the resolution of important public questions or [who], by reason of their fame, shape events areas of concern to at large. After Bulls, distinguishing public from private persons sometimes was as difficult as trying to nail a jellyfish to the wall,3 and Gertz v. Roben Welch, Inc.,4 the Supreme Court provided a more elaborate discussion of the public figure concept. For the most part, the Gertz court reasoned, public figures have assumed roles of especial promience the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures all purposes. More commonly ... public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. Therefore, under Gertz, a plaintiff a defamation action may be classified as a public figure on either of two bases. Someone who voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy becomes a limited-purpose public figure discussion relating to that controversy. But if the plaintiff has fame or the community, and pervasive involvement the affairs of he becomes a public figure for all purposes and all contexts. This division of public figures still left some questions unanswered. In discussing pervasive (also known as all-purpose and general-purpose) public figures, example, the Gertz court referred to community and society without defining those terms. Is national fame required or is enough? What is meant by society? If, as one court has reasoned, the plaintiff must be a celebrity or a household word,5 the question becomes in which household? The Supreme Court has done little to clarify those issues, other than to express a preference the limited-purpose classification over the all-purpose designation,6 and to indicate that only a small group of individuals should be general-purpose public figures.7 A few cases support the view that an all-purpose public figure must have great prominence.8 After Gertz, however, lower courts have ruled consistently that national is not required. Decisions discussed below indicate that a plaintiff could become a or a topical pervasive public figure. 1) The Local Public Figure. In examining the plaintiffs status Gertz, the Supreme Court observed that he was not well known to the local population.' Therefore, lower courts have concluded that an all-purpose public figure need not have national fame. Instead, they have focused on whether the plaintiff had achieved general fame or where the defamation was published or where the events relating to the lawsuit occurred. Thus, plaintiffs have been pervasive public figures within states and even counties. In Williams v. Pasma,16 example, a political figure and author brought suit over a press release accusing him of having been federally indicted a variety of misbehavior. The Supreme Court of Montana found clear evidence that Williams had general fame or notoriety that state. In Steere v. Cupp,l] a prominent attorney, accused of having been censured by the State Board of Law Examiners, was an all-purpose public figure because of his activities one Kansas county. No case could be found which a plaintiff was held to be an all-purpose public figure within a city,12 although at least one court seemed willing to consider that possibility. In Durham v. Cannon Communications, /nc.,n an attorney brought suit against a television station over an allegation that he was connected with a club used as a front prostitution. …
Read full abstract