Adverse Selection Costs Research Articles

Accounting Quality and Debt Contracting

We study the role of borrower accounting quality in debt contracting. Specifically, we examine how accounting quality affects the borrower's choice of private versus public debt market and how the design of debt contracts vary with accounting quality in the two markets. We find that accounting quality affects the choice of the market, with poorer accounting quality borrowers preferring private debt, i.e., bank loans. This is consistent with banks possessing superior information access and processing abilities that reduce adverse selection costs for borrowers. We also find that accounting quality has an economically significant but differential impact on contract design in the two markets consistent with differences in recontracting flexibility across the two markets. In the case of private debt, since there is greater recontracting flexibility, both the price (i.e., interest) and non-price (i.e., maturity and collateral) terms are significantly more stringent for poorer accounting quality borrowers, unlike public debt where only the price terms are more stringent. The impact of accounting quality on interest spreads of public debt is 2.5 times that of the private debt, since the price terms alone reflect the variation in accounting quality.

Evaluating Spread Decomposition Models with a Basket Security

In this paper we evaluate the most widely used spread decomposition models. We argue that Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs) should have lower adverse selection costs than appropriate control securities. We make this assertion because ETFs have the characteristics of a basket security described by Subrahmanyam (1991). As such, an ETF will diversify away the private information held by informed traders. Diversification of this information causes ETFs to have lower adverse selection costs than individual securities providing a criterion for evaluating spread decomposition models. Comparisons of adverse selection costs for ETF's and control securities obtained from spread decomposition models show that only the Glosten-Harris (1988) and the Madhavan-Richardson-Roomans (1997) models provide estimates of the spread that are consistent with the diversification of private information in a basket security. Our results are robust even after controlling for the stock exchange.

Designated Sponsors and Bid-Ask Spreads on Xetra

In order to enhance liquidity, Deutsche B?rse AG postulates that non-actively traded stocks on the electronic limit order platform Xetra contract services of a designated sponsor. Interestingly, a lot of stocks opt for trading with more than one designated liquidity provider. In a first step, this paper provides a panel data assessment of the influence of designated sponsors on quoted and effective spreads. We find that while spreads narrow when trading with one or two designated sponsors, further increases in the number of specialists do not necessarily pay out in terms of higher liquidity. Results are shown to differ both across market segments and across different sponsor firms with spreads being lower for firms contracting brokers. In a second step, the variation in the number of liquidity providers is used to test predictions that link the number of market makers to theoretic components of the bid-ask spread. We provide evidence that the observed spread decline is related to inter-dealer competition and risk sharing, but not necessarily to a decrease in adverse selection costs.

Electronic Communication Networks, Market Makers, and the Components of the Bid-Ask Spread

We investigate why trading costs through Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs) are lower than trading costs with market makers through estimating the components of the bid-ask spread. Additionally, we show how the composition and size of bid-ask spreads change with the market environment. We find the adverse selection cost component of the bid-ask spread to be lower when ECNs are alone at the inside compared to when market makers are alone at the inside. The magnitude or size of the inside spread is largest during periods of high volatility but smallest when stock returns approach zero.

Investor protection, adverse selection, and the probability of informed trading

The purpose of this study is to investigate the relation between investor protection, adverse selection, and the probability of informed trading. Previous research has established a direct relation between investor protection and firm liquidity, measured by bid-ask spreads and depths. In this study, we test the hypothesis that adverse selection is the mechanism through which poor investor protection leads to higher costs of liquidity. The Hong Kong equity market provides a unique opportunity to compare adverse selection differences across distinct investor protection environments, holding constant the trading platform and currency. Using various bid-ask spread decomposition models and probability of informed trading estimates, we confirm the hypothesized relation between investor protection quality and adverse selection costs. These findings contribute to the literature by establishing one of the links in the chain connecting investor protection to firm valuation.

Adverse Selection Costs, Sequential Learning, and the Within-Wave Timing of Initial Public Offerings - Evidence from Germany

This paper investigates whether IPO firms' characteristics associated with adverse selection costs, which are in particular proxies for asymmetric information and signaling, differ across the recent German IPO wave from 1996 to 2002. Theoretical research on sequential learning within an IPO wave suggests that issues undertaken late in a wave exhibit larger proxies for information asymmetries and apply less signaling (learning hypothesis). This is interesting since previous empirical research focused on explanations of whole IPO waves and hot issue markets, while dynamics within waves were neglected. In a logistic regression with early and late wave IPOs (within-wave timing) as the dependent variable, the hypothesis is clearly confirmed for asymmetric information and weakly confirmed for signaling mechanisms. The findings in the sample of 315 IPOs are not driven by the occurrence of hot issue markets, and are robust to a special consideration of industry waves and several versions of the timing variable. Although these results imply a learning process, more research is needed to generalize the findings for more IPO waves and countries.

Do corporate governance attributes affect adverse selection costs? Evidence from seasoned equity offerings

We examine the relation between corporate governance attributes and perceived information asymmetry. In a sample of seasoned equity offerings between 1996 and 2001, we find that board independence, size of the audit committee, and officer and director ownership mitigate the negative effect of the equity offering announcement on share prices. These results are consistent with the notion that investors perceive certain governance systems to better align manager and shareholder incentives, which improves firm access to capital markets.

A Dynamic Family History model Of Hereditary Nonpolyposis Colorectal Cancer and Critical Illness Insurance

ABSTRACTHereditary nonpolyposis colorectal cancer (HNPCC) is characterised by the familial aggregation of cancer of the colon and rectum (CRC). It may be caused by any of five mutations in DNA mismatch repair (MMR) genes or by non-genetic factors, such as life style. However, it accounts for only about 2% of CRC, which is a very common cancer. Previous actuarial models, of diseases with only genetic causes, assumed that a family history of the disease shows mutations to be present, but this is not true of HNPCC. This is a significant limitation, since the best information available to an underwriter (especially if the use of genetic test results is banned) is likely to be knowledge of a family history of CRC. We present a Markov model of CRC and HNPCC, which includes the presence of a family history of CRC as a state, and estimate its intensities allowing for MMR genotype. Using this we find the MMR mutation probabilities for an insurance applicant with a family history of CRC. Our model greatly simplifies the intensive computational burden of finding such probabilities by integrating over complex models of hidden family structure. We estimate the costs of critical illness insurance given the applicant's genotype or the presence of a family history. We then consider what the cost of adverse selection might be, if insurers are unable to use genetic tests or family history information. We also consider the effect of using alternative definitions of a family history in underwriting.

Welfare Effects of Banning Genetic Information in the Life Insurance Market: The Case of BRCA1/2 Genes

AbstractWe investigate whether regulations that ban insurance companies from access to individuals' genetic tests are likely to lead to substantial adverse selection costs for the specific example of the so‐called breast cancer (BRCA1/2) genes. Using a data set including economic, demographic, and relevant family background information to simulate the market for 10‐year term life insurance, we find generally only modest adverse selection costs associated with such a regulatory ban. However, for family background groups that are at high risk for carrying one of these genes, the efficiency cost of adverse selection may be significant should the test become widely adopted.

Inter-market competition for exchange traded funds

We examine how the different mix of informed and liquidity trading in the market for ETFs affects the nature of inter-market competition. We find that both the characteristics of the securities and the structures of the competing markets jointly determine the nature of inter-market competition. Given the superior execution quality on the ECNs and the low adverse selection costs in the ETF market, anonymous market such as the ECNs, attract both liquidity and informed traders. We also find that markets compete in a subset of ETFs. In addition, we find that quotebased competition is prevalent in the market for ETFs.

Trading Costs Analysis: A Comparison of Euronext Paris and the London Stock Exchange

This article compares the cost of trading large capitalisation equities on the hybrid order-driven segment of the London Stock Exchange and the centralised electronic order book of Euronext. Using samples of stocks matched according to economic sector, free float capitalisation, and trading volume, our study shows that transaction costs are lower on the centralised order book than on the hybrid order book. The presence of dealers outside the electronic order book favours the frequency of large trades, but is associated with higher execution costs for all other trades and higher adverse selection and inventory costs inside the order book.

Centralised order books versus hybrid order books: A paired comparison of trading costs on NSC (Euronext Paris) and SETS (London Stock Exchange)

This article compares the cost of trading large capitalisation equities on the hybrid order-driven segment of the London Stock Exchange and the centralised electronic order book of Euronext. Using samples of stocks matched according to economic sector, free float capitalisation, and trading volume, our study shows that transaction costs are lower on the centralised order book than on the hybrid order book. The presence of dealers outside the electronic order book favours the frequency of large trades, but is associated with higher execution costs for all other trades and higher adverse selection and inventory costs inside the order book.

The role of convertible bonds in alleviating contracting costs

Theoretical research argues that convertible bonds mitigate the contracting costs of moral hazard, adverse selection, and financial distress. Using firm-specific and macroeconomic factors of the contracting costs, we examine the extent to which they impact the likelihood of issuance and the structure of convertible bonds. Our evidence indicates that moral hazard, adverse selection, and expected financial distress costs are all important determinants of the likelihood of issuing convertible bonds over straight bonds. We also analyze the structure of convertible bonds issued by studying whether these bonds are more debt-like or equity-like. The evidence indicates that moral hazard costs do not influence bond structure, while adverse selection costs are somewhat important in determining the structure. Expected financial distress costs have the strongest statistical and economic impact on convertible bond structure.

Mature franchise systems use multiple unit franchising to leverage learning economies and sustain systemwide growth

PurposeThis paper aims to extend current understanding of organisational choice theory through examining to what extent firm‐level factors influence the growth of franchisee‐owned mini‐chains within Australian franchise systems. In particular, this study examines how the age of the system, corporatisation of management processes, plurality of distribution, levels of intra‐firm conflict and franchise system complexity influence multiple unit franchising adoption.Design/methodology/approachA qualitative methodology was adopted to gain a clearer picture of the salient issues influencing multiple unit franchising adoption from the franchisor's perspective.FindingsThe research reveals that mature franchise systems in Australia use sequential methods of multiple unit franchising expansion in order to minimise adverse selection costs and leverage learning economies derived from previous experiences in managing intra‐firm channel relationships.Research limitations/implicationsIndustry‐specific influences and differences in managerial orientations may limit the predictive application of this study to all franchise systems. However, on balance the reflections offered by the participants provide a rich and valuable source of information about the factors influencing their willingness to encourage this growth strategy.Practical implicationsFranchisors need to consider upfront whether they are ready and able to encourage multiple unit ownership within their systems. Less experienced franchisors may need to corporatise operations, minimise channel conflict and introduce administrative support procedures to ensure the recruitment of suitable franchisee candidates who will assist in realising the franchisor's goals, thus promoting a harmonious franchising relationship.Originality/valueWhereas, previous research has investigated motivations for encouraging multiple unit franchising, this paper supplements that literature by examining multiple unit franchising within Australia.

Public Equity Issues and the Scope for Market Timing

This paper tests whether and how market timing explains public equity offerings and consequently firm leverage. Prior research has subsumed two mechanisms under the market timing terminology. One is a mispricing mechanism with irrational investors or managers, the other is due to fluctuations in adverse selection costs. Using a comprehensive sample of SEO and IPO firms I find no support for the mispricing mechanism, but evidence consistent with the adverse selection mechanism. When asymmetric information is low, firms rationally issue equity to finance future investment. Moreover, equity is not mispriced when issued. Inconsistent with both market timing arguments however, issuing firms releverage through increased debt issues and within three years eliminate the impact of market timing on leverage.

Switching to a Temporary Call Auction in Times of High Uncertainty

We evaluate a stock specific circuit breaker mechanism implemented in several European stock exchanges, which consists of a short-lived call auction triggered by intraday stock-specific price limits. This switching mechanism differs from the previously studied US trading halts in that it is short-lived, non-discretionary, and there is always a trading mechanism (continuous or discrete) going. It differs from daily price limits in that trade prices are not restricted once the limit has been hit; moreover, the intraday price ranges are smaller and adjusted to the recent volatility of the stock, so that limit hits are more frequent. Using data from the Spanish Stock Exchange (SSE), we show that market conditions remain usually high no longer than 90 minutes after the resumption of the continuous session. Adverse selection costs are unusually high near the time of the limit hit, but they revert to normal levels in no longer than 30 minutes after the restart of continuous trading phase. Moreover, price patterns show continuations during the 5-minute auction period and strong reversals in the 30-minute interval following the resumption of the continuous session. Afterwards, prices stabilize. These price patterns suggest that limit hits in the SSE are mostly provoked by noise traders overreacting to new information. We also show that higher returns during the auction are both preceded and followed by more unstable market conditions and higher adverse selection costs, and lead to stronger post-auction price reversions. Our findings contribute to the debate about the benefits and drawbacks of circuit breakers by enlarging the span of these mechanisms studied so far.

Evidence on board size and information asymmetry: A capital markets perspective

We examine the relation of board size with market liquidity and adverse selection costs using a sample of Fortune 200 companies. After controlling for firm specifics, equity characteristics, and ratio of insiders, we find a direct relation between board size and equity market liquidity. Our findings indicate that board size is positively and significantly related to dollar depth but has no impact on bid-ask spreads. Furthermore, using the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread as a proxy for transparency, we find that larger boards reduce information asymmetries, but the ratio of insiders to total board members has no impact on informational asymmetries

How Do Firms Finance Their Investments? the Relative Importance of Equity Issuance and Debt Contracting Costs

This paper extends the literature on how firms finance their investments in four ways: First, we examine a much richer menu of financing alternatives, including internal sources (changes in excess cash and adjustments to distribution policies) as well as external sources (short-term debt, long-term debt, and equity). We find that firms actively, and simultaneously, use a variety of financing sources, both internal and external, to meet their funding needs. Second, we use predicted rather than actual investments of the firm to examine financing choices. Existing literature widely assumes that investments are exogenous, but in this paper we explicitly model firm investments. Third, we examine whether and how financing policy varies according to the characteristics of the investments being financed. We find that firms use excess cash and issue debt to finance investments in net working assets, issue debt and equity to fund investments in net fixed assets, and finance shortfalls of internally generated funds with more equity than debt. Moreover, we find that firms issue most equity to fund investments having the highest information costs, including internal investments and intangible assets such as research and development and advertising. Fourth, we examine whether and how financing policies in the cross section of firms depend upon firm characteristics. We find that equity issuance to fund investments is especially pronounced among small firms, high market-to-book firms, and low profit firms. The overall evidence indicates that information and agency costs play a significant role in the cross section of financing. However, models based on adverse selection costs associated with equity issuance cannot explain why equity financing is more (less) preferred in financing assets/firms with high (low) asymmetric information.

Order preferencing, adverse-selection costs, and the probability of information-based trading

Although prior studies offer various conjectures on the causes and consequences of order preferencing, there is only limited empirical evidence. In this study, we show that the extent of order preferencing is significantly and negatively related to both the adverse-selection component of the spread and the probability of information-based trading. This result is consistent with the prediction of the clientele-pricing hypothesis that dealers (brokers) selectively purchase (internalize) orders based on information content. Our results suggest that order preferencing may not be as harmful as some researchers have suggested and offer some rationale for its prevalence in securities markets with heterogeneously informed traders.

The Genetics of Breast and Ovarian Cancer III: A new model of family history with insurance applications

Insurers’ access to genetic test results is often restricted and the only genetic information that might be collected during underwriting in some countries is family history. Previous studies have included family history in a simple way but only for diseases which have no cause other than gene mutations, because then the event ‘affected parent’ contributes all possible information short of a genetic test result. We construct a model of breast cancer (BC) and ovarian cancer (OC) — common diseases with rare genetic variants — in which the development of a family history is represented explicitly as a transition between states, hence as part of the applicant's own life history. This allows the impact of a moratorium to be modelled. We then apply this family history model to life insurance in a semi-Markov framework and to critical illness (CI) insurance in a Markov framework to: (a) estimate premium ratings depending on genotype or family history; and (b) model the potential cost of adverse selection.